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Note on Transliteration 
Russian names, with the exception of place and personal names that have a commonly 
used English form, have been transliterated in accordance with the Library of Congress 
system. The titles of books and films are given in the original Cyrillic, with 
translations.  
 
All translations from German are by the author.  
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Abstract of Thesis 
 
Name of student: 
 
Anne Liebig   
Degree sought: PhD No. of words 
in the main 
text of thesis: 
98143 
Title of thesis: 
 
Nostalgia Re-Written. Boris Akunin’s Fandorin Project and 
the Detective (Re-)Discovery of Empire 
 
Since his rise to fame in 1998, Boris Akunin has become a household name on 
the post-Soviet book market. Temporarily, he also became one of the leading 
voices in Russia’s liberal opposition movement to the Putin regime. Occupying 
a place on the border between fiction and non-fiction, Akunin’s oeuvre 
challenges genre classifications along with established perceptions of cultural 
authority in Russia.  
Akunin’s first and most successful project is the best-selling Fandorin series, 
a series of historical detective novels that are set in the late Imperial era. The 
choice of historical detective fiction - a genre that is both popular and interactive 
at the same time – allowed Akunin to involve a broad, middle-brow readership in 
a critical problematisation of Empire whilst updating crime fiction for a specific 
post-Soviet usability. In my thesis, I approach the Fandorin project as a double 
detective journey that consists of two narrative strands: one righting the historical 
narrative about Empire, the other using this reassessment to counteract the 
widespread trends of nostalgia and cynicism in contemporary post-Soviet culture. 
In my reading, these two strands simultaneously embody the novelty of Akunin’s 
self-proclaimed ‘new detective novel’: a revivification of the socio-political 
function of traditional crime fiction, aimed at Russia’s post-Soviet nostalgia 
discourse, and a rediscovery of original intelligentsia values, accompanied by a 
critical investigation of the intelligentsia’s ill-fated nostalgia for their own, 
insufficiently reassessed past. Consequently, I present the Fandorin project as a 
multi-tome counternarrative to the regnant nostalgic remembering for Empire 






Lay Summary of Thesis 
 
Name of student: 
 
Anne Liebig   
Degree sought: PhD No. of words 
in the main 
text of thesis: 
98143 
Title of thesis: 
 
Nostalgia Re-Written. Boris Akunin’s Fandorin Project and the 
Detective (Re-)Discovery of Empire 
 
This thesis discusses the work of Boris Akunin, one of the most popular writers of 
detective fiction in contemporary Russia. Akunin, who became a writer in the late 
1990s following the post-Soviet liberation of the Russian book market, designed 
what he called a ‘new detective novel’ that mixes entertainment with intellectual 
brainteasers. The result of this experiment was the Fandorin project, a 15-volume 
series of historical detective novels set in the Russian Empire during the late 19th 
and early 20th century.  
In this thesis, I analyse how Akunin used the specific genre of historical detective 
fiction to engage readers in the playful re-discovery of Imperial history and culture. 
I argue that Akunin’s overall aim was to counter the widespread nostalgic trends in 
official Russian memory politics and culture, many of which contribute to a one-
sided and simplified remembering of Empire in contemporary Russia. This is an 
important task for two reasons: first, the current Russian nostalgia boom contributes 
to the return of authoritarian forms of governance under the Putin regime. Akunin 
provides readers with reasons not to copy the past, but to learn from its mistakes. 
Second, by highlighting the need for a constructive reflection on the problematic 
heritage of Empire, Akunin simultaneously tackles a problem that is highly relevant 
for other cultural backgrounds – showcasing literature’s unique potential for 








Без тайны невозможно жить. Извините за 
трюизм, но вся наша жизнь – сплошной 
детектив с убийством, точные 
обстоятельства которого нам до самого 
финала неизвестны.1 
 
No border today is as contested as that between fact and fiction. On 18th March 2018, 
the official UK Russian Embassy Twitter account mocked British accusations over the 
Salisbury novichok attacks in a tweet that called for the help of Agatha Christie’s 
Hercules Poirot: 
 
Figure 1 Russian Embassy UK Tweet  
(Russian Embassy UK, Twitter post, March 18, 2018, 2:54 a.m. [accessed 20 February 2020]) 
By implying that the Skripal affair was nothing but a fabricated mystery tale, the 
Embassy spokesteam chose to view politics as a spectacle, best scrutinised through the 
prism of popular fiction. In the age of fake news and international disinformation 
campaigns, the line between the narrative construction of truth, reality, and fantasy 
poses a substantial challenge for people across the entire globe. The figure of a beloved 
literary detective, used to evoke a sense of security in the midst of all this confusion, 
promises to provide the reassurance modern media no longer can. 
Yet detective fiction is, essentially, a paradox. It is a genre that is both new and 
old, traditional and innovative, rigid and lithe. Most interesting, perhaps, is detective 
 
1 Grigorii Chkhartishvili, “Grigorii Chkhartishvili otvetil na nashi voprosy,” Snob.ru, July 13, 2010 
<http://snob.ru/selected/entry/21272> [accessed 17 December 2019] 
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fiction’s periodical resurgence as a massively popular genre in times of social upheaval 
and instability. Through its ability to answer to current trends, issues, and, most 
importantly, anxieties without losing its recognisable shape for the reader, it has 
contributed to the longevity and applicability of popular fiction frameworks across 
world literature. Both classical and contemporary detective fiction carry an inherent 
capacity to re-phrase and re-contextualise the ills and troubles of a world caught in 
unremitting change, helping readers to make sense of the senseless. As the genre has 
become increasingly transnational since the turn of the 19th century, it has also joined 
strongly localised issues with affairs of international importance, helping to bridge 
cultural gaps in the process. Today, readers of crime fiction are united by the “real 
international popularity of the crime novel, which makes [them] into a community of 
conspirators”2 – or, to put it differently, into readers and writers of their very own 
detective journey alike.  
The lasting global appeal of crime stories, be they in written or in televised form, 
prompted Lee Horsley to speak of a late 20th-century ‘wound-culture’, i.e. a world 
characterised by a “pervasive fascination with the spectacle of the traumatized body”3. 
However, contemporary crime fiction writers have begun to compose their stories not 
only on the bodies of individuals, but on entire body politics. Postmodern crime 
authors in particular have successfully addressed the “perceived loss of collective and 
social structures, the loss of biographic certainties and the fragmentation of life 
stories”4 that inform the fabric of reality across modern societies. As a result, the 
perception of crime fiction’s primary function has also changed: in the 21st century, 
the genre no longer serves to restore the illusion of a stable social contract, but to 
disrupt whatever binary conceptions of reality are in place and uncover ways of 
overcoming them. Thus, the Russian Embassy’s tweet appears in dire need of a 
methodological update: not only would Poirot’s easy, early 20th-century answers fail 
to satisfy the demands of a postmodern readership, but his style of detection would 
 
2 Eva Erdmann and Fiona Fincannon, “Nationality International: Detective Fiction in the Late Twentieth 
Century,” in Investigating Identities: Questions of Identity in Contemporary International Crime 
Fiction, eds. Marieke Krajenbrink and Kate M. Quinn (Amsterdam, New York: Rodopi, 2009): 11-27, 
16. On the topic of crime fiction’s transnationality, cf. Vivien Miller and Helen Oakley, Cross-Cultural 
Connections in Crime Fictions (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 
3 Lee Horsley, Twentieth-Century Crime Fiction (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2005), 117.  
4 Erdmann and Fincannon, “Nationality International,” 20.  
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also tragically pale in comparison to that of detective hero figures from contemporary 
crime fiction – many of whom now carry Russian credentials. Erast Petrovich 
Fandorin, protagonist of the eponymous and best-selling Fandorin series, is one such 
contestant for the role: created in 1998 and hero of altogether 15 historical detective 
novels, four film adaptations and one play, Fandorin has become one of Russia’s most 
recognisable literary exports since the end of the Soviet Union. His creator, Boris 
Akunin – whose real identity remained shrouded in secrecy for close to a year, and 
who was eventually revealed to be former literary critic and Japanese scholar Grigory 
Shalvovich Chkhartishvili – struck gold with a detective fiction project set in the late 
Imperial period, which allowed him to likewise turn into a writer of international 
renown. 
 
Detective Literature, National Identity, and Post-Soviet Nostalgia 
Akunin’s success on the post-Soviet book market was no isolated case. Following the 
break-up of the Soviet Union, detective fiction made a dizzying ascent to the pinnacle 
of Russian popular fiction: “By 1995, there were six Russian detektiv authors in the 
top ten category [of bestseller lists]. In 1996, crime fiction displaced all other genres 
from the top ten”5. The correspondent number of book sales should not be 
underestimated, given that “publishing [was] the second largest industry in Russia 
[…], surpassed only by vodka”6. This success continued to hold well into the 21st 
century, where crime and detective fiction still enjoy immense popularity among 
Russian readers. Whence this sudden rise in popularity? 
The post-Soviet detektiv was born into a period of immense political, economic, 
and social upheaval – as is characteristic of the genre. Scholars generally refer to the 
immediate post-Soviet years as a period of far-reaching identity issues for the Russian 
public; Susan Larsen, for example, talked of the “tattered post-Soviet fabric of Russian 
national identity”7, whereas Evgeny Dobrenko and Mark Lipovetsky compiled the 
modest list of “the trauma of all Soviet history, […] of Russian history seen in its 
 
5 Anna L. Shparberg, “Issues in Collecting Post-Soviet Crime Fiction in Academic Libraries,” Slavic & 
East European Information Resources 10, no. 4 (2009): 291-303, 292. 
6 Helena Goscilo, “Big-Buck Books: Pulp Fiction in Post-Soviet Russia, 1999-2000,” The Harriman 
Review 12 (1999/2000): 6-24, 7. 
7 Susan Larsen, “National Identity, Cultural Authority, and the Post-Soviet Blockbuster: Nikita 
Mikhailkov and Aleksei Balabanov,” Slavic Review 62, no. 3 (2003): 491-511, 493. 
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entirety; […] the breakdown of the Soviet symbolic and social order in the 1990s, [and] 
the trauma of everyday existence, which often seems endless and immutable”8, along 
with Russia’s “ancient traumatic consciousness of inadequacy before Europe”9 as 
some of the challenges faced by the post-collapse populace. Other scholars, such as 
Helena Goscilo and Rosalind Marsh, added that “the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
constituted a mass/national trauma inevitably entailing dispossession of the collective 
identity”10, and that “[a]fter the fall of the Soviet Union many Russians experienced a 
traumatic crisis of political, moral and spiritual identity”11. Also nicknamed the ‘wild 
nineties’ (‘лихие 90-е’), the years following the break-up of the Soviet Union became 
synonymous with the idea of an unstable reality. 
Whereas literature and the arts generally play a formative role in the everyday 
construction of national identities, detective fiction is a particularly prominent genre 
in times of identitary crises.12 Christoph Jürgensen sees a direct link between “a search 
for identity with detective work”13, whereas John Scaggs stresses that crime fiction 
“emphasises at every turn […] the clear parallels between reading, detection, and 
interpretation”14. By involving readers in the creation of the text, detective fiction turns 
itself into an inherently questioning genre that actively invites, rather than repudiates, 
readerly participation and self-reflexion.15 As crime fiction supports the application of 
literary frameworks to its readers’ extratextual reality, it simultaneously highlights the 
often flimsy barrier between fact and fiction.  
Detective fiction’s close relationship with both epistemological and ontological 
concerns, embodied in and perpetuated by the “drive to make the unintelligible 
 
8 Evgeny Dobrenko and Mark Lipovetsky, “The Burden of Freedom: Russian Literature After 
Communism,” in Russian Literature Since 1991, eds. E. A. Dobrenko and M. N. Lipovetsky 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2015): 1-20, 10. 
9 Evgeny Dobrenko, “Utopias of Return: Notes on (post-)Soviet Culture and Its Frustrated (post-) 
Modernisation,” Studies in East European Thought 63, no. 2 (2011): 159-71, 163. 
10 Helena Goscilo, “Narrating Trauma,” in Russian Literature Since 1991, 167-88, 169. 
11 Rosalind Marsh, Literature, History and Identity in Post-Soviet Russia, 1991-2006 (Oxford: P. Lang, 
2007), 494. 
12 Cf. Bhikhu C. Parekh, A New Politics of Identity: Political Principles for an Interdependent World 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 96. 
13 ‘in denen Identitätssuche und Detektivarbeit kurzgeschlossen werden’. Christoph Jürgensen, “Keine 
Ordnung. Nirgends,” Zeitschrift Für Literaturwissenschaft Und Linguistik 38, no. 1 (2008): 118-37, 
122. 
14 John Scaggs, Crime Fiction (London: Routledge, 2005), 143. 
15 Cf. Roland Barthes, The Pleasure of the Text (New York: Hill and Wang, 1975) for Barthes’s 
distinction between readerly and writerly texts. 
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intelligible”16, offers one explanation for detective literature’s ongoing popularity – 
particularly in post-Soviet Russia, where “history, and especially historical fiction, has 
a significant role to play in articulating a post-Soviet national identity”17. As Duncan 
Bell reminds us, in order “to mould a national identity […] it is necessary to have an 
understanding of oneself as located in a temporally extended narrative”18 – yet the 
events of 1991 not only upended historical certainties, but also “forced masses of 
ordinary Russians to experience the discontinuity of historical time as a matter of daily 
routine”19. As the riddle of Russia’s history became one of the biggest stumbling 
blocks on the way to formulating a coherent sense of national identity, post-Soviet 
detective fiction likewise discovered identity and history as two key terms in the 
further development for its plotlines. 
For an analysis of the post-Soviet identity search carried out through literature, it 
is necessary to add a third term to this framework: the notion of nostalgia. This is 
essential for two main reasons: first of all, national identity – from a methodological 
point of view – is too vast and too nebulous a term to deal with in any literary analysis. 
Jean-François Bayart provided a useful summary of this problem in the astute 
observation that 
[…] there is no such thing as identity, only operational acts of identification. The identities we talk 
about so pompously, as if they existed independently of those who express them, are made (and 
unmade) only through the mediation of such identificatory acts.20 
 
I therefore propose to view the backwards-oriented thinking encapsulated in nostalgia 
as one such operational act of identification, which helps to break down the unwieldy 
topic of national identity into a manageable unit. At the same time, this approach 
allows a focus on specific points of nostalgic reflection along a timeline of imagined 
past stability – giving voice to identificatory desires on both an individual and a 
national level.  
 
16 Scaggs, Crime Fiction, 16.  
17 Stephen Lovell, The Russian Reading Revolution: Print Culture in the Soviet and Post-Soviet Eras 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 137. 
18 Duncan Bell, “Mythscapes: Memory, Mythology, and National Identity,” British Journal of Sociology 
54, no. 1 (2003): 63-81, 69. 
19 Dina Khapaeva, “Historical Memory in Post-Soviet Gothic Society,” Social Research 76, no. 1 
(2009): 359-394, 364. 




The second reason for the inclusion of nostalgia in this thesis is that literature often 
plays an active role in the mediation of nostalgia, as “[l]iterary works are memory-
productive and memory-reflexive, and often, like a reversible figure, 
simultaneously”21. More importantly, many literary “depictions of imagined 
homelands […] represent an effort less to recover a body of ancestral wisdom effaced 
by imperialism than to translate a community’s various longings and aspirations into 
a set of common goals and ideals”22 – a creation of that which we wish we had 
possessed, rather than an exploration of that which we really did call our own. This is 
certainly the case in the Russian context, where a veritable nostalgia boom has taken 
hold of the national identity debate since the early 1990s. 
The fact that Russia did witness the beginning of a nostalgic craze in the early 
1990s is not in itself a unique phenomenon. Liudmila Mazur has traced the 
international proliferation of nostalgic trends across the globe in the latter half of the 
20th century, linking their widespread appearance to a post-traumatic shock disorder.23 
I agree that the troubled global history of the 20th century unleashed events that drew 
many a national identity into question, and consequently awakened a desire for a 
reinterpretation of the past that would provide a sense of safety and stability – not just 
within Russia, but across the globe. Worldwide ideological wars and the break-up of 
state constellations raised the question of how to define, construct, or even justify a 
national sense of identity in the aftermath of border-transcending society breakdowns 
and historical horrors. A desire to rid oneself of one’s national history collided with 
the realisation of the impossibility of such an undertaking. Globalisation, the 
internationalisation of political entities, the expansion of the global market, and the 
transgression of cultural borders further helped to corrode traditional frameworks of 
identification; nostalgia, in effect, became a symptom of both progress and crisis.24  
However, the post-Soviet nostalgic boom was not only born into a set of much 
more complex circumstances, but it was also, like all “[d]ebates on national identity 
 
21 Astrid Erll, Memory in Culture (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 151. 
22 John J. Su, Ethics and Nostalgia in the Contemporary Novel (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005), 19. 
23 Cf. Liudmila Mazur, “Golden Age Mythology and the Nostalgia of Catastrophes in Post-Soviet 
Russia,” Canadian Slavonic Papers 57, no. 3-4 (2015): 1-26. 
24 Cf. Katharina Niemeyer, Media and Nostalgia Yearning for the Past, Present and Future 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 2. 
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[…] never politically innocent”25. Instead, it “[existed] in the realm of political design 
in a complicated relationship with various socio-cultural factors”26, and has, as a result, 
produced “unusual, maybe even perverted, forms of memory and protest”27. Among 
other things, “the word ‘empire’ has become so ubiquitous that almost any article, 
novel, or television program with this term in its title is likely to find an audience”28 – 
a proliferation that is by no means unproblematic. In the words of Oleg Kinsky,  
для подавляющего большинства населения монархическая власть сейчас – это просто 
крепкая и справедливая власть, обеспечивающая процветание своего народа […] Для 
многих монархическая идея вообще потеряла свою политическую актуальность [...] 
остались лишь знаки – моральные (‘человеческая’, ‘благородная’) и эстетические 
(‘красивая’).29 
 
Yet the political dimensions of Imperial nostalgia are not entirely absent from this 
discourse. Under the Putin regime, the introduction of a carefully crafted narrative 
about Russian Imperial exceptionalism has lent official sanction to the nostalgic 
tendencies that started out from below. Multiple scholars have commented on the 
increasingly neo-Imperial character of Putin’s regime; it has likewise been remarked 
that Putin’s inauguration was cloaked in historic imagery from the start, drawing 
heavily on symbols of Empire.30 This infatuation with the Imperial narrative on an 
official and an unofficial level has resurrected Empire as the mythological resting place 
of Russia’s long lost identity – and jumpstarted a search for more than just the 
Romanov’s bones. 
Apart from its obvious susceptibility to ideological manipulation, there is one 
major problem with Russia’s post-1991 search for a viable national identity narrative 
 
25 Parekh, A New Politics of Identity, 77. 
26 Moonyoung Lee, “Nostalgia as a Feature of ‘Glocalization’: Use of the Past in Post-Soviet Russia,” 
Post-Soviet Affairs 27, no. 2 (2011): 158-77, 161. 
27 Alexander Etkind, “Magical Historicism,” in Russian Literature Since 1991, 104-119, 117. 
28 Rosalind Marsh, “The Concepts of Gender, Citizenship, and Empire,” Russian Review 72, no. 2 
(2013): 187-211, 199. 
29 Oleg Kinsky, “Romanovy, kotorye my poteriali. Monarkhicheskaia ideia na XXII MMKF,” 
Neprikosnovennii zapas 14, no. 6 (2000), <http://magazines.russ.ru/nz/2000/6/kinsk.html> [accessed 
17 December 2019] 
30 For discussions of the Putin regime’s neo-imperial character, cf. Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Putin’s 
Imperial Designs Are Reminiscent of Stalin’s,” New Perspectives Quarterly 25, no. 4 (2008): 50-52; 
Marcel H. Van Herpen, Putin’s Wars: The Rise of Russia’s New Imperialism (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 2015); Grigory Yavlinsky, “Putin Represents an Imperial Course for Russia: 
Interview with Grigory A. Yavlinsky,” Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 
12, no. 1 (2004): 9-12. For a description of Putin’s inauguration, cf. Elizabeth A. Wood, “Performing 
Memory: Vladimir Putin and the Celebration of World War II in Russia,” The Soviet and Post-Soviet 
Review 38, no. 2 (2011): 172-200, 183. 
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in its memory of Empire. Empire did not have one. Serguei Oushakine correctly 
observed that Russians – unlike their Soviet ‘brethren’ – never had a narrative of 
national sovereignty to fall back on after the break-up of the Soviet Union.31 Prior to 
1917, no viable national identity narrative existed in Russia, which had been a multi-
ethnic and multi-religious Empire from the 18th century onwards. Edith Clowes 
correctly analysed that European empires “had been developing a broad national 
identity and a nation state before they ever had an empire”32, whereas Russia became 
an Empire long before it started becoming a nation.  
The historian Geoffrey Hosking dedicated an entire book to this topic, in which 
he conclusively demonstrated the ways in which the building of the Russian Empire 
obstructed the development of a nation – in other words, how “Rossiia obstructed the 
flowering of Rus’”33. Although there are many interesting points to discuss from 
Hosking’s work, two of his arguments carry particular significance in relation to this 
thesis and the discussion of present-day nostalgia for Imperial times: first of all, 
Hosking looks for the origins of the Russian conflict between Empire vs. Nation in the 
reign of Peter the Great, whom he views not just as the ruler who opened up Russia’s 
proverbial ‘window to the West’, but who did so in a conflicting and detrimental way 
that turned his reign into a system of rule where “the eye of the sovereign should be 
everywhere […] Freedom backed by compulsion; enlightenment bolstered by the 
convict camp”34. According to Hosking, Peter I’s hierarchical enforcement of Western 
habits and modes of behaviour created both a physical and cultural periphery that led 
to the “‘cultural construction’ of [a] Russian citizenship [that] had largely foreign 
underpinnings”35. The separation of the emerging Russian nation into two parallel 
societies negatively affected the development of Russia’s national identity narrative 
for centuries to come.  
Secondly, Hosking focusses on the role of the intelligentsia as the social class that 
tried to breach the gap between these two parallel Russian societies. The term 
 
31 Cf. Sergeui Oushakine, The Patriotism of Despair: Nation, War, and Loss in Russia. Culture and 
Society after Socialism (Ithaca, London: Cornell UP, 2009), 10-11. 
32 Edith W. Clowes, Russia on the Edge: Imagined Geographies and Post-Soviet Identity (Ithaca: 
Cornell UP, 2011), 10. 
33 Geoffrey A. Hosking, Russia: People And Empire 1552-1917 (London: Fontana Press, 1998), xix. 
34 Ibid, 83-91. 
35 Ibid, 290. 
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intelligentsia, although Russian in origin and by now widely adopted in Western 
academic parlance, is as obscure in its precise reach and meaning for Russians as it is 
for Western Slavicists. In this dissertation, I am going to follow Hosking’s definition 
of the term, who views the intelligentsia as “critical of the existing regime, concerned 
about the condition of society”36 and aiming to “reknit the torn ethnic and civic fabric 
of Russia […] to create a new society which was both more humane and more 
authentically Russian”37. Such a definition appropriately focuses on the intelligentsia’s 
traditional position between politics and culture, along with its self-imposed 
responsibility to challenge the former through purposeful uses of the latter.  
 
The Crisis of the Post-Soviet Intelligentsia 
As champions of the ill-fated mission to reconnect Russia’s nobility with the people 
and do “service to ‘the nation’ rather than to the state”38, the intelligentsia took on the 
task of designing a cultural citizenship narrative of their own, partly because no 
correspondent narratives were forthcoming from above. After Peter the Great, the only 
attempt at designing an official Russian national identity was carried out by Count 
Uvarov, whose famous triad of ‘Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nation’ may have served Tsars 
up to Nicholas II, but never even specified what ‘narodnost’ really meant.39 
Throughout most of the 20th century, the formation of a Soviet – although heavily 
Russo-centric – identity took precedence, ignoring all nation-building alternatives 
until the dissolution of the Union invalidated the Soviet identity as well.40 Faced with 
such an overwhelming and prolonged sense of historical displacement, the newly 
minted post-Soviet citizens experienced a near-obsessive wish to rediscover a stable 
version of their past and self.  
However, the group traditionally charged with providing answers to this kind of 
task had undergone a drastic change in both social composition and function over the 
 
36 Ibid, 264. 
37 Ibid, 265. 
38 Orlando Figes, Natasha’s Dance: A Cultural History of Russia (London: Allen Lane, 2002), 79. 
39 According to Svetlana Boym, there are still two versions of ‘narodnost’ - which she translates as 
‘people’s spirit’ – to be found in Russia, neither of which actually originated among the people: 
Uvarov’s legacy, summed up as state policy, and the Slavophile legacy, which also supports the idea of 
an absolute monarchy. Cf. Svetlana Boym, “From the Russian Soul to Post-Communist Nostalgia,” 
Representations 49, no. 1 (1995): 133-66, 140-1. 
40 Cf. David Brandenberger, National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern 
Russian National Identity, 1931-1956 (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2002). 
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course of the 20th century. More importantly, it had never managed to complete its 
historic mission in the first place. In the 19th century, the intelligentsia’s composition 
primarily consisted of upper-class representatives whose nostalgic enthusiasm for the 
past dictated a “romantic modernity à la Russe [which] drew heavily on the aesthetics 
of pre-Petrine Muscovy”41. Although the late Imperial intelligentsia began to include 
increasing numbers of non-noble members, so-called raznochintsy, it still acted as a 
small elite whose attempts to build “a civic community that could become a moral and 
cultural vanguard for society”42 – although genuine – ultimately only served to 
contribute to dysfunctional ideas on how to develop a Russian nation. On the one hand, 
the Imperial intelligentsia gave rise to the belief that “only the toiling Russian people 
could belong to the nation”43; on the other hand, they also created the notion “that the 
entire multi-ethnic tsarist empire was the Russian nation-state”44. As these questions 
started to be actively discussed in the literary works of 19th-century writers, they also 
became eternalised and internalised in the self-perception of its intelligentsia members, 
who would carry these problems into the 20th century. 
After 1917, the intelligentsia’s main function became the defence of those cultural 
and intellectual traditions that they had inherited from their 19th-century predecessors. 
The efforts to preserve an independent, free-thinking spirit in society against the 
unifying forces of mass Soviet education and artistic discipline made the intelligentsia 
an undesirable element for the Soviet regime, as the persecutions under Stalin and the 
Great Purge were quick to prove. The literary intelligentsia suffered particularly high 
losses; as noted by Orlando Figes, “[o]f the 700 writers who attended the First Writers’ 
Congress in 1934, only fifty survived to attend the Second in 1954”45. This decimation 
of the original, pre-revolutionary intelligentsia simultaneously meant the eradication 
of much of their historical self-understanding and societal image.  
Vladislav Zubok eloquently followed the trail of the intelligentsia in the decades 
following Stalin’s death and chronicled the rise of a new generation of intelligentsia 
 
41 Katia Dianina, When Art Makes News: Writing Culture and Identity in Imperial Russia (DeKalb: NIU 
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42 Vladislav M. Zubok, Zhivago’s Children: The Last Russian Intelligentsia (Cambridge: Belknap Press 
of Harvard UP, 2009), 160. 
43 Vera Tolz, Russia: Inventing the Nation (London: Arnold, 2001), 15. 
44 Ibid, 16. 
45 Figes, Natasha's Dance, 482. 
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members, whose primary concern was the reformation of the Communist ideal.46 
According to Zubok, the early 1960s offered a real opportunity to unite the 
intelligentsia’s “subtle irony and stern judgment”47 with the regime’s efforts to create 
‘Socialism with a human face’. Yet Khrushchev’s staunch anti-intellectual stance 
meant that “the revival of an intelligentsia that could be both freethinking and morally 
committed to the Soviet communism was nipped in the bud [original emphasis]”48. The 
Prague Spring of 1968 completed the disempowerment of this reawakened 
intelligentsia, which developed two main coping mechanisms for its renewed 
disenfranchisement: a persistent pattern of cynicism called stiob and a retreat into the 
private realm, which Alexei Yurchak termed ‘living vnye’, a position “that was 
simultaneously inside and outside [...] neither simply in support nor simply in 
opposition [of the system] [...] in some extreme cases [it] translated into having little 
involvement with the system’s constative concerns, and even being ignorant of 
them”49. Both stiob and the practice of living vnye carved out spheres of sovereign 
intellectual activity in the late Soviet era, but they were notably removed from any 
areas of official governance.  
This disconnect between intelligentsia and state activity posed a real problem for 
the former: traditionally, “[f]or most of the intelligenty most of the time, solutions to 
Russia’s ills were state solutions: a total, systemic change directed from above”50. The 
intelligentsia wanted to be the agent, but not the executor of change. Although first 
attempts at overcoming this attitude had been underway at the turn of the 19th century, 
these had been disrupted by the revolution. Under Gorbachev, the hopeless 
unattainability of a cooperation between intelligentsia and government changed once 
again, giving the “Thaw dream of a partnership between a reform-minded political 
leadership and the progressive intellectual and artistic elites”51 new impetus. Not 
surprisingly, the representatives of the 1960s intelligentsia felt as if “the history of 
 
46 Zubok, Zhivago’s Children, 192. 
47 Ibid, 172. 
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their generation had resumed at the point where it had been forcibly arrested in 1968”52 
– only to be faced with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. In Zubok’s 
portrayal, the result of this dissolution was a wholesale disappointment on part of the 
intelligentsia, which made perestroika “the last time that the intelligentsia, as either an 
idea or a reform-minded community, would play a central role in Russian history”53.  
In many ways, Zubok’s assessment is correct. The post-Soviet intelligentsia failed 
to live up to the challenges of the changed socio-political circumstances of the 1990s, 
as the majority of them either continued to perceive reality through their established 
prism of late Soviet passivity or joined the political system, which, by 1993, suffered 
its first major setback – a crisis that was left unchallenged by most of the intelligentsia. 
Rather than come up with new ways of engaging with a new polity, the intelligentsia 
betrayed its “inability to create a brand new identity without reflecting on tradition and 
heritage”54, thus failing to fulfil its traditional role as Russia’s “virtually […] sole 
nation-builders”55. This failure found an exemplary outlet in the protagonist’s 
struggles in Viktor Pelevin’s Generation P, where 
[the] Russian intelligent’s anxiety about diminishing cultural capital in a world dominated by 
currency is demonstrated not only by Tatarskii’s lowly status as a mid-level copywriter in several 
ad agencies, but – more significantly – by his inability to produce what has traditionally been 
associated with Russian authors: namely, a cosmic, life-transforming ideal.56 
 
At the same time, many intelligentsia members chose to give in to their very own 
nostalgic predicament, allowing “postmodernism [to morph] into cynicism, effectively 
legitimizing it culturally and furnishing it with the fashionable discursive and media 
strategies to achieve its nefarious agenda”57. The loss of intelligentsia authority that 
this attitude engendered subsequently turned into a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
In 1996, Tim McDaniel commented that “the intelligentsia was always oriented 
more toward critique and opposition than to responsible construction, for which task 
they had no experience in any case”58. A year later, Masha Gessen published a book 
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58 Tim McDaniel, The Agony of the Russian Idea (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1996), 148. 
19 
 
whose title proclaimed the intelligentsia for dead, sparking a discussion about potential 
new spheres of influence for its remaining members.59 In 2009, Dina Khapaeva 
lamented the continued absence of an “intellectual or political force that would make 
post-Soviet society face the issue of historical responsibility”60, whereas in 2013, 
Birgit Beumers surmised that while “the intelligentsia was the think-tank of social 
reform during the Soviet era, in present-day Russia it has lost its meaning, its role and 
its touch with the political reality entirely”61. Two years later, Evgeny Dobrenko 
astutely stated that “the cynicism that had built up in late-Soviet times became truly 
pandemic in Putin’s Russia of total corruption, disenfranchisement, and government 
arbitrariness, and permeated all strata of society”62, while Gasan Gusejnov attacked 
the contemporary intelligentsia’s complacent cynicism as behaviour that “[excuses] 
[…] idleness as virtue”63. Mark Lipovetsky called members of the intelligentsia the 
“chief consumers and sponsors of neo-traditionalist sentiments”64, and according to 
Andrei Piontkovsky, the intelligentsia as a whole “committed moral and ideological 
suicide”65. 
Thus, the list of grievances against the post-Soviet intelligentsia is long. However, 
I believe a diversification of this narrative is in order, along with an update to Zubok’s 
claim. Zubok’s argument about the end of the intelligentsia in post-Soviet Russia 
remains plausible for as long as we consider the reformation of the Socialist dream the 
sole raison d’être for the intelligentsia’s continued existence – but there is no reason 
why a second revival of the intelligentsia, comparable to the group’s self-revivification 
in the 1960s, should not also be possible in contemporary, post-Yeltsin Russia. After 
all, the intelligentsia traditionally strove to act as a moral, not just as a political 
vanguard for society’s development, and would find plenty to oppose in today’s 
atmosphere of widespread corruption, repression of freedoms, and constitutional 
powerplay. A comparison of pre-revolutionary, 1960s and post-Soviet intelligentsia 
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responses to the task of nation-building therefore seems not just permissible, but 
actually in order – not least because the “politicization of literature and history which 
characterized nineteenth-century Russian society and the entire Soviet period has 
continued unabated into the post-communist era”66. 
Some of these literary voices have already taken it upon themselves to oppose the 
political changes that occurred under the Putin and Medvedev leadership. 
Complicitous as the intelligentsia was in returning Russia to its current, post-Soviet 
form of authoritarianism, it also remains the part of society best equipped to create an 
offer of counterculture to the public. In this sense, the cultural liberation that occurred 
during the 1990s can be seen as a second, albeit much more extreme version of the 
Thaw – creating opportunities not just for cynicism, but also for creative impulses that 
made a lasting contribution to the critical reassessment of Russia’s past and its future 
paths forward.  
 
Boris Akunin and the Fandorin Project 
Cue the appearance of the Fandorin project. Named after its protagonist and finished 
in 2018, the Fandorin series comprises fifteen highly-acclaimed ‘intellectual detective 
novels’ and chronicles Fandorin’s life and career from the moment he first joined the 
Moscow police department as a 19-year old clerk in 1876 to his supposed death in 
1918. Its historical timeline, which interrogates several key points in Russian history 
– the Russo-Turkish War, the Khodynka tragedy and the 1905 Revolution among them 
– has made the Fandorin project a tremendous success in post-Soviet Russia and a 
uniquely suitable case study for intelligentsia-inspired cultural (counter-)productivity 
in the country.  
Somewhat controversially, Akunin also endowed his pioneer project with the 
subtitle ‘new detective novel’ (новый детективъ) – combining the qualifier new with 
the 19th-century spelling of the word detektiv, which, in Russian, can denote both the 
literary genre and the figure of the detective. In this way, Akunin made a playful, yet 
bold claim about the creation of an entirely new subgenre of crime fiction, showcasing 
both a dissociation from the genre’s classical source texts, a desire to reform the sphere 
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of cultural production in Russia, and an awareness “that reality is escaping the state’s 
efforts to know it and stabilize it”67. Although Akunin’s writerly style consciously 
echoed the elegance of late 19th-century novels, his work noticeably explored the past 
from a contemporary point of view – asking, tongue-in-cheek, why his readership 
would develop a taste for crime fiction at this precise moment in time, and linking 
detective fiction’s popularity in post-Soviet Russia not just to a desire for escapist fare, 
but also to the anxious, yet excited search for a national identity.  
Akunin’s reinterpretation of the operating modes and functions of detective fiction 
answers John Cawelti’s notion of genre transformation as the result of generic 
exhaustion; in a more general sense, it also addressed the exhaustion of Soviet cultural 
thought in the post-Soviet space in general and foreshadowed the rise of popular 
culture in future discussions of questions surrounding state, nationhood, and history.68 
Akunin’s playful disregard for genre boundaries purposefully brushed away the 
cobwebs of Soviet indoctrinating thought and reactivated the pre-revolutionary belief 
“that truth can only be discovered through a combination of multiple genres (fictional 
and nonfictional)”69. All of Akunin’s fictional projects deal with this issue in some 
form or other, but the Fandorin project was both his first and, potentially, most 
experimental way of doing so.  
Critical reviews from within Russia suggest that Akunin hit a nerve with his 
eagerness to experiment – but not always a positive one. Roman Arbitman outright 
attacked Akunin’s work in 1999 as the outgrowth of Soviet ideology: 
Причем наиболее часто возвращаемая потеря […] — это, естественно, Россия. 
Да-да, та самая. Которую мы ненароком утратили и которую, слава Богу, кое-кто нашел, 
чтобы теперь вернуть нам за солидн. вознагр. Или хотя бы просто за вознагр. Или даже за 
бесплатно. Лишь бы мы взяли.70 
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He further surmised that “под видом ‘добротного, стильного детектива’ нам 
обязательно подсуропят какую-нибудь литературную недотыкомку — скорее 
всего, очередной ‘идеологический роман’, хитро обернутый в детективную 
шкурку”71. This unexpected resurrection of Sologub’s elusive, malevolent dust bunny 
as the hidden soul behind Akunin’s project may sound humorous at first, but 
Arbitman’s quotes are excellent proof for the profound scepticism that related to 
authorial premeditation, stylistic experimentation and commercial reasoning in the 
1990s. It also tells us a lot about the author’s failure to perceive the world through 
anything but a Soviet prism, and the struggles that post-Soviet Russians experienced 
in moving from the consumption of ideology to the consumption of commercial goods 
instead.72 After all, the massive commercial success of Akunin’s mix of history and 
entertainment was one of its first distinguishing marks, and as of 2016, the Fandorin 
series reportedly sold over 30 million copies in more than 30 languages worldwide.73  
Arbitman was not the only critic to exhibit the very Soviet mind-set that Akunin 
wrote to overcome. Alla Latynina described Akunin’s detective hero as “скромный 
советский Джеймс Бонд”74 and linked the Fandorin project to Soviet trash culture, 
without specifying what exactly it is she meant by that term. Like Arbitman, Latynina 
mistakenly reads Soviet nostalgia into Akunin’s novels by applying the binary rules of 
Soviet literary and political thinking to his work, singling out the fact that “Акунин 
посвящает свою фандоринскую серию памяти литературы ХIХ века. Но создает 
героя, которого просто не могло в ней быть”75 – failing to realise that this is exactly 
Akunin’s aim. Yet another critic who committed this mistake was Evgenia 
Shcheglova, who described Fandorin as “смесь Шерлока Холмса с доктором 
Ватсоном […], а заодно и со Штирлицем, и с Иоганном Вайсом, и другими 
советскими душками-разведчиками, любимчиками хомо советикус”76. Detective 
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literature is here retrospectively elevated to a favourite genre of the Soviet reader, but 
its popularity among readers is grossly exaggerated, not to mention the fact that 
Akunin himself has talked disparagingly about the Soviet detektiv.77  
In contrast, Western critics primarily focussed on Akunin’s political engagement 
in their attempts to measure his clout as a writer. After Akunin’s emergence on the 
English-speaking book market, which occurred with a five-year delay (The Winter 
Queen was published in 2003), Western journalists and columnists quickly took a 
liking to the Russian crime-writing wildcard on their shelves. Akunin was called 
“Russia’s anti-Putin ‘J.K. Rowling’”78, “Russia’s best-known author of historical 
fiction—and, quite probably, its best-known popular writer tout court”79, “the man 
credited with having created a new genre of Russian literature”80, the “virtual savior 
of Russian popular fiction”81 and “without doubt the most interesting phenomenon in 
Russia’s contemporary literary marketplace”82. However, it is not always clear 
whether these comments stem from Akunin’s actual merit as an author or whether they 
are the result of a Western desire to frame Russian writers as an alluring, semi-exotic 
breed of dissidents. By inferring, for example, that Akunin is “a somewhat singular 
Russian by arriving perfectly on time at the Mari Vanna restaurant in London’s 
Knightsbridge […] hardly someone likely to shake the Kremlin’s walls and provoke 
the wrath of President Vladimir Putin”83, Akunin is taken more as a nolens volens 
political activist than a serious belletrist. Akunin’s phenomenal success in his home 
country has also been framed in this context, having been described as “startling, since 
none of his books contains the ingredients said to be the sine qua non of popularity in 
a post-authoritarian, post-censorship literary market”84.  
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Verdicts like these are as outdated as they are nonsensical, but they are a testament 
to Akunin’s success in updating the Russian detektiv tradition in a previously unseen 
manner. They also document a widespread cultural anxiety in post-Soviet Russia, 
which reacted not just to the fact that Akunin took a formerly pulp fiction genre and 
made it sound erudite, but which also felt threatened by the way he unapologetically 
embraced a popular culture genre despite possessing a pronounced intellectual 
background.85 In the Russia of the 1990s, this was not only reason for serious 
consternation, but it also acted as a painful reminder of the changes that were afoot in 
society. After all, no commonly accepted word for ‘popular culture’ had existed in 
Russian up until the 1980s, and official Soviet literature had certainly been mass, but 
hardly ever popular fiction.86 Even the term ‘mass’ was fraught with conflict: “In 
Russia the term massovaia kul’tura was not applied to the Soviet Union – it was 
regarded as a phenomenon specific to Western capitalist societies, which Soviet 
society […] had managed to avoid”87. As a result, the truly popular was often 
subversive in nature and marked by limited availability, but by no means lowly origins.  
The fact that Akunin chose to highlight the merits of a newfound commercial 
culture, rather than criticise its pitfalls, deserves special mention. Stephen Lovell 
highlighted the boldness of this approach when he described the 1995 book market, 
stating that “publishers were confident enough in their analysis of popular taste to 
commission works of historical fiction from contemporary writers”88. Lovell’s choice 
of words is telling: publishers needed confidence to ask for popular versions of a genre 
that had previously belonged to the echelons of higher culture, and which most 
associated with elephantine works such as Tolstoy’s War and Peace (Война и мир, 
1865-69) or Sholokhov’s And Quiet Flows the Don (Тихий Дон, 1928).  
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The majority of Soviet-educated literary intellectuals and readers struggled to 
accept the commercialisation of Russia’s cultural sphere during the 1990s. Many felt 
that the considerably less discriminate commercial publishing industry was 
challenging the last vestiges of Russian cultural authority on the international stage; 
people in particular lamented the loss of the ‘thick journals’, which had served as 
important places for the debate of cultural and literary trends as well as for political 
developments in the 19th and, partly, the 20th century.89 Similarly, Russian readers 
struggled to associate mass print-runs with readability or to view themselves as the 
consumers they were destined to become. An inborn wariness of the commercial book 
market alongside a projection of “the Soviet regime’s extreme hostility to 
commercially successful, entertainment-orientated popular literature”90 was also 
reflected in the disparaging comments aimed at popular literature by Russian literary 
scholars and critics of the 1990s, who, as summarised by Birgit Menzel, were united 
in “the verdict that popular so-called mass literature dominates the entire post-Soviet 
literary field [… and] the ostentatious refusal to deal with the reading material of 
choice for 90% of the population”91. The scholars who did discuss this reading material 
often took a disdainful stance. Norman Shneidman is one such example: his 
comprehensive study of 1990s Russian literature stated that the “writer who is unable 
to sell the product of his or her labour often stops writing serious fiction and starts 
producing detective novels”92, before delivering a sweeping dismissal of all Russian 
literature written during the 1990s. According to Shneidman, not “a single work of 
prose […] will become a classic, and not a single new author whose works appeared 
in print in the same period demonstrates any prodigious talent”93.  
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(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 10. 





From a contemporary perspective, it would be interesting to hear Shneidman’s verdict 
on Boris Akunin’s work. Far from having performed a literary fall from grace, Akunin 
began as a writer of popular fiction and demonstrated a much more progressive and 
much less rigid attitude towards artistic boundaries than Shneidman did. By raising 
questions about history, heritage and Empire in a work of popular fiction, Akunin 
joined in the national identity debate that dominated much of 1990s Russian literature, 
but supplemented “those overtly political bol’nye voprosy, like ‘who is to blame?’ and 
‘what is to be done?’ [with] a new focus on the equally thorny, and even more 
irresolvable, ‘who are we?’ and ‘where are we going?’”94. His choice of detective 
fiction to investigate these questions was a logical step in an international context, yet 
a provocative one within the cultural sphere of Russia.  
The Fandorin project was also unusual for its obvious anti-nostalgic stance. 
Towards the end of the 1990s, even “popular culture in Russia [was] heavily 
nostalgic”95 – a trend to which Akunin refused to subscribe, imbuing his novels with 
astute examinations of existing narratives about the Empire’s lost glory instead. At the 
same time, Akunin embedded a new type of intelligentsia hero into this game of 
historical hide-and-seek, using his protagonist to delineate ideals for the future of 
Russia’s quickly diminishing intellectual elite.  
By choosing the late Imperial era as the setting for the Fandorin project, Akunin 
not only aimed to investigate the Empire itself, but also to question the original 
intelligentsia’s failure to unite the narratives of Empire and Nation – pointing out the 
historical dimension and context of this problem while expressing a hope for the 
intelligentsia’s internal revivification. Thus, Akunin addressed the post-Soviet 
nostalgia for Empire on multiple levels, dissecting both official, state-sponsored views 
and unofficial, cultural responses to the problem. The fact that Akunin began writing 
at a watershed moment in post-Soviet history offers an opportunity to contextualise 
his work as a result of the 1990s search for a national identity, while at the same time 
 
94 Christopher D. Ely, “The Unfinished Puzzle of Identity in Imperial Russia,” Kritika 14, no. 4 (2013): 
823-35, 824. 
95 Adele Marie Barker, “The Culture Factory: Theorizing the Popular in the Old and New Russia,” in 
Consuming Russia, 12-46, 19.  
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rendering it into a real-time commentary on the subsequent developments of this 
struggle under Putinism.  
It is therefore all the more surprising that no comprehensive study of the Fandorin 
project has been published to date. With the exception of Robert Mulcahy’s doctoral 
thesis, only article-length discussions about select Fandorin novels – such as The State 
Counsellor, The Coronation and The Diamond Chariot – are available.96 Moreover, 
the majority of these studies focus on the generic aspects of Akunin’s work only; Boris 
Dralyuk, for instance, claims that Akunin aimed to manipulate his “readers’ nostalgia 
for detective stories and thrillers of an earlier vintage”97, whereas Mulcahy discusses 
Akunin’s ‘refurbishment of genre’ and argues that an important factor for Akunin’s 
success was the serialisation of his detective figure. He further claims that Akunin uses 
the Fandorin novels to “[provide] a sense of stability absent from modern Russian 
social and political structures”98 – a view that misses the main point of the Fandorin 
project, which is to communicate the instability of imagined narratives of stability 
instead.  
Kevin Platt touched upon the latter issue when he summarised that the Fandorin 
novels’ mystery plots are  
a supremely appropriate form for historical fiction in the post-Soviet era – at a moment when there 
is no consensual conception of national history to be had, the historical mystery takes up the task 
of allegorizing not only history’s known movements, but also the search for the shape and the 
mechanisms of history and identity themselves.99 
 
Lipovetsky and Lisa Wakamiya likewise stated that “Akunin’s novels suggest that the 
social and political problems that plague Russia today have a long history in its 
past”100, whereas Claire Whitehead argued that Akunin “problematizes [not only] the 
act of reading, but […] also […] the nature of knowledge itself, particularly historical 
 
96 Cf. Robert Mulcahy, “A Not-so-thrilling Thriller: Adapting Boris Akunin’s The State Counsellor,” 
Studies in Russian and Soviet Cinema 7, no. 3 (2013): 311-35; Marsh, Literature, History and Identity, 
232ff.; Olga Sobolev, “Boris Akunin and the Rise of the Russian Detective Genre,” Australian Slavonic 
and East European Studies 18 (2004): 63-85, and Linda Galvane, “In the Middle, Somewhat... 
Japanese-Russian Mixed Blood Characters in Contemporary Russian Literature,” New Zealand 
Slavonic Journal 44 (2010): 69-87. 
97 Boris Dralyuk, Western Crime Fiction Goes East: The Russian Pinkerton Craze 1907-1934 (Leiden, 
Boston: Brill, 2012), 1. 
98 Robert Mulcahy and Helena Goscilo, A Hero of Two Times: Erast Fandorin and the Refurbishment 
of Genre (ProQuest Dissertations and Theses, 2013), 200. 
99 Kevin Platt, “Historical Novel,” in Russian Literature Since 1991, 66-85, 79-80. 
100 Mark Lipovetsky and Lisa Ryoko Wakamiya, Late and Post-Soviet Russian Literature: A Reader 
(Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2014), 274. 
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knowledge”101. Elena Baraban, who offered the first substantive discussion of 
Akunin’s use of the late Imperial era to oppose the post-Soviet glorification of Russia’s 
pre-revolutionary past, summarised that he exposes the “myths about a ‘wonderful pre-
revolutionary Russia’ and ‘people’s well-being’ before 1917 [as a version of] the past 
[whose] wholeness […] never existed”102. In an important update to this verdict, 
Stephen Norris described Akunin’s work in his 2012 monograph on Russian 
blockbusters as “[playing] with Russia’s past, particularly the Romanov and Soviet 
Empires [my emphasis]”103. However, important as these contributions are, they 
remain limited in scope and are, in some cases, outdated – highlighting the need for 
further contributions to the field of Akunin studies as a whole. 
 
Research Question and Methodology 
This thesis aims to fill this lacuna by approaching the Fandorin project as a double 
detective journey, consisting of two narrative strands: one aimed at righting the 
historical narrative about Empire, the other using this reassessment to reverse the 
trends of nostalgia and cynicism and detect a meaningful way forward for the Russian 
intelligentsia. In my reading, these two strands simultaneously embody the novelty of 
Akunin’s ‘new detective novel’: a revivification of the socio-political function of 
traditional crime fiction, aimed at uncovering the (in)validity of Russia’s post-Soviet 
nostalgia for Empire, and a rediscovery of original intelligentsia values, accompanied 
by a critical investigation of the intelligentsia’s ill-fated nostalgia for their own, 
insufficiently reassessed role as nation-builders. Which overall contribution does this 
two-pronged reinvention of the detective genre make to post-Soviet Russia’s nostalgic 
search for a national identity? This is the central question this thesis aims to answer.  
In order to reflect the two parallel narrative strands that discuss nostalgia in the 
Fandorin project, my thesis will borrow Hosking’s theory about Empire and Nation as 
a structural guideline for my analysis chapters. In doing so, I will not revisit at length 
the complex history behind the term Empire, either from a general or from a Russian 
 
101 Claire Whitehead, “The Temptation of the Reader: The Search for Meaning in Boris Akunin’s 
Pelagia Trilogy,” Slavonic & East European Review 94, no. 1 (2016): 29-56, 37-8. 
102 Elena Baraban, “A Country Resembling Russia: The Use of History in Boris Akunin’s Detective 
Novels,” Slavic and East European Journal 48, no. 3 (2004): 396-420, 398. 
103 Stephen M. Norris, Blockbuster History in the New Russia Movies, Memory, and Patriotism 
(Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2012), 77. 
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perspective; instead, I will adhere to the basic shared understanding that Empires are 
polities “marked by inequality, subordination, and difference, with hierarchically 
distinct units”104 and “based on conquest, difference between the ruling institution and 
its subjects, and the subordination of periphery to the imperial centre”105. I also 
subscribe to Dominic Lieven’s view that Empires are “by definition the antipode of 
democracy […] Power over many peoples without their consent […] is what 
distinguished all great empires of the past and what all sensible definitions of this 
concept propose”106. The revived dominance of power over policy under the Putin 
regime makes this choice doubly appropriate in its timely approach. 
The term Nation is considerably more complex than Empire and notoriously 
difficult to define; it is also increasingly subjected to ideological distortions in 
contemporary Russia. In 2011, Oxana Shevel highlighted that “the ruling elites may 
have found a way to postpone, potentially indefinitely, a resolution of the vexing 
contradictions associated with [nation-building]”107 through the institutionalisation of 
an ambiguous compatriot law. As discussed by Emil’ Pain, contemporary Russia’s 
neo-Imperial character spells out further problems for the emergence of real nation-
building processes, as the misleading promulgation of imperial-civilisational 
nationalism under the umbrella of an official civic nation project only serves to 
strengthen the ambiguity pointed out by Shevel. I believe Pain is correct when he 
predicts that “these attempts will prove even less successful than those made in the 
nineteenth century”108. 
The situation surrounding nation-building in post-Soviet Russia is therefore both 
highly complex and frustratingly fuzzy. In my thesis, I will follow Vera Tolz’s 
delineation of five basic threads of nation-building in contemporary Russia, which 
comprise a union identity, a community of eastern Slavs, a community of Russian-
 
104 Nancy Condee, The Imperial Trace: Recent Russian Cinema (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009), 13. 
105 Ronald G. Suny, “The Contradictions of Identity: Being Soviet and National in the USSR and After,” 
in Soviet and Post-Soviet Identities, eds. Mark Bassin and Catriona Kelly (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
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106 Dominic Lieven, “Imperiia, istoriia i sovremennyi mirovoi poriadok,” Ab Imperio, 1 (2005): 75–
116, 79. 
107 Oxana Shevel, “Russian Nation-building from Yel’tsin to Medvedev: Ethnic, Civic or Purposefully 
Ambiguous?,” Europe-Asia Studies 63, no. 2 (2011): 179-202, 199. 




speakers, a racial definition via blood ties, and a civic Russian nation.109 As Tolz views 
the intelligentsia as Russia’s principal nation-builder, I shall approach Akunin as one 
of the “advocates of civic nationalism, who are a minority [and the only] real 
innovators in the Russian context”110. Civic citizenship, in Tolz’s definition, is 
“formed through [...] conscious efforts”111, characterised by horizontal ties within 
a multicultural community of citizens […], who are united by loyalty to the constitution and 
political institutions […] Its proponents argue that no nation can be equated with a primordial 
ethnos claiming descent from a common ancestor. Biologically based beliefs and cultural ‘myths’, 
which are artificial constructs of intellectuals, only breed inter-ethnic conflicts. National identity 
[…] can be a matter of individual choice.112 
 
As this concept has no precursor in pre-revolutionary Russia, its use in the Fandorin 
project poses a bit of an anomaly; however, Akunin’s exploration of this citizenship 
model against an achronological timeline matches the premise of his project, and 
fittingly illuminates a missed opportunity in the past, reevaluated now in order to arrive 
at answers for the present.  
While neither Empire nor Nation are in any way clear-cut categories and an 
occasional overlapping of ideas and notions will undoubtedly occur, I believe that my 
approach nonetheless promises to yield a comprehensive insight into the ways in which 
Akunin’s work helps to address the increasingly sanitised processes of historical 
remembering in Russia.  
Structure of this Thesis 
Chapter One of this thesis will provide a short history of the development of Western 
and Russian detective fiction as a tried and tested socio-political discussion platform. 
Inevitably, this discussion will touch upon some of the generic elements of these 
traditions; however, for reasons previously mentioned, my overview will focus on the 
function, not on the form, of the genre. Following this contextualisation of Akunin’s 
work on a historical timeline and an international stage, I will outline the particularities 
of Akunin’s ‘new’ approach to detective fiction in more detail. Part of this discussion 
 
109 Tolz, Russia: Inventing the Nation, 237ff. 
110 Ibid, 266. 
111 Vera Tolz, “Forging the Nation: National Identity and Nation Building in Post-Communist Russia,” 
Europe-Asia Studies 50 (1998): 993-1022, 994. 
112 Ibid, 1004-5. The keyword of individual choice is important here, as it once again highlights the 
prerequisite of a democratic mind-set, rather than Imperial subservience, for authentic nation-building 
to occur. As a result, I cannot follow such definitions of a civic nation that rely solely on the aspect of 
territorial integrity, as done in part by Shevel and others, cf. Shevel, “Russian Nation-building from 
Yel’tsin to Medvedev,” 180. 
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will involve a short description of Akunin’s writerly persona, along with his use of 
social media that played into the transformation of the essayist and intellectual G. 
Chkhartishvili into the writer B. Akunin. An examination of the postmodernist 
principles that influenced Akunin’s work and his treatment of history will round off 
the chapter. 
Chapter Two offers an overview of the nostalgic trends that developed in post-
Soviet Russia and which shaped Akunin’s design for the Fandorin project. Elaborating 
on my initial claim that nostalgia features as one of the dominant operational acts of 
identification in contemporary Russia, I will trace the upsurge and development of 
nostalgic sentiments in both the official and the unofficial sphere throughout the post-
Soviet period. Whereas the unofficial elements of nostalgia will largely be taken from 
post-Soviet TV culture, films, and literature, their official equivalent will be traced 
through laws, decrees, and other manifestations of official memory culture. My focus 
throughout this chapter will be on nostalgia for Empire, but I will inevitably also touch 
upon elements of Soviet nostalgia, which – while not directly pertinent to the Fandorin 
novels discussed in this thesis – nevertheless play a central role in the overall post-
Soviet nostalgia discourse. 
Chapter Three of my thesis comprises the analysis of three Fandorin novels: The 
Death of Achilles (1998), The State Counsellor (2001), and The Black City (2012). I 
chose these novels for three specific reasons: first of all, they provide a spaced insight 
into Akunin’s reaction to the increasingly politicised nostalgic discourse in Russia, 
having been written just before, during, and after Putin’s coming into power. 
Moreover, The Black City was written during a time of intense political involvement 
on the part of Akunin and his participation in a protest movement opposing Putin’s 
return to a third presidential term. Secondly, the plotlines of these novels feature a 
variety of locales within the Russian Empire, providing an opportunity to unite a 
temporal with a spatial analysis of Akunin’s Imperial world-building and to discuss 
the geographical and the cultural peripheries explored in his work. Thirdly, all three 
novels feature a rich background of intertextual references and insights into the 
intelligentsia heritage, allowing for a careful, in-depth reading of the cultural subtext 
that Akunin invokes for his readers. At the same time, they function as milestones in 
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the development of the detective protagonist Fandorin, who features as Akunin’s 
alternative intelligentsia role model throughout the project.  
Each of the three analysis chapters that form the main body of this thesis will 
consist of two subchapters, titled ‘Re-Writing Empire’ and ‘Writing Nation’, 
respectively. These titles were not only chosen in reference to Hosking’s theory, but 
also with regard to the increasingly fixed, reactionary nature of the post-Soviet 
discourse about Empire, along with the decidedly more fluid and, more importantly, 
unfinished conversation about Russian nation-building. Whereas ‘Re-Writing Empire’ 
addresses the multi-focal tendencies that characterise the existing romanticised, 
official narrative for identification with Empire, ‘Writing Nation’ focusses on 
Akunin’s exploration of the intelligentsia’s nostalgia for Imperial culture and the 
established voices of literary and cultural authority that inform their identity narrative. 
While it would no doubt have been useful to include other works from the 
Fandorin series, particularly The Diamond Chariot (2002) and Not Saying Goodbye 
(2018), this would have exceeded the scope of a doctoral dissertation and might be 
more appropriate for a book project. Although the three novels selected for a 
discussion of these questions offer only a glimpse into the Fandorin project’s overall 
treatment of these issues, each of the novels analysed still provides a different, and 
differently pertinent, insight into Akunin’s treatment of post-Soviet nostalgia for the 
late Imperial era.  
I will outline these insights, along with further avenues for analysis, in the 
conclusion in Chapter Four.  
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1. Detective Fiction and the Instability of Reality  
Detective fiction is […] distinguished by the 
way it blurs the line between private and 
public affairs, between civil society and the 
state, and, more radically still, between two 
manifestations of reality.113 
 
Let me begin with a riddle: it is frequently claimed that detective fiction, in order to 
be successful, needs to be written against the backdrop of a stable social contract that 
highlights its central mystery, puzzle, or enigma as an anomaly.114 I am not sure this 
is the case. Detective fiction tends to be at its most popular and sought after in the most 
unstable of times – thus lending voice to a search for, not a guarantee of, stability. 
Crime fiction’s periodical re-emergence during times of social upheaval testifies to its 
role as a chronicler of change. Yet at the same time, crime fiction’s contrasting image 
as a provider of stability points to a central challenge that readers and writers of the 
genre grapple with: the negotiation of changing social norms amid a constantly 
evolving interplay between life and art.115 
The question of detective fiction’s role in inscribing destabilised or changing 
social contracts into reality will be my guiding thread throughout this chapter. Leaving 
aside purely generic conventions of crime and detective fiction (about which separate 
volumes could and have been written), I shall trace detective fiction’s history as a 
genre that not only directly reflects upon the state of law and (dis)order in given 
societies, but whose primary function has fundamentally changed over the centuries. I 
will argue that far from continuing to provide a return to stability, contemporary 
detective fiction primarily unveils and negotiates the instability of reality for its 
readers.116 
As this is a common characteristic shared by crime fiction across the globe, I will 
relay this development not in separate categories of Western and Russian detective 
 
113 Boltanski, Mysteries & Conspiracies, 16. 
114 Cf. ibid, 5; Maria Galina, “Outside the Law: Russian Detective Stories,” Russian Social Science 
Review 42, no. 2 (2001): 93-99, 99. 
115 While crime and detective fiction are not synonymous terms – strictly speaking, only detective fiction 
requires the presence of a detective figure – both genres revolve around the topic of a crime. I will 
therefore treat detective fiction as a subgenre of crime fiction to allow for the use of both terms. 
116 Going forward, the different perception and portrayal of reality as stable vs. unstable shall act as the 
main discussion thread for my differentiation between the somewhat generalised terms classic and 
contemporary crime fiction, which both comprise a highly diverse subset of narrative forms and 
transnational manifestations – some, but not all of which will be discussed in this chapter.  
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literature, but in a single subchapter, thus effacing the notion of supposedly unique 
features and functions of crime fiction in today’s world. In the second subchapter, I 
will then use this overview as a starting point for the discussion of Akunin’s Fandorin 
project as a ‘new’ type of detective fiction. As I contextualise the novelty of Akunin’s 
approach within the greater post-Soviet crime fiction market and a wider debate on the 
uses and abuses of a postmodernist thought culture in Russia, I will pinpoint the 
elements that distinguish Akunin from his contemporaries – and which make the 
Fandorin series a project worthy of further academic attention. 
 
1.1. From Classic to Contemporary 
For centuries, crime fiction has enjoyed worldwide popularity as a genre that entertains 
intimate relationships with the surrounding socio-political fabric of reality. Both in a 
Western and a Russian context, the emergence of crime fiction dates back to the 
establishment of official police forces, which paved the way for the institutionalisation 
of social contracts in Europe and elsewhere. Edgar Allan Poe, who is commonly 
considered the father of detective fiction, set his mystery stories not in his native 
America, but in France – presumably because the French Sûreté, the world’s first 
criminal police force, was founded a full two decades before its New York 
equivalent.117 The alleged father of Russian detective fiction, Fyodor Dostoevsky, was 
not only well acquainted with Poe’s work, but also reacted to similar events in his own 
native country: the publication of Crime and Punishment (Преступление и 
наказание, 1866) took place shortly after the implementation of widespread judicial 
reforms, which were a part of Alexander II’s Great Reform project.118 
Among other things, the Great Reforms established an adversarial system, 
introduced juries, and formed new courts; they also created a temporary atmosphere 
of confusion, which positively contributed to the short-lived liberation of the press that 
 
117 Cf. Scaggs, Crime Fiction, 19. 
118 Cf. Louise McReynolds, “‘Who Cares Who Killed Ivan Ivanovich?’: The Literary Detective in 
Tsarist Russia,” Russian History 36, no. 3 (2009): 391-406, 395. Following Russia’s defeat in the 
Crimean War, these substantial legal reforms addressed the problem of Russia’s highly ineffective and 
outdated judicial system. For more on Dostoevsky’s role in the inception of crime fiction in Russia, cf. 
Claire Whitehead, The Poetics of Early Russian Crime Fiction 1860-1917: Deciphering Stories of 
Detection (Cambridge: Legenda, 2018). 
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had begun after 1856.119 Indeed, the Great Reforms resulted not just in a remarkable 
increase of readily available information on criminal deeds and legal prosecutions in 
newspapers and journals, but also a greater degree of public participation in legal 
processes in general. Because the Great Reforms presented such a fundamental 
overhaul of the Russian legal system – with which, at the time, “there was little that 
was not wrong”120 – they were avidly discussed throughout society; whereas some 
researchers link the Great Reforms to a “growth of nationalistic tendencies”121, others 
have commented upon their role in facilitating “the rise of modern Russian culture”122. 
It is for this reason that the Great Reforms present an ideal backdrop against which to 
observe the interaction of the political with the cultural, along with the reception of 
legal changes in society and literature. As an immediate side effect to these changes, 
the public developed a strong taste for so-called true crime stories, which were just as 
embellished and sensationalised in Russia as they were elsewhere in Europe. 
Dostoevsky, editor of the literary and political journal The Epoch (Эпоха) from 
1864 to 1865, took a keen interest in these developments, and fashioned his own police 
detective figure in Crime and Punishment after the newly created post of judicial 
investigator, or sudebnyi sledovatel’. This position, which was introduced in 1866, 
effectively introduced the role of professional detective and allowed Dostoevsky to 
merge the best and the worst qualities of existing Western literary investigators into a 
single character. Porfiry Petrovich, the slightly eccentric, but ultimately humane 
policeman who appears “incorruptible, but also incompetent to bring closure to the 
case”123 serves as evidence that “Russians did not need the Enlightenment to see killers 
humanely”124 – a fact often remarked upon in studies on the history of Russian law 
and order in general, but which is also reflected in the high number of acquittals for 
Russian murder cases in the 19th century.  
 
119 For a detailed account on the Great Reforms, cf. Ben Eklof, John Bushnell and L. G. Zakharova, 
Russia’s Great Reforms, 1855-1881 (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1994). 
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124 Louise McReynolds, Murder Most Russian: True Crime and Punishment in Late Imperial Russia 
(Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2012), 168. 
36 
 
Another term used to explain the Russian reticence to trust in official institutions 
was transfixed in the label neschastnyi, which designates the criminalised 
downtrodden and is loosely translated as ‘the unlucky one’. However, the neschastnyi 
figure was seen as unlucky not because of personal failure, but because of society’s 
inherent unfairness, thus dictating compassion rather than imprisonment as an 
appropriate response. Porfiry Petrovich’s failure to arrest Raskol’nikov could and has 
been read as a literary variation of this theme. Louise McReynolds, for instance, called 
Raskol’nikov the “quintessential neschastnyi”125. 
By locating the source of criminality in society and not within the criminal, the 
neschastnyi figure indicated “a low-level political subversion [and] a cultural 
obstinacy that worked against respect for the prosecution”126. A similar process was 
observable in Western Europe in the late 18th and early 19th century, following the 
onset of the Enlightenment.127 However, in contrast to the European point of view that 
took shortfalls of law and order as a negative reflection upon both king and country, 
no such doubts about the Tsar’s fallibility arose in Russia. Instead, extreme state 
despotism tended to be blamed on the Tsar’s advisors. Several Russian rulers were 
happy to use this distrust to their advantage, Nicholas II among them: Russia’s last 
Tsar created the “Imperial Chancellery for Receipt of Petitions, designed to give the 
people the sense that they had direct access to the Tsar, where he could resolve for 
them what the courts could not”128. The only more direct way of undermining public 
trust in the legal system would have been to close the courts completely. 
Western European countries and Russia did, however, share a common level of 
distrust towards the police – and often for good reason. In the West, reactions to the 
new profession of the trained policeman ranged from amused belittlement to outright 
disdain. Despite moderately successful literary works that talked about the daily life 
of policemen in England in the 1840s and 1850s, such as William Russell’s 
 
125 Ibid, 117. This definition is debatable, to say the least. Openly portrayed as a former student suffering 
from dire financial straits, the origins of Raskol’nikov’s idea to murder the old moneylender are more 
securely rooted in his Ubermensch theory, and his wish to prove its validity and his own status as one 
of the world’s Napoleons. Although both his own and his sister's poverty act as catalysts in his decision 
to commit the actual murder, they are, ultimately, no more than that – catalysts. 
126 Ibid, 267. 
127 Cf. Martin A. Kayman, From Bow Street to Baker Street: Mystery, Detection, and Narrative (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 41f. 
128 McReynolds, Murder Most Russian,7. 
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Recollections of a Police Officer (1859), policemen continued to be viewed as 
incapable and incompetent across much of Western Europe. Notwithstanding official 
attempts to portray the policeman as a “substitute for organic, paternalistic community 
control and the Providential eye […] a master who embodied an acceptable image of 
surveillance, ideologically as rigorous but also as benign as the eye of God [original 
emphasis]”129, literary renditions of the Victorian policeman continued to prefer the 
image of the bumbling fool instead. 
In Russia, police detectives were primarily portrayed as government thugs well 
past the turn of the century.130 This is not altogether surprising, taking into 
consideration the high levels of control that many Russian state officials exerted. Cases 
of corruption, covered up or made exempt from prosecution by the Tsar, were 
widespread and often coupled with a lack of basic education as well as low pay, 
resulting in an “arbitrary and coercive operational style”131. Nonetheless, a number of 
judicial investigators strove to improve the public image of their professional peers by 
publishing novels or private memoirs in the style of Eugène Vidocq’s Memoires 
(1828). One of the first investigators to produce such a literary re-telling of his criminal 
cases was A. A. Shkliarevskii, a contemporary of Dostoevsky who paid similar 
attention to the press coverage of judicial proceedings and who later became known as 
the ‘Russian Gaboriau’.132 In contrast to his Western colleagues, Shkliarevskii never 
created a serialised detective persona, but chose to “freely [mix] fact and fiction”133, 
populating his novels with “nameless judicial investigators […], each with a different 
sense of professional obligation”134. Consequently, it was the power of an institution, 
not that of an individual, which Shkliarevskii strove to capture.  
Both in the West and Russia, crime fiction thus populated the fracture line between 
society and state from the very start. An important step in the development of Western 
detective fiction was the advent of the sensation novel, which dominated British 
literature from the 1850s until the 1870s. This genre, with its “nervous, psychological, 
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sexual and social shocks [and] complicated plots involving bigamy, adultery, 
seduction, fraud, forgery, blackmail, kidnapping and, sometimes, murder”135, catered 
to a large audience and produced such genre-shaping works as Mary Elizabeth 
Braddon’s Lady Audley’s Secret (1862) and Wilkie Collins’s The Moonstone (1868). 
By focusing on the central importance of the family as a social construct and setting, 
the sensation novel introduced an important aspect of the Victorian mind-set into the 
developing detective genre: “the scene of the crime was more likely to be the home 
than the road, the drawing room rather than the drinking den […] Crime is dealt with 
in and by the family”136. This family setting not only matched the Victorian 
predilection for privacy and Imperial anxieties about the reach of Empire, but it 
actually remained the locus of most Western crime fiction well into the 20th century.137  
 
The Case of Sherlock Holmes 
The next step in the development of crime fiction was the arrival of Sherlock Holmes. 
While Arthur Conan Doyle was not the first writer to introduce a detective figure into 
English literature – Charles Dickens is credited with having been the first writer to use 
the word detective, whereas Anna K. Green created the female detective Violet Strange 
in 1878 – he was the first to professionalise the role and create an international hit 
figure in the process.138 Despite the fact that “Sherlock Holmes […] is mostly an 
attitude and a few dozen lines of unforgettable dialogue”139, Conan Doyle helped create 
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the unmistakable atmosphere of British homeliness and eccentricity that served as 
identifying traits for decades of detective fiction to come.140 Yet he also consolidated 
the view of detective fiction as a reality-affirming genre that aims to safeguard, 
“[consolidate] and [disseminate] patriarchal power”141, rather than disrupt official 
narratives about existing power hierarchies. Sherlock Holmes’s world is essentially a 
bourgeois microcosm with links to the upper class and frequent allusions to the British 
Empire – which Conan Doyle helped to keep that way. As pointed out by Stephen 
Knight, Holmes dispels the impression of an unrulable, unreliable modernity by 
uncovering reality’s supposed underlying simplicity: 
Inside the scientific mumbo-jumbo, the learned baggage, the mystique of all-night pipe-
smoking and austerely distant behaviour is someone who can apply the common knowledge 
of the human tribe. It is both exciting and consoling to have a hero so grand who is also so 
familiar […]142 
 
In essence, Holmes is the embodiment of Imperial prowess made to (pre)serve 
Empire.143 
Nonetheless, Sherlock Holmes left an indelible mark on the history of Russian 
literature. Once Conan Doyle’s works reached the Russian Empire, the fictional 
accounts of real-life Russian investigator and head of Saint Petersburg’s detective 
division I. D. Putilin quickly gained in countrywide popularity. Written by M. V. 
Shevliakov and R. L. Antropov, the stories varied considerably in style from their 
English prototype, replacing Holmes’s carefully orchestrated trademark search for 
clues with a much more action-oriented, fast-paced approach.144 Unlike the original 
Holmes stories, Putilin’s literary investigations also usually failed to lead to any 
convictions – thus reinstating the neschastnyi theme, creating a “counternarrative that 
rejected the closure found in Sherlockology”145, and highlighting Russian crime 
fiction’s much earlier preoccupation with a problematisation of the existing social 
contract.  
 
140 Considering the rather modest literary merit of the bulk of the Sherlock Holmes stories, this may 
seem puzzling to some. Critical acclaim of Conan Doyle’s work has taken on a much more diversified 
light in recent years, however, cf. Chandler, The Simple Art of Murder, 5. 
141 Scaggs, Crime Fiction, 20. 
142 Stephen Knight, Crime Fiction, 1800-2000: Detection, Death, Diversity (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004), 57. 
143 This is also one of the main reasons why Fandorin should not be compared, but contrasted to him. 
144 Cf. McReynolds, Murder Most Russian, 201f. 
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None of that hindered Sherlock Holmes from becoming a major cultural influence 
on Russian culture to come. I would not go so far as to say that Holmes “managed to 
become [Russia’s] national hero”146, but there certainly was a remarkable public 
awareness and appropriation of the Sherlock Holmes figure in Russia. After the 1905 
revolution in particular, a wealth of imitations, satires, and parodies was produced –
such as a 1906 theatre play that “finds [Sherlock Holmes] reduced to an action 
figure”147. Around the same time, P. Nikitin and P. Orlovets penned a series of stories 
that transported Holmes and Watson onto Russian soil, claiming that they had learnt 
Russian from a landlady in South America. Nikitin and Orlovets’s stories create a 
curious impression of the transnational quality of much of 19th- and 20th-century crime 
fiction, which was neither afraid to plagiarise nor to enhance existing prototypes. 
Holmes comes across as uncharacteristically deferential and polite towards both 
Watson and his clients in these stories, but suffers from a severe case of Western 
capitalism in exchange for his sang-froid: “Мы, англичане, пересчитываем каждый 
шаг и момент на деньги”148. True to the action-loving taste of the time, the 
Russianised Sherlock also engages in fights that involve brandishing revolvers, death 
by bayonet, and a highly proactive Sherlock with lightning-quick reflexes.149 In the 
words of Stephen Lovell, “Holmes had mutated into a gorilla with a pistol”150. Gone 
were the meditative musings over violin sounds and tobacco ash: the analytical, overly 
rational bent of the British super-sleuth was clearly not an ideal fit for the Russian 
reader’s taste. 
The 1905 revolution marked the beginning of a veritable craze for similar fast-
paced, action-oriented, and, at times, outrageous crime stories. Highlighting the 
genre’s popularity in times of social, cultural, and political upheaval, Russia’s early 
20th-century voracious appetite for cheap and readily available popular crime fiction 
encompassed a highly diverse readership that included workers, young people, and 
poets such as Sergei Esenin and Aleksandr Blok.151 The hype also occurred at a time 
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when the power of state censorship as good as crumbled under a general strike.152 
Following the initial surge of social-revolutionary sentiments in the 1870s, politically 
motivated terrorist activity peaked once again during the years 1906 and 1907 – 
catapulting Russian society into a state of permanent anxiety as “several thousand 
persons, mainly government officials, [were assassinated] until the government under 
Stolypin took especially harsh measures to end the wave of killings”153. Desensitised 
by this violence and bloodshed, urban Russian readers reacted positively to the satirical 
magazines and cheap, five-kopeck crime fiction serialisations that were available on 
every corner. 
As a result, fast-paced tales that gave voice to shared experiences of terror and 
crime acquired an identity-forming power in Russia, and “tapped into frustration about 
the limits that remained over the expression of personal autonomy”154 in the country. 
Subsequently, the choice of an exotic setting became a popular way of displacing local 
worries to a safe distance away, whilst simultaneously creating the illusion of a world-
wide fraternity of companions in misfortune.155 America offered the perfect 
sociocultural and literary backdrop for trigger-happy adventurers and story-tellers: 
following the creation of the Pinkerton Agency in 1850 and its involvement in several 
high-profile cases, the ubiquity of detective work as a respectable means of police 
activity helped create an international atmosphere that raised the profile of both 
professional investigators and their sensational case files. 
The motto of the Pinkerton Agency was ‘We never sleep’, represented by the 
agency’s symbol of an open eye. Allan Pinkerton, the agency’s founder, had begun 
publishing novels about his work during his lifetime, but it was only around the turn 
of the century that a fictional detective by the name of Nat Pinkerton started to conquer 
the literary markets all over Europe. Serialised instalments with easily recognisable 
cover art that told of the American detective’s exploits appeared in almost every 
country between the British and the Russian Empire, with particularly high sales 
figures in Germany and France.  
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Pinkertonovshchina and Golden Age 
Only in Russia, however, did Nat Pinkerton – along with his fictional colleague Nick 
Carter – achieve such a level of popularity as to be given his own cultural moniker: 
Pinkertonovshchina. Figures vary, but according to one source, the American crime 
stories “reportedly [sold] by the millions in Russia in 1908”156. Korney Chukovsky, 
who made a special study of Nat Pinkerton in Russia, claimed that “in May 1908 in St 
Petersburg alone no fewer than 622,300 copies of the Pinkerton books were sold”157. 
The authorship of the majority of these stories remains unclear, but analyses of the 
plots and characters suggest that many of them were Russian fabrications. In effect, 
however, “both the Russian and American Carters answered much the same 
psychological demands, affirming their readers’ desire for a greater justice beyond 
bureaucratic, imperfect, and, in Russia’s case, flagrantly unjust legality”158. It is hardly 
surprising that the trademarks of the Russian Pinkertons were a high degree of 
violence, an abundance of life-threatening situations, high-speed travel, and garish 
cover illustrations.159  
Equally unsurprising is the fact that the action-oriented crime fiction from 
America enjoyed greater popularity in inter-revolutionary Russia than the 
comparatively benign and unspectacular British clue-puzzle that was on the rise at the 
same time. The terms ‘country-house crime’, ‘clue-puzzle’ and ‘armchair deduction’ 
all delineate the basic, homely qualities of the Golden Age detective story – which, 
while often lauded as the epitome of an idyllic, comforting Englishness, was still far 
less reassuring than commonly assumed.160 Recent studies of Golden Age fiction 
suggest that the genre acted not so much as a sterling defence of conservative social 
ideals than as a disquieting spyhole into the sick British body politic. Most Golden 
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Age detective stories puncture “the elaborate deceptions of a sophisticated society”161 
and portray “a society that maintains the social order through self-surveillance”162 
instead. Golden Age paragons such as Agatha Christie and Dorothy Sayers imbued 
their stories with a heightened sense of paranoia and suspicion that appears appropriate 
for life in 1930s Europe.  
The fact that society was increasingly perceived as unstable and, in many ways, 
rotten to the core is particularly prevalent in stories such as Agatha Christie’s Murder 
on the Orient Express (1934), where complicity in the crime is visited upon a whole 
range of characters. No other period in crime fiction expressed the genre’s capacity for 
conjuring up panoptic horror through its quasi-democratic structure as did the Golden 
Age, where “crime [could] be attributed to any character at all, whatever his or her 
worth or hierarchical position”163. This is not to say that Golden Age crime fiction was 
not, in a remarkable number of cases, intentionally blind to its surrounding political 
issues and societal worries. In fact, much of Golden Age crime fiction does display a 
remarkable capacity for denial as well as an insularity of thought that becomes doubly 
problematic when considered from a geographical point of view; however, uncoupled 
from both the sentimental extravagance and the linguistic unctuousness of 19th-century 
sensationalist fiction, Golden Age detective figures did eschew the grand exclamations 
and swooning sensations produced and experienced by previous forms of crime fiction.  
In Russia, Pinkertonovshchina experienced a lull between 1909 and 1913, but 
revived under the influence of the cinematographic experiments and increasingly 
lenient attitude towards popular forms of mass entertainment that followed the First 
World War.164 It should be noted that the Pinkerton novels were well embedded in a 
generally flourishing market of cheap print materials, represented also by the kopeiki, 
or kopeck newspapers, which contained similarly outrageous adventure stories 
featuring bandits, outlaws and other roguish rascals.165 However, Pinkertonovshchina 
found itself in a precarious position after the 1917 revolution, owing to the growing 
importance of the collective in official political rhetoric: on the one hand, the detective 
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booklets with their “Westernism, exoticism, fantasy, orientation toward plot, stylistic 
artlessness, violence, [and] reactionary ideology served as synechdochic [sic] 
shorthand for the worst, most corrupting elements of popular literature”166 and were 
deemed unfit for consumption by the reading public. Most Soviet officials discredited 
Pinkerton-style literature as children’s literature, doubting it was even suitable as 
that.167 On the other hand, the influential power of Pinkertonovshchina was obvious to 
Soviet officials, who would later go on to claim that they had created the ‘foremost 
nation of readers’.  
Arguably, it was with this goal in mind that N. I. Bukharin approached the 
phenomenon of Pinkertonovshchina in the early 1920s. Trying to utilise the lingering 
Russian interest in detective stories to create a branch of state literature that was both 
instructive and ideologically sound, Bukharin harnessed Pinkertonovshchina to the 
freshly minted Soviet ideals for art and society. Theoretically, this could have been a 
success. The very shablonnost’ of the detective formula lent itself well to the new 
requirements of Soviet literature, and the scholar Boris Dralyuk called the Red 
Pinkerton “a vital ‘missing link’ between pre- and post-Revolutionary popular 
literature”168. On a practical level, however, the Red Pinkerton simply did not work, 
despite its closeness to the equally new, and possibly even more popular, genre of 
science fiction.169  
Turning villains into capitalists and detectives into working-class heroes went 
against the grain of the genre, no matter how many “mysterious disappearances, 
unexpected reappearances and heinous murders”170 authors managed to include. Part 
of the problem certainly lay in the relative sameness of the new-old plots, transplanted 
from a world of endless, exotic opportunities into the copy-paste scheme of 
metallurgical plants and steel factories. Another problem was that even the authors 
struggled to take their own work seriously. A case in point is Marietta Shaginian’s 
Mess-Mend, or Yankees in Petrograd (1924), a cinematic novel which celebrates the 
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technical reproducibility of identities via mirrors, film, and audio files, and which 
presents a disturbing commentary on the emptiness of the emerging collective self. 
Some of the novel’s depictions of contemporary cultural phenomena, such as the mass 
exodus of members of the intelligentsia from the Soviet Union, could even be read as 
subversive.171 
Only a few years after the initiation of the Red Pinkerton, “[i]t was increasingly 
difficult to tell whether each new work […] was truly bad writing churned out by a 
profit-hungry hack, a ‘serious’ parody, or an occluded but devastating satire of Soviet 
policy”172. The risk of it being the latter was too high for the majority of Soviet 
publishers, and after a noticeable drop in demand from 1928 onwards, 
Pinkertonovshchina works were indirectly banned. In the eighth volume of the Soviet 
Union’s official Literary Encyclopaedia from 1934, Pinkertonovshchina novels are 
called vulgar, bourgeois and fascist.173 The years of Stalin’s reign saw the detective 
genre further relegated to the realm of children’s literature, with the exception of a few 
early works such as Yuri German’s Ivan Lapshin (1937). It was only after Stalin’s 
death that the genre resurfaced properly, both in literature and in cinematography.174 
 
Inter-War Crime Fiction 
Meanwhile, the interwar period saw the birth of the hard-boiled detective hero in 
America. Growing out of “the stock market crash of 1929; the Great Depression; 
Prohibition and its attendant gangsterism; the growing evidence of illicit connections 
between crime, business and politics in rapidly expanding American cities”175, this 
subgenre faced a social and political situation no less dire than that of early 1930s 
Britain. Contrary to Golden Age fiction, however, hard-boiled detective novels did not 
pretend to comfort readers in a world where little comfort was to be found. Known to 
“avoid neatly optimistic closure[s]”176, its writers answered to the predominantly bleak 
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political atmosphere in the United States with a hard and unforgiving stare. By 
addressing the various societal ills of both mid- and post-war America in an explicit, 
rather than implicit fashion, authors such as Raymond Chandler and Dashiell Hammett 
helped the genre overcome the “post-war malaise [of] caution, repression, and 
intellectual retreat”177. Criminals and detectives alike appeared as rough-and-ready 
flâneurs that roamed urban spaces and followed the disenchanting promise of the 
anonymous big city, calling to mind Poe’s The Man of the Crowd (1840).178  
The doubling of private eye and criminal and the vulnerability of moral 
individuals in inherently corrupt societies served – regardless of the virile masculinity 
brandished about by most hard-boiled detectives – to express profound hopelessness 
and fatigue on part of society. Their “discovery that what seems on the face of things 
to be personal is actually only a small corner of a scene of official wrongdoing so 
sprawling and intractable that the investigator is ultimately powerless to resolve things 
except within the most narrow limits”179 mirrored, in many ways, the main quandary 
faced by Soviet writers at the same time: most of the birth-pangs of the Red Pinkerton 
continued to trouble the Soviet detektiv as it tried to gain a foothold within the limited 
confines of Socialist Realism.  
It seems fair to say that the trademark of classic detective fiction, i.e. a highly 
individualised detective persona with easily distinguishable character traits and a flair 
for the extravagant, had not found its footing in Russian literature – nor could it under 
Soviet guidelines. The few detective novels that met with official approval in the 
Soviet Union generally featured a team of investigators, rather than a single hero. A 
case in point is the long-running TV show Sledstvie vedut znatoki (1971-1989, revived 
in 2002).180 One of the first Russian writers to reintroduce a single investigator into 
literature was Yulian Semyonov, the godfather of the Soviet spy novel: replacing the 
investigative team in his novel In the Performance of Duty (При исполнении 
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служебных обязанностей, 1962) with a single, and singularly successful, literary 
hero by the name of Isaev-Stirlitz, Semyonov also created one of the most recognisable 
heroes of all Soviet TV.181  
The basic idea behind the spy story, i.e. the exploration of “the gap between the 
private and public self, the instable border between ‘Soviet’ and ‘Russian’ and between 
‘us’ and ‘them’”182 was well suited to the day-to-day experiences of the average Soviet 
citizen. The Vayner brothers, who were part of a wider resurgence of Soviet crime 
fiction in the 1970s, went a step further by creating a series of novels with alluring 
titles such as I, the Investigator (Я, следователь, 1972) and The Meeting Place 
Cannot Be Changed (Место встречи изменить нельзя, 1975).183 The latter featured 
a “streetwise, self-made, and devoid of doubt […] modern Robin Hood”184 as its 
central hero, but made sure not to suggest a lone wolf mentality. It used the catchphrase 
‘The thief belongs in jail’ to proclaim “a communal, moral, and emotional, rather than 
a legal, foundation for Russian justice”185, effectively resurrecting the idea of the 
neschastnyi figure to highlight a continued fundamental rift between society and state. 
However, the guidelines set by Socialist Realism severely limited the scope for the 
detective work to be carried out, and murder as a plot device was seen as impermissibly 
Western.186 That meant that the Soviet detektiv had to revert to the kind of crimes 
characteristic of both the Sherlock Holmes and the Golden Age eras: theft, forgery, 
and matters of mistaken identity.  
Both the social and the economic set up of the Soviet state presented crime fiction 
writers with additional difficulties. On the one hand, Soviet society was no longer 
officially a class society, which, in essence, eliminated the plot device of interfamilial 
and interclass strife, meaning that “the butler couldn’t have ‘done it’ [original 
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emphasis]”187. Similarly, avarice, greed, or base capitalist desire were categories of 
thought(-crimes) which Soviet citizens would not entertain, further limiting the list of 
potential crimes against the state. This meant that “more often than not, [the Soviet 
crime novel] was reduced to a police novel about the brilliant actions of agents of the 
OBKhSS [Section for the Struggle Against Theft of Socialist Property and 
Speculation] investigating the theft of scraps of cloth from a textile mill”188. There was 
simply no room for more intricate plots, as neither the KGB nor the state police could 
be portrayed as incapable of dealing with crime or allowing society to spiral so far out 
of control as to permit murder. 
The world view present in the Soviet detektiv mirrored the binary world view 
prevalent in much of Soviet life. Socio-political critique, one of the traditional 
mainstays of detective fiction, was relegated to the fringes of society and ascribed to 
dissidents and defectors. Paradoxically, this created an entire society of criminals, as 
the simple act of noticing the gap between the real and the ideal form of Communism 
sufficed to count as a crime. Coupled with an economic system that was based on 
personal favours, denunciations, and a pervasive ‘не болтай’ mentality, this state of 
things spelt out the complicity of nigh on every citizen in the Soviet Union in the 
creation of a criminal society. Even literary critics of a pro-Soviet persuasion 
occasionally slipped up in their discussions of crime and society; Arkadii Adamov, for 
instance, decried detective fiction as a genre that had absorbed “самые острые, 
болезненные, обычно скрытые от глаз общества проблемы [my emphasis]”189 – 
thus no longer portraying criminality as an unbidden import from the West, but as 
something that lurked in the very depths of Soviet society itself.  
 
Contemporary Crime Fiction 
In Western detective fiction, the post-war decades saw an internationalisation and 
transnationalisation of crime and detective plots that was already briefly discussed in 
the introduction. In America, this shift was largely galvanized by the Vietnam war and 
the African-American civil rights movement, which gave rise to an awakening of the 
civic body politic in a way that effectively undermined America’s claim to moral 
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superiority and rattled the very foundations of US national identity. In East Germany 
as well as in Eastern Europe, surveillance states proper came into being, inspiring 
writers on both sides of the Iron Curtain to engage in the writing of spy novels.190 At 
the same time, Western Europe had its own challenges to deal with, facing an “erosion 
of the sense of self [as] part of the disorder of contemporary society”191 that led literary 
investigators to act “like a person with paranoia, the difference being that he is 
healthy”192. This process was exacerbated by the rise of mass media and up-to-date 
coverage on global events such as terrorism and warfare.  
As geopolitical, ethnic and cultural borders were beginning to appear increasingly 
fluid, previously limited needs for surveillance were likewise broadened into a 
panoptic spectacle that culminated in today’s atmosphere of international paranoia and 
global suspicion. On these grounds, the genre of crime and detective fiction continues 
to find a plethora of uncomfortable questions to ask. Western crime fiction writers 
started to actively engage with socio-political concerns that relate to gender studies, 
race, and ethnicity; novel series such as Walter Mosley’s Easy Rawlins (1990-2016) 
or Val McDermid’s Lindsay Gordon (1987-2003) are only two cases in point.193 The 
post-millennial boom of Nordic Noir, the rise of awards such as the CWA International 
Dagger, and the unwavering popularity of crime TV shows across the globe further 
prove detective fiction’s continued intercultural appeal, which has long transcended 
Anglo-Saxon representations of the genre and left “hardly any areas [on the map of the 
world] uncharted”194.  
In Russia, detective fiction experienced a resurgence after the break-up of the 
Soviet Union, which brought its own momentous challenges with it. First 
undercurrents of change made themselves felt from the mid-1980s onwards, when 
Valentin Rasputin, Chingiz Aitmatov, and Viktor Astafyev acted as the harbingers of 
a late apotheosis of detective fiction and effected a socio-critical turn of the Soviet 
 
190 The annexation of Crimea in 2014 has helped the Cold War-inspired spy novel to flourish once again 
and has put Russia back on the map of international crime fiction lovers. Jason Matthews’ modern-day 
spy novel Red Sparrow (2013), which has since been turned into a Hollywood film, and Tom 
Callaghan’s detective Borubaev series, set in present-day Kyrgyzstan, are just two cases in point. 
191 Horsley, Twentieth-Century Crime Fiction, 28. 
192 Boltanski, Mysteries & Conspiracies, 15. 
193 Cf. Horsley, Twentieth-Century Crime Fiction and Priestman, The Cambridge Companion to Crime 
Fiction. 
194 Erdmann and Fincannon, “Nationality International,” 13. Cf. Kerstin Bergman, “The Captivating 
Chill. Why Readers Desire Nordic Noir,” Scandinavian-Canadian Studies 22 (2015): 80-89. 
50 
 
detektiv.195 Richard Stites, Evgeny Dobrenko and Mark Lipovetsky all consider 
Gorbachev and the perestroika as the starting point for the emergence of an actual 
popular culture in Russia.196 1989 saw the publication of the first volume of the 
quarterly magazine The Detective and Politics (Детектив и политика), which was 
edited by Yulian Semyonov and contained “crime stories, spy thrillers, documents 
from the Stalin terror, and pro-Gorbachev commentary, thus closing the ranks of 
practitioners of urban popular fiction along liberal lines”197. The magazine’s editors 
and writers not only pointed a metaphorical finger at the undeniable connection 
between detective fiction, politics, and society, but also helped the genre on its 
transition from perestroika to post-Soviet literature, lending it a new, provocative voice 
that was well suited to the newly liberated media after 1991. The first volume of The 
Detective and Politics featured, among other works, Dashiell Hammett’s The Maltese 
Falcon (1929), several short stories by Semyonov, and two contributions by (not yet 
turned political hardliner) Eduard Limonov. Subsequent volumes grew narrower in 
scope, but contained, amongst others, works by G. K. Chesterton, Ian Fleming, and 
Kurt Vonnegut. The last volume was published in 1991, by which time The Detective 
and Politics had grown increasingly more focused on Russian contributions. 
Post-1991, Russian crime fiction also quickly grew into a field that was dominated 
by women writers. Polina Dashkova, Darya Dontsova and Tatyana Polyakova have all 
staked their claim to fame, but none of them achieved comparable popularity to 
Aleksandra Marinina, whose success even outweighs Akunin’s – in monetary terms, 
at least. Marinina’s heroine, Anastasia Kamenskaya, is designed as a tough and 
independent detective who contradicts the widespread notion of the elegant Russian 
femme fatale and promulgates a Westernised image of the modern Russian woman 
instead. Kamenskaya is “a rational and unromantic alpha-female […] with an addiction 
to work, cigarettes and coffee and an inability to complete daily chores or to get up 
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early in the morning”198 and is “nearly always [dressed] in jeans, baggy sweaters, and 
ratty tennis shoes”199. She is both a long shot from and a travesty of the dashing alpha-
male that so many readers have come to associate with the classic detective hero. 
However, the extent to which Marinina’s work uses overt feminism and political 
correctness as a strategy to advocate a conservative political image is still under 
debate.200 In the televised version of the Kamenskaya cycle, the heroine appears as “an 
example of skilful post-Soviet pro-government small-screen propaganda”201, 
advocating an anti-intelligentsia mind-set alongside conservative political views that 
seem to mirror her creator’s personal stance.  
Indeed, Marinina herself often appears to share a dislike for the creative 
intelligentsia’s heritage in Russia. Many of her novels evoke a nostalgia for Soviet 
times that kowtows, in several ways, to official Putin rhetoric about the deplorable 
‘wild nineties’. Thus, Marinina perpetuates a trauma discourse by demonising the 
1990s:  
Ты подумай, как времена меняются! Раньше живые в очереди за финскими сапогами и 
сырокопченой колбасой стояли, а теперь мертвые ждут очереди на вскрытие… Мне порой 
кажется, что наша действительность плавно переходит в непрерывный кошмар.202 
 
The tangible yearning for the alleged stability and innocence of Soviet life, juxtaposed 
with a nightmarish present, is evocative of the desire to rebrand memories of the Soviet 
byt in a positive light and restore a past that never existed. Marinina’s heroine gives 
voice to similar sentiments, cutting down complex concepts such as truth and untruth 
into black-and-white categories that are both reminiscent of official Soviet 
terminology and eerily prophetic of today’s post-truth climate: “Она думала о том, 
что в русском языке слово ‘правда’ – только одно, а слов, противоположных по 
значению, куда больше: ‘обман’, ‘ложь’, ‘неправда’, ‘вранье’. Может, потому, 
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что правда – проста, а ложь многолика?”.203 This crude linguistic manipulation not 
only creates an impression of indomitable evil, but also wilfully ignores the existence 
of a number of synonyms to go along the word pravda in the Russian language – istina, 
vernost’, and pravota among them.204 
Marinina’s protagonist also frequently works together with various mafia 
representatives, refusing to distinguish between good and bad citizens and preferring 
to differentiate between good and bad criminals instead. This approach effectively 
collapses the border between citizen and criminal, lending voice to a pervasive bandit 
mentality in society instead.205 Unlike classical detective fiction writers, however, 
Marinina does not condemn, but condone the fact that every character is a potential 
suspect in her stories. By omitting to flag up the crisis of the social contract that 
underlies this situation, Marinina effectively consolidates the image of the good 
criminal, whose lawless activities serve to defend his motherland and the Russian soul 
from the evil influences of Westernisation and democraticisation.  
Within the context of post-Soviet crime fiction, Marinina is not the only supporter 
of such a patriotic view on corruption and violence. Another popular subgenre of post-
Soviet crime fiction is the boevik, represented in the works of Viktor Dotsenko, 
Aleksandr Bushkov and others. Birgit Menzel describes the typical boevik protagonist 
as an orphaned loner and ex-con, afganets, or other social outsider who has explicit 
inside knowledge of the criminal world and follows his own moral code. This code 
differs from the long-discredited written code of law, which once again signals the 
breakdown of a social contract and evokes a strong sense of fraternity between the 
boevik and society’s criminal classes.206 Unlike in Western hard-boiled fiction, the 
underlying societal problems that contribute to the emergence of such a mafia society 
are neither questioned nor dismantled. Instead, boeviks are generally coated in the type 
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of nationalist rhetoric that resurrects the illusory power of the fabled Russian 
sonderweg. 
One contemporary writer who claims to criticise Russia’s ever-upward reaching 
criminal career ladder is Darya Dontsova. Credited with having created the subgenre 
of ironical detective fiction in Russia, Dontsova allegedly offers her readers a “re-
orientation in Russian popular values: from nostalgia to forward-looking optimism, 
from criticism of wealth to consumer-centrism, and from general pessimism to the 
carnivalization of the post-Soviet socio-economic environment”207. While I agree that 
Dontsova’s work supports the normalisation of the consumer-oriented reader, I also 
believe that the above statement is far too benevolent in general: Dontsova’s supposed 
optimism about present-day Russia may be refreshingly free of Soviet nostalgia (she 
occasionally even stylises Soviet terms as elements of the distant past by providing 
them with footnotes), but it is, on the whole, still largely unreflective about the socio-
political nature of Putin’s ‘fairy-tale Russia’.208 In one-sidedly affirming consumerism 
as an antidote to the post-transition crisis, Dontsova inadvertently also ratifies the 
pseudo-success of the Putin regime in returning stability to the people.  
 
Conclusion 
Over the course of the centuries, crime fiction writers in the West and Russia have 
positioned themselves along fault lines that spell out the instability of reality to their 
readers – be it by problematising the fallacies of the social contract, the problem of a 
moral protagonist within an immoral world, or the “public’s reluctant awareness of the 
uncontrollable power of violence in the hands of the government”209. In doing so, they 
created a “contest between an author and a reader about the possession of meaning”210, 
in which the author can be both the novelist or any other entity that engages in the 
creation of fictional narratives for public consumption – such as the government. 
However, post-Soviet crime fiction writers increasingly fail to follow this trajectory, 
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foregoing complex plotlines for the provision of comfortable, outdated sound bites – 
similar to the approach taken by the Russian Embassy Twitter team in 2018. If “writing 
a crime story essentially functions as an act of freedom”211, then the freedom exercised 
here is the freedom to regress towards the official narrative, not to exact a critical 
independence of mind. 
However, there are exceptions to this trend. In 2016, Whitehead identified Boris 
Akunin as one author whose novels “counteract the considerable uniformity in the 
work of other contemporary Russian detective writers”212 – a uniformity that pertains 
to both form and content. But what is it that makes Akunin different from other writers, 
leading him and scholars alike to claim the creation of a ‘new detective novel’? 
Starting from Akunin’s position on the post-Soviet book market in general, I will now 
focus on two aspects of his work in particular: Akunin’s openly commercial stance 
with regard to the Fandorin project and the postmodernist aesthetics that informed both 
his prose style and his approach to writing historical fiction. 
 
1.2. Boris Akunin as Post-Soviet Literature’s Trickster 
From the moment Boris Akunin appeared on the literary stage, he assumed the role of 
literary trickster. His pseudonym, which was immediately recognisable as such, 
sparked heated discussions because of its apparent double meaning: approached from 
a Russian point of view, ‘B. Akunin’ conjures up the spectre of Russian 19th-century 
anarchist Bakunin. This is a link that Akunin himself confirmed in regard to his origins 
as a writer, stating: “[t]he style I used at the beginning was anarchistic. Russian 
literature was either very high or low. I mixed literature with entertainment”213. 
However, Akunin not only positioned himself as a stylistic trickster. By taking the 
image of a political anarchist and giving it a literary spin, he also offered an 
underhanded commentary on the often involuntarily political role of writers in the 
country that he grew up in. In the light of Akunin’s active involvement in the 2011/12 
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protest movement in Russia, this initially playful conflation of literary and political 
anarchism has since acquired the aftertaste of a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
Apart from its Russian connotations, akunin also carries the meaning of ‘evil doer’ 
or ‘evil person’ in Japanese, where the word is used to describe “lowly and disruptive 
elements in society who [do] not submissively conform to communal norms and the 
established social order”214. Akunin assumed this role alongside that of the literary 
rebel, using the subversive quality of his writerly work to expose problems in Russian 
society and interrogate established norms of cultural authority. In creating a 
pseudonym with such intricate layers of meaning, Akunin not only united his own 
background in Japanese studies with his position as a Russian writer, but also imbued 
his name with a transnational quality that broached the issue of Russia’s identity search 
between East and West and foreshadowed the multi-ethnic identity construction that 
would go into the creation of Erast Petrovich Fandorin. 
At the start of his career, however, Akunin’s ‘evil’ role in post-Soviet culture was 
largely interpreted in the context of his work’s openly commercial nature. Akunin was 
both the first writer to marry the best-selling genre of detective fiction to 19th-century 
soul-searching finesse and the first to embrace popular culture unapologetically: “I call 
‘Boris Akunin’ a project, because that’s what it is: a sort of architectural construction. 
Not a hospital or a school or an administrative building, to be sure — rather something 
playful like Disneyland, but still something devised and built according to a technical 
plan”215. Andrei Ranchin highlighted the bravery of this move, stating that “никто 
иной не декларировал и вроде бы не декларирует свой сериал как осознанный 
проект, не демонстрирует — решительно, смело, откровенно — собственную 
стратегию успеха”216.  
Naturally, not all of Akunin’s critics approved of this stance. In 2001, Viktor 
Myasnikov stated that “[л]ауреат ‘Антибукера’ не имеет права перекочевывать в 
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масслит — это профанация и попса”217. Myasnikov then prematurely proclaimed 
the end of the Akunin cult. Similarly, Lev Anninsky argued that Akunin’s work 
corresponds to “глянцевая литература, которая сродни глянцевым журналам [...] 
у Акунина серьезных задач нет вообще”218. However, both these critics were too 
hasty – or simply too dismissive – in their assessments. 
Akunin’s star did not wane, and instead, it began to glow all the brighter with the 
onset of the internet, which helped Akunin involve an even wider readership in the 
discussion of several ‘serious tasks’. He became an active social media user, 
employing platforms such as LiveJournal and Facebook to discuss the development of 
his book projects alongside Russian daily life and politics. As a result, Akunin 
successfully positioned himself as an audience-oriented writer of both intellectually 
and politically engaged popular fiction.219 He also expertly seized on new 
opportunities to create interactive experiences for his ever-growing readership. From 
the start of the Fandorin series, Akunin chose to provide lavishly illustrated print 
publications of his novels alongside plain pocket-sized paperbacks. He also brought 
two literary apps to the market: Akuninbook and Os’minog.220 Whereas Akuninbook 
offers access to the entirety of Akunin’s oeuvre, including illustrations, audiobooks 
and Akunin’s latest social media posts, Os’minog is a literary game for portable 
devices that allows readers to choose an ending for each (paid for) chapter. As eight 
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potential storylines can be discovered, readers and viewers alike are encouraged to 
question the idea of linear narratives and their perception of historical time and reality.  
 
Akunin’s Postmodernist Aesthetics 
All of these elements already point to what Olga Sobolev and Elena Baraban voiced 
in 2004: the fact that Akunin created a “polyphonic artistic space, so characteristic of 
postmodernist writing […] [but] hardly ever seen in the works of formula genre”221. 
Baraban called Akunin “the first among contemporary Russian detective authors to 
combine the genre of the historical detective novel with Postmodernist aesthetics”222. 
In 2011, Akunin affirmed this description: 
river_keeper  
Скажите, насколько Вы считаете свои собственные книги — постмодернизмом.  
 
На сто процентов.223 
 
However, entering the topic of postmodernism inevitably also means stepping onto a 
terminological minefield. Given the manifold transformations that the term 
postmodernism has undergone over recent decades, a short detour is therefore in order. 
In a Western context, two of the leading authorities on literary postmodernism are 
Brian McHale and Linda Hutcheon. Whereas McHale succinctly characterises 
postmodernist fiction as “above all illusion-breaking art […] systematically 
[disturbing] the air of reality by foregrounding the ontological structure of texts and of 
fictional worlds”224 and holding up a mirror to a reality that “now more than ever 
before, is plural”225, Hutcheon calls it a phenomenon that is “resolutely contradictory 
as well as unavoidably political”226. In a postmodernist world, nothing can exist as 
self-explanatory or self-evident; as a result, postmodernism raises questions about past 
and present alike. In Hutcheon’s view, one of the main functions of postmodernism is 
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therefore to join readers and writers in a revolt against totalizing givens and misleading 
notions of the self-understood.  
It is easy to draw a link from this to historical detective fiction’s truth-searching 
quests. Hutcheon united postmodernism’s epistemological and ontological concerns 
in the concept of historiographic metafiction, the basic premise of which is that “story-
telling has returned – but as a problem, not as a given”227. Because postmodernism’s 
awareness of the narrative basis of all representations of reality challenges the border 
between fact and fiction, it likewise turns all historical narratives into constructs – 
marred by the imperfection of human language and the impossibility of rendering truly 
objective views. Given today’s proliferation of post-truth thinking across the globe, 
Hutcheon’s work has lost none of its topicality.  
However, postmodernism’s ambiguity also makes it contentious in the eyes of 
many critics. Post-Soviet writers of an ultra-conservative, nationalist conviction, such 
as Aleksandr Dugin, have used postmodernism to claim validity for their Russian 
sonderweg theories since the 1990s, revealing the phenomenon’s potential for political 
manipulation. In 2016, Boris Noordenbos detected postmodernism’s presence in 
contemporary Russian politics, judging that one “may see how the ambiguous attitudes 
and politicized aesthetics of neo-imperialism—an over-the-the-top chauvinism which 
borrows from and moves beyond postmodernism—in some cases informs the Putin 
government’s rhetoric and policies”228. Two years later, Mark Lipovetsky stated that 
“Postmodernism in Russian politics has been especially tangible in the nationalist 
discourse after Russia started its war against Ukraine and annexed Crimea, and it 
reached an apex after Trump was elected the U.S. president”229. Postmodernism is 
therefore a highly prevalent aspect of contemporary Russian politics – but its presence 
has been felt since the 1990s. 
This timeline is not altogether surprising. When interpreted as an all-
encompassing disregard for moral, legal and criminal boundaries in face of their 
ulterior meaninglessness, postmodernism carries a certain conceptual kinship with the 
post-perestroika notion of bespredel’, or lawlessness, as well as with Soviet stiob and 
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its peculiar forms of in-betweenness. Indeed, a link between today’s prominence of 
postmodernism and the cultural heritage of the Soviet period has been suggested by 
Mikhail Epstein, who coined the term simulacrum in this context. Epstein argues that 
the emptiness of post-Soviet, postmodernist signifiers is grounded in the centuries-
long proclivity of Russian culture to engage in the creation of simulacra, for which he 
lists the city of Saint Petersburg and the public image of Soviet leader Brezhnev as 
examples. According to Epstein, the simulacrum-building part of Russian culture 
reached its climax in the period of Socialist Realism.230  
While I would join Rosalind Marsh in her warning that “such denials of historical 
reality should not be taken too far”231, Epstein did raise an important point when he 
highlighted the existence of precursors to contemporary forms of Russian 
postmodernism. This chronology has led some scholars to question the existence of a 
post-Soviet postmodernism altogether: Evgeny Dobrenko, for instance, considers the 
term “a slip of the pen”232, arguing that Russian postmodernism is nothing but a 
reaction to the undead Soviet elements in contemporary Russian art. Lipovetsky and 
Borenstein, while not denying the existence of a Russian postmodernism in toto, also 
suggest that Russian postmodernism is “restricted to the art of reflection on the ruins 
of Socialist Realism”233, which is a position shared by Teresa Polowy.234  
In the light of post-Soviet Russia’s nostalgia debate and intelligentsia crisis, these 
claims certainly have their place. In essence, they imply that the ‘art of reflection’ has 
not gone far enough, indicating an insufficient reappraisal of Russia’s Soviet past 
alongside a deep-seated inability to move past established doctrines of reality 
perception – outgrowths of which were noticeable in the previously cited responses to 
Akunin’s work. However, it is equally important to stress that critical and creative 
forms of postmodernism have also evolved in the post-Soviet cultural space. 
Lipovetsky and Borenstein speak of a “new level of fullness and historical universality, 
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a new scale of history’s dramas and potential; by no means [...] history’s 
annihilation”235 in relation to Russian postmodernism, whereas Rosalind Marsh 
noticed that the rise of the term ‘usable past’ in post-Soviet Russia indicates a growing 
awareness and appreciation of postmodernism’s versatility in society.  
Marsh also showed that postmodernist historical fiction frequently challenges the 
concept of linear time, which is a phenomenon that Edith Clowes described with the 
words: “[if] modernity was striking for its […] belief in linear progress, then in 
postmodernity history […] resembled movement along a Moebius strip”236. The 
mention of the Moebius strip is an interesting one in relation to Akunin, as readers of 
the Fandorin series are met with at least one random use of the name Moebius in all of 
the earlier novels. From among the different interpretations for this occurrence, I am 
most inclined to agree with Andrei Staniukovich’s, who considers the consistently 
random name-dropping a reference to the Moebius strip. In Staniukovich’s 
interpretation, Akunin plays with the term to relay a view of time as circular and 
developing along multiple, parallel narratives.237  
In recent years, the idea of the Moebius strip has also been applied to Russian 
history. Mikhail Shishkin, with whom Akunin interviewed in 2013, stated that the 
“twentieth century locked Russian history into a Mobius [sic] strip”238, whereas Ilya 
Kalinin – in a highly readable assessment of culture politics under the Putin regime – 
adopted a more political stance, observing that “[к]ультурное наследие и 
политические амбиции становятся элементами общей топологии, как в ленте 
Мебиуса”239. Both of these interpretations of the Moebius strip – either as a form of 
historical cyclicity or as a visualisation of contemporary Russia’s interweaving of 
culture and politics – indicate, once again, the strong presence of postmodernist 
elements in contemporary Russian culture, alongside a deliberate indecisiveness about 
the border between past and present, fact and fiction. 
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The same is true for Akunin’s latest project, the multi-tome History of the Russian 
State (История Российского государства), which he described as “большущую 
мегаповесть о жизни одного русского рода за тысячу лет”240. The project features 
eight historiographical tomes on major periods of Russian history, designed to emulate 
Karamzin’s early 19th-century history of the same title: “[я] (пришло время в этом 
признаться) всегда мечтал стать новым Карамзиным”241. However, each of the 
historical tomes is also accompanied by a book of corresponding fictional stories, 
which are given equal prominence as the historical analyses. Both parts of the History 
of the Russian State are published under the pseudonym Boris Akunin. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, such a deliberate commingling of fact and fiction met with mixed reviews 
by critics. Ilya Gerasimov’s verdict that Akunin “ничего нового не предложил, а 
только довел практически до абсурда основные идеи карамзинской картины 
мира”242 is a rather stark misrepresentation, but it does express some of the anxieties 
experienced by contemporary critics about Akunin’s postmodern play with history and 
literature.  
The same aesthetic is also used in the Fandorin project. In 2001, Anatoly 
Vishevsky claimed that “the only future Akunin sees for Russia is in its literary 
past”243, highlighting the way that intertextuality is not only used as a postmodernist 
and intellectual mind-game in the Fandorin series, but as a serious part in Akunin’s 
overall world-building. Both Russian and Western critics have commented on 
Akunin’s prolific use of intertextuality, which is an element of the Fandorin series that 
Akunin has neither tried to hide nor silence. In a blog post from 2011, he wrote: 
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Я никогда не скрывал, что многие эпизоды/персонажи/коллизии выхватываю из истории 
или из ‘большой’ литературы […] Эта литературно-историческая угадайка является одной 
из несущих опор всего акунинского проекта.244 
 
Over the years, Akunin’s work has been linked to “Nikolai Leskov, Ivan Goncharov 
and Sergei Aksakov, with echoes of Nikolai Gogol and Fyodor Dostoevsky”245 along 
with “Chesterton, Peters and Eco […] as well as […] Agatha Christie”246 and many 
others. As Akunin refuses to acknowledge the existence of “непроходимых 
литературных границ и легко оперирует деталями разных художественных 
миров”247, he creates a rich tapestry of intertextual references to classical works of 
Russian and European fiction in addition to carefully researched historical content – 
effectively making detective fiction into the seat of a shared, transcultural history. 
Through the additional use of paratextual elements such as elaborate chapter headings, 
newspaper clippings and epigraphs – all of which have been named parodic elements 
characteristic of historiographic metafiction by Hutcheon – Akunin creates a unique 
artistic space that mixes literary memory with the impression of historical 
authenticity.248 
However, it is important to point out that instead of mindlessly recreating classical 
source texts in the pursuit of a nostalgic utopia, Akunin stands for a critical and fluid, 
rather than an unreflective memory culture. While Lyudmila Parts is correct in 
pointing out that every “instance of intertextuality, be it a small quotation or a complex 
network of allusions, signals the fact that the pre-text or texts are vital parts of 
culture”249, Akunin’s use of intertextuality goes further than that. He 
uses the classics’ ‘testimonies’ to question the myth of Russia’s golden age [...] the philosophical 
principles of Postmodernism are used to create a pertinent critique of the idealization of tsarist 
Russia and to depict ‘the Russia we have never lost’ […] allusions and pastiche become historical 




244 Boris Akunin, “Otkuda chto beretsia - 1,” Echo Mosvky (blog), September 16, 2011, 
<http://echo.msk.ru/blog/b_akunin/812363-echo/> [accessed 13 July 2019] 
245 Aron, “A Champion for the Bourgeoisie,” 149. 
246 Whitehead, “The Temptation of the Reader,” 44. 
247 A. G. Golovacheva, “Dilogiia B. Akunina ‘Ves’ Mir Teatr’ i ‘Chernyi Gorod’ kak polilog velikoi 
russkoi i mirovoi literatury,” Voprosy russkoi literatury 31, no. 1 (2015): 88-135, 110. 
248 Cf. Linda Hutcheon, “Irony, Nostalgia, and the Postmodern,” in Methods for the Study of Literature 
as Cultural Memory, eds. Raymond Vervliet and Annemarie Estor (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2000): 189-
207. 
249 Lyudmila Parts, “Boris Akunin’s Postmodern Čajka,” Russian Literature 82 (2016): 37-47, 45. 
250 Baraban, “A Country Resembling Russia,” 403. 
63 
 
Whitehead aptly analysed Akunin’s provocative and postmodern use of intertextuality 
as a method that not only creates a friendly intellectual contest between author and 
reader(s) over the possession of knowledge, but which also conjures up specific frames 
of reading expectations in order to engage a diverse readership in the deliberate 
deconstruction of these canonised perceptions of culture, “thereby [demonstrating] the 
redundancy of such literary categories”251. 
Akunin’s obvious desire to carve out a new sphere of cultural activity that prompts 
readers to leave their Soviet-educated comfort zone of cultural superiority behind is 
crucial in the context of post-Soviet Russia’s struggles to critically illuminate its own 
past – literary or otherwise. However, before I can analyse the precise nature of 
Akunin’s challenge to Russia’s nationwide nostalgia for Empire, it is imperative that 
I first discuss the precise forms and trends that this nostalgia boom has taken since its 
inception. 
 
2. Between the Popular and the Political: The Post-Soviet 
Nostalgia Debate 




In the year 2000, Linda Hutcheon surmised that “contemporary [Russian] culture is 
[…] nostalgic; some parts of it – postmodern parts – are aware of the risks [...] and 
seek to expose those through irony”253. In 2014, Ekaterina Kalinina reformulated this 
bond between nostalgia and irony, stating that “[like] irony, nostalgia should be 
perceived as an emotional response and a discursive practice which is directed towards 
the construction of identities”254. These quotes are pivotal not just because of their 
content, but also because of their timing: written at watershed moments in post-Soviet 
Russian history, they describe nostalgia’s persistent significance for a correct 
understanding of post-Soviet culture at large. 
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Nostalgia as a term was originally coined by the Swiss army doctor Johannes 
Hofer, who used it to describe the medical-pathological symptoms of homesickness 
among 17th-century soldiers. Since then, the term’s meaning has undergone several 
shifts, the most important of which describes the move from a spatial to a temporal 
category: whereas Hofer’s understanding of nostalgia involved a simple cure by 
returning the afflicted soldiers to their homeland, the modern nostalgic is seen to suffer 
from a psychological condition that is embodied in a yearning for a lost time, rather 
than a lost space.  
Over the course of the 20th century, nostalgia has become a mass phenomenon of 
global dimensions, which acts as a culturally accepted flight response in times of 
political and social uncertainty. According to Hutcheon, there are three reasons for this 
mass proliferation of nostalgia: the ontological uncertainty created by postmodernism, 
growing dissatisfaction with the present, and the rise of technology.255 Indeed, most 
contemporary nostalgia seems to be “less about the past than about the present […] 
which […] is constructed as complicated, contaminated, anarchic, difficult, ugly, and 
confrontational […] Nostalgic distancing sanitizes as it selects, making the past feel 
complete, stable, coherent, safe”256 – a statement that holds true both in a Western and 
in a Russian context.  
The role of the internet and social media in the creation of a specific postmodern 
nostalgic boom is equally applicable to a global context. Katharina Niemeyer links the 
appearance of mass nostalgia to today’s modern, ever-growing media landscape, 
claiming that “nostalgia has always been an affair of mediated processes, within both 
literature and the arts”257. According to Niemeyer, both traditional and modern forms 
of media can work as triggers for nostalgia. Similarly, Andrew Higson argues that 
because of nostalgia’s ubiquitous presence in the media and its associated status as a 
commodified good, past and present are merging into one, making nostalgia a positive 
rather than a negative experience that “retains nothing of melancholia and 
wistfulness”258, and which is “no longer about loss and the irrecoverable, but about the 
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found, about discovery and enjoyment”259. In Higson’s view, postmodern nostalgia 
achieves an atemporal perception of the past through the process of commercialisation 
– unlike modern nostalgia, which upheld a temporal dimension and yearned for a 
return to an authentic, often pre-industrial past: 
It is not that the irrecoverable past can now be recovered; it is rather that the object of nostalgic 
celebration is celebrated precisely because it is attainable, because it was never lost […] it renders 
the past as co-existent with the present; it recovers the past as something that can be experienced 
by present-day spectators.260  
 
There are some weaknesses to Higson’s argumentation, particularly his view of 
commodification as a result of postmodernism – Elizabeth Outka’s study on late-
Victorian commodified nostalgic goods is a case study to the point.261 Nevertheless, 
both Niemeyer and Higson are right to point out the role of mediated 
commercialisation processes in boosting a global, commodified access structure that 
offers wide-scale nostalgia-on-demand. What neither scholar explores in any depth is 
how this phenomenon applies to the post-Soviet space in particular. 
Kalinina’s 2014 study of the mediation of post-Soviet nostalgia presents an 
important first contribution to this field. Using Hutcheon as a theoretical framework, 
Kalinina showcases how certain areas of communication – such as restaurants, fashion, 
television, and theatre – have contributed to Russia’s present nostalgic boom.262 
Nostalgia, in Kalinina’s interpretation, is not an immanent characteristic to any one 
subject; instead, it is the result of a process of interpretation or mediation, be it via a 
producer or a viewer. As nostalgia becomes “both a discursive and a bodily experience 
[that] has the potential to contribute to the constructions and reconstructions of nation-
states”263, its strong emotive powers also place it within a wider structure of feeling 
that connects individuals to their surrounding social and political spheres and 
contributes to the process of identity formation.  
While Kalinina’s study provides an up-to-date analysis of the interrelationship 
between media and nostalgia and suitably shows the infiltration of various aspects of 
 
259 Andrew Higson, “Nostalgia Is Not What It Used to Be: Heritage Films, Nostalgia Websites and 
Contemporary Consumers,” Consumption Markets & Culture 17, no. 2 (2014): 120-42, 126. 
260 Ibid, 126-8. 
261 Cf. Elizabeth Outka, Consuming Traditions: Modernity, Modernism, and the Commodified Authentic 
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009). 
262 Cf. Kalinina, Mediated Post-Soviet Nostalgia.  
263 Ibid, 48. 
66 
 
modern Russian life with nostalgic sentiments, it does not touch upon the nostalgia 
mediated – or challenged – in literature. Likewise, it fails to highlight the peculiarities 
of the post-Soviet nostalgia boom as compared to its Western equivalents. Where does 
the Fandorin project – an openly commercial work, situated in a transcultural artistic 
space, but constructed as a counter-narrative to post-Soviet nostalgia – fit in this 




As mentioned before, post-Soviet societies did not just struggle with the global 
traumas of the 20th century, but also with specific “transitional periods, in which old 
ideologies and value systems [were] being replaced by new ones”264 – or were 
supposed to be replaced, at least. It is this reality split, complete with all its 
imperfections, that has produced the fertile ground for nostalgic phenomena in the 
post-Soviet space to grow on. Therefore, I agree with Maria Todorova that nostalgia, 
in the case of post-Communist societies, has not only been brought about by the 
aforementioned factors of postmodernism, present-day ennui and a proliferation of 
social media, but by a highly specific combination of “elements of disappointment, 
social exhaustion, economic recategorization, generational fatigue, and [a] quest for 
dignity”265.  
Todorova’s summary adequately describes the strong socio-political layers as well 
as the identitary confusion inherent to Russian nostalgia that are not necessarily found 
in its less politicised Western forms. Both Niemeyer and Higson essentially consider 
nostalgia a positive force; so does John J. Su, a scholar of Anglophone literature who 
views nostalgia as a positive social practice that “enables a kind of constructive 
forgetting and stabilization of the past”266. While generally correct, these statements 
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tend to underrepresent the thin line that can be trod between constructive and 
destructive forgetting – which is a problem of considerable magnitude in the post-
Soviet space, where nostalgia risks a dive into the deep end of nationalist myth-making 
when turned into a political tool.  
One of the definitions of nostalgia that does take this difference into account is 
Svetlana Boym’s model of restorative versus reflective nostalgia. Boym views 
nostalgia as different from melancholia, which according to her is a private and 
individual phenomenon. In Boym’s view, nostalgia presupposes an interplay between 
individual and collective mnemonic practices, which is also the point at which 
nostalgia and national identity formation intersect. According to Boym, supporters of 
restorative nostalgia consciously distort history for the sake of the reconstruction of a 
mythical past, which is why this kind of nostalgia is particularly popular among 
nationalist movements.267 Reflective nostalgia, in contrast, expresses what in German 
is rendered with the uniquely untranslatable term Vergangenheitsbewältigung, i.e. an 
attempt to investigate, understand and come to terms with one’s past through the 
creation of an “individual narrative that savors details and memorial signs, perpetually 
deferring homecoming itself”268. This kind of nostalgia invites both private and public 
retrospection and frequently carries humorous or ironic overtones, which is why Boym 
initially also called it creative or ironic nostalgia.269 Unlike the unreflective nostalgic 
ready-mades provided by restorative nostalgia, reflective nostalgia fashions a critical 
future out of the past.  
Boym helped point out another peculiarity of the post-Soviet rise of nostalgia by 
placing it in the context of the Russian 1990s trauma discourse. This approach must 
now be taken with a grain of salt: as pointed out by Timothy Bewes, Boym’s views 
tend to overstate the significance of “the traumatic experience of Communism and 
state repression”270 in relation to the events of 1991. Catriona Kelly and Mark Bassin 
analysed the misrepresentative character of such descriptions, arguing that perestroika 
and the subsequent, peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Union did not lead to a sudden 
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loss of identity, but instead served as the final manifestation of a process that had been 
unfolding over a long time.271  
This is not to say that the collapse of the Soviet Union did not constitute a 
traumatic incision in many peoples’ daily lives. However, their main cause for 
nostalgia was less the loss of an ideological system and more the loss of certainty and 
stability that this incision signified. It was the chaos and incompetence of the 
transition, not the transition itself, which the majority of the people lamented. 
Therefore, I am inclined to agree with Kalinina’s correction to Boym’s perspective 
and to see “as the trauma that causes growing nostalgic sentiments towards the past 
[…] not communism itself, but the period immediately after the fall of 
communism”272. Consequently, the overarching master-narrative about the break-up 
of the Soviet Union as the dominant identity crisis of the 1990s looks like an 
increasingly shaky and potentially unsound commonplace.  
The following two subchapters will now detail the development of nostalgic 
trends in post-Soviet Russia since 1991, leading to a list of suitable interrogation points 
for my analysis of the Fandorin project. I will trace the various narratives of truth-
bending nostalgia that developed during the 1990s and the 2000s, giving credence to 
the changed interplay between culture and politics that resulted from the 1999 regime 
change. Which nostalgic ideas were formulated on the unofficial level of society, and 
which dominant forms of nostalgia were circulated top-down as part of an official 
rewriting of Russian history? To what extent has nostalgia been politicised in 
contemporary Russia, and how have cultural figures and the intelligentsia responded 
to this process? Last but not least, which role have the regime and cultural figures of 
authority played in circulating narratives of trauma to perpetuate a specific nostalgia 
for Empire?  
 
2.1. The 1990s: Exploring Nostalgia 
It is often claimed that Russia is a country with an unpredictable past. At the beginning 
of the 1990s, it was a country with no past at all: in 1988, even “university entrance 
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exams in history were cancelled […] in a reflection of the impossibility of determining 
right answers from wrong ones”273. Hans Bagger characterised the 1990s by a “‘[…] 
longing for history’ (toska po istorii) […] so marked that there was actually talk of a 
‘worship’ of the past [original emphasis]”274. First comments about the rise of 
nostalgia in the Russian cultural sphere occurred in the mid-1990s, when “many 
democratically oriented journalists raised the alarm about the new wave of unreflective 
nostalgia in media and public discourse”275. However, it stands to reason that in order 
to manifest as mediated nostalgia, nostalgic sentiments in Russian society had to 
consolidate over a certain period before they could first be recorded. 
One of the earliest manifestations of mediated nostalgia in post-Soviet Russia was 
the 1992 film The Russia That We Lost (Россия, которую мы потеряли). Produced 
by Stanislav Govorukhin – Putin’s election campaign manager in 2011 and 2012 – the 
polemically titled documentary portrays Russian 20th-century history as the tragic 
result of a Soviet rise to power and conveys a decidedly anti-Soviet mentality. 
Shrouded in romantic and borderline kitschy descriptions, The Russia That We Lost 
laments Russia’s lost opportunities after 1913 and constructs an image of pre-
revolutionary Russia as a ‘загадочная, незнакомая страна’276: 
 
Figure 2 The Russia That We Lost Film Still 
(“Rossiia, kotoruiu my poteriali. Stanislav Govorukhin 1992 god,” video file) 
Supposedly factual pieces of information and personal reflections on the part of the 
narrator alternate to create a non-objective (as is indeed warned at the beginning of the 
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film) voiceover. Norris describes the film as “an active site of memory […] 
deliberately unmaking Soviet-era historical narratives and replacing them with 
alternatives”277 – alternatives which focussed, among other things, on the stability 
provided by the Romanov family and their love for family, fatherland and tradition. 
Oushakine sees in The Russia That We Lost the “trope of the Russian tragedy 
[cementing] yet another community of loss”278, singling out the film’s role as one of 
the earliest renditions of a post-Soviet trauma discourse aimed at the loss of Empire. 
Another television show that first aired in 1992, and which enjoyed great 
popularity throughout the decade, was the programme Who are we? (Кто мы?). 
According to Marlene Laruelle, it offered “a reconciled and consoling view of the 
major moments of Russian history […] [t]he overarching pathos is that of a suffering 
nation, decimated by pathologically unstable leaders and frantic masses and by a 
significant loss of the sense of values and identity”279; as such, it seems to have carried 
less overt forms of nostalgia, favouring, instead, an experimental discovery of the past 
that did not necessarily romanticise it.280 
Although anti-Communist sentiments prevailed during the immediate post-
perestroika period, Kathleen E. Smith also noted that the “Communists had worked 
diligently since 1992 to harness positive collective memories”281. The 1995 musical 
film Old Songs About Main Things (Старые песни о главном) speaks to the apparent 
success of this strategy, offering an insight into the parallel development of pro- and 
anti-Communist nostalgic strands in Russian society. A staple of 1990s Russian 
nostalgic popular culture, Old Songs About Main Things was modelled after Soviet 
propaganda films, but lacked elements of class struggle or conflict. Set in an unnamed 
village and an unspecified year between the late 1940s and the early 1950s, the film 
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portrays its protagonists as singing and pining after their various love interests, living 
a simple and straightforward life devoid of any kind of chaos or uncertainty.  
From a critical perspective, it is not quite clear how life in the Soviet Union, and 
under Stalin no less, would have provided that kind of harmony – yet historical 
accuracy was not the aim behind this production. Lipovetsky links Old Songs About 
Main Things to other nostalgic works from the mid-90s, all of which, he says, “are 
[…] aimed at pleasing the middle-aged generation for whom Socialist Realism is more 
associated with childhood memories”282. This thought is also echoed in Dominic 
Boyer’s work on 1990s nostalgia, in which he claims that people were primarily 
experiencing “a sociotemporal yearning for a different stage or quality of life”283. A 
similar thought was also raised by Boym, who called early post-Soviet mass nostalgia 
in Russia a “nationwide midlife crisis; [a] longing for the time of […] childhood and 
youth, […] partaking collectively in a selective forgetting”284, whereas Platt 
considered the Soviet past “a treasure house of timeless elements of a shared 
identity”285 for many post-Soviet Russians.  
Thus, the early 1990s forms of Soviet nostalgia appear primarily concerned with 
a temporal yearning for the safety of one’s childhood – a period in time which just so 
happened to coincide with Soviet rule for the majority of the Russian population. It 
did not, by and large, reference actual Soviet realia. This also explains the temporarily 
strong nostalgic feelings about the 1970s, which were dubbed Soviet Russia’s ‘Golden 
Age’.286 Both Old Songs About Main Things and The Russia That We Lost represent, 
to an extent, an apolitical form of nostalgia, which mourns not the loss of an ideology, 
but the loss of stability and blissful uneventfulness.  
In the field of literature, postmodern ideas and concepts were on the rise during 
the 1990s, whereas nostalgia was not – yet. As noted by Rosalind Marsh, 
Russian readers began to long for more escapist fare, and detective stories, thrillers and romances 
became the most popular reading matter in the 1990s. The people of Russia and the former USSR, 
to the great disappointment of the cultural intelligentsia, seemed to be more interested in 
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developing a mass culture than in filling in the many remaining gaps in their knowledge of history 
and ‘high culture’.287 
 
The term chernukha forms an important keyword for the era. Originally a slang term 
coined in the perestroika period to denote “a tendency toward unrelenting negativity 
and pessimism both in the arts and in the mass media”288, chernukha gave voice to the 
prolonged and ubiquitous sense of historical rootlessness that was frequently 
expressed in images of trauma and the shell-shocked mind. The heavy use of tropes 
such as “amnesia, returning ghosts, hereditary diseases, […] psychic flashbacks […] 
standing for the problems involved in formulating a shared, continuous identity after 
the traumas and upheavals of the twentieth century”289 is characteristic for novels such 
as Pelevin’s Buddha’s Little Finger (Чапаев и пустота, 2000) and Sorokin’s Blue 
Lard (Голубое сало, 1999), which also include frequent portrayals of Russian history 
as a black hole.  
The choice of these metaphors, while powerful, is also problematic. They 
contributed to the artificial inflation and perpetuation of a trauma narrative that would 
outlast the nineties and return in official guise under the Putin regime. Borenstein 
described the post-perestroika culture industry as “hell-bent on creating [an] 
impression of chaos while the 1990s were still a going concern”290, whereas Oushakine 
used the more general term of the “authors of the Russian tragedy”291 in an analysis of 
nationalist texts as late as 2009. At the same time, Alexander Etkind stated that 
“Russian literature played an integrative rather than a divisive role”292, whereas Marsh 
judges that “[i]t is difficult to measure the impact of trauma on the work of Russian 
writers, since […] mental illness remains largely taboo in Russian society”293.  
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Akunin struck a successful balance between these two extremes: although the 
issue of trauma is incorporated into the Fandorin project, it is done in a way that helps 
Fandorin – the central trauma victim – to reclaim individual responsibility for the 
events and make peace with his past. Thus, both the detective’s prematurely white 
temples and his pronounced stammer, which disappears in moments of stress, intense 
concentration, or masquerade, are the result of a bomb blast that killed Fandorin’s new 
bride in the series’ first instalment The Winter Queen (Азазель, 1998). Fandorin’s 
shell-shocked view of the mutilated arm of his wife raises both the spectre of the 
fragmented Empire and “the dismemberment of the Soviet Union”294 – a starting point 
for the series that not only marked the Fandorin project as a product of the Russian 
1990s, but which also created a conceptual link between Fandorin’s private tragedy 
and the bigger picture of Russia’s national trauma.  
The way that Fandorin deals with his trauma is indicative of Akunin’s break-out 
position on the post-Soviet book market. His protagonist not only accepts his stammer 
with equanimity, but also refuses to dye his temples – thus refusing to give his trauma 
any identitarian precedence. In the novel Leviathan (Левиафан, 1999) Fandorin 
advises another trauma victim not to escape into an illusory ideal world, but to face 
the roots of his traumatic memories and come to terms with them: “Мне, как и вам, 
тоже угрожала потеря рассудка. Я сохранил разум и даже заострил его […] Не 
уходите от истины, какой бы страшной она ни была, не прячьтесь за 
иллюзию”295. Approached in this way, trauma does not spell out an inevitable turn 
towards the past, nor does it justify a rejection of objective truth.  
However, similar voices of forward-looking self-reflexion were few and far 
between in the Russian literature of the 1990s. The dominant, chernukha-inspired 
insistence on metaphors of loss and fragmentation also created another problem by 
suggesting “that the parts of a shattered empire may secretly cohere in ways hitherto 
unsuspected”296 – triggering not only a belief in the wholeness of Empire, but also a 
search for alternative identity offers that received little to no guidance from above.  
The Russian President at the time, Boris Yeltsin, tried and failed to adequately 
deal with the legacy of his predecessors’ politically induced historical amnesia. 
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Yeltsin’s attempts at managing Russia’s search for a viable identity narrative were 
largely confined to an open, but disorganised embrace of Western liberalism and 
Western ideals. In 1996, Yeltsin initiated a search for a new ‘idea for Russia’ as part 
of his presidential campaign; the results, however, were as scarce as they were 
disheartening. In the end, all they revealed was a profound lack of convincingly 
positive reference frames among the public. At the same time, however, responses to 
Yeltsin’s call for a new national identity narrative also indicated the absence of deeply 
rooted nostalgic sentiments, as neither Soviet ideology nor the intelligentsia’s liberal 
mind-set evoked clear preferences on the part of the public.  
While it is not particularly surprising that no sound concept of a non-Western and 
non-Soviet way forward for Russia could be found in 1996, the results still aptly 
illustrate the fact that Yeltsin’s “politics of memory was episodic and lacked 
resources”297. The only suitable foil for Yeltsin’s Western-oriented political agenda 
was Imperial Russian culture, mainly based on the fact that the Russian Empire had 
entertained a much less reclusive cultural sphere than its Soviet counterpart. The 
somewhat paradoxical identification of Imperial nostalgia with Western progress was 
reflected in the fact that, for most of the 1990s, “Peter the Great (since 1990) and 
Catherine II (since the end of the decade) were the two most popular historical figures 
in Russia, both being perceived less as powerful rulers […] than as enlightened 
monarchs, modernizers, and Westernizers”298.  
However, the open embrace of all things Western “as an incarnation of moral and 
aesthetic perfection, economic efficiency, and political freedom”299 began to tip 
towards exasperation in the wake of a growing disenchantment with the liberal 
experiment during the mid-1990s. As the West stopped being an attractive offer of 
identification, so did the word ‘new’. Instead, Boym registered that “sometime in the 
mid-1990s […], the word old became popular and commercially viable, promoting 
more goods than the word new”300 – which is an interesting observation to make in the 
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context of the Fandorin project, which continued to use the opposite approach with 
some success. 
During the mid-1990s, official voices that focussed on Russia’s pre-revolutionary 
past in an outspokenly nostalgic manner also began to make themselves heard. 
Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov engaged in an ambitious architectural project aimed at 
redesigning Moscow as Russia’s traditional capital and the mythological heart of the 
country. In 1995, work began on the reconstruction of the Cathedral of Christ the 
Saviour, which had been dynamited by the Soviet authorities in 1931. It was the 
crowning piece of Luzhkov’s architectural renaissance project, which betrayed his 
open desire to 
have Russians embrace a vague folkloric concept of their roots – one that included castles and 
churches, tsars and soldiers. Gritty social history and balanced interpretations of past policies have 
no place in his vision of the national capital. […] The mayor seemed nostalgic for an idealized 
distant past, when Russians were united around faith in their state and and [sic] in their church.301  
 
In 1997, Luzhkov’s celebrations of Moscow’s 850th anniversary drew national and 
international attention as “a festival of reimagined Tsarism, fake Slavicism, and gold-
encrusted religious ceremonial”302. Three years later, the new Cathedral of Christ the 
Saviour was finished. 
The symbolic and indeed nostalgic value of the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour 
was subsequently referenced in Nikita Mikhalkov’s 1998 film The Barber of Siberia 
(Сибирский цирюльник), which remains one of the most expensive blockbusters and 
most discussed films of post-Soviet film history to date. It is said to have been heavily 
sponsored by the Russian government, making it a precursor for the later wholesale 
commodification of nostalgia under Putin.303 Norris paid attention to the film in several 
of his works, describing it as both a “cultural eruption and the first explosion that made 
Putin’s use of patriotism possible”304 as well as an “effort to rekindle tsarist-era values 
in contemporary society”305, “a comment on Russian nationalism after 1991”306 and a 
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homage to Russia’s traditional father-like ruler figures and the “timeless patriotism of 
the Russian soldier”307. At the same time, many “reviewers […] believed that 
Mikhalkov was attempting to sell an outdated patriotism that glossed over the tsarist 
past and overly criticized the West”308.  
As one of the milestones in the development of post-Soviet nostalgia discourse, 
The Barber of Siberia encapsulates several of the nostalgic discussion points that were 
carried over from the 1990s into the Putin years, and which consolidated a nostalgia 
for both Empire and the image of a strong, paternal ruler in the broader swathes of 
Russian society. It also joined an already existing discussion around the significance 
of Eastern values for Russia’s future development. The ways in which The Barber of 
Siberia focuses on the illusory image of the enigmatic, incomprehensible Russian soul 
are reminiscent of Govorukhin’s earlier work, but the choice of Alexander III’s reign 
provides a more selective interpretation of the Imperial past, which refutes Peter the 
Great’s vision for Russia as much as it does Yeltsin’s cosying up to the West. Birgit 
Beumers credited Mikhalkov’s film with performing a “shift from a nostalgia that is 
openly constructed as a myth to a nostalgia for a past that pretends to be authentic”309. 
In other words, The Barber of Siberia signals the move from an overwhelmingly 
postmodern, ironic form of nostalgia to a nostalgia more correctly labelled restorative 
after Boym’s theoretical model. 
The considerable loss of ambiguity in mediated forms of nostalgia during the 
1990s also became apparent in Aleksandr Sokurov’s film Russian Ark (Русский 
ковчег), one of the last major cultural productions to emerge from the decade. 
Commissioned in the mid-1990s, the film was only finished in 2002 due to its singular 
production circumstances and complicated technical approach. It follows the Marquis 
de Custine, a real-life French chronicler of Russian court life in 1839, on his journey 
through the Hermitage. The tour leads through an achronological assortment of 
snippets from Russian history and is accompanied by the voiceover of an invisible 
narrator, with whom the Marquis engages in a discussion of Russian values, 
achievements, and national identity. The film has alternatively been described as “a 
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covert propaganda film”310, a “solemn contemplation of the ‘Russia that we lost’”311 
and as an expression of “cultural identification that occurs on the brink of identity 
hesitation”312 – thus highlighting, once again, the multipolarity of the Russian national 
identity and nostalgia discourse in the 1990s. 
Both Russian Ark’s setting within the Hermitage, where the protagonist and 
narrator are surrounded by artefacts of European culture, and the film’s ongoing 
comparison between Russia and the West have become the subjects of prolonged 
academic discussions. Despite the fact that Russian Ark features multiple instances of 
criticism directed at both Russian state history and the European othering of non-
European cultural achievements, Sokurov has been accused of “[producing] various 
forms of erasure and national myths of origin”313 as well as, somewhat dramatically, 
“[carrying] the same load of Russian nationalism that helped to unleash the flood of 
the 20th century”314. The use of the term ‘ark’ certainly does suggest a “timeless, 
cloistered space”315 and an inviolable sanctity of values that carries eternal meaning. 
At the same time, the notion of an ark could be interpreted critically, or as a parody 
aimed at a long out-of-date repository of cultural elements in dire need of an update. 
Seen from a contemporary perspective of domineering restorative nostalgic moods in 
cultural productions, I would agree with Yana Hashamova on this matter, who views 
Sokurov’s attempts at dissolving the timeline between past and present as a 
postmodernly inspired experiment as well as a critical and reflective engagement with 
Russian history.316  
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Considered through the prism of Boym’s methodology, it thus appears that a mix 
of restorative and reflective nostalgia was at work in Russia during the time between 
1991 and 1999. Neither an overarching nostalgic master-narrative nor a united sense 
of national nostalgia for one particular period in time can be detected; instead, various 
manifestations of nostalgia played with the borders and specifics of a hitherto illicit 
discourse about the national past whilst simultaneously rediscovering the hidden 
corners of Russia’s multi-faceted history. A nostalgia for the intelligentsia was 
curiously absent from most of these productions: whereas Mikhalkov, for instance, 
tended to “pillory the intelligentsia as weak and ineffectual […] Sokurov, in many 
ways the quintessential, absorbed intelligent, has seemed not to notice them”317. The 
intelligentsia itself remained largely silent on these issues. Unlike the realm of TV and 
cinematography, the literary world of the 1990s seemed hesitant to embrace nostalgia 
as a theme; instead, romance and historical fiction were on the rise, while the 
intelligentsia occupied itself with its own demise and engaged in a more one-sided 
chernukha-inspired discourse that laid the groundwork for its own, subsequent 
cynicism trap.  
Crucially, however, the initial wave of nostalgia in the 1990s was the result of a 
public movement, played out from a variety of perspectives in the available arenas of 
public discourse. While political figures such as Luzhkov and Yeltsin influenced this 
debate and came to represent it to a degree, they never dominated it. As summarised 
by Koposov,  
the situation with historical memory in Yeltsin’s Russia was uncertain and contradictory. On the 
one hand, it was characterized by a growing nostalgia for Soviet times, increasing anti-Western 
sentiments, and the rise of nationalism. On the other hand, the liberal master narrative, which was 
gradually losing credibility, remained the government’s official position and continued to enjoy 
some popular support.318  
 
Lee was therefore correct when she called the 1990s nostalgic discourse a “genuinely 
popular impulse [my emphasis]”319 – i.e. a spontaneous and largely unorganised 
process characterised by its intensity, but also its potential brevity. From today’s 
perspective, it is impossible to say whether the 1990s nostalgic discourse would have 
outrun its lifespan and simply ceased to play a part in the national identity discourse if 
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different political events had taken place after 2000. As it happened, “after the end of 
the 1990s, [nostalgia] acquired its dynamic force from the ‘outside.’ It is noteworthy 
that this ‘outside’ is neither a mature civil society nor the intelligentsia, […] but 
political power itself.”320 As of 31 December 1999, the name behind this political 
power was that of Vladimir Putin. 
 
2.2. After 2000: Streamlining Nostalgia 
Putin’s coming into power changed the trajectory of Yeltsin’s unstructured national 
identity project. Starting from a “desire to restore Russia’s injured national pride”321, 
Putin initiated an aggressive politics of revival, aimed at recapturing Russian history 
for a public usability. Neither the failures of the Russian Empire nor the Soviet 
regime’s horrors played a part in this narrative. Instead, the interim of the 1990s was 
labelled as a period of unprecedented instability in Russian history, taking on the role 
of the main culprit in Russia’s continued identity struggle. Constant reminders about 
the strength of the state – and the Empire – that came before the 1990s, along with the 
many ways in which Putin’s style of governance connects to these periods, served to 
cement the national trauma of the ‘wild nineties’ – lest people forget how the absence 
of a strong, paternal ruler and state lastingly uprooted them.  
By rejecting the anti-Communist rhetoric employed by Gorbachev and Yeltsin 
and placing the Soviet period – with a special focus on the victory in the Great Patriotic 
War – “within a power-political continuum [that] takes its departure in the year 1612, 
when […] a popular uprising expelled the Polish occupation troops from Moscow”322, 
the Putin regime purposefully glossed over the historical breaks created by previous 
regimes in the 20th century. It also filled those gaps with a blinkered view of Russian 
history, following an unbroken line of Russian patriotism, military strength and 
century-old anti-Western fervour in a bid to turn identitary indecision into a need for 
opposition and othering instead.323  
 
320 Ibid, 172. 
321 Marsh, Literature, History and Identity, 113. 
322 Bagger, “The Study of History,” 115. 
323 Cameron Ross, “Das Paradox: Putins Populäre Autokratie: Legitimitätsquellen in Einem Hybriden 
Regime,” Osteuropa 64, no. 8 (2014): 99-112, 111. Whether this process was always entirely under 
control or not would be a subject for debate, but it certainly fits Putin’s 2016 elevation of patriotism to 




This confrontative stance stabilised the Russian search for a national identity in 
two ways: on the one hand, a negative definition of selfhood conveniently made it 
redundant to define who or what Russians really were. On the other hand, the failure 
of Putin’s predecessors to create a convincing national identity narrative based on a 
reassessment of history made Putin’s open embrace of Russia’s past into a trailblazing 
moment, enabling him to conquer the interpretative primacy over both Soviet and 
Imperial history in one fell swoop. By openly reclaiming – rather than denigrating – 
past periods in Russian history, Putin answered the widespread psychological need for 
clear guidance in the post-Soviet space and appeared as the first post-perestroika 
politician to openly refute “the liberal habit of soul-searching”324 – which had 
seemingly only led to uncomfortable truths about self and nation anyway.  
 
Restorative Soviet Nostalgia 
Putin’s strategy in formulating a national idea for Russia was thus to dictate a narrative 
from above, rather than leave the search process to society, scholarship, and culture. 
Instead of embracing the radical heterogeneity of postmodernist thinking and 
continuing to foster a critical spirit capable of authentic Vergangenheitsbewältigung, 
Putin chose an approach that worked for, and not against, the onset of a nationwide 
revival of restorative nostalgia. The transfer of these reactionary attitudes into the 
public discourse promptly followed suit: as described by Kalinina, the years 
immediately following Putin’s rise to power were marked by a “rejection of ironic 
attitudes […] the general rejection of the postmodern paradigm and the revival of 
conservative modes of thinking”325.  
The education sector was one of the spheres of public life that was quickly affected 
by this shift in narrative. In 2003, Catherine Merridale analysed Russia’s education 
system and identified 
a tendency to seek an undivided truth, the one correct answer beside which all 
others are sheer lies; a fascination with charismatic authority, and especially 
with the personalities of leaders; an equal fascination with the irrational, and 
especially with the idea of miraculous deliverance, the hoped-for but elusive 
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‘special path’; and a taste for making extreme judgments about events, dividing them into light 
and dark, good and evil, the echoes of omniscient morality.326 
 
Three years later, a history textbook was withdrawn from Russian schools because it 
“invited students to discuss the positive and negative aspects of the current president’s 
policies”327. In 2013, Putin’s call for a unified history textbook to end the discussion 
of multiple parallel versions of historical events in schools even made international 
headlines, as it drove home the fact that in his Russia, historical “Truth is unitary and 
compulsory”328. 
Journalism and media were also directly affected by this changed attitude towards 
fact and fiction. In 2001, the independent TV channel NTV – which had been known 
for its satirical political programmes – was raided and incorporated into the state-
controlled media holding company Gazprom, which effectively silenced it as a voice 
of critical news coverage. While not directly related to nostalgia or the manipulation 
of historical memory, the NTV incident did mark the moment from which non-
conformist news coverage was under attack in Russia. A subsequent case was that of 
the liberal TV channel TVRain, which – following the publication of a public opinion 
poll about the siege of Leningrad, which asked viewers to consider the hypothetical 
outcome of a surrender of the city to the Germans – was ousted from all official TV 
providers in 2014. As part of a fundraising campaign to re-establish broadcasting, the 
channel created a promotional video titled The Strength of Words (Сила слова), which 
featured the reading of a Pushkin poem on public transport that defends the idea of 
free speech.329 As of 2020, the channel is still limited to online streaming – which is 
also under threat following gradual changes to Russia’s internet laws.330 
The short period of the Medvedev interregnum (2008-2012), although often 
lauded for its moderately successful ‘reset’ of US-Russian relations, did not introduce 
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any considerable changes into official memory politics, particularly those concerning 
the Soviet Union.331 In 2008, the NGO Memorial – a perestroika-era organisation that 
researches Soviet totalitarianism and human rights issues in post-Soviet states – 
became a target for state repressions and had its digital archives confiscated, before 
being placed on the list of so-called foreign agents. Subsequently, Memorial was 
subjected to a lawsuit that almost caused its liquidation.332 In 2009, the ‘Presidential 
Commission of the Russian Federation to Counter Attempts to Falsify History to the 
Detriment of Russia’s Interests’ (Комиссия при президенте Российской Федерации 
по противодействию попыткам фальсификации истории в ущерб интересам 
России) was established; political historian Mark Kramer reads this as evidence for 
Putin’s puppeteering of Medvedev, and states that the “mere existence of the 
commission was a symbolic reminder of Putin’s interest in fostering a particular 
historical narrative with little regard for what the evidence might show”333.  
Putin’s rehabilitation of the Soviet past for a post-Soviet usability intensified after 
his return to the Presidency in 2012. Acts such as the reactivation of Hero of Labour 
medals, the construction of a Russian Disneyland featuring a Berlin Reichstag waiting 
to be stormed by teenage cadets, and the return of Stalin memorial plaques, statues and 
busts in official institutions across the country all confirm what Dobrenko has called 
Putin’s removal of the post- from the post-Soviet space.334 Not all of these elements 
were innovations by the Putin regime – Gregory Feifer, for instance, wrote as early as 
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1999 about the surge of Soviet military medals displayed on inner-city buildings 
alongside Tsereteli statues in central Moscow, asking: “What kind of history is that? 
It is myth as history, and it works all the better in Russia’s feeble knowledge of the 
real, disappointing thing – and society’s reluctance to ponder it”335. However, the Putin 
regime was happy to further the nation’s ignorance and capitalise on the existing 
reactionary trends in society – and it did so to noticeable success.  
Today’s cultural climate in Russia not only openly supports, but actively yearns 
for “a politics whose objective is the positive recording of nostalgia for the Soviet past 
into a new form of Russian patriotism”336. Opinions such as Likhacheva et al.’s, who 
claim that “[t]he last remnants of the Soviet identity are dying out”337, therefore need 
to be read with a generous amount of scepticism. Nothing seems off limits in the wide 
range of commemorative practices aimed at remembering the Soviet past, as long as 
practitioners stay within the political agenda set by the regime – which has led to the 
emergence of some unsettling memory practices, such as the creation of a privately-
owned TV channel called Nostalgia (showing round-the-clock reruns of Soviet films 
and TV programmes and featuring a sickle and hammer on its channel logo), the offer 
of Hitler Youth haircuts in Russian hair salons and the emergence of a popular Stalin 
selfie app.338 In Kalinina’s words, the “Soviet past [has become] an emotional 
currency”339 that feeds both patriotic and nationalist sentiments. 
It is crucial to point out that this is no longer the emotional currency of illusory 
childhood stability as purported in Old Songs About Main Things.340 However, it does 
carry familial bonds of a different kind, representing the emotional currency of a nation 
indebted to its paternal leader figure. Just as the Putin regime’s use of Russia’s victory 
 
335 Gregory Feifer, “Utopian Nostalgia: Russia's ‘New Idea’,” World Policy Journal 16, no. 3 (1999): 
111-118, 112.  
336 Ilya Kalinin, “Nostalgic Modernization: The Soviet Past as ‘Historical Horizon’,” Slavonica 17, no. 
2 (2011): 156-66, 157. 
337 A. Likhacheva, I. Makarov, and E. Makarova, “Post-Soviet Russian Identity and Its Influence on 
European-Russian Relations,” European Journal of Futures Research 3, no. 1 (2015): 1-8, 3. 
338 Cf. Sergey Medvedev, “Izobrazhaia Gitlera. Kak pamiat’ o voine prevrachaetsia v igru,” Republic, 
May 5, 2017, <http://republic.ru/posts/82518> [accessed 17 December 2019]; Hannah Thoburn, “For 
Putin, For Stalin,” Foreign Policy, January 15, 2016, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/25/for-putin-
for-stalin-russia-propaganda> [accessed 17 December 2019]. 
339 Kalinina, Mediated Post-Soviet Nostalgia, 232f. 
340 Dobrenko has called Putin the creator of his own version of the show, stating that “President Putin 
should be recognised as the most consistent contemporary postmodern artist [...] he has managed to 
create a genuine sots-art political collage: there are new words in the Russian national anthem, but the 
music is Soviet (real Starye pesni o glavnom) [...],” Dobrenko, “Utopias of Return,” 170. 
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in the Second World War masks the fact that the war was won despite, not because of, 
Stalin, it also effectively reframes Stalin’s role into that of Russia’s paternal saviour – 
the iron-fisted ‘Father of the nations’ who commands blind obedience from his 
‘children’ in exchange for the services rendered to the country.  
By expounding on his own KGB history and devising a clever PR strategy 
(complete with bare-chested horseback riding, martial arts photo shoots, and public 
puppy cuddling), Putin successfully updated the old operating modes of Stalin’s 
personality cult for a modern-day usability. While presenting himself as the 
diametrical opposite to the feeble, indecisive alcoholic Yeltsin, he also drew 
legitimacy for his turn towards authoritarianism from a combined nostalgia for Stalin 
and superpower glory. The success of this strategy can be seen in poll results that have 
been naming Stalin as the most outstanding Russian in world history for years – closely 
followed by Putin himself.341  
I therefore fully agree with Nikolai Petrov’s suggestion to label the current Putin 
regime as ‘Stalin light’, with a tendency towards ‘Stalin medium’.342 Rudra Sil and 
Cheng Chen have documented the return of a curious doublethink in response to this 
newly authoritarian turn in politics, which they describe as a willingness to unite 
“continued support for democracy [with] declining state legitimacy and rising 
nostalgia for the Soviet regime”343. The coining of the term ‘sovereign democracy’ 
under Putin’s leadership successfully cemented this growing “demand for non-
democracy”344 into a linguistic caveat of uniquely Russian proportions – and lent a 
name to the fact that “the Kremlin is no longer trying to act as if open-ended elections, 
a division of powers, local self-administration and the rule of law still existed in 
Russia. The attempt to appear as a legitimate power in this way has been left 
 
341 Cf. Vasily Maximov, “Russians Name Stalin ‘Most Outstanding’ World Figure, Putin Ties for 
Second,” RT, June 26, 2017, <http://www.rt.com/politics/394158-russians-name-stalin-most-
outstanding/> [accessed 17 December 2019] 
342 Cf. Nikolaj Petrov, “Legitimität, Repression, Kollaps: Entwicklungsstadien Des Putin-Regimes,” 
Osteuropa 64, no. 8 (2014): 85-98, 96-7. 
343 Rudra Sil and Cheng Chen, “State Legitimacy and the (In)significance of Democracy in Post‐
Communist Russia,” Europe-Asia Studies 56, no. 3 (2004): 347-68, 353. 
344 ‘Nachfrage nach Nichtdemokratie’. Boris Makarenko, “Repressionsindolenz: Politische Kultur Und 
Autoritäre Herrschaft in Russland,“ Osteuropa 64, no. 8 (2014): 113-20, 118. The return to a narrative 
about the inviolability of the national leader was made quasi-official in 2019, when Putin signed a law 
that introduced fines and potential prison sentences for ‘disrespecting authorities’ online. This law was 
followed by a no less controversial law about a sovereign Russian internet under state control. As of 
yet, both laws are still being carried out inconsistently. However, this should not distract from the fact 
that they spell out a disastrous verdict on the state of democracy in contemporary Russia. 
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behind”345. The cult figure of Russia’s iron-fisted leaders plays an inherent part in this 
shift in perception about what constitutes political legitimacy. 
 
Imperial Nostalgia 
The Soviet period is not the only source of nostalgic capital for this endeavour. The 
Putin regime’s fixation on the cult potential inherent to strong leadership also provided 
the Kremlin with an opportunity to seize hold of the existing discourse about Imperial 
nostalgia in Russian culture. According to Khapaeva, 
Re-Stalinization and Russian neo-medievalism represent two interrelated trends of a complex 
ideological process. At the core of this process, which depends on aesthetics for its expression, is 
the reconsideration of the concept of citizenship and of the social contract between the authorities 
and the majority of post-Soviet society. That consensus is thoroughly grounded in the unprocessed 
memory of Soviet crimes and collective denial of historical responsibility.346 
 
Far less controversial than the Soviet horrors, removed from individual remembering 
and pre-popularised during the 1990s, the late Imperial period offered an attractive 
“source (or resource) for the extraction of symbolic capital”347 for the Putin regime – 
along with a long list of paternal leader figures to emulate.  
Over the course of his presidential terms, Putin reinstated the image of some of 
Russia’s most notorious iron-fisted rulers to the national memory – Vladimir the Great 
and Ivan the Terrible among them.348 By doing so, he not only allowed, but openly 
enforced a positive remembering of their role in Russian history – making his own, 
initially proverbial identification with the role of ‘Father figure Tsar’ (a logical 
extension from the ‘Father of the Nations’ that was Stalin) obtain an increasingly literal 
meaning over the years. This process reached its temporary climax in 2016, when a 
new monument to Vladimir the Great was unveiled in front of the Kremlin. Not 
 
345 ‘Der Übergang zu einem offen autoritären Regime bedeutet, dass der Kreml nicht mehr versucht so 
zu tun, als gebe es in Russland Wahlen mit offenem Ausgang, Gewaltenteilung, lokale Selbstverwaltung 
und Rechtsstaatlichkeit. Der Versuch, auf diese Weise als rechtens erachtet zu werden, wurde 
abgebrochen.’ Petrov, “Legitimität, Repression, Kollaps,” 86. 
346 Dina Khapaeva, “Triumphant Memory of the Perpetrators: Putin’s Politics of Re-Stalinization,” 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies 49, no. 1 (2016): 61-73, 72. 
347 Ilya Kalinin, “Petropoetics,” in Russian Literature Since 1991, 120-144, 121.  
348 Cf. Alexander Baunov, “A Tale of Two Statues,” Foreign Affairs, November 7, 2016, 




without reason, many citizens took it to represent “a thinly veiled tribute to the 
Vladimir residing within its walls: two bookends of a millennium of Russianness”349.  
Unlike Yeltsin’s version of Imperial nostalgia, which was mainly saturated with 
the myth of Russia’s pre-Communist cultural greatness, Putin’s version of 
remembering Empire was initially focussed on the sacrosanct image of the royal family 
and their status as defenders of the Orthodox faith.350 Indeed, Orthodoxy has made a 
return in the definition of Russian national identity that often interlinks with nostalgia 
for Empire. In 2000, Nicholas II – the last Russian Tsar – was canonised by the 
Orthodox Church. In 2007, a school dubbed ‘Orthodox Eton’ was founded in Moscow, 
aimed at prepping students for the return of the monarchy.351 Likewise, marches 
commemorating Nicholas II and other members of the murdered royal family draw 
thousands of spectators every year; in 2016, a Duma deputy even carried Nicholas II’s 
portrait on a march of the Bessmertny polk – providing a senseless, yet telling example 
of the way Soviet and Imperial nostalgia for patriarchal rule mix in the official 
discourse.352 
Over the years, Putin’s self-stylisation into a new Tsar-like figure has also been 
adopted by Western and opposition media outlets. The October 2017 edition of The 
Economist featured a cover image of Putin’s head, photoshopped onto an Imperial 
uniform and running the headline ‘A Tsar is Born’.353 In 2018, Alexei Navalny’s 
protest movement against Putin’s fourth inauguration as president used the slogan ‘He 
is no Tsar to Us’ (он нам не царь), which criticised Putin’s authoritarian power grab 
 
349 Shaun Walker, The Long Hangover: Putin’s New Russia and the Ghosts of the Past (Oxford: Oxford 
UP, 2018), 246. Peter the Great is conspicuously absent from this list, although he still figured in 
Luzhkov’s building mania of the 1990s. 
350 Putin’s closeness to the Orthodox Church and his apparent openness towards including Orthodoxy 
into a neo-Imperial Russian identity narrative have been a continuous subject of academic debate in 
recent decades, cf. John Anderson, “Putin and the Russian Orthodox Church: Asymmetric 
Symphonia?,” Journal of International Affairs 61, no. 1 (2007): 185-201; Alexander Agadjanian, 
“Tradition, Morality and Community: Elaborating Orthodox Identity in Putin’s Russia,” Religion, State 
& Society 45, no. 1 (2017): 39-60. 
351 Shaun Walker, “Russia’s Soul is Monarchic,” The Guardian, March 6, 2017, 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/06/russia-revolution-tsarist-school-moscow-nicholas-
ii> [accessed 17 December 2019] 
352 Cf. Shaun Walker, “Thousands of Pilgrims Walk to Commemorate Russian Tsar Nicholas II,” The 
Guardian, July 17, 2017, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/17/thousands-of-pilgrims-
walk-to-commemorate-russian-tsar-nicholas-ii> [accessed 17 December 2019]; “Poklonskaia vyshla na 
aktsiiu ‘Bessmertnii polk’ s ikonoi Nikolaia II,” Lenta.ru, May 9, 2016, 
<http://lenta.ru/news/2016/05/09/polk/> [accessed 17 December 2019] 
353 “A Tsar is Born,” The Economist, October 26, 2017, 
<https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/10/26/a-tsar-is-born> [accessed 7 February 2020] 
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whilst – somewhat idiosyncratically – using the word Tsar as if it really did carry the 
right to omnipotent almightiness.  
 
Figure 3 A Tsar is Born 
(The Economist, October 26, 2017.) 
Indeed, the memory of Russian Tsars in post-Soviet Russia is increasingly shrouded 
in an aura of historically inscribed and officially promoted inviolability – the 
transgression of which can be met with vehement opposition. This was the case in 
2017, when a scandal erupted in the run-up to the release of Alexei Uchitel’s film 
Matilda (Матильда). Strongly opposed by the conservative and ultra-orthodox camp 
for its allegedly blasphemous and heretical portrayal of Nicholas II, Uchitel’s film 
about the last Russian Tsar’s pre-marital affair with Polish-born ballerina 
Kshesinskaya led to terrorist attacks on cinemas, advertising pull-outs on national TV, 
a social media campaign under the hashtag #wewillstopmatilda 
(#остановимматильду) and a barrage of threats against Uchitel. A further reason for 
protest was the choice of a German actor to play Nicholas II, which offended the 
nationalist sentiments of hardliners such as Duma deputy Poklonskaya – the very one 
who carried Nicholas II’s portrait on a march commemorating victims of World War 
II in the year prior.  
If we consider that up until perestroika, “the official Soviet attitude to the last Tsar 
and the immediate pre-revolutionary period had been one of unalloyed hostility, 
[portraying] Tsar Nicholas II and his Empress Alexandra Fyodorovna, if they were 
mentioned at all, […] as parasites and oppressors”354, then the observable shift in 
memory culture is truly tremendous. The scandal surrounding Matilda forced people 
 
354 Marsh, History and Literature in Contemporary Russia, 174. 
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to engage with the question of whose stance was more nostalgic: that of the film-
makers, who produced an aesthetically spectacular, but clearly romanticised vision of 
the late Imperial era, or that of the film’s critics, who claimed interpretative agency 
and a right to historical distortion for the sake of preserving a dead dictator’s public 
image and the religious sentiments of Orthodox believers. Who wields the cultural 
authority to dictate which comfortable lies to remember, and which uncomfortable 
truths to forget? 
 
Imperial Nostalgia in Literature 
Russian film and cinema were not the only cultural sphere that discussed these issues, 
no matter how hesitantly. Another powerful strand within the neo-Imperial nostalgic 
discourse was post-2000 Russian literature, which quickly proved that “empire 
survived 1917 and 1991”355. As summarised by Marsh, a specific kind of nostalgic 
literature best labelled “serious historical fiction written from a Russian nationalist 
viewpoint […] began [to emerge] during perestroika”356, grew in prominence during 
the late Yeltsin period, and experienced a veritable popularity boost following the 
official sanction given to it by the Putin regime.  
Unlike the sense of existential insecurity and inadequacy that was engendered by 
the “emphasis on post-Soviet national humiliation and the tragic dissolution of former 
frameworks of collective belonging”357 during the 1990s, the literature of the 2000s 
was largely dominated by works and authors who espoused a “militant devotion to ‘an 
empire we have lost’”358. The seeds for this trend had clearly been sown in the decade 
prior; however, with the perceivable lack in opposition from intelligentsia quarters and 
the added support from above, openly nostalgic voices for Empire were at liberty to 
freely discredit both the postmodern experiment in literature and the democratic 
experiment in politics. The work of Aleksandr Dugin is a case in point: apart from 
turning postmodernism into a weapon against itself, Dugin – who published his first 
 
355 Jane Burbank and Mark Von Hagen, “Coming into the Territory: Uncertainty and Empire,” in 
Russian Empire: Space, People, Power, 1700-1930, eds. Jane Burbank, Mark von Hagen, and Anatolyi 
Remnev (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2007): 1-29, 25. However, the term ‘Soviet Empire’ was 
considered taboo in the Soviet Union itself, cf. Marsh, “The Concepts of Gender, Citizenship, and 
Empire,” 194-5. 
356 Marsh, Literature, History and Identity, 318. 
357 Noordenbos, Post-Soviet Literature, 3. 
358 Ibid, 119. 
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books in the mid-nineties – also used “neo-imperial metaphors of Eurasian geography 
and territory”359 to support his rewriting of the Russian national identity narrative. 
The success of the neo-Eurasianist movement signalled a public departure from 
Yeltsin’s pro-Western orientation of the early and mid-nineties. Originally a 1920s 
movement that emerged in the Russian émigré community, Eurasianism was created 
in opposition to the doctrines of the Soviet Union and “the repressive Russification of 
the nineteenth century”360. It started to flourish again in the late 1990s, when neo-
Eurasianists began to take an interest in Asia by merit of it not being the West. Their 
flirtations with the idea of neo-Imperial grandeur made heavy use of pseudo-scientific 
racist doctrines and stressed Russia’s kinship with the East; during the 2000s, neo-
Eurasianism grew into “the legitimating ultra-nationalist ideology of the new [Putin] 
regime”361 and “a Kremlin-sponsored ideology that aims to reconstruct a pseudo-
medieval society of orders and lead Russia into the new Middle Ages […] [it is] 
instrumental in solidifying popular support for Putinism”362.  
Some popular novels that fall into the neo-Eurasianist category are Aleksandr 
Prokhanov’s Gospodin Geksogen (2002), the Etnogenez project (Этногенез, 2009-
2012) under the leadership of Konstantin Rykov and Vyacheslav Rybakov and Igor’ 
Alimov’s Eurasian Symphony (Евразийская симфония, 2000-2005) – a series of 
novels written in the ironical detective style. With their strong geopolitical focus, these 
novels provide easily digestible historical ‘truths’ about Russia’s unique mission in the 
world while employing “various degrees of fanaticism and seriousness […] [to] 
construct cultural continuities in response to social chaos and historical breaks”363.  
 
359 Clowes, Russia on the Edge, 44. 
360 Ibid, 49. 
361 Mervyn F. Bendle, “Putin’s Rasputin: Aleksandr Dugin and Neo-Eurasianism,” Quadrant 58, no. 9 
(2014): 14-20, 14. 
362 Khapaeva, “Triumphant Memory of the Perpetrators,” 69. 
363 Noordenbos, Post-Soviet Literature, 106. Marsh raises the interesting point that most of 
contemporary neo-Imperial fiction on the Russian market is of male authorship, particularly in the case 
of the new genre of the imperial novel (e.g. Pavel Krusanov’s Bite of an Angel (Укус ангела, 1999)). 
While I do not want to enter the gender debate in this thesis, I think it is worthwhile to point out that 
Akunin does not conform to this paradigm, further strengthening his position as an author of note in the 
post-Soviet literary landscape. Clowes provides another case in point for Marsh’s hypothesis when she 
lists Ulitskaya and other women writers as the authors who attempt to rewrite the history of centre and 
periphery by trying to give voice to “the disenfranchised, the outsider, as well as the ‘typical’” (Clowes, 
Russia on the Edge, 139) and create a picture of modern Russia that incorporates all these groups without 
any inherent conflict. 
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Many followers of the school of Neo-Eurasianism also belong to the literary group 
of the Petersburg fundamentalists, which, in 2001, penned a letter to Putin that stated 
that “(geo)political action and imperial expansion were the only possible 
compensation for Russia’s humiliating and paralyzing postimperial status”364 – an 
aggressive, revisionist stance that went beyond the identification with the royal family 
and simultaneously carried the kind of ambiguity characteristic of stiob. Boris 
Noordenbos coined the term ‘imperial stiob’ for this phenomenon, calling it an attitude 
that brings “conformism and consensus to their limits, by creating sweeping claims 
about collective missions and strong leadership, and by noisily echoing a new 
superpower rhetoric expressed in Russian politics since Putin first took office as 
president”365.  
As lies in the nature of stiob, it remains unclear to what extent the work of the 
Petersburg fundamentalists ought to be considered a parody or an outright expression 
of support for irredentist geopolitical action. However, stiob’s reappearance in post-
Soviet Russia’s cultural sphere fittingly illustrates the long hangover of Soviet modes 
of thought, along with the new-old forms of reactionary conservatism in art that it can 
engender. 
 
Geopolitical vs Cultural Nostalgia 
A strong geopolitical focus remained a defining characteristic of Imperial nostalgia in 
post-Soviet Russia up until 2014. By reactivating the memory of Empire and its vast 
borders – borders that had remained largely the same throughout the Soviet period – 
supporters of the neo-Imperial doctrine exploited the fact that Russia’s “extensive 
territory was a source of state pride and self-definition”366. Putin’s 2005 Annual 
Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, in which he described the 
break-up of the Soviet Union as the “крупнейшей геополитической катастрофой 
века […] настоящей драмой […] Эпидемия распада […] перекинулась на саму 
Россию”367, had not only explicitly framed the loss of territory as a loss of strength 
and power, but had also superimposed the narrative of a lasting post-Soviet trauma 
 
364 Ibid, 132. 
365 Ibid, 131. 
366 Burbank and von Hagen, “Coming into the Territory,” 16. 
367 Vladimir Putin, “Poslanie Federal’nomu Sobraniiu Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” Kremlin.ru, April 25, 
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back onto the Russian national consciousness. Kalinin speaks of an “exploitation of 
trauma”368 in this context – a rhetorical exploitation which ultimately led to a very real 
act of geopolitical aggression. 
The annexation of Crimea notably heightened the neo-Imperial elements in 
Putin’s historical narrative, but it also initiated a change in trajectory for the Kremlin’s 
nostalgia manipulation. Most notably, the “choice to make war rather than culture the 
symbol of national identity”369 was partially reversed. Instead, a ‘Russkiy Mir’ world-
view – a term that describes the invented concept of a spiritually and culturally linked 
‘Russian World’ of historical prominence – began to be propagated, which helped 
legitimise Russia’s geopolitical transgressions by promoting a defensive patriotism 
under the unifying strength of Russian literature and culture. As a result, the aura of 
inviolability previously attached to Russian leaders of state was expanded to include 
Russia’s cultural as well as its political heritage.  
Ilya Kalinin has provided one of the most astute analyses of the Putin regime’s 
belated attempts to create a ‘cultural citizenship’ from above. Kalinin calls the 
ideological construction of the ‘Russkiy Mir’ the “сновидение постимперского 
субъекта, грезящего об утраченном”370 and describes how the current regime 
portrays past truths as if they dictated the reinstitution of these lost status quos in the 
present – regardless of changed geopolitical realities or legal obstacles: 
“причастность к почве становится значимее обладания территорией: первую 
освящает традиция, вторая закреплена лишь международным правом”371. Thus, 
the Putin regime’s use of nostalgia’s characteristic “aura of ‘inevitability’”372 helps to 
inscribe the myth of Empire with the historical authority to overrule the present. It also 
imbues the Imperial period with even greater ideological worth for the Kremlin-guided 
nostalgia discourse than the Soviet past. 
Through a skilful manipulation and streamlining of the haphazard nostalgic 
landscape of the 1990s, the Putin regime has officially returned history to the people 
 
368 Kalinin, “Prazdnik identichnosti,” 256. 
369 Koposov, Memory Laws, Memory Wars, 253. 
370 Kalinin, “Prazdnik identichnosti,” 254. 
371 Ibid, 252. 
372 Maya Nadkarni and Olga Shevchenko, “The Politics of Nostalgia: A Case for Comparative Analysis 
of Post-Socialist Practices,” Ab Imperio 2004, no. 2 (2004): 487-519, 489-90. 
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– but it has done so in an extremely limited offer of nostalgia-on-demand that feeds 
solely off bite-sized historical myths. In Angela Stent’s words,  
[by] the end of his first term as president, Putin had answered the question of Russia’s national 
idea by restoring both Tsarist and Soviet-era symbols of Russian identity […] By the end of his 
second term, this blend of Tsarist and Soviet symbols had answered the question of Russia’s search 
for a ‘usable past’ that could unite the nation […] by the political exploitation of nostalgia.373 
 
The memory and (re-)enactment of war as a means of national self-assertion, the 
concomitant belief that Russia and the West are intrinsic Others, and the reactivation 
of personality cults, along with the belief that a strong political leader will act as 
saviour and repairman to a battered national pride, all feature as central components 
for Putin’s official narrative of historical legitimisation.  
The sacrosanct positioning of historical memory as an integral part of culture 
under the current regime has also made it exempt from re-tellings, analyses, or, indeed, 
academic discussions. In comparison to the cultural productions that dealt with issues 
of nostalgia in the 1990s, a great loss in versatility and critical-minded playfulness is 
observable. Some Russian writers have challenged the increasingly politicised use of 
nostalgia in official culture, but their number is shrinking. Tatiana Tolstaya, for 
instance, has fallen noticeably silent on her 1990s stance of anti-nostalgia. Viktor 
Pelevin and Vladimir Sorokin, whose novels Empire V (Ампир V) and Day of the 
Oprichnik (День oпричника) made quasi-prophetic predictions about the return of 
medievalesque Empires in 2006, have likewise turned away from historical subject 
matters, embracing dystopian science fiction projects instead.  
A notable exception to this rule is Russian popular and youth culture, which 
appears to be the main frontline that openly engages with the political doctrines set by 
the state in the 21st century – be it via hip hop, the world of YouTube vlogs or 
individual picket lines as part of a new protest culture.374 More often than not, 
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374 Cf. Leonid Bershidsky, “Russian Rappers Give Up on Putin,” Bloomberg.com, December 14, 2018, 
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however, these instances of counterculture address present-day issues like corruption, 
censorship and human rights violations, not the task of Vergangenheitsbewältigung.375  
However, there is also the case of Boris Akunin. In 2005, Marina Koreneva stated 
that the Fandorin project is “good enough for readers who want to receive a nostalgic 
positive impression of the state: back then, in the past, good did have a fighting chance 
of triumphing over evil”376. Yet if we take a closer look at Akunin’s detective novels, 
the very opposite appears to be the case: written at the junction of not just two 
millennia, but also of two political reigns in Russia, Boris Akunin’s Fandorin project 
offers a critical and at times scathing testimony to the socio-political moods, issues, 
and challenges that shaped not only Russia’s past, but whose nostalgic revival 
continues to stymie post-Soviet Russia’s future. 
  
 
375 At the same time, this shift away from the past could also indicate the end of the nostalgic era in 
Russia, initiated by the first generation not to be burdened by memories of the Soviet experience. 
Whether such an estrangement from the nationwide nostalgia discourse is truly underway remains to be 
seen, however. 
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3. The Fandorin Project: Against a Canonisation of the Past 
Ну и какое же будущее ожидает Россию в 
ХХ веке? […] - Самое великое! Нужно 
только […] образовывать и постепенно 
воспитывать в [обществе] чувство 
самоуважения и достоинства. Это самое 
главное! Если этого не сделать, то Россию 
ожидают самые чудовищные 
испытания...377 
 
In 1998, Rosalind Marsh and Stephen Lovell issued a prediction for the post-Soviet 
book market that foresaw a high probability “that the Russian best-seller, when it 
arrives, will neglect the ‘accursed questions’ of Russian intellectual history while in 
some way exuding confidence in what tomorrow will bring”378. Only a few months 
later, the Russian best-seller did arrive – but it turned out to be neither anti-intellectual 
nor overly optimistic about Russia’s future. Instead, Akunin became the only author 
who approached Imperial nostalgia from the postmodern point of view of 
historiographic metafiction – and who created a continuous body of work that 
chronicled the post-Soviet nostalgia discourse from the late-1990s up to the Crimean 
crisis and beyond. As readers are taken on a journey covering the last four decades of 
the Russian Empire, they are provided with a chance to compare their own lived 
experience with that of another, similarly portentous transitional period in Russian 
history.  
The results of my nostalgia chapter dictate the focus on a set number of reference 
points for my subsequent analysis of three Fandorin novels. If we assume the Fandorin 
project to be an anti-nostalgic re-writing of the post-Soviet discourse on Empire, then 
the glorification of the Romanov family, the authority of autocratic leadership, the 
image of Empire as a stable and unified governing unit, and Empire’s desirability as a 
geopolitical and cultural model for Russia’s future all ought to feature in this 
discussion. Similarly, myths about Russia’s national exceptionalism and the question 
of its self-positioning between East and West must be addressed, as they feature 
heavily in both the neo-Imperial and the neo-Eurasianist discourse about Empire.  
 
377 Boris Akunin, Statskii Sovetnik (Moscow: Zakharov, 2014), 29. All further quotations will be 
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Oxford UP, 1998): 56-87, 82. 
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The topic of the periphery, both in a literal and in a figurative sense, will also need 
to play an important role in my analysis. As stated by Clowes, the periphery “has 
become the crucial problem for post-Soviet identity”379 as well as a pivotal concept in 
post-Soviet discussions about Empire – not least because it poses a conceptual 
anomaly. Unlike Western Empires, Russia never possessed any overseas colonies; as 
a result, “the periphery could be as close as a rural province in European Russia or as 
far as the farflung borderlands of the empire”380. The paradoxical desire to return 
Russia’s dominion of influence to the dimensions of the original Imperial space is 
rooted in the historical conviction that “there is no Russian identity without empire 
[…] and no personhood outside of the ruler”381.  
In my thesis, I conform to the identity-forming power of the periphery in Russian 
consciousness by treating it as a geopolitical and a cultural concept. More important 
than the geographical fluidity of invisible peripheral borders is the psychological effect 
that this non-fixability creates: by feeding into a (literal and proverbial) state of anxiety 
and fear, the problem of the ubiquitous periphery creates the desire to control the 
dangers that seemingly lurk within. As my selection of novels will show, Akunin 
developed the topic of a homegrown cultural peripherality in his treatment of Russia’s 
historical process of self-colonisation, writing anxiety into the very make-up of 
Russian society itself. 
This takes me back to Akunin’s parallel narrative of writing Nation. Whereas the 
first part of my subsequent analysis chapters will focus on Akunin’s uncovering of the 
internal fault lines of Empire, the second part will outline the ways in which Akunin 
engages with the cultural and intelligentsia heritage of the Imperial era. While 
addressing Akunin’s portrayal of alternative voices for identification among Russian 
classical literature and the way he questions the (un)suitability of the hero paradigms 
provided therein, I will also delve into Akunin’s discussion of the post-Soviet 
intelligentsia’s failure to provide a counternarrative to Empire’s continued 
glorification in present-day Russia. Traditionally tasked with closing the “profound 
gap between the sanitized nostalgic reproductions and the actual traumatic history”382, 
 
379 Clowes, Russia on the Edge, 4. 
380 Ibid, 9. 
381 Ibid, 63. 
382 Sergei Oushakine, “‘We’re Nostalgic but We’re Not Crazy’: Retrofitting the Past in Russia,” Russian 
Review 66, no. 3 (2007): 451-82, 452. 
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the post-Soviet intelligentsia instead chose to engage in a nostalgia crisis of its own – 
thus creating an act of self-silencing so egregious that it prompted Akunin to place an 
intelligentsia detective hero of his own invention in their midst. 
Erast Petrovich Fandorin will form one of the main objects of discovery in the 
‘Writing Nation’ chapters. Described as aloof, collected, and a person of little outward 
emotional range – all of which fits the bill of the detached, gentlemanly amateur whose 
blueprint was created by Conan Doyle – Fandorin both is and is not a recognisably 
Russian protagonist. Where Holmes carries traces that indelibly mark him as English 
and Poirot celebrates his Belgian roots, Fandorin embodies a transcultural set of 
values, tastes, and principles that creates an accurate reflection of 19th-century 
intelligentsia life: “citizenship in the Russian ‘republic of letters’ presupposed a 
cosmopolitan upbringing, the sense that one’s roots were as much in Paris, London or 
Göttingen […] as they were in Moscow or St Petersburg. To be fully Russian, one had 
to be a citizen of the world”383. Yet at the same time, Fandorin has also been described 
as a literary novelty because he is “a prototypical intelligent […] depicted as serving 
the state (and not trying to undermine or destroy it)”384. Unlike his Western 
counterparts, Fandorin does not act in an amateur capacity, but was conceived as a 
state servant from the start – thus following in the footsteps of Russian detective heroes 
from 19th-century literature, but certainly not in the footsteps of 19th-century 
intelligentsia members.  
The resulting paradoxical character portrait was first problematised by Leon Aron 
in 2004. Linking his analysis to the 19th-century journal Vekhi – an intelligentsia 
mouthpiece that advocated individual self-improvement over a passive waiting for 
state solutions to Russia’s problems – Aron claimed that Fandorin’s behaviour was 
much closer to Vekhi in spirit than to the actual 19th-century intelligentsia heritage, 
calling “Fandorin’s credo […] the opposite of the intelligentsia’s […] Chkhartishvili 
seems to have constructed his hero as a living antithesis to every negative stereotype 
of the Russian intelligenty”385. This reading would make Fandorin a forerunner of the 
 
383 Hosking, Russia: People and Empire, 290. Akunin makes Sherlock and Fandorin meet in the 
currently untranslated short story The Tower Prisoner, or The Short, but Illustrious Path of Three Wise 
Men (Узница башни, или Краткий, но прекрасный путь трех мудрых, 2006), in which the two 
super-sleuths collaborate on a case – aiming to catch none other than Arsène Lupin. 
384 Dobrenko and Lipovetsky, “The Burden of Freedom,” 5. 
385 Aron, “A Champion for the Bourgeoisie,” 153-4. 
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early 20th-century “modernist self-consciousness”386 that was beginning to take root 
amid the intelligentsia, and whose further development was disrupted by the onset of 
the revolution.  
The subsequent development of this heritage was illustrated by Zubok, who 
arrived at a similar conclusion to Aron’s at the end of his book on Russia’s modern-
day intelligentsia. According to Zubok, the newly minted post-Soviet intelligentsia had 
completed “‘a voyage from the coast of Utopia’ into the turbulent open sea of 
individual self-discovery”387. In Zubok’s reading, this seems to spell out an end to all 
social and political activism on the part of the intelligentsia – a verdict that, 
paradoxically, goes hand in hand with the age-old reproach about the intelligentsia’s 
verbose ineffectiveness. I disagree with this reading, however. Why should a 
heightened awareness of individual responsibility not also lead to a revival of socio-
politically engaged intellectualism? 
Akunin’s creation of Fandorin appears to follow a similar thought experiment: 
combining self-determinacy with state service, Fandorin occupies an in-between place 
in post-Soviet Russia’s intelligentsia debate that embodies both late Imperial 
intelligentsia hesitancy and perestroika-era intellectual activism. Deviating markedly 
from the notoriously charming, yet arrogant Western prototypes of his kind, 
Fandorin’s main merit and strength lie not in his unique skills, unparalleled cleverness 
or quirky behaviour – although he does possess all of those traits, too – but in his 
stalwart moral integrity.388 As a result, Fandorin’s “moral qualities capture the spirit 
of two ages that are outwardly different, but inwardly remarkably alike”389.  
By thus highlighting the historical dimensions to Russia’s post-Soviet 
intelligentsia problem, the character of Fandorin also acts as a ‘hero of two times’: 
[b]y understanding the needs of his readers and the Zeitgeist of the late 1990s and the first decade 
of the 2000s, Akunin limned a hero whose qualities met the requirements of those times. Indeed, 
his fictional protagonist could compete with the likes of folk heroes (bogatyri), historical figures, 
literary protagonists, comic book figures, and child heroes for the title of ‘hero of our time’.390 
 
 
386 Ibid, 155. 
387 Zubok, Zhivago’s Children, 361. 
388 In fact, most of Fandorin’s recognisable character traits and slightly unusual pastimes are connected 
to his time in Japan. He practises calligraphy and meditation, acquired the habit of taking ice baths, and 
moved from doing English gymnastics to Japanese training techniques. In terms of his appearance, 
Fandorin demonstrates a penchant for modern, dandy-like clothing and is repeatedly described as 
attractive by characters of both genders – a fact that he is unabashedly conscious of. 
389 Mulcahy and Goscilo, A Hero of Two Times, 200. 
390 Ibid, 203. 
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Given the complex political and nostalgic developments that followed the initial 
inception of the Fandorin figure in Russia, a careful reading of this character’s 
evolution over the course of the Fandorin project is in order. My ‘writing Nation’ 
chapters will focus on Akunin’s search for old intelligentsia offers of identification in 
classical Russian source texts, along with the ways in which Fandorin embellishes their 
legacy into a new offer of civic citizenship. What kind of cultural authority does 
Akunin attribute to the Imperial era, and which weaknesses in post-Soviet Russia’s 
cultural nostalgia for Empire does he reveal? More importantly, how did Akunin’s 
alternative intelligentsia hero paradigm fare against the backdrop of increasing 
nostalgic and neo-Imperial tendencies in Russian politics and culture – and where did 
it lead him in the overall debate about the death of the intelligentsia?  
 
 
3.1. The Death of Achilles (1998) 
Во что бы он превратился, получив 
возможность вершить судьбами 
миллионов? Страшно подумать.391 
 
The Death of Achilles is the fourth novel in the Fandorin series and was among those 
published in 1998, the year when Akunin first entered the literary stage. The novel has 
been described as “the most straightforward, even conventional, of Fandorin’s 
adventures”392 – yet there is little that is conventional about it. The Death of Achilles’s 
events are set during 1882, the year of Fandorin’s return to Russia after a six-year 
diplomatic absence. Upon his arrival in Moscow, Fandorin discovers that his old friend 
General Sobolev – whom he had met during the Russo-Turkish War, in events 
described in the novel The Turkish Gambit (Турецкий гамбит, 1998) – resides at the 
same hotel as him. When Fandorin asks to be shown to the General, his request is 
refused; a day later, news of Sobolev’s death is broadcast. Fandorin suspects foul play 
and starts to investigate, uncovering a private scandal that quickly grows into an 
 
391 Boris Akunin, Smert’ Akhillesa (Moscow: Zakharov, 2002), 179. All further quotations will be 
referring to this edition, abbreviated as (SMA). 
392 “The Death of Achilles,” Kirkus Review, May 20, 2010, <http://www.kirkusreviews.com/book-
reviews/boris-akunin/the-death-of-achilles/> [accessed 17 December 2019] 
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international conspiracy involving both international secret agents and the Russian 
government.  
The novel’s subtitle, ‘a hired killer detective novel’ (детектив о наемном 
убийце), hints at The Death of Achilles’s underlying murder mystery: the novel ends 
with the revelation that Sobolev was murdered by Achimas, a contract killer who 
worked at the behest of the Russian government. This choice of criminal plot signals 
a change in the Fandorin series, as it not only introduces a larger range of historically 
identifiable figures than in any of the previous novels, but also sets an unambiguously 
political stage – making The Death of Achilles the first explicitly political novel in the 
Fandorin project and a suitable case study for Akunin’s interrogation of Empire and 
Nation in response to the post-Soviet nostalgia crisis. 
The first part of my analysis will deal with Akunin’s presentation of Empire in 
The Death of Achilles. Akunin’s use of the detective genre allows him to posit 
Fandorin in the traditional role of the detective-flâneur, merging a spatial exploration 
of Moscow with a discovery of its historical characters and cultural landmarks. The 
central nostalgic issue Akunin investigates in The Death of Achilles is that of 
Moscow’s symbolic function as Imperial heartland and microcosm, which places the 
city within a colonial paradigm while also addressing Russia’s conflicting position 
between East and West. Unlike the geographical capital Saint Petersburg – a carbon 
copy of the ideal European city, built on the very edge of Empire – Moscow is 
commonly perceived as Russia’s ancestral seat of tradition and governance. Yet 
scholars such as Clowes argue that the city “stands out because of its disconnectedness 
from its peripheries[, resembling] the utopian and dystopian traditions of the island or 
insular city”393. In post-Soviet literature, this theme has been explored in works as 
diverse as Viktor Pelevin’s Buddha’s Little Finger (Чапаев и пустота, 1996), 
Tatiana Tolstaya’s Slynx (Кысь, 2000), and Dmitry Glukhovsky’s Metro 2033 
(Метро 2033, 2002). Where does Akunin position Moscow along the spectrum of 
heartland and periphery, and how does he use the detective genre to uncover and 
dismantle mythologised categories of Imperial geography in the post-Soviet neo-
Imperial discourse?  
 
393 Clowes, Russia on the Edge, 21. 
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The second part of this chapter will then address Fandorin’s own peripherality as 
a character. I will read Fandorin’s status as a returnee against the traditionally liminal 
position of literary detectives, taking into account the added geographical and 
psychological othering present in The Death of Achilles. Akunin uses Fandorin’s role 
as a semi-outsider to engage in a rediscovery of Russian literature’s traditional hero 
narratives, most notably the cult surrounding Pushkin – a cult that was started in the 
Soviet period and furthered by Yeltsin and Luzhkov, only to be fully instrumentalised 
under the Putin regime. How does Akunin evaluate the nation-building potential 
inherent in this and other hero narratives in The Death of Achilles, and to what extent 
does he challenge their officially codified forms? A juxtaposition of Fandorin and 
Achimas, his antagonist, will reveal the two characters’ relation to 19th-century 
intelligentsia thought and highlight their potential to fulfil a new national hero role in 
Russia – amid a discussion of fate and established literary blueprints of individual 
agency, as well as the true meaning behind The Death of Achilles’s title. 
 
3.1.1. Re-Writing Empire: (M)Other Moscow 
From the very start of The Death of Achilles, Akunin approaches the conceptual 
parallel between the late Imperial and the post-Soviet timelines through the fixed 
spatial point of Moscow. The city appears as the metonymic heartland of Empire, of 
which readers receive their first glimpse through the eyes of Fandorin. Akunin’s 
protagonist is nothing short of enthusiastic about his return to Russia: “Оглядев 
скучные станционные строения, молодой человек с не вполне понятным 
волнением вдохнул прокопченный вокзальный воздух и прошептал: ‘Господи 
боже, шесть лет’” (SMA 4). This scene is charged with symbolic meaning: as 
Fandorin is said to have arrived on the Saint Petersburg train, he would have been 
traversing the country for at least a day prior to his arrival in Moscow. Yet his moment 
of homecoming is deferred until Fandorin’s actual arrival in the heartland of Empire – 
suggesting that only Moscow, not Saint Petersburg, carries the potential to evoke the 
image of Mother Russia for the Imperial citizen.394  
 
394 At the time of the novel’s events, the most logical way for Fandorin to return to Russia from Japan 
would have been via steamship. Construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway only began in 1891. 
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The search for a historically viable and emotionally charged version of Moscow 
permeates The Death of Achilles. Akunin employs generous amounts of postmodern 
playfulness in his construction of 1882 Moscow, imbuing the city with several easily 
identifiable landmarks and characters of post-Soviet consequence. One of the latter is 
Prince Dolgorukoi, the Governor General of Moscow. In the Russian system of 
administration, Governor Generals were “supreme commanders of their territories 
when the monarch was absent […] they also controlled the police […] had the power 
to impose emergency measures […] and to report directly to the emperor”395. Governor 
Generals also considered themselves “omnipotent rulers [gosudari] of their 
territories”396, which in effect turned them into miniature versions of local Tsars. 
Rather fittingly, during the 19th century, their “main tasks […] were limited to 
combating enemies of the autocracy”397. The post was abolished under the Communist 
regime, but reinstated, albeit under a different name, under the Yeltsin government, 
making Akunin’s depiction of the role an exploration of both: authoritarian 
Imperialism and post-Soviet nostalgia for Empire. 
The presence of several historical and contemporary doubles for Prince 
Dolgorukoi heightens this impression of an exploration of parallel timelines. As 
previously pointed out by Baraban, Akunin’s fictional Dolgorukoi can be linked to 
three different historical prototypes: “the real historical figure, Prince Vladimir 
Andreevich Dolgorukov (1810-1891), who was the Governor General of Moscow 
from 1864 until 1891 [and] a descendant of the old noble family of princes Dolgorukoi 
[…] the current mayor of Moscow, Yury Luzhkov, and Prince Yury Dolgoruky”398. 
For a study of post-Soviet nostalgia, the link to Luzhkov, Moscow’s mayor from 1992 
to 2010, is the most evocative.399 Indeed, The Death of Achilles introduces Dolgorukoi 
as “всемогущий хозяин матушки-Москвы” (SMA 9) and the person who 
 
395 A. G. Trifonov and B. V. Mezhuev, “The Governor-Generalship in the Russian System of Territorial 
Administration: An Exercise in Historical Reminiscing,” Russian Politics & Law 39, no. 4 (2001): 76-
88, 80. 
396 Ibid, 81. 
397 Ibid, 85. 
398 Baraban, “A Country Resembling Russia,” 404. 
399 Unconnected to a reading of Akunin, Kalinin delineated the nostalgic modernisation of Russian 
history in the service of a political re-imagining of Empire, mentioning that “in the framework of such 
a narrative, there is no clear-cut difference between Stolypin and Stalin (efficient managers), Nikolai II 
and Solzhenitsyn (national martyrs) [...] or, finally, Yury Dolgoruky and Yury Luzhkov (founders of 
Moscow),” Kalinin, “Nostalgic Modernization,” 158.  
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“[п]олтора десятка лет правил […] мягко, но хватко, за что недруги называли его 
Юрием Долгоруким и Володей Большое Гнездо, а доброжелателем Владимиром 
Красно Солнышко” (SMA 10).400 Both Dolgorukoi’s manner of speech and his 
condescendingly paternal, yet in times of crisis demanding attitude to his subordinates 
play on Luzhkov’s own public image; lastly, both Luzhkov and Akunin’s Dolgorukoi 
possess a range of nicknames, which touch in similar ways upon their place in Russia’s 
greater historical hero narrative: 
Luzhkov has been called not only the ‘mayor in a cap’ but also the ‘Boss’ […], ‘Iurii Dolgorukii’ 
[…] and the ‘Moscow bear.’ […] ill-wishers call him the ‘godfather,’ ‘Papa Doc,’ even ‘Il Duce.’ 
But […] most Muscovites who vote for him as mayor consider him […] one of the epic heroes 
that our country invariably produces in times of trial and trouble.401 
 
However, Akunin follows a slightly more complex juxtaposition than this, avoiding a 
simplified dichotomy of supposedly ‘positive’ vs. ‘negative’ influences from Russian 
history for a more variegated portrayal. Thus, Akunin’s Dolgorukoi receives the 
nickname of Yuri Dolgoruki, the 12th-century founder of the City of Moscow, from 
his adversaries – not his supporters. The name of Dolgoruki’s son, Volodya Bolzhoe 
Gnezdo – who was known for his success in expanding the reach and power of Kievan 
Rus’ – is likewise given to the Governor General by his critics. From a historian’s 
perspective, this approach is not unfounded: after Bolzhoe Gnezdo’s death, his 
progeny descended into prolonged years of familial strife that quickly undermined the 
strength of the budding Russian state and served as a case study for the dangers of 
nepotism. However, these aspects are not commonly included in official portrayals of 
Russian history, and therefore prompt readers to find explanations for their seemingly 
paradoxical attribution to Dolgorukoi by themselves. 
In a similar vein, Akunin also problematises the incomplete and incorrect 
remembering of Vladimir the Great, who was the ruler of Kievan Rus’ from 980 to 
1015.402 Although Dolgorukoi is put in connection with this national figure in Russian 
history by his well-wishers – indicating an open appraisal of Vladimir’s active 
 
400 These nicknames were not made part of the English translation of the novel, which suggests a bias 
towards the Western reader as unable to make the necessary connections to Russian history.  
401 Roy Medvedev, “The Yuri Luzhkov Phenomenon,” Russian Politics & Law 42, no. 5 (2004): 50-63, 
63. 
402 The fact that the name ‘Vladimir Krasno Solnyshko’ is typically reserved for Russian bylini or epic 
poems adds an extra layer of mythical heroism to its use. This is also the same Vladimir whose statue 
was erected in front of the Kremlin in 2016. 
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diplomatic ties with other countries such as the Byzantine Empire – Akunin omits this 
part of his reign, and chooses to subvert one of its better-known aspects instead: 
Vladimir’s adoption of Christianity on behalf of the entire Rus’. In Dolgorukoi’s first 
appearance, he laments:  
[…] по пятницам […] у меня заведено разные секретно-деликатные дела обсуждать. Сейчас 
вот намечено тонкого вопроса коснуться – где достать денег на завершение росписи Храма. 
Святое дело, крест мой многолетний. […] Будем думать, как с московских толстоумов на 
богоугодное дело миллион вытрясти. (SMA 11) 
 
For any reader vaguely familiar with Russian news during the 1990s, the cathedral 
referenced here could be none other than Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ the Saviour. 
Even the time frames match: while the novel’s events take place in 1882, shortly before 
the original building project was finished, Akunin’s book was published in 1998 – just 
months before Luzhkov finished his own megalomaniacal (re-)building project.  
 
Mythical Past and Modern Illusions 
The reconstruction of the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour was Luzhkov’s most 
ambitious and, potentially, most controversial nostalgic building project, and it 
sparked a range of different reactions across the Russian public. Akunin incorporates 
several of these commentaries into his portrayal of the Cathedral’s original erection, 
such as when he references the enormous costs of (re-)building the Cathedral (now 
estimated at 300 million dollars). In the novel, the financing talks are said to be part of 
Dolgorukoy’s weekly slot for secret affairs – making it not so much a public endeavour 
as a private vanity project. Such a reading calls to mind Andrew Gentes’s verdict that 
“[h]ow much the city and federal governments have actually spent on construction is 
a closely guarded secret, though it appears significant”403. Moreover, discussions about 
alternate, more useful ways of spending the city’s money not only took place during 
the 1990s, but are also echoed by Moscow’s chief of police in The Death of Achilles: 
“А пресловутый Храм! Ведь все соки из города высосал. Зачем, спрашивается? 
Сколько приютов да больниц на этакие деньжищи можно бы построить! Нет, 
наш Хеопс новоявленный желает непременно пирамиду после себя оставить” 
(SMA 76).  
 
403 Andrew Gentes, “The Life, Death and Resurrection of the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour, Moscow,” 
History Workshop Journal, no. 46 (1998): 63-95, 87. 
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Rather than profess a need for grandiose spiritual salvation, the characters in 
Akunin’s novel consider religion and state welfare as two separate spheres, 
counteracting the image of an overarching Orthodox mind-set in the Imperial era as 
well as the idea of an unbroken unity between state, Church and nation – or the appeal 
of leaders turning themselves into cult figures. The fact that such an idea was an 
integral part in the building of the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour is attested by 
Kathleen Smith, who states that Alexander I “meant the cathedral to be ‘a visible 
manifestation of the credo of ‘Official Nationality’, (that is) ‘Orthodoxy, autocracy 
and nationality’ – thereby linking the notion of one god and one emperor with the idea 
of the distinctiveness of the Russian people”404. In transplanting this credo onto a post-
Soviet context, Akunin not only alludes to Russia’s nationwide search for a national 
identity, but also provides a remarkably accurate foreshadowing of its subsequent 
manipulation under the Putin regime. 
Akunin also works to dismantle claims about the Cathedral’s inherent national 
identity potential, repeatedly framing its construction in terms of corruption and 
conspiracy. One of the final plot twists in The Death of Achilles is that the money used 
for the completion of the Cathedral is donated by Fandorin himself, who, in turn, 
retrieved it from the assassin that was hired to kill Sobolev: 
[…] Ишь, какой портфельчик-то у вас. Хорошая вещь. Поди, иностранной работы? 
- Портфель не мой […] Собираюсь в городскую Думу переслать. Крупное пожертвование 
от анонимного дарителя, на завершение устройства Храма. 
- И сильно крупное? – внимательно взглянул на молодого человека камердинер. 
- Почти миллион рублей. (SMA 365) 
 
The scathingly bitter irony inherent in this situation stems from the circumstance that 
the killer was in the employ of a Government official, making it not only blood money, 
but a symbolic investment into the strengthening of authoritarian and Moscow city 
rule. This, too, bears a contemporary parallel: according to Smith, “[d]espite the 
current prevailing myth that the cathedral was raised on the basis of small contributions 
from ordinary Russians, the state provided by far the major part of the funding”405. As 
a result, the only tradition that the new-old Cathedral manages to uphold is that of a 
 
404 Kathleen E. Smith, “An Old Cathedral for a New Russia: The Symbolic Politics of the Reconstituted 
Church of Christ the Saviour,” Religion, State and Society 25, no. 2 (1997): 163-75, 164. 
405 Ibid, 164. 
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government reinforcing hollowed-out myth-making processes about its own past as an 
Empire. 
The latter impression is heightened in the context of a discussion about the 
essential lack of authenticity surrounding the Cathedral building project. Instead of 
following original building plans, Luzhkov’s reconstruction of the Cathedral of Christ 
the Saviour used exclusively modern materials such as steel and bronze, foregoing 
even the use of several surviving stone busts from the original.406 This reconstruction 
method not only raised justified warnings by architects about the future of Russia’s 
restoration culture, but also revealed the fundamental hollowness of official attempts 
at rebuilding Russia’s past. What is being recreated and chosen as part of the official 
narrative about the Imperial period are external glamour and richness, which lack in 
historical weight and serve as cheap – albeit convincing – copies instead.  
For present-day critics, the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour is a culturally empty 
replica that “demonstrates the futility of trying to establish links with the imperial 
past”407, mirroring “the new cultural landscape of Russia […] as an indecipherable and 
sometimes impenetrable maze”408. Akunin takes this criticism a step further by 
questioning not just the original Cathedral’s claim to authenticity, but also its 
subsequent benefit to the neo-Imperial discourse, thus ridding both of their elevated 
statuses and turning the Cathedral’s supposedly glorious reconstruction into twice the 
farce.  
Akunin’s repeated references to Luzhkov’s personality cult also play an important 
role in this depiction. As pointed out by Baraban, 
[the] ironic attitude of Akunin’s narrator to Dolgorukov’s megalomania is a projection of 
Russians’ irony about Luzhkov’s megalomania, which, in turn, is a manifestation of the neo-
imperial attitude in Russia, the desire to reinstate Russia’s greatness through pursuing grandiose 
projects such as the erection of the WWII memorial on Poklonnaia Hill, the celebration of the 
850th anniversary of Moscow, and Pushkin’s bicentennial in 1999.409 
 
In this comment, Baraban constructs two clearly separate fronts: the desire for a 
nostalgic reconstruction of a neo-Imperial heritage is limited to Luzhkov and the 
 
406 Cf. Clementine Cecil, “‘We Shall Soon Have the Newest Ancient Heritage in the World’: The Rise 
of the Sham Replica under Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov and Its Implications for Russia's Architectural 
Heritage,” The Historic Environment: Policy & Practice 2, no. 1 (2011): 68-102, 81-2. 
407 Gentes, “The Life, Death and Resurrection of the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour,” 89. 
408 Barker, “Rereading Russia,” 4. 
409 Baraban, “A Country Resembling Russia,” 404.  
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political strata of post-Soviet Russian society, whereas a predominantly ironical 
attitude towards these projects is attributed to the Russian general public. Indeed, 
public opinions about the Cathedral were mixed, despite “initial efforts [by] 
preservationists and believers”410 to support the project. As early as 1995, the 
Cathedral was called both “an expression of the autocratic vertical power structure in 
Russia, in which personality and power count for more than the law”411 and a building 
that “evokes the ugly, autocratic, face of Imperial Russia”412. Chrystia Freeland called 
Luzhkov the “country’s first mainstream [politician] to flirt with Russian 
nationalism”413. The various voices in Akunin’s novel that criticise the Governor 
General’s grandiose construction projects thus become an echo of the public voice of 
discontent of the 1990s, which also expressed scepticism about personality cults and 
the perceivable shift in public opinion towards the far right. Akunin extends the reach 
of these sceptical voices in his novel by putting them into the mouths of members of 
the police apparatus and even the Governor General’s advisor, which creates a true 
social network of critically-minded feedback. 
As Fandorin’s investigation into Sobolev’s death leads him to rediscover Moscow 
as part of his detective journey, he also comes across yet another symbolically charged 
architectural landmark of Empire: the Swedish Gates,  
с деревянным навесом, с резными столбами. Исконно русские, допетровской конструкции, 
а зовутся почему-то ‘свейскими’. Видно, в незапамятные времена научились москвитяне 
этой плотницкой премудрости у какого-нибудь шведского купца. (SMA 354) 
 
The oxymoron in this statement could not be more obvious, despite the fact that 
Akunin changed the name of the original structure from Spasskie, or Saviour, to 
Sveiskie vorota, or Swedish Gates. The apparent naivety with which Fandorin 
describes the gates’ history evokes an ironical distance on part of both the narrator and 
the reader – not least because the gates’ re-naming hints at Russia’s controversial 
Norman theory, which outlines the role that Scandinavian rulers played in resurrecting 
the faltering Rus’ in the 9th century. Ever since its first formulation in the 18th century, 
the Norman theory has sparked controversy as to Russia’s national origins.  
 
410 Gentes, “The Life, Death and Resurrection of the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour,” 64. 
411 Cecil, “'We Shall Soon Have the Newest Ancient Heritage in the World',” 70. 





Akunin’s invention of an architectural structure that links the word Swedish to the 
concept of Saviour serves as both a historical reminder and a terminological question 
mark in the very heart of Moscow’s claim to authenticity. Akunin neither mentions the 
Norman theory by name nor does he explicitly refer to it, but he nonetheless challenges 
the image of a distinctly Russian Imperial past – along with the portrayal of Peter the 
Great’s reign as a clear demarcation line for the onset of European influences in 
Russian culture. Fandorin’s thoughts not only point out that Europe played an integral 
part in Russia’s development long before Peter the Great took power, but they also 
reveal the historical palimpsest that is inherent to all so-called national memoryscapes. 
Rather than appear as a seat of ur-Russian values, Moscow becomes a core 
representation of the cultural influence of the other instead – and reveals the manifold 
ways in which it has enriched Russia in the process.  
The fruitlessness of trying to utilise a nostalgic vision of the past as a raison d'être 
for retro-imperial sentiments about Russia’s distinctiveness is also shown in the 
description of government buildings and the Imperial bureaucratic apparatus in The 
Death of Achilles. As Fandorin walks past the house of the chief of police on Tverskoi 
Boulevard – the supposed seat of law and order in the city – he describes it as follows: 
Дом обер-полицеймейстера на Тверском считался одной из достопримечательностей 
первопрестольной. Выходя фасадом на респектабельный бульвар, где в погожие дни 
прогуливалось лучшее московское общество, двухэтажный дом […] словно оберегал и в 
некотором роде даже благословлял приличную публику на изящное и безмятежное 
времяпрепровождение. Гуляйте, мол, просвещенные дамы и господа, по узкому 
европейскому променаду […] пусть вас не тревожит сопение огромного полу-азиатского 
города, населенного по преимуществу людьми непросвещенными и невоспитанными – 
власть здесь, вот она, на страже цивилиазции и порядка, власть никогда не спит. (SMA 193)  
 
Akunin’s use of irony in this passage is overwhelming, mocking a shallow adaptation 
of Western mannerisms that fails to transcend to the level of principles and values by 
describing the police headquarters as a tourist attraction (‘одной из 
достопримечательностей первопрестольной’) and a place for rich Muscovites to 
flaunt their fake Western-ness.  
As the European image of Moscow is shown to be nothing but a façade, the city’s 
wholesomeness begins to appear like a Potemkin village, using civilised elevatedness 
to mask the underlying reality of frailty and decrepitude. The sickness of Moscow’s 
organism is given voice through the heavy breathing of the city, which reveals its 
laborious effort to function. The official representatives’ love for a mere veneer of 
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Europeanism is shown to be lacking in substance just as much as the Cathedral of 
Christ the Saviour was shown to be lacking in authenticity: by coveting a Western 
appearance, the city’s elite affirms the desirability of an idealised West, but at the same 
time, the integrity and initiative to act on this ideal remain absent. The narrowness of 
the described European promenade symbolically reflects this process of selective 
Westernisation, which was as topical of Russia in the 1880s as it was of the 1990s.414  
The inside of the police apparatus in The Death of Achilles is shown to be similarly 
inefficient and outdated. Fandorin criticises the use of antiquated fighting techniques 
in the gendarmerie as proof of an obsolete mind-set within the administration:  
Фандорин скептически покачал головой: тоже еще жизненная необходимость для 
жандармского офицера – на рапирах фехтовать. С кем, спрашивается? С бомбистами? Все 
пережитки прошлого. Лучше бы дзюдюцу изучали или, на худой конец, английский бокс. 
(SMA 155)  
 
Moreover, mistrust and suspicion reign supreme, hinting at the ruling elite’s failure to 
fulfil their role as “столп законности и порядка” (SMA 163). Yet they also indicate 
the resurfacing of a surveillance state that contradicts both Moscow’s and Russia’s 
claim to kinship with the West: as the police and official representatives of the state 
begin to live in a state of permanent fear, the fact that ‘power never sleeps’ (‘власть 
никогда не спит’) turns from a reassurance to a threat.  
The way Akunin repeatedly phrases the state as an unknowable or unintelligible 
entity in The Death of Achilles duplicates the narrative of the crime novel onto its 
intratextual reality, recreating a claustrophobic atmosphere of secrecy that is both 
recognisable and oppressive for the modern-day reader. The unassailability of the state 
is mirrored in the arbitrary violence it exacts upon its people; in the end, the Empire’s 
own police officials are turned into the victims of their own panoptic spectacle: “[он] 
был приставлен наблюдать за наблюдающим – у нас в ведомстве это часто 
бывает” (SMA 169). Nobody, however, appears to be aware of this fact other than 
Fandorin, the semi-foreigner who captures everything through the internal outsider’s 
inquisitive gaze: “Ни шагу без охраны. Боже, куда катится Россия... […] мне все 
теперь кажетса подозрительным!” (SMA 194-6).415 Despite being a historical 
 
414 It is also an oddly prophetic statement about the way in which protest spaces for the liberal opposition 
movement were firmly restricted in Moscow during the 2011/12 protests. 
415 Akunin’s choice of words in the Russian original, in particular the verb катиться (‘to rush’ or ‘to 
roll’), calls to mind Gogol’s The Dead Souls, which posits this very question as its final sentiment and 
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insertion into an alternative past, this is the voice of the modern Muscovite – left adrift 
in a plurality of truths, finding its echoes in the sentiments of a fictional forebear. 
 
Moscow’s Urban Jungle 
The impossibility of arriving at a part of Moscow that offers a stable narrative of 
distinct Russianness also draws Moscow’s identification within the Imperial heartland 
into question. Surprisingly, it is Fandorin’s colleagues and superiors who introduce 
this thought into the conversation, as they repeatedly voice colonial attitudes about the 
city they call home:  
- […] Не Москва, а чистые жунгли.  
- Что? – не понял Фандорин.  
- Жунгли. Зверь на звере! (SMA 71) 
 
- Вы в наших московсках джунглях человек новый..., - осторожно начал он.  
И этот про джунгли, мысленно удивился Эраст Петрович, но виду не подал. Сказал 
лишь: - Да и в российских тоже. (SMA 75) 
 
At first, Fandorin is reluctant to adopt this terminology, but he eventually succumbs to 
its usage: “В самом деле, не первопрестольная, а какие-то джунгли, подумал 
Эраст Петрович” (SMA 76). Thus, Moscow is not perceived as the core of the 
Empire, but as an exotic, ungovernable periphery instead. The use of the word ‘jungle’ 
is noteworthy, as it is a term better associated with Western colonial narratives and the 
colonial boomerang than with Russian colonialism – particularly as the Russian 
Empire never possessed any overseas colonies in tropical climates.416 However, 
Akunin’s use of it conveys a slightly different meaning. Whereas the term ‘urban 
jungle’ was traditionally used to suggest a focus on the maze-like urban structures of 
the city, the mention of beasts (‘Зверь на звере’) in The Death of Achilles brings the 
behavioural codes and interactions of Moscow’s inhabitants to the fore instead.  
In a paradoxical twist, Akunin’s characters fall back on Western terminology just 
as they have stumbled upon a phenomenon that does differentiate Russia from the 
West. According to Steven Sabol, the Russian Empire was “not [an] accidental 
[empire]; instead, [it was] opportunistic, deliberate, and aggressive […] the Russian 
 
also uses a verb that implies an out-of-control movement. The question of political terror, here only 
mentioned fleetingly, will be explored in more detail in chapter 3.2 (The State Counsellor). 
416 Cf. Joseph McLaughlin, Writing the Urban Jungle: Reading Empire in London from Doyle to Eliot 
(Charlottesville and London: UP of Virginia, 2000). 
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Empire colonized, but it had no colonies”417. Alexander Etkind took this definition a 
step further, resurrecting the term self-colonisation from Russia’s historiographical 
annals, where it had first been discussed in some depth by the 19th-century historian 
Vasily Kliuchevskii.418  
As described by Etkind, Russia’s development into an Empire was not only 
accompanied by a conquering of people of different ethnicities and faiths in Asia and 
Central Asia, but also by a colonisation of Russia’s own people via serfdom – which 
was a phenomenon primarily located in the Imperial heartland: “There were few 
privately owned serfs in northern Russia and Siberia; no serfdom among Kalmycks, 
Kazakhs, Jews, or peoples of the north; few serfs among Tatars [...] However one 
defines the core of this Empire, the closer one got to it, the more serfs there were”419. 
Paradoxically, the majority of serfs were Orthodox Russians who were treated akin to 
‘white negroes’ – regardless of the fact that they were still viewed as humans and 
Christians. They were not, however, viewed as part of the Europeanised elite and, as a 
result, relegated to a place in Russian society that was culturally peripheral. 
Akunin problematises the lack of awareness about this historic process of internal 
colonisation in his use of jungle-rhetoric, but also in the way his characters associate 
Asia with either despotism or danger. The reactions to Masa, Fandorin’s Japanese 
assistant and manservant, are indicative of this process. While Masa is dressed as a 
beggar as part of their investigation, he is mistaken for a “чумазый киргиз в 
засаленном халате и драном малахае. Господи, кого только в матушку-Москву 
не заносит” (SMA 129). Voiced by a servant herself, this statement turns Masa’s 
Asian features into a threat, whilst linking the image of ‘Mother Moscow’ to the 
concept of non-Asianness – an interesting statement to make, given that Moscow is 
traditionally portrayed in Russian literature as the antidote to Saint Petersburg’s 
excessive Europeanism. Akunin uses the apparent contradiction in this statement to 
point out Russia’s historic problems with verbalising its own in-betweenness.  
A further parallel between the Russian Empire and the post-Soviet context is to 
be found in the contextualisation of present-day racism in the unmistakably Imperial 
 
417 Steven Sabol, The Touch of Civilization: Comparing American and Russian Internal Colonization 
(Boulder: University Press of Colorado, 2016), 4. 
418 Cf. Vasilii Osipovich Kliuchevskii, Sochineniia v vos’mi tomakh (Moscow: Gos. izd-vo. 
politicheskoi lit-ry, 1956-1959). 
419 Etkind, Internal Colonization, 125. 
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narrative of the ‘Yellow Peril’. In turn-of-the-century Russia, “the East and Asia 
loomed ever larger in Russian intellectual discourse”420 as sources of an existential 
threat to both the Russian Empire and its civilisation – a discourse that was shared by 
other Empires in the West, but which carried particular poignancy in the Russian 
Empire for obvious geopolitical reasons. One of the most famous literary reflections 
of this fear was rendered immortal in Andrei Bely’s novel Peterburg (Петербург, 
1913), in which Bely “plays on the figure of the ‘yellow peril,’ not as an impending 
threat […], but rather as a form of confusion about Russia’s origins”421. Even though 
Masa is Japanese, he is automatically perceived as Kirghiz – mirroring a similar 
confusion about Russia’s ‘internal’ Asianness, which appears more threatening and 
more disturbing than its external equivalent.  
As summarised by M. L. Roman, the problem of anti-Asian sentiments in Russia 
resurfaced with some force after the break-up of the Soviet Union, which resulted in a 
swift parallel collapse of the Soviet narrative of the brotherhood of all peoples. As 
widespread racial profiling of Caucasian and Central Asian citizens began to be 
instated in Moscow, “uncertainty and insecurity on […] streets and public transport, 
frequent verbal and physical harassment and arbitrary fines”422 became everyday 
occurrences in the city. I concur with Roman in this regard, who convincingly argues 
that a neo-Imperial subtext needs to be read into this growth in hostile sentiments. 
According to Roman, the predominant Russian view about the break-up of the Soviet 
Union contains a strong element of blame for the Central Asian people, who so 
willingly abandoned their quasi-colonial overlord for a return to the state of self-
governance – an illogical embrace of pre-civilised and barbarian roots as well as a 
rejection of the nostalgically charged heritage of Imperial grandeur. 
From a post-Soviet view, the real issue at the heart of this confrontative stance is 
the lack of a similarly attractive and similarly distinct identity narrative for Russia to 
fall back on. Only a deeply ingrained inferiority complex along with romanticised 
views about Imperial superpower glory could explain such an aggressive defence of 
 
420 Clowes, Russia on the Edge, 13. 
421 Sabine Doran, The Culture of Yellow, Or, The Visual Politics of Late Modernity (New York: 
Bloomsbury, 2013), 134. 
422 M.L. Roman, “Making Caucasians Black: Moscow Since the Fall of Communism and the 




the narrative of Russian ethnic superiority. The 19th-century Western colonial 
stereotype of the urban jungle harbouring savage beasts unfit to govern themselves 
therefore finds its double equivalent in Akunin’s text: first in a hint at Russia’s 
historical process of self-colonisation in the 19th century and the way it imposed a 
narrative of savagery upon its own people, followed by a more overt description of the 
post-Soviet adoption of a colonial gaze that openly embraces, rather than repudiates, 
the widespread contemporary denomination of non-white, non-Russian citizens as 
‘blacks’.423  
In The Death of Achilles, Akunin does not pass up the chance to reveal the secret 
reciprocity and accompanying hollowness of such discriminatory thinking. When a 
Caucasian adjutant lieutenant employs the quasi-Darwinian racist comparison of man 
to monkey upon seeing Masa dressed in a ceremonial kimono, he exclaims: “Это еще 
что за макака!” (SMA 36). The scene is rendered parodic by the fact that the lieutenant 
himself is decked out in his national, Georgian uniform; moreover, Masa – who, at this 
point in the series, does not speak or understand Russian – responds to the news that 
the duel will be fought by pistol, not by sword, with the words: “Опять на 
пистолетах? – разочарованно спросил Маса. – Что за варварский обычай. И кого 
же вы убьете? Того волосатого человека? До чего же он похож на обезьяну” 
(SMA 36-7). Scenes like these undoubtedly serve a humorous purpose, but there is an 
underlying bite of bitter irony to them: as Japan is shown to harbour the same 
pretensions towards national superiority as Russia does about its Eastern neighbour, 
the inherent meaninglessness of statements of this kind is laid bare. The horizontal 
axes of the equation are inversed: West mocks East and East mocks West, ridding both 
 
423 The portrayal of other non-Russian characters in The Death of Achilles likewise brings the existence 
of a range of national stereotypes to the fore. Germans are repeatedly described as ‘sausage eaters’ 
(‘колбасники’) who value punctuality and possess a “[ч]исто немецкая, топорная хитрость” (SMA 
96); when the suspicion arises that the death of a German spy may be attributable to the German 
government, the act is described with the words: “Нехорошо, майне херрен, не по-христиански – 
собственного резидента, как свинью на бойне” (SMA 97) – which, given the resolution of the novel, 
certainly carries a considerable degree of parodic acerbity. At the same time, Germany is also placed 
within a terminological fraternity that denotes the West as civilised; thus, while trying to solve the 
mysterious circumstances surrounding Sobolev’s death, the head of the secret section of the police 
states: “Отравить Белого Генерала? Бред! Не верю, что немцы могли пойти на такой риск. Это 
же цивилизованная нация, а не какая-нибудь Персия!” (SMA 61). The recollection of Persia recalls 
the death of the Russian poet Griboyedov, who was serving as the Russian ambassador to Persia in 1829 
when he was murdered by an angry mob after signing a treaty that forced the country to cede several of 




insults of any actual meaning. As Japanese and Russian speakers alike adopt Western 
colonial attitudes in an attempt to overcome their own sense of inferiority, they strip 
not only themselves, but all Imperial discourses of their claim to civilised 
enlightenment.  
Masa’s description of Achimas, the antagonist who managed to trick him into 
relinquishing the suitcase containing the contract money, inverts another commonly 
known racist stereotype: “желтые волосы, водянистые глаза… Мы д-для него все 
на одно лицо” (SMA 159). Masa’s inability to differentiate one Western face from 
another echoes the alleged indistinguishability of Asian features for people of Western 
origin. Yet the quote also underhandedly comments on the pointlessness of relying on 
visual markers of otherness in Russia – an impossibility that is explicitly problematised 
in the character of Achimas. Born to a Moravian father and a Muslim mother in the 
Caucasus, Achimas is described as having had “два бога и три языка” (SMA 211) as 
a child. He also appears as the ethnic enfant terrible of the story: optically 
indistinguishable from an ethnic Russian, Achimas fails to conform to the role of 
peripheral Asian scapegoat based on his looks alone. For Masa, a Japanese character, 
Achimas is the embodiment of the stereotypical European; for the Russian characters 
in the novel, Achimas’s place of origin singles him out as the Caucasian, Asian Other.  
Achimas’s background as a half-Chechen does indeed seem to predestine him for 
the role of antagonist – both from a historical and a contemporary point of view. On 
the one hand, Achimas’s journey from the southernmost borders of the Empire to its 
nominal core reflects the classical voyage of colonial-era threats; on the other hand, 
the context of the 1998 Chechen War and the aforementioned discrimination against 
‘people of Caucasian nationality’ provide Akunin with a contemporary link to the 
narrative of a renewed Asian peril. Yet just as Akunin dissolved the demarcation lines 
between East and West by playing with the blurry boundaries between Russia’s 
“metropole and colony […] subject and citizen”424, he also reveals the unsuitability of 
Russia’s North-South axis as a historical tool for differentiation and negative self-
identification. Achimas does not move to Moscow in the pursuit of private terror 
 
424 Alexander Morrison, “Metropole, Colony, and Imperial Citizenship in the Russian Empire,” Kritika 
13, no. 2 (2012): 327-64, 338. 
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designs – he simply follows the trail of the highest bidder, i.e. the Russian government, 
in his search for contract money.  
Therefore, transgressions move from the core of the Empire outwards in Akunin’s 
Imperial Russia – not vice versa. By subverting the dictum of the periphery as a zone 
of violence and instability in the Russian Empire, Akunin challenges its continued use 
in the post-Soviet space and offers a scathing comment on the pathological post-
perestroika flirtation with Imperial categories of thought. The resulting narrative 
collapses conceptual, rather than geopolitical borders and focuses, first and foremost, 
on the inborn, not the imported, instabilities of Empire. 
 
3.1.2. Writing Nation: Strolls With Pushkin, Lermontov & Co. 
Another instability of Empire that The Death of Achilles deals with is the novel’s 
eponymous crime. Akunin’s choice of murder victim places an emblematic figure of 
Imperial strength and military prowess at the heart of Fandorin’s detective journey: 
General Sobolev, also called the ‘White General’ or ‘Achilles’ by his friends, is 
modelled after real-life General Mikhail Skobelev (1843-1882), who achieved 
nationwide fame in his lifetime for campaigns in the Russo-Turkish War (1877-78) 
and the Siege of Goek-Tepe (1881). As an easily recognisable figure from Imperial 
history for present-day readers, Sobolev is described as “любимец всей России. Да 
что России – вся Европа Белого Генерала знает” (SMA 17). Correspondingly, his 
death is framed as a national tragedy that surpasses even the assassination of Alexander 
II, the ‘Tsar Osvoboditel’’ or ‘Tsar Liberator’: “Такой скорби город не выказывал 
и в прошлом марте, когда служили панихиды по злодейски убиенному 
императору” (SMA 101).  
In The Death of Achilles, instead of corroborating a view of the deceased as an 
embodiment of Russian virtue, a summary description of Sobolev’s character portrays 
him as a man of international tastes, who prefers Russia’s European capital over its 
historical one: 
Усопший подолгу живал в Петербурге, в древней столице бывал только наездами, однако 
же Москва любила его сильней, чем холодный чиновный Питер […] Достаточно то, что был 
он хорош собой и славен победами, а более всего полюбился москвичам Соболев тем, что 
чувствовали они в нем истинно русского человека, без чужестранных фанаберий и 




Although Sobolev is still presented as a beloved national hero across all strata of 
society, his public persona appears distinctly different from his private one – hinting 
at the existence of a double life that draws the General’s suitability as a Russian 
national hero into question. The notes gathered by Achimas in preparation for the 
assassination reveal: “[п]ьет умеренно, предпочитает ‘шато-икем’, курит 
бразильские сигары, любит русские романсы, в особенности ‘Рябину’” (SMA 
280). The circumstances of Sobolev’s death pose the final challenge to his 
unadulterated hero status: although Sobolev’s unexpected demise is passed off as a 
sudden heart attack at his desk, Fandorin’s investigations soon reveal that the General 
died in the bed of a well-known German femme fatale of the capital. Unaware of the 
fact that Sobolev was assassinated, his svita subsequently tries to safeguard the 
General’s hero narrative in a way that remains marketable for the wider public: 
“Народный герой – и такая смерть. Некрасиво. Как-то не по-русски. Французы 
своему кумиру, пожалуй, простили бы, у нас же сочтут национальным позором” 
(SMA 55).  
The wish to protect the dead General’s reputation also leads several members of 
his entourage to desperately attempt to hinder Fandorin from investigating the case: 
- Фандорин, обещайте, что не используете свой детективный талант во вред отчизне. Здесь 
на карту поставлена честь России. Эраст Петрович помолчал. – Обещаю […] что ничего не 
сделаю против своей чести, и думаю, этого достаточно. (SMA 40)  
 
For the first time in his career, Fandorin finds himself faced with a moral conflict of 
interest while carrying out his duty to the state. Although he ignores the military’s wish 
to keep up appearances, imbuing a full reconstruction of the crime with greater 
importance than the protection of an official narrative of Empire, Fandorin equally 
does not suspect any foul play on part of the Russian state. At one point, he even 
suggests to act in a private capacity – thus offering to preserve the Empire’s face by 
avoiding diplomatic conflicts with Germany (cf. SMA 73).  
Throughout The Death of Achilles, Fandorin’s loyalty to the regime is repeatedly 
put into the spotlight. When Fandorin comes across a newspaper article that details the 
use of a fake cover story in an American newspaper, announcing the U.S. President’s 
death as part of an advertisement campaign for woollen underwear – an insertion so 
random that it begs interpretation – he mentally argues that “государь император это 
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вам не какой-то там президент” (SMA 44).425 By condemning the everyday 
normalcy allowed in the treatment of a democratically elected head of state, Fandorin 
lifts the image of the autocratic ruler above that of a representative of the people –
imbuing the former’s image with the sacred inviolability typical of his post, and 
embellishing it with the concomitant notions of greater wisdom and competence. 
Fandorin’s indignation in this scene is an expression of the leader cult thinking that 
continues to inform Russian culture today, along with the associated metonymic 
identification of Tsar, Empire and Russia.426  
What Fandorin fails to perceive, however, is that while an Emperor may be a 
stronger representation of Empire than a President will ever be, he is always a weaker 
representative of Nation, too. While reluctant to submit to the irrational concept of 
blind allegiance, Fandorin still wishes to uphold the reputation of the Russian Empire 
and professes complete faith in the government’s right to rule – a position that marks 
him as a highly idealistic intelligentsia member of his time. Although Fandorin is led 
to suspect a government official as the main culprit early on in the novel, even voicing 
his doubts in a letter to his superiors, his conviction crumbles to shameful resignation 
as soon as the order to abandon this investigation comes from above, which effectively 
places Fandorin under house arrest:  
Побледнев, Эраст Петрович медленно поднялся. Нет, не строгая, но, в сущности, 
справедливая монаршья кара заставила похолодеть его сердце. Хуже всего было то, что 
позорно провалилась версия, выдвинутая им с таким апломбом. Принять тайного 
правительственного агента за главного злодея! Какая постыдная ошибка! (SMA 181) 
 
However, Fandorin’s assumptions of guiltlessness on the part of the government are 
gradually proven wrong as the full circumstances surrounding Sobolev’s death are 
revealed. Through accounts presented by Achimas and Sobolev’s former lover 
Ekaterina Aleksandrovna, General Sobolev’s private persona is shown to be even more 
complex than previously assumed. True to his historical prototype, Akunin’s Sobolev 
harbours militant pan-Slavist convictions akin to sonderweg ideas for Russia’s future, 
which Ekaterina Aleksandrovna summarises with the words: “Россия для русских, 
 
425 Ironically, the headline given in the Russian original, “Президент умер” (‘The president died’), 
recalls the 2015 internet phenomenon of the website putinumer.com, which was called to life after Putin 
failed to appear in public for over a week. The site featured a button that generated satirical answers to 
the question of whether Putin had, in actual fact, died. It has since been taken off the internet.   
426 At the same time, Putin’s present-day tsar-ification of the Presidential post now makes Fandorin’s 
distinction appear oddly redundant – in the Russian context, at least. 
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объединенное славянство, собственный не-европейский путь и прочая дикость” 
(SMA 105). She also mentions a clear geopolitical dimension to Sobolev’s plans, 
saying “России нужны не Дарданеллы, а просвещение и конституция” (SMA 
178). In the end, Fandorin uncovers Sobolev’s plan to organise “какой-то дерзкий 
демарш. Возможно, переворот в духе восемнадцатого столетия. В общем то, что 
немцы называют putsch” (SMA 195). The only further details the reader receives are 
marked as mere speculations, but they include the idea to take the royal family into 
custody and establish a military dictatorship in their stead. 
Not coincidentally, these plans sound reminiscent of the events of 1917. Akunin 
lives up to his self-chosen image of the literary trickster and ‘evil man’ by connecting 
a national hero image with political designs that would have been controversial in the 
context of the 1990s, when anti-Communist sentiments were still comparatively strong 
in post-Soviet society and the revolution particularly detested. Even in 2017, 
commemorative acts to mark the centenary of the revolution were limited to a 
minimum: 
[a]s the centenary of 1917 approached, the focus was not on the two revolutions and their 
confusing, shades-of-grey meaning for Russia, but on slotting other historical events into place to 
weave a grand narrative of Russian history. Second-tier heroes and victories, including from the 
tsarist past, could take their place below the Great Victory and the return of Crimea in an unbroken 
narrative of Russian success.427 
 
Representations like those of Govorukhin’s, who framed the revolution as the year of 
Russia’s national downfall, certainly prevailed at the time when Akunin was writing 
The Death of Achilles.  
The intricacies of Sobolev’s national hero image thus acquire a confounding 
complexity: on the one hand, his proposal of a politics that envisages ethnic Russian 
dominance and ultra-nationalist superiority is said to find support across all of Imperial 
society, in principle answering the demands for a truly Russian national hero: “Есть 
серьезные основания полагать, что этот безумный прожект будет поддержан 
значительной частью армии, дворянства, купечества и даже крестьянства. Белый 
Генерал идеально подходит на роль спасителя отечества!” (SMA 276). On the 
other hand, the power to unite the highly diverse Russian society behind a common 
cause places Sobolev in rivalry to the Tsar and in the role of political enfant terrible – 
 
427 Walker, The Long Hangover, 245. 
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a threat great enough that it warrants Sobolev’s death sentence at the hands of the 
government. His assassination is deliberately framed in a way that discourages 
Sobolev’s followers from idolising him further, placing a halo of shame on his memory 
instead.  
By unravelling the seemingly straightforward national hero narrative surrounding 
the White General – whose real death occurred under similarly mysterious 
circumstances and remains shrouded in speculation to this date – Akunin engages in a 
play with potentially not-altogether-alternative history and deliberately calls a 
contested episode in Russian national history back to the attention of his contemporary 
readership. Without stripping Sobolev’s character of his overall identification potential 
for the population, Akunin still reveals the dark underbelly of his fictional General’s 
activities – which intersect closely with the real Skobelev’s historical controversy and 
thus spell out the complexity of historical hero narratives in general. As the traditional 
‘whodunit’ quest of classical detective fiction is elevated onto a more abstract level 
and turned into a quest for stabilisers of national identity instead, the question arises: 
what makes or breaks a national hero? 
  
Achilles, Achimas and the Doubling of the Antagonist 
Akunin further interrogates the seeming givens of the national hero theme through the 
thinly veiled double meaning inscribed into The Death of Achilles’s title. Although 
Sobolev is the most obvious candidate for the nickname of Achilles, the antagonist 
Achimas also bears several parallels to Homer’s original character. Thus, the chapters 
describing Achimas’s childhood reveal that he was secretly trained by his mother to 
become an invincible fighter; just like Homer’s Achilles, he, too, escapes into a 
temporary hideaway disguised as a girl and eventually goes on to murder a famous 
general. Whereas Homer’s hero was felled by an arrow to the heel, Achimas is killed 
by a shot in the leg. Finally, Achimas’s point of view is explored in a considerably 
greater number of chapters than Sobolev’s, imbuing his character with much greater 
poignancy and a much more recognisable presence for the reader. 
Achimas’s traditional doubling function is turned into a threedimensional 
character constellation when it is extrapolated onto Fandorin, with whom Achimas 
shares an equally large number of similarities. Akunin uses the formulaic juxtaposition 
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of Fandorin and Achimas to paint them as quintessential doubles: both characters 
embark on quests to discover the identity of a murderer, while exhibiting a distinctive 
way of enumerating their arguments and reasoning logically.428 Both also lead an 
unsteady lifestyle, traversing the Russian Empire and foreign regions to follow 
assignments on their respective jobs. Finally, both spent their childhoods as orphans, 
leading Achimas to blandly discredit the idea of father- or motherland altogether: 
“'Мужчина должен […] защищать себя и честь своего рода.’ Ахимас не знал, что 
такое честь рода. У него не было рода” (SMA 221).429 For Achimas, there is no 
patria – meaning there is no need to shackle himself to a reductive sense of national 
identity or the empty invocation of honour based on the coincidence of birthplace. All 
that counts for him are individual actions and interests. 
The most important connection between Achimas and Fandorin is their 
preoccupation with the theme of fate and coincidence. According to Achimas, “жизнь 
преставлялась [ему] буйно заросшим газоном, в котором он выстригал линию 
своей судьбы” (SMA 264). This quotation recalls Pasternak’s Doctor Zhivago 
(Доктор Живаго, 1957), who used the phrase “жизнь прожить – не поле 
перейти”430 in Gamlet (Гамлет), one of the best-known poems from the novel. 
Achimas’s variation of the theme indicates defiance of Zhivago’s submissiveness to 
the force of fate and his religious beliefs, as life to him is no longer a field – subject to 
nature’s whim – but merely an overgrown lawn, i.e. an object of human agency and 
responsibility that can be controlled and cut into the desired shape.  
Throughout The Death of Achilles, Achimas’s refusal to subscribe to a higher will 
clashes with his awareness of feeling inserted into events he can only partially control. 
During Sobolev’s funeral procession, “Ахимас стоял в причитающей, крестящейся 
толпе и чувствовал себя главным персонажем этого грандиозного 
представления, его невидимым центром. Это было непривычное, пьянящее 
чувство” (SMA 331). Achimas’s surprise at feeling at the centre of things proves that 
he is typically aware of being confined to the opposite role of self-dependent outsider 
and foreigner. Yet, once arrived in Moscow, he realises he is not so very different from 
 
428 Cf. SMA 282. 
429 Translated as ‘family’ by Bromfield, I would suggest a broader interpretation of the original Russian 
term ‘род’ to suggest a genealogical line and infer a sense of nation and national community instead. 
430 Boris Pasternak, Doktor Zhivago (Moscow: Sovetskaia Rossiia, 1989), 604. 
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the Empire’s centre – or perhaps it is the heartland that is not so different from the 
periphery.  
Achimas’s awareness of his invisible role in the funeral spectacle – in itself a 
theatrical performance of post-mortem celebration, callously staged by the perpetrator 
of the crime – focusses on the authority it grants him over the ignorant masses, 
providing him with a taste of power akin to that of the panoptical, power-wielding 
state.431 Translated by Bromfield as ‘theatrical production’, Achimas’s choice of 
words underlines his instinctually correct perception of the events as staged and 
choreographed. They also open up a parallel between the real and the written world, 
divided only by the invisible border between fact and fiction: as Achimas becomes an 
unwitting actor within a play of deception staged by the state, his condition likewise 
raises questions about the autonomy of citizens in real political entities. 
The role of the state as an authorial presence that imposes its own – potentially 
violent and transgressive – narrative onto the body politic is also expressed in 
Fandorin’s relationship with fate, which is similarly antagonistic to Achimas’s. At one 
point during the novel’s events, Fandorin realises that the Empire and Achimas share 
an uncanny ubiquity of knowledge, which he expresses through the use of identical 
terms: 
Главное же – откуда такая дьявольская осведомленность, такая фантастическая 
вездесущесть? (SMA 168)  
 
Это человек незаурядный, невероятных способностей. Невидим, неуловим, неуязвим. 
Вездесущий, он повсюду появлялся раньше нас с вами, наносил удар первым. (SMA 197) 
[my emphases] 
 
As omniscience becomes a weapon, knowledge is, quite literally, turned into power – 
of the surveillance kind. Fandorin bristles at the sensation of existing within a pre-
written reality, partly because one of his own character quirks is that he is “истинный 
баловень судьбы” (SS 256-57) – a person who preternaturally wins at gambling, bets 
 
431 In his descriptions of Moscow’s Khitrovka district, Akunin creates another parallel like this by 
describing the city’s underworld as a Tsardom, “жуткое […] местечко, какое-то подземное царство, 
где обитают не живые люди, а тени” (SMA 132). Akunin goes on to show that the criminal 
underworld has its own set of rules and moral guidelines, some of which appear to be followed by a 
stricter code of honour than those entertained on a government level – similar to the way it is portrayed 
in Aleksandra Marinina’s novels. However, unlike Marinina, Akunin does not allow his protagonist to 
fraternise with these criminal elements out of a supposed lack of alternatives. 
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and duels. Fandorin dislikes his supernatural luck because he is aware of the imbalance 
it creates in life: robbed of uncertainty, he also feels robbed of individual agency.  
Fandorin’s grudging self-perception as a pawn of fate, to be moved randomly 
across the stage of life, finds its parallel within 19th-century Russian literature and 
connects both him and his double Achimas to various well-known figures from 
classical Russian works of fiction. One of these characters is Pechorin, Lermontov’s 
superfluous man in A Hero of Our Time (Герой нашего времени, 1840). Stuck in the 
moral morass of uncertainty, hypocrisy, and boredom that was the fate of many 
nobility members of his time, Pechorin repeatedly engages with the question of 
destiny: “если точно есть предопределение, то зачем же нам дана воля, рассудок? 
почему мы должны давать отчет в наших поступках?”432. The question of moral 
integrity and a potential descent into criminality acquires real significance for Pechorin 
after he kills his former friend and colleague Grushnitsky in a duel, prompting him to 
famously pronounce the phrase ‘finita la commedia’ – a statement that expresses both 
his knowledge of the rigged nature of the duel and his scorn at fortune’s script for life 
in general.  
Pechorin’s murder of his would-be-assassin Grushnitsky finds its double parallel 
in Fandorin’s and Achimas’s final encounter in The Death of Achilles. Not only does 
Achimas attempt to kill the detective during this showdown, he is also revealed to be 
the person behind the bomb blast that killed Fandorin’s wife on their wedding day in 
The Winter Queen. An additional intertextual layer is introduced as Fandorin recalls 
“сцена дуэли из оперы ‘Евгений Онегин’. Сейчас белоглазый запоет: ‘Паду ли я, 
стрелой пронзенный’” (SMA 355). The mention of Eugene Onegin creates a mirror 
connection between Onegin and Pechorin as well as Lensky and Grushnitsky, along 
with Fandorin and Achimas as their doubles: like Onegin, Fandorin perceives the 
outcome of his fatalistic encounter with Achimas as preordained by fate; this 
impression is heightened by the fact that the line he quotes from Pushkin’s novel is 
preceded by the words “прав судьбы закон”433. Just like Pechorin, Fandorin also 
escapes a treasonous murder through an unnatural stroke of luck, but has to save his 
 
432 M. Iu. Lermontov, Geroi nashego vremeni (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 1963), 166. 




own life by killing his would-be assassin – feeling all the more disillusioned with the 
state of reality because of it.  
The literal death of Achilles-Achimas provides an opportunity for both him and 
Fandorin to break through the paradigm set by the fate-wielding state. Achimas’s final 
act in The Death of Achilles is to defy his pre-written script, performing the move from 
enemy to the role of conspirator. As he lies dying, Achimas provides Fandorin with 
proof of the government’s complicity in Sobolev’s murder, thus destroying the façade 
of the state’s carefully enacted play. With his dying words, Achimas predicts that 
Fandorin will be erased from the state’s narrative of Imperial grandeur, presaging a 
role reversal that will turn him into enemy number one instead: “Вас убьют ваши же 
начальники. Они вас вычеркнули. Из жизни. […] Вы никто и ничто. Вы труп. 
[…] Теперь вы знаете всю правду. За это вас убьют. Государственная 
необходимость” (SMA 359-60).  
As Fandorin is forced to acknowledge that his view of the Empire was 
romanticised and wrong, he is also faced with a decision: whether to remain a cog in 
the Imperial machine – as indeed most Russian literary detectives have done – or 
whether to act as an individual and reclaim his sense of self-governance in the process. 
The seeming incongruity of the two options weighs heavily on him, and even after 
being presented with undeniable proof of the government’s involvement in the murder 
of a national hero, Fandorin struggles to come to terms with the truth laid before him:   
Лишился всего – службы, чести, жизненного смысла. Негодяй Караченцев предал его, 
послал на верную смерть. Нет, не Караченцев – государство, держава, отчизна. […] 
Опороченный, преследуемый, бросивший службу, изменивший долгу и отечеству. Нет, не 
изменивший, это отечество предало своего верного слугу! (SMA 360-61) 
 
The triple invocation of the term ‘fatherland’ (‘государство, держава, отчизна’) 
reveals Fandorin’s continued desire to uphold the sanctity of the state and patriotic 
attachment to Empire, which he mistakenly sees as the synonymous embodiment of 
Nation. As the ultimate expression of his faith in being able to repair the two disjointed 
narratives, Fandorin returns to state service at the end of The Death of Achilles – 
hoping that he will prove capable of turning the country into a state where Rossiya and 
Rus’ align. From an intelligentsia standpoint, that potentially makes him into an anti-
hero; from the point of view of Akunin’s ambition to create a new type of intelligentsia 
hero, however, it makes perfect sense. 
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Fandorin as National Hero 
The title of the third and final part of the novel, ‘White and Black’, offers a fitting 
phrase for Akunin’s reversal of hero and anti-hero narratives, which turns established 
categories of heroism and national belonging upside down. As neither Fandorin nor 
Achimas agree to act as clear-cut pawns in a simplified game of good vs. evil, they 
also appear as two different manifestations of the modern, self-determined subject, 
united in an essentially identical will for independence. What differentiates Fandorin 
from Achimas is his moral integrity, along with a childlike belief in the righteousness 
of authorial subservience and the existing social contract. Whereas Achimas dares pick 
at the notions of the seemingly self-understood, Fandorin only challenges the very 
foundations of the existing discourse – yet at the same time, Achimas’s suggested hero 
narrative contains violence and transgressions that ultimately result in his death, 
leaving only Fandorin’s much more moderate, critically engaged middle-ground to fill 
the suggested hero paradigm. 
The peculiarity of this hero ideal becomes obvious in the light of Fandorin’s 
cultural otherness from his peers, made manifest from the outset in The Death of 
Achilles. On the very opening pages of the novel, Fandorin discards several 
conveniently located offers of accommodation in favour of a hotel that fascinates him 
because of its literary associations: “У Дюссо все наилучшие писатели 
останавливались – и Достоевский, и граф Толстой, и сам господин Крестовский. 
[…] Красавец-брюнет ахнул: - Неужто граф Толстой?” (SMA 5). This reaction 
echoes not so much that of the native Muscovite as the curiously intrigued foreign 
traveller.  
Fandorin’s choice of hotel is also revealing in another regard: the Dusseaux (or 
Duseaux, as it is sometimes spelt) did indeed host both Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, and 
was even mentioned by name in Anna Karenina: “А я вчера был у Дюссо и вижу на 
доске ‘Каренин’, а мне и в голову не пришло, что это ты!”434 and one of 
Dostoevsky’s letters: “О себе скажу, что я было поселился сначала в Москве, у 
Дюссо, где стоял тоже Филиппов”435. Just like Stepan Arkadyevich, Fandorin learns 
about Sobolev’s stay at the hotel because his friend’s name is written onto the publicly 
 
434 L. N. Tolstoy, Anna Karenina (Tula: Tul’skoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1963), 332. 
435 F. M. Dostoevsky, “A. P. Miliukovu, 10-15 iiulia 1866, Liublino,” Sobranie Sochinenii v piatnadtsati 
tomakh, tom XV (Leningrad: Nauka, 1988), 286. 
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displayed guest board. Akunin creates a world of well-known literary classics into 
which to place his protagonist – only to parody, along the way, the post-Soviet 
distortions of this heritage.  
Whereas Tolstoy and Dostoevsky are likely to be recognised by all of Akunin’s 
readers, Vsevolod Krestovsky is a less well-known figure. A literary contributor to the 
Dostoevsky brothers’ journal Epokha (Эпоха) and a writer who – much like 
Dostoevsky himself – frequently chose Russia’s downtrodden society as a leitmotif, 
Krestovsky became famous for his novel The Slums of Saint Petersburg 
(Петербургские трущобы) in 1864. This novel was turned into a television series 
during the 1990s, which was named The Secrets of Saint Petersburg (Петербургские 
тайны, 1994-1998) in an obvious attempt to cater to the increased public taste for 
detective stories. From slums to secrets, the serial showcased the conflicting nostalgic 
atmosphere prevalent during this period and changed Krestovsky’s original text into a 
romanticised portrayal of Imperial Petersburg. The very first episode begins with a 
character who, upon returning home from a lengthy absence, proclaims how good it is 
to be home – finding reassurance in the fact that nothing has changed during his years 
away. Imperial glamour and the criminal underworld are made to coexist in The 
Secrets of Saint Petersburg in a strikingly flattering symbiosis aimed to make crimes 
look intriguing, rather than condemnable.  
To an extent, the Fandorin series followed the same strategy. On every single book 
cover of the Fandorin project, readers find a dedication to the 19th century that reads: 
“когда литература была великой, вера в прогресс безграничной, а преступления 
совершались и раскрывались с изяществом и вкусом”. A similar thought was also 
voiced in the stories about Sherlock Holmes, who endorsed an aestheticized view of 
crime and deplored “the decline of the art of crime in his day”436. Akunin reactivates 
this 19th-century heritage in literature, but subverts its tenets through the provision of 
a considerably more sordid, less elegant post-Soviet equivalent. As he uses the genre 
of detective fiction to strengthen the romanticisation of fictional villainy and yet 
undermine the concomitant glorification of the criminal mind-set in post-Soviet 
society, Akunin also challenges the nostalgic chorus of voices that changed 
 




Krestovsky’s socio-critical novel into shallow bedtime television. By providing this 
tongue-in-cheek commentary inside a crime story of his own, Akunin issues a poignant 
verdict on how the genre ought to engage with the past instead: irreverently, but 
honestly. 
Irreverence also plays a part in the way Fandorin’s outlandish behaviour is 
perceived by his compatriots. Fandorin appears as a distinct cultural alien, combining 
the traditionally liminal position of the eccentric detective figure with the cultural 
peripherality of the Russian intelligentsia member. During the carriage ride to his 
hotel, Fandorin confounds his driver by inquiring into the identity of a newly erected 
statue, asking: “А кому это на б-бульваре памятник поставили? Неужто лорду 
Байрону? - Пушкин это, Александр Сергеич, - укоризненно обернулся возница” 
(SMA 6). Here is a whodunit-mystery that rattles the very foundations of Russian 
cultural heritage: how could a Russian citizen possibly confuse Pushkin with Byron?  
Despite appearing like a mere humorous insertion at first glance, Fandorin’s faux-
pas carries multiple layers of meaning. On the one hand, the carriage driver’s rebuke 
is a barb aimed at Fandorin’s loss of connection with his home culture, particularly as 
the distance between Fandorin and the rest of his countrymen is linguistically marked 
by the narrator’s use of the pronoun ‘ours’: “Молодой человек покраснел и опять 
залопотал что-то по-ненашему [my emphasis]” (SMA 6) – a distinction sadly lost in 
translation. On the other hand, Fandorin’s statement violates the national hero 
narrative linked to Pushkin as Russia’s national poet. As pointed out by Dobrenko,  
Pushkin’s unique place in the Russian national consciousness owes less to his greatness as a poet 
than to the fact that a myth of Pushkin lies at the heart of the Russian national identity which is 
defined by a conflict between a lofty image of Russia’s majesty, and the bleakness of her past and 
uncertainty of the present. It can be described as a cross between an inferiority complex and a 
superiority complex […] Pushkin incorporates everything that Russia wants to be and everything 
that it fails to be.437 
 
Whereas the Communist regime initially deprived Pushkin of his pivotal role in 
national identity formation, the cult surrounding the poet resurfaced during the Soviet 
years – quickly imbuing him with the inviolable status of national genius and messiah 
that continues to inform the political use of Pushkin’s name today.438  
 
437 Evgeny Dobrenko, “Pushkin in Soviet and Post-Soviet Culture,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Pushkin, ed. Andrew Kahn (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006): 202-20, 202. 
438 Cf. ibid, 205f. 
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The fixation of Russia’s contemporary political elite on utilising Pushkin as their 
figurehead in the construction of a cultural citizenship narrative first gained 
momentum during Yeltsin’s and Luzhkov’s reign, who both played important parts in 
the nationwide Pushkin bicentennial celebrations in 1999. Under Putin, the image of 
the national poet was then made into a sacrosanct notion of patriotism, effectively 
turning any attack on the poet into a collateral ambush on Russia’s national prestige 
and pride. This is why, in the contemporary post-Soviet cultural climate, even films 
like Дуэль. Пушкинъ – Лермонтовъ (2014) can cause a national scandal – simply by 
suggesting an alternative historical timeline in which neither Pushkin nor Lermontov 
died in their respective duels.439  
In his willingness to point out and subvert the ideological corruption of Pushkin 
as Russia’s national poet, Akunin follows in the footsteps of both the Russian futurists 
and Soviet writers such as Andrei Sinyavsky and Andrei Bitov. Sinyavsky’s novel 
Strolls with Pushkin (Прогулки с Пушкином, 1975) was heavily criticised at the time 
because of its attempt to “[liberate] Pushkin from the deadening myth of greatness”440 
– a stance that Fandorin’s matter-of-course replacement of Pushkin with Byron 
mirrors, pointing out the futility of trying to create an aura of national uniqueness 
around a historical figure who was emblematic for much of the transnationalism of 
19th-century Russian thought.441  
The strong European influences that informed both Pushkin’s work and that of 
many other classical Russian authors strengthens the impression that these writers 
achieved their immortal renown not through the sheen of national distinctiveness that 
was belatedly added to their work, but through a cross-fertilisation of literary traditions 
that put Russian identity into a cultural context of curiosity, open-mindedness and 
intellectual daring. This is particularly so in the case of Pushkin, who served several 
 
439 Ekaterina Aponina, “Al’ternativnaia istoriia. V Krymu vse zhe pokazali ‘Duel’. Pushkin – 
Lermontov’,” Argumenty i fakty, November 6, 2014, <http://www.krym.aif.ru/culture/events/1376404> 
[accessed 17 December 2019] 
440 Stephanie Sandler, “Sex, Death and Nation in the Strolls with Pushkin Controversy,” Slavic Review 
51, no. 2 (1992): 294-308, 296. 
441 In an academic context, the juxtaposition of Pushkin and Byron is a well-established and often 
discussed subject for research. Cf., among others: Ann Gelder, “Wandering in Exile: Byron and 
Pushkin,” Comparative Literature 42, no. 4 (1990): 319-34; Connor Doak, “Poltava at 300: Re-Reading 
Byron’s Mazeppa and Pushkin’s Poltava in the Post-Soviet Era,” Australian Slavonic & East European 
Studies 24, no. 1-2 (2010): 83-101; Monika Greenleaf, “Pushkin’s Byronic Apprenticeship: A Problem 
in Cultural Syncretism,” The Russian Review 53, no. 3 (1994): 382-98. 
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years in exile for his vocal defence of free speech and his frequent criticism of 
authoritarian rule. The rediscovery of Pushkin’s critical spirit is therefore what lies at 
the heart of Fandorin’s mistake – along with his own character construction as an 
intelligentsia hero of his time(s).  
 
3.1.3. Conclusion 
The Death of Achilles is the first of the Fandorin novels to move beyond a general 
representation of Imperial Russia and towards an explicit representation – and 
dissection – of Empire and Nation. Akunin interweaves historical timelines in a way 
that invites a reading of the novel’s events against the backdrop of post-Soviet Russia, 
creating the impression of a postmodern circularity of history akin to the two sides of 
a Moebius strip: readers cannot read the past without also reading the present, and vice 
versa.  
This blurring of the boundary between fact and fiction, intensified by the real 
mystery surrounding Mikhail Skobelev’s death, allows Akunin to put an important 
detective quest to his readers: by prompting them to detect the border between 
alternative and real history, he simultaneously raises the question as to whether such a 
border can exist at all. Unlike traditional detective fiction, which reliably provided 
readers with a reassuring resolution to the dilemma at hand, Akunin’s The Death of 
Achilles refuses to generate the impression of such a return to stability. Instead, the 
novel’s ending stresses the instability of reality, confronting both Fandorin and 
Akunin’s readers with an epistemological dilemma that spells out the corruption of 
Empire and raises the spectre of cyclical manipulations of national identity narratives 
in Russia. 
The manipulation of the historical narrative likewise plays a key role in The Death 
of Achilles. Akunin’s process of re-writing Empire in the novel focusses primarily on 
the myth of Moscow as Russia’s authentic heartland. Fandorin’s spatial exploration of 
Mother Moscow (‘матушка-Москва’) perpetually turns into a discovery of the Other 
Moscow instead, linking architectural landmarks of Empire with cultural elements 
from abroad that are either hidden or barred from the contemporary discourse. When 
read as a metonymic microcosm of the vast Russian Empire, Akunin’s Moscow reveals 
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the narrative disfigurement of memories about Imperial stability and cohesion.442 
Symbolic landmarks that carry meaning in both Imperial and contemporary Russian 
history, such as the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour, are given a prominent, but 
contested place in The Death of Achilles: just as Akunin acknowledges their 
importance as cultural identity structures, he also subverts it, thus highlighting the 
arbitrariness of all such symbolic narratives. 
Akunin also investigates the peripherality of Moscow’s populace, thus joining into 
a dialogue with other post-Soviet writers who have portrayed Moscow as “a centripetal 
force [that] has isolated itself in three ways: ideologically, through its closed, single-
minded leadership; physically, through building walls and barriers; and temporally, by 
controlling the narrative about its history”443. The recognisably colonial stereotype of 
the urban jungle fulfils a double function in the novel: on the one hand, it places the 
history of the Russian Empire within the same corrosive framework as Western 
colonialism, blurring the boundary between Europe and Russia through a shared 
legacy of oppression. On the other hand, the peculiar singularity of Russia’s colonial 
experience comes to the fore as Moscow’s populace – not its territory – is placed in 
the heart of this colonial paradigm.  
Russia’s historic process of self-colonisation and the identity split it produced is 
exemplarily explored in the character of Achimas, who defies attempts at pigeon-
holing according to predetermined East-West or North-South dichotomies and 
introduces the issue of modern-day racism into the novel. While illustrating late 
Imperial Russia’s lack of a stable national identity narrative alongside the 
fragmentation of its ethnic subtext, Achimas’s role also challenges post-Soviet 
Russia’s continued colonial behavioural patterns towards Central Asian and Caucasian 
citizens. Other than in the Sherlock Holmes stories, where the exotic appears as an 
unmistakable threat from the outside, in Fandorin’s, and by extension the post-Soviet 
reader’s Moscow, no comparable stabilisation point can be found: there is no Other 
that is not also the own. Imperial Russia, in Akunin’s view, is therefore not part of a 
 
442 Emma Polotskaya noted the same “paradoxical motif of the claustrophobia of Russia’s vast expanse” 
in the work of Chekhov (cf. Emma Polotskaya, “Chekhov and His Russia,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Chekhov, eds. Vera Gottlieb and Paul Allain [Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000]: 17-28, 
20.) Akunin’s close connection to Chekhov’s literary and cultural legacy will be discussed in detail in 
chapter 3.3 (The Black City). 
443 Clowes, Russia on the Edge, 23. 
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binary world where West means progress and East means degeneration; instead, the 
influence of both East and West on Russia’s development is represented, but the 
allegedly irreconcilable otherness of their experiences resisted. 
The categorical transnationality of values that forms part of the central mystery of 
Empire in The Death of Achilles is also apparent in Akunin’s choice of crime plot. 
Fandorin’s detective journey towards debunking the myth of Empire is intertwined 
with his investigation of the murder mystery surrounding General Sobolev. By not just 
spelling out, but commercialising the mortality of one of Russia’s best-known national 
heroes, Akunin uses one of detective fiction’s formulas – the need for a crime – as a 
means to violate the general sanctity of the national hero figure in contemporary 
discourse. As Russia’s fabled military hero of the 19th century is shown to be half 
mirage, half narrative construct, Sobolev’s dethronement from the pedestal of Russia’s 
indisputable hero pantheon expands The Death of Achilles’s story arc beyond a mere 
detective plot and reveals a question of general historical significance: does a true 
national hero show unwavering loyalty to the state, no matter how corrupt, or does he 
stand out as a daring, potentially brash, free-thinker?  
By refusing to provide his readers with a reductionist, clear-cut answer to this 
question, Akunin successfully demonstrates the transience of national hero paradigms 
in general. In The Death of Achilles, national hero figures are not portrayed as immortal 
manifestations of unshakeable nostalgia, but as arbitrary objects of selective national 
memory processes. Akunin expresses the same irreverent attitude in relation to 
Pushkin, who is not toppled from his place of literary worship, but presented from the 
alternative angle of critical 19th-century intelligentsia thought. As a result, Pushkin 
arises not so much as a cultural copy to the image of the national leader, but as a 
blueprint for voices that dare resist the petrification of claims to power – be they of a 
cultural or a political nature.  
The same spirit of resistance finds its expression in Fandorin and Achimas’s 
rebellion against fate: as they attempt to break through the pre-written course of their 
lives, they also end up railing against their creator – establishing an extratextual level 
of meaning that not only pits the individual citizen against the state, but which also 
exposes Akunin as the villain he has made himself to be. By problematising his role 
as author, Akunin draws attention to the role of authorship in the more general sense 
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of Russia’s national identity narrative, while continuing to play with his self-
stylization as Russian literature’s unruly purveyor of uncomfortable truths. 
At the end of The Death of Achilles, Fandorin is the only surviving candidate for 
the role of national hero. His stance is characterised by a conciliatory compromise 
between the two extreme positions embodied by Sobolev and Achimas: whereas 
Sobolev appears as the military idealist whose voice bridges 19th-century Slavophilism 
and 21st-century conservative thinking, Achimas, whose Machiavellian practicality 
mirrors much of post-Soviet utilitarianism, spells out a path of bloodshed and violence. 
Fandorin appears as a less radical version of these turns towards individualistic 
autonomy, favouring integrity and self-determination over a senseless inflation of 
empty hero rhetoric and patriotic fervour. The fact that Fandorin’s path ultimately 
leads him back into the folds of Empire is a testament to Akunin’s commitment 
towards fashioning a new intelligentsia ideal that seeks active co-partnership with the 
state. Yet as subsequent instalments of the detective project show, Fandorin’s 
discovery of the conflicting split between Empire and Nation had only just begun.  
 
3.2. The State Counsellor (2000) 
[…] в самом деле много читал […] Хотел 
понять, почему люди мучают друг друга, 
откуда берется несправедливость и как ее 
лучше исправлять. Прямого ответа в 
книгах не обнаруживалось, но, если как 
следует поразмыслить, его можно было 
прочесть между строк. (SS 40) 
 
The novel The State Counsellor (Статский советник) is the sixth novel in the 
Fandorin series. It was published in the year 2000 and has been called “the most 
ceremonious tale of terrorism and counterterrorism you’re ever likely to read”444. The 
novel’s plot, set in 1891, opens with the murder of one Adjutant-General Khrapov by 
the Combat Group, a revolutionary terrorist cell. Khrapov, who is acting Governor 
General of Siberia and soon-to-be Minister of the Interior, is assassinated following a 
nationwide scandal surrounding his involvement in the hanging of a young 
revolutionary. Several of the General’s attendants identify the escaped murderer as 
 
444 “The State Counsellor,” Kirkus Reviews, April 17, 2017, <http://www.kirkusreviews.com/book-
reviews/boris-akunin/the-state-counsellor/> [accessed 17 December 2019] 
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Fandorin, who is subsequently arrested, but quickly able to prove his innocence. After 
realising that the murderer only masqueraded as Fandorin, capitalising on the 
detective’s reputation as a trustworthy and loyal servant to the state in order to gain 
access to Khrapov’s private train compartment, Fandorin’s honour is piqued and he 
begins to investigate the case.  
Accompanying him in this task is Prince Pozharsky, a newly arrived detective 
from Saint Petersburg. Together, Fandorin and he infiltrate the simmering 
revolutionary circles in Moscow and navigate the corrupt and incompetent behaviour 
of police and government representatives alike. It soon becomes clear that a 
conspirator has been passing on government secrets to the Combat Group, helping 
them orchestrate several successful assassinations. During the final confrontation with 
the Combat Group, Fandorin uncovers that this conspirator is none other than 
Pozharsky himself – acting at the behest of the highest echelons of the Tsarist family 
and causing Akunin’s protagonist yet another major identity crisis.  
The State Counsellor’s historical backdrop of revolutionary circles and terrorist 
conspiracies lends a particular vibrancy and topicality to Akunin’s novel, inviting a 
reading that focusses on the “political parallels between 1891 and Putin-era Russia, a 
national situation in which the government is besieged by terrorist attacks […] and 
heated discussions within government circles about how to confront those attacks”445. 
As The State Counsellor explores the cyclical repetition of Russian history through the 
prism of its terror episodes, it also skilfully broadens the traditional whodunit-structure 
of the crime novel into an overarching exploration of Russia’s problematic revival of 
Imperial politics. Moreover, Akunin draws attention to the increased theatricalisation 
of post-Soviet political life through the narrative structure he chooses for The State 
Counsellor: unlike other instalments of the Fandorin series, the novel is framed by a 
prologue and epilogue, which outline the initial crime and set the stage. In addition, 
The State Counsellor contains a chapter “в которой, как положено, происходит 
несчастье” (SS 225) – delivering a meta-commentary not only on established crime 
fiction formulas, but also on Aristotelean drama structure.  
By making the careful extremes to which he pushes The State Counsellor’s self-
referentiality obvious, Akunin also parodies his readership’s unspoken expectations of 
 
445 Mulcahy, “A Not-so-thrilling Thriller,” 314. 
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what constitutes a thrilling plot – pointing out his own powerful position as author and 
master of the narrative. The paratextual elements that Akunin uses in the construction 
of his plot – such as newspaper reports, telegrams and secret notes in varying fonts, 
indentations, and a diagram of rooms needed for a plan of action – conjure up the 
spectre of historical authenticity, but double-perform as representations of the ludic 
elements of a play and act as a visual reminder of Akunin’s continued transgression of 
the border between fact and fiction.446  
The first part of this chapter will resume my analysis of Akunin’s process of re-
writing Empire against the backdrop of these mind-games with Russian history. 
Akunin continues his previous discussion of Moscow’s peripherality in The State 
Counsellor, but relocates it from a focus on architectural landmarks to a discovery of 
Imperial power structures instead – questioning both Imperial attitudes towards 
Eastern and Western forms of governance and the way power distribution works within 
the Russian Empire. As he traces the remnants of these attitudes into the post-Soviet 
space, Akunin uses the parallels between late Imperial and post-Soviet Russia to 
highlight the instability of this (neo-)Imperial experience. Once again, he also touches 
upon the lasting legacy of Russia’s self-colonisation process, first by exploring 
conflicting attitudes towards East and West among the Russian characters in his novel 
and then by positing a Jewish character in the role of main antagonist. How does 
Akunin utilise the specific backdrop of terrorist activity, led by a character of Jewish 
origin, to subvert post-Soviet Russia’s problematic search for a negative self-definition 
of identity – dismantling the neo-Imperial narrative about ethnic Russian superiority 
in the process?  
 
446 Through the provision of these paratextual elements, Akunin also copies both the style of classical 
crime fiction and of sensationalist and Gothic novels – most notably Bram Stoker’s Dracula. The first 
novel to make deliberate use of textual performativity to engage its readers with the fluid borders 
between textual and historical authenticity, Dracula also involved its protagonists in a quest for truth 
and carried a strong “focus on power (who has it, who wants it, who gets it, and who gets to keep it)” 
(Harriet Hustis, “Black and White and Read All Over: Performative Textuality in Bram Stoker’s 
Dracula,” Studies in the Novel 33, no. 1 (2001): 18-33, 18). In the late-Victorian Gothic novel, a 
preoccupation with power resulted from a sense of the threatening collapse of society, fears about the 
nature of the self, and, as is particularly prevalent in Dracula, concerns about racial impurity and the 
destabilising influence of the periphery on the heartland of Empire. Akunin uses these elements of 
Gothic fiction as a foil for the post-Soviet era and a means to criticise Empire, which is why scholars 
like John Givens count him among Russia’s neo-Gothic writers – who, according to Givens, “[seek] to 
cope with the recent past by exploring more ancient history or by returning to old literary forms” (John 
Givens, “The New Gothic, Mythic Prose, and the Post-Soviet Novel [Special Issue],” Russian Studies 
in Literature: A Journal of Translations 46, no. 4 (2010): 3-103, 3).  
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In the second subchapter, I will return my attention to Akunin’s process of ‘writing 
Nation’. Both the revolutionary leader Grin and Prince Pozharsky will appear as 
doubles to Fandorin’s candidacy for the national hero role, and their validity for the 
part will be analysed through an exploration and juxtaposition of the different 19th-
century source texts that went into their construction. Through the use of these various 
doubling processes as well as the notion of the double agent, Akunin once again 
problematises the fluidity of hero narratives: how can a character who strives to 
destroy the status quo from within – such as Pozharsky – act as a hero alternative? 
While this question would not pose a dilemma in other genres such as sci-fi, fantasy, 
or dystopian novels, disruptive behaviour on the part of a protagonist in detective 
fiction does constitute a serious breach of genre conventions and therefore begs closer 
interpretation. Finally, the issue of post-Soviet Russia’s need for an identifiable hero 
figure will return my discussion to Fandorin, whose character development and 
intelligentsia stance will be re-evaluated against the background of The State 
Counsellor’s final plot-twist and the novel’s pivotal place in the overall Fandorin 
project. 
3.2.1. Re-Writing Empire: Of Might and Men 
Like so many other Russian novels, The State Counsellor begins with a train journey. 
Just as Adjutant-General Khrapov’s train hurtles along snow-covered landscapes, the 
man himself dies underneath a map of the Russian Empire – imbuing the novel’s 
opening scene with a double symbolic meaning: on the one hand, the fact that 
Khrapov’s train is moving from the colonial hinterland of Siberia to Moscow 
reactivates the narrative of the periphery as a destabilising force for the Imperial 
heartland. On the other hand, Russia’s geographical vastness dictates that “злодей мог 
куда угодно податься...” (SS 18), while the layout of Russia’s train network 
simultaneously narrows the available hiding spots for the criminal at large into one 
logical endpoint: Moscow, the Empire’s epicentre of boundless moral lawlessness, 
sprawling street mazes and diverse societal undergrounds.  
Strolling through Moscow at the beginning of the novel, Fandorin experiences a 
moment of foreshadowing as he reminisces about the city’s double-edged beauty: 
“Москва проделала свой любимый фокус – обратилась из лягушки такой 
царевной, что вдохнуть вдохнешь, а выдохнуть позабудешь” (SS 27). What starts 
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like a deep breath of enamourment turns into a stifling chokehold upon closer 
inspection. Rather than function as the embodiment of the Empire’s might and 
unyielding power, Moscow once again appears as the claustrophobia-inducing source 
of infection in Russia’s overall sick body politic. Both city and countryside, heartland 
and periphery, thus become spaces of infiltration and danger, once more collapsing the 
supposed border between the two categories. 
Throughout The State Counsellor, Akunin moves his discussion of Moscow’s 
peripherality onto the more abstract level of government structures. Instead of 
focussing on specific landmarks, he explores the historical capital primarily through 
the prism of its power structures. Neil Weissmann noted that the fragility and 
fragmentation of concepts such as “‘obshchestvo and narod’ […] were deeply rooted 
in the empire’s socio-economic structure and political culture [and] reflected the 
weakness of institutions which normally provide a kind of social cement - institutions 
like the school, church, or police [original emphasis]”447. The police department is one 
such structure in Akunin’s novel, rendered in a state of complete internal 
disintegration:  
Очевидно, в свое время кто-то мудрый, опытный, придерживающийся не слишком лестного 
мнения о людской природе, рассудил, что одного надзирающего и приглядывающего ока 
для беспокойной империи маловато. Ведь недаром и человекам Господь выделил не по 
одной зенице, а по две. (SS 30) 
 
 
The use of the old Slavic term oko for eye calls to mind the Biblical law of retaliation 
‘an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth’ (‘око за око, зуб за зуб’), which shows the state 
machine’s potential for brutality and its capacity to exact, quite literally, biblical 
revenge. At the same time, the parallel existence of two police branches results in a 
deliberate obstruction of the law: “по давней традиции отношения между двумя 
ответвлениями тайной полиции складывались ревнивые и неприязненные, что 
свыше не только дозволялось, но даже, пожалуй, и поощрялось” (SS 30).  If the 
two warring police departments act as the warring eyes of the governmental head of 
state, then this also suggests a fundamental incompetence: two eyes that do not look 
as one may as well leave the state blind. 
 
447 Weissman, “Regular Police in Tsarist Russia,” 66. 
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Prince Dolgorukoi – an old acquaintance from The Death of Achilles – further 
expands the religious narrative of an impending downfall of Empire by linking 
Moscow’s police department to the biblical image of Babylon: 
Вы же видите, какой у нас по полицейской части Вавилон сделался. Под Вавилоном его 
сиятельство имел в виду хаотическое положение, образовавшееся во второй столице после 
того, как был отставлен последний обер-полицеймейстер, слишком буквально 
трактовавший смысл понятия ‘неподотчетные секретные фонды’. (SS 19) 
 
Apart from incorporating the modern-day problem of corruption into the narrative, 
Dolgorukoi’s use of the Babylonian simile also highlights the break-down of 
communication within the legal apparatus.448 The resulting impression of police 
impotence casts doubts about the longevity of the existing social contract across all 
levels of society, not just the revolutionary camp; thus, when a young lieutenant by the 
name of Smol’yaninov starts on his first assignment, Fandorin advises him to carry out 
his duty in plainclothes because of the “неприязненное отношение, с к-которым к 
синим мундирам относятся в обществе” (SS 28). However, Smol’yaninov rejects 
the idea and delivers a fierce defence speech about the special honour that it is to serve 
Russia – saying that he especially enjoys the “секретные задания, выслеживание 
опасных преступников […] и перестрелки” (SS 28).  
Akunin’s characteristic meta-textual mockery in this scene breaches the supposed 
border between fact and fiction: instead of sounding like an actual police officer, 
Smol’yaninov appears more like a crime fiction reader about to enjoy a good Pinkerton 
novel. In smiling, however indulgently, at the young lieutenant’s rose-tinted 
enthusiasm for a good crime story, readers of The State Counsellor simultaneously 
engage in an act of self-observation and are made to reflect on their own reasons for 
choosing this particular genre. Although Smol’yaninov’s follow-on statement that 
“эмблема, назначенная Корпусу императором Николаем Павловичем – белый 
платок для утирания слез несчастных и страждущих” (SS 28-9) could easily be 
read as a sincere expression of patriotic fervour by readers who are so inclined, 
Smol’yaninov’s essential naivety is underlined when he claims that people would think 
better of officials such as him if only they knew about the rigours of their training – 
 
448 It is noteworthy that embezzlement on the uppermost levels of government not only serves as a 
reminder of the parallels between late Imperial and post-Soviet politics, but that it is also considered a 
crime of such ubiquity in the novel that it does not even invite further discussion.  
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summed up as having to achieve good grades and not run up any gambling debts. 
Smol’yaninov ends his speech with the admission that it was his father’s influence that 
ultimately secured him his post in Moscow. Nepotism is alive and well – both in 
Fandorin’s 19th-century Russia and the reality of most post-Soviet readers. 
The ubiquitous state of unchecked corruption and abuse of power in The State 
Counsellor creates an oppressive atmosphere of paranoia, which not only makes an 
appearance in the revolutionaries’ “самая настоящая мания преследования” (SS 
263), but also features as a common characteristic among the many double agents that 
populate the novel. Burlyaev, the head of the Moscow Department of Security, 
entertains an entire network of spies – “и бывшие нигилисты, и всякие темные 
личности” (SS 24) – and explains his recruitment strategies as follows: “Стол у 
Ларионова хорош, наш секретный фонд оплачивает. Берем болтунов на 
заметочку, заводим на каждого папочку. Как попадается на чем серьезном – у 
нас уж на голубчика полная бухгалтерия” (SS 64). Fandorin’s reaction to this piece 
of news is one of indignation: “Но ведь это провокация! […] Вы сами плодите 
нигилистов, а потом сами же их арестовываете” (ibid.). By turning the narrative on 
its head like this, Fandorin also questions the causal relationship between government 
oppression and terrorist activity in the country. 
In a subsequent conversation with Larionov, Fandorin rejects the latter’s offer to 
hand him additional information with the words: “Я услугами тайных 
осведомителей не пользуюсь, […] По-моему, шпионить на своих товарищей м-
мерзко” (SS 73). Thus prompted to explain the reason why he turned informer, 
Larionov reveals that he “тоже о социальной справедливости мечтал” (SS 74). 
However, having engaged in revolutionary activities as a student, he was arrested for 
distributing leaflets that called for liberal changes to the government. Larionov was 
subsequently coerced into working for the police to avoid being sent to exile or prison, 
which would have left his ailing mother to fend for herself. He was provided with an 
apartment, a good job and an additional salary for his services, but adds that he has 
been living in a permanent state of fear of detection ever since: “В общем, всем жизнь 
хороша. Только вот совсем не сплю по ночам. […] Забудусь на минуту и 
вздрагиваю – слышу стук. Думаю, а вот и за мной пришли. То ли те, то ли эти. 
Так и дергаюсь всю ночь. Стук-стук. Стук-стук” (SS 75). As if to give credence to 
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this quasi-Gothic sense of inescapable doom, Larionov’s words are followed by an 
actual knock on his door. The visitor turns out to be a member of the Combat Group, 
sent to kill the informer.  
Running counter to popular depictions of spies in crime fiction, this is not the 
portrayal of a glamorous character full of clever deceit and cunning, but of a human 
being reduced to animal-like fear and terror. Larionov’s sense of persecution highlights 
the interchangeability of the two reigns of terror that co-exist in the Russian Empire: 
both the revolutionaries and the government elicit identical reactions of fear on the 
part of the populace. At the same time, the recognisable parallel between revolutionary 
terror and Empire also echoes a later situation under the Stalin purges, which doubled 
up with an omnipresent culture of denunciation and secrecy. The resulting impression 
is one of a lasting legacy of paranoia and mistrust, both of which date back to the era 
of authoritarian rule and Empire.  
Police officials are likewise no longer exempt from observation by their peers in 
Akunin’s Imperial Russia. Fandorin is spied upon by his colleague, the Collegiate 
Assessor Myl’nikov (cf. SS 77), whereas Dolgorukoi is routinely informed of 
Fandorin’s whereabouts without the latter’s knowledge. Nonetheless, Akunin’s 
protagonist comments less fervently on the Empire’s regression into a surveillance 
state than he did during the events set a fictional decade ago, which indicates that the 
routine violation of personal freedoms has since become a common and commonly 
accepted state of affairs: “Осведомленность князя о частной жизни своих 
ближайщих помощников Фандорина ничуть не удивила – успел привыкнуть за 
годы совместной службы” (SS 139). In the end, all of these different forms of 
surveillance are born out of the state’s fear of losing power: “Когда власти страшно, 
она никого не жалеет. Надо на всех страху нагнать, и особенно на своих. Чтоб в 
оба смотрели и чтоб ее, власти, больше, чем убийц боялись” (SS 18). In engaging 
in this top-down transfer of anxiety into the very make-up of Russian society, the 
Empire not only produces the ruthless battle strategies of the revolutionaries, but 
ultimately even exceeds them. 
The question about permissible transgressions of the law is raised multiple times 
in The State Counsellor. Unlike the other high-ranking police officials in the novel, 
Fandorin insists on observing the letter of the law in his fight against terrorism, but is 
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met with varying degrees of cooperativeness on the part of his colleagues. When 
Myl’nikov attempts to carry out an arrest despite a lack of evidence, announcing that 
“Нет времени слежку разворачивать. Результат нужен” (SS 65), Fandorin steps in 
and declares that he will not allow any such arrest to be made. In Fandorin’s 
interpretation of duty, it is not permissible to fill quotas without sufficient evidence – 
a practice which was not only widespread in Imperial times, but which continues to 
influence Russia’s contemporary system of justice. In 1997, for instance, foreign 
observers and Amnesty International raised alarms about “the state’s continuing 
keenness to lock up supposed malefactors without due process”449. Because of this 
continued malpractice, Myl’nikov’s stance may not strike Russian readers as 
particularly unusual or even objectionable, but it does make Fandorin’s unrelenting 
conviction to the opposite appear markedly foreign: 
- Господин подполковник, воля ваша, а я бы с этой сволочью по-свойски поговорил. Вы 
только все испортите своим либерализмом. Дайте мне их на полчасика – соловьями 
запоют, честное благородное слово. 
[…] 
- Стойте, господин Мыльников, - поднял палец статский советник. – Никого увозить я 
не п-позволю.  
[…] 
- Это неслыханно! – прорвел Петр Иванов, цветом лица напоминающий уже не свеклу, 
а баклажан. – Да на чьей вы стороне!? 
- Я на стороне з-закона. А вы? (SS 68-71) 
 
By forcing Fandorin to spell out his allegiance, Myl’nikov puts his finger on one of 
the central hiccups of the Imperial justice system: the volatility of its interpretation by 
Russian officials, along with the way in which ‘law’ and ‘order’ are by no means 
synonymous terms. 
 
Law and Order vs. West and East 
Fandorin’s perception of the law as inviolable is contrasted not only by Myl’nikov, but 
also by Prince Pozharsky. The latter’s arrival broadens the existing discussion into a 
wider analysis of Russia’s self-positioning between East and West, as Pozharsky’s 
Saint Petersburg origins mark him as the novel’s token representative of Western, 
democratic values – at least following the Russian literary tradition of positing Saint 
Petersburg as Moscow’s European double. According to the same paradigm, Fandorin, 
as the born Muscovite, ought to defend the Asiatic position of established rules and 
 
449 “Lawless: Russia. (Criminal Justice System),” The Economist (US) 342, no. 8013 (1997): 52. 
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authority. Yet both their true allegiances are a matter of complex debate, which the 
reader gets to know via a quasi-Aristotelian dialectic – a “[спор] двух умных людей, 
каждый из которых грамотно и доказательно излагает свою позицию […] дело 
читателя – чью позицию выбрать”450.  
One of the issues Fandorin and Pozharsky continually clash over is the use of 
illegal combat strategies in the fight against terrorism. When Pozharsky suggests an 
ambush on the revolutionaries, Fandorin points out the unlawfulness of such an act: 
- Надо бить без предупреждения, залпами. Перестрелять, как бешеных псов. Иначе своих 
людей потеряем. 
- У наших людей такая служба – рисковать жизнью, - упрямо заявил статский советник. – 
А без предложения сложить оружие операцию проводить п-противозаконно. (SS 232) 
 
This is a continuation of a previous discussion, during which Fandorin argued that “и 
на войне есть правила. А за шпионаж с использованием вероломства на войне 
принято вешать” (SS 148). Pozharsky’s reply to Fandorin’s admonition teems with 
inflated stereotypes about Europe and Asia, ignoring the authority of the common code 
of law in favour of irrational fearmongering: 
– Это не та война, в которой применимы правила […] Воюют не две европейские 
державы. […] Идет дикая, исконная война порядка с хаосом, Запада с Востоком, 
христианского рыцарства с мамаевой ордой. […]  Здесь воюют по всей безжалостной 
азиатской науке с заливанием раскаленного свинца в глотку, сдиранием кожи и 
избиением младенцев. (SS 148) 
 
In this scene, Pozharsky positions himself as the last chivalrous defender of Western 
values in the fight against chaos, using staple images of populist mythmaking in his 
references to the Mongol horde, the slaughter of children and the use of torture as 
outgrowths of Asian degeneracy. The topic of torture is particularly relevant to him, 
as Pozharsky also rejects its use during an earlier interrogation scene, during which he 
states: “Какие пытки? Мы ведь в России, а не в Китае. Велите развязать, Петр 
Иванович. Что за азиатчина, право” (SS 105). 
However, by arguing for a suspension of all martial laws in the fight against 
terrorism, Pozharsky takes a stance not so very different from the revolutionaries 
themselves. To make matters more complicated, the same stereotype of Asiatic 
barbarity is also voiced by the young revolutionary Esfir, a provocative socialite and 
 
450 A. N. Iarko, “Akunin-Chkhartishvili-Brusnikin-Borisova: Chetyre avtora ili smert’ avtora?,” 
Voprosy russkoi literatury 31, no. 1 (2015): 146-161, 149. 
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prototypical ‘new woman’ who makes textbook use of her liberal attitudes to criticise 
the barbarity of Russia’s existing system of rule. Esfir frames her anti-Imperial 
allegations within the historic context of the ‘oprichnina’ (SS 73, 84), recalling Ivan 
the Terrible’s reign of terror as a suitable comparison for her own era and mocking 
Fandorin for receiving an invitation to dinner at Prince Dolgorukoi’s house with the 
words: “Грозный царь зовет? Собачью голову к седлу и на службу – головы 
рубить?” (SS 139).451 Thus, whereas Pozharsky sees Asiatic degeneracy in the 
revolutionaries, Esfir levels her negative illumination of Russia’s Asian heritage at the 
Empire itself. In her view, historical continuity is not a sign of stability, but failure.  
As a result, it appears that the “Asiatic character of Russia’s despotism [was 
indeed] a commonplace of the nineteenth-century democratic intelligentsia”452. 
However, as both sides of the political divide connect to the same inflated stereotype 
in their accusations of each other, the problem of Asia also increasingly appears as the 
expression of an identity conflict that has more to do with Russia itself than with any 
real concept of the East. Pozharsky’s earlier use of the word ‘aziatchina’ (‘азиатчина’) 
is highly apt in this context, as it is an inherently ambivalent term meaning “the almost 
unlimited capacity among Russians to identify themselves with Asia while showing 
their contempt for the Asian peoples and civilizations as utterly barbaric”453. The same 
highly conflicting parallel process of self-identification and othering is also expressed 
in Pozharsky’s talk of the ‘two powers’ at war (‘не две европейские державы’), 
which splits Russian society into a European and non-European entity.  
In an essay titled ‘What is Asia to Us’, Dostoevsky explored this very idea in 
1881. Discussing the parallel existence of two Russias, he decreed that “вообще вся 
наша русская Азия, включая и Сибирь, для России все еще как будто существуют 
в виде какого-то привеска, которым как бы вовсе даже и не хочет европейская 
наша Россия интересоваться”454. Dostoevsky’s choice of words in this quote is 
interesting in the context of the final encounter between the revolutionaries and the 
 
451 Although Akunin is not the only post-Soviet author to recycle the image of the oprichnina, he might 
have been the first to do so. In 2006, Vladimir Sorokin published Day of the Oprichnik (День 
опричника), a dystopian novel about the return of an authoritarian Russian state loosely modelled after 
the Holy Rus’ and its most notorious medieval ruler.  
452 Figes, Natasha’s Dance, 369. 
453 Milan Hauner, What Is Asia to Us?: Russia’s Asian Heartland Yesterday and Today (London: 
Routledge, 1992), 2. 
454 F. M. Dostoevsky, Dnevnik Pisatelia Za 1877 God (Paris: YMCA-Press, 1952), 603. 
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policemen in The State Counsellor, as the revolutionary leader notices – somewhat 
randomly, in the midst of the combat action – a shop sign with the inscription “Мебиус 
и сыновья Колониальные товары” (SS 240). Not only is there a certain linguistic 
similarity between the Russian words for appendage (‘привеска’) and attached sign 
(‘вывеска’), but the sign’s inscription also recalls the Russian Empire’s colonial past 
in the context of the Moebius strip. Dostoevsky’s differentiation between a Russian 
Asia and a European Russia corresponds to this visualisation, placing the Russian 
Empire in the simultaneous role of coloniser and colonised.  
This doubling is made even more explicit by the fact that both corresponding parts 
of Russia in Dostoevsky’s essay are called ‘ours’ – an attitude clearly shared by 
Pozharsky. Akunin thus returns to the topic of Russia’s process of self-colonisation 
through Pozharsky’s inconsistent rhetorical rejection of the concept of Asia, which is 
accompanied by the concomitant failure to transform this renunciation into a practical 
denial of despotism and autocracy. Instead, Pozharsky even justifies the need for quasi-
despotic leadership. When Smol’yaninov echoes Fandorin’s concerns about the moral 
implications of recruiting double agents, saying that “защитникам государства не 
пристало действовать нечестными методами […] Мы должны справедливость и 
чистоту блюсти, а мы еще больше, чем нигилисты, общество растлеваем” (SS 
110), Pozharsky responds: 
- С чего вы взяли, юноша, что государство – это справедливость и чистота? […] Наше 
государство несправедливо и нечисто. Но лучше такое, чем бунт, кровь и хаос. Медленно, 
неохотно общество становится чуть-чуть чище, чуть-чуть презентабельней. […] А 
революция отшвырнет его назад, к Ивану Грозному. Справедливости все равно не будет 
[…]. (SS 110-11) 
 
Rather than criticise a status quo where injustice and corruption prevail, Pozharsky 
argues to uphold this very system of rule as the only way to achieve long-lasting 
control. More importantly, he considers justice an empty phrase, non-achievable under 
either system – and threatens with the return of a medieval system of rule which, 
according to Esfir, has already found its way back into Russia.  
Pozharsky’s mockingly selective attitude towards Westernism is made further 
apparent when he responds to Fandorin’s accusations of corruption by asking: 
“Обратишься на газеты? Не напечатают. У нас, слава Богу, не Европа” (SS 269). 
Freedom of speech or lack of censorship are rendered as exotic, foreign elements in 
Pozharsky’s view, which lose their applicability once transplanted onto Russian soil. 
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Likewise, Pozharsky criticises the idea of an approachable leader, announcing 
Dolgorukoi’s dismissal from the post of Governor-General of Moscow by voicing the 
hope that “[в]ласть в городе устанавливается настоящая, крепкая, безо всякой 
‘легкодоступности’” (SS 255). The latter comment in particular demonstrates the 
lasting legacy of Russia’s self-colonisation process, as Pozharsky inadvertently lends 
voice to the country’s obsession “with complexes of its own powerlessness and 
inferiority […] how you wish to be seen is how you wish to be in reality. This mix of 
aggressiveness and impotence is the last and strongest thread connecting today’s 
Russia with its history [original emphasis]”455.  
Pozharsky’s desire to appear strong and distant demonstrates an underlying fear 
of inherent weakness, which stems from the fragmentation of the Imperial national 
identity narrative itself – exposing its unsuitability as a reference frame for a 
rediscovery of political and societal stability. Pozharsky’s view of the West as 
something he can invent in order to accommodate his own ideological needs for a fixed 
Russian identity mirrors Orlando Figes’s hypothesis that the “idea of ‘Russia’ could 
not exist without ‘the West’ (just as ‘the West’ could not exist without ‘the 
Orient’)”456. Yet Akunin also broadens this concept, showing that ‘the idea of Russia’ 
can likewise not exist without Asia – an important contribution to the largely Western-
centric identity discourse of the Russian 1990s.457  In the end, both the West and Asia 
appear as two sides of the same coin, making the inconsequent rejection of one into an 
equally hypocritical embrace of the other.  
The complexity of this situation elevates Pozharsky’s character into a highly 
recognisable mirror image for the contemporary post-Soviet reader. Pozharsky’s 
perverted sense of pride in his own lawlessness not only resonates with the bespredel’ 
atmosphere of the Russian ‘wild nineties’ – which is also hinted at by Fandorin’s use 
of the term ‘bandit’ in an earlier scene – but also corresponds to the subsequent 
development of a ‘sovereign democracy’ under the Putin regime.458 As pointed out by 
 
455 Dobrenko, “Utopias of Return,” 161. 
456 Figes, Natasha’s Dance, 66. 
457 Cf. Tolz, Russia: Inventing the Nation, 69-132. 
458 During the illicit arrest scene featuring Esfir, Fandorin provides her with a subterfuge to escape the 
law’s clasps: “- Вы ведь могли принять господина Бурляева за б-бандита? – спросил Эраст 
Петрович барышню, смотревшую на него с весьма странным выражением. - А разве он не 
бандит? – немедленно откликнулась Эсфирь Литвинова, изобразив крайнее удивление” (SS 71). 
During the 1990s, the term ‘bandit’ was applied copiously to Russia’s legal and financial system; Boris 
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Svetlana Tishchenko, Pozharsky’s attitude carries “popular appeal in the ‘new Russia’ 
of Putin and Medvedev: it embodies a gung-ho attitude of the political leaders”459 that 
is not only perceived as a sign of strength, but also as a long-overdue rebuke to the 
allegedly weak transparency of democratic ideals.  
Akunin incorporated an explicit link to the political situation of the late 1990s into 
The State Counsellor. In referring to the fictional Dolgorukoi’s amiability 
(‘легкодоступности’), he makes Moscow’s Governor General appear closer in 
character to Yeltsin than to the previously constructed alter ego of Moscow mayor 
Luzhkov. This similarity is expanded upon through the mention of a not altogether 
sincere newspaper announcement, which commemorates Dolgorukoi’s “глубокое 
значение для ясного сознания всего народа” (SS 255) in a way that could easily be 
read as a reference to Yeltsin’s failed national identity project of the mid-1990s. Lastly, 
just as Yeltsin’s era was clearly coming to an end when Akunin was writing The State 
Counsellor, so did his fictional Dolgorukoi have to face the end of his own era as 
Moscow’s Governor General. 
Pozharsky is not incidentally placed in the midst of this historical parallel. His 
historical double, Dmitry Pozharsky, acted as a figurehead of the Time of Troubles 
and paved the way for Romanov rule to take over from the Rurikid dynasty – one of 
whose members was Yuri Dolgoruky. In Akunin’s novel, Pozharsky fulfils the same 
role, as his superior and successor to Dolgorukoi’s post is none other than the 
Romanov Grand Duke ‘Simeon’ Aleksandrovich Romanov. Akunin conflates the 
historical and fictional timelines in order to link the 1990s to the Time of Troubles –  
thus seemingly catering to the trauma narrative that dominated much of the cultural 
and the political discourse in post-perestroika Russia, while also addressing the 
 
Nemtsov’s entry into Moscow politics, for instance, was labelled ‘New Man in Bandit Country’ (cf. 
Chrystia Freeland, “New Man in Bandit Country [Russia’s First Deputy Prime Minister Boris 
Nemtsov],” The Financial Times, May 27, 1997) by Western reporters. Since then, the popularity of 
attaching the epithets ‘lawless’ or ‘bandit’ to post-Soviet Russia has continued unabated – and has 
entered the public consciousness to a degree where it is not only left unchallenged, but readily accepted. 
459 Svetlana Tishchenko, “My Hero Is a Villain: The Relationship Between the Hero and the Villains in 




symbolic capital that both the Putin regime and the neo-Eurasianists drew out of the 
events of 1612.460  
Akunin acknowledges the importance of the Time of Troubles in the construction 
of narratives about Imperial greatness and stability, but subverts their nostalgic power 
by highlighting Pozharsky’s duplicitous role in the novel. Instead of ushering in a new 
era of strength, Pozharsky betrays both the Russian Empire and the Russian nation – 
ridding his offer of identification of all promises of stability and glory. Pozharsky’s 
ultimate complicity in the end of Empire is implied in his inability to express his own 
Imperial identity, which results in his use of diversified concepts of othering instead. 
Clowes noticed the continued topicality of this problem for post-Soviet Russia when 
she argued that “expressions of identity under the Putin regime have turned resolutely 
in the direction of […] drawing thick ideological borders between itself and all the 
‘others’ out there – Chechens, Jews, new, politically engaged Russian entrepreneurs, 
artists, freemasons, freethinkers”461. Marsh noted the same problem, documenting a 
“heightened awareness of the presence (often the malign influence) of ‘the Other’ 
(whether in the form of Westerner, Jew or ‘person of Caucasian nationality’)”462 in 
post-Soviet public discourse.  
 
The Jewish Other in Imperial Russia 
In the context of the Fandorin project, these lists of prominent others find their echoes 
across several of the novels – The State Counsellor among them. Whereas Akunin 
included an antagonist of Chechen origins in The Death of Achilles, the revolutionary 
circle in The State Counsellor features several characters of Jewish origin. By once 
again placing a peripheral Other in the stereotypical role of troublemaker and 
incendiary, Akunin subverts, rather than solidifies, the stereotypes that pertain to this 
group and opens up a historical dimension for the discussion of anti-Semitic tendencies 
in the post-Soviet space. Owing, in part, to the fact that Jews “constituted the largest 
 
460 Neo-Eurasianism’s ‘high priest’ Aleksandr Dugin, for instance, glorifies the Time of Troubles as the 
beginning of Russia’s sonderweg in global history, cf. Dmitry Shlapentokh, “The Time of Troubles in 
Alexander Dugin’s Narrative,” European Review 27, no. 1 (2019): 143-57. 
461 Clowes, Russia on the Edge, 199. 
462 Marsh, “The Nature of Russia’s Identity,” 571. 
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non-Slavic as well as the largest non-Christian ethnic group”463 in the Russian Empire, 
the so-called ‘Jewish Question’ was one of the leading issues in late Imperial 
nationality politics.  
The two most prominent Jewish characters in The State Counsellor are the 
antagonist Grin and the revolutionary Esfir. In line with Esfir’s supporting role in the 
novel overall, descriptions of her experiences with anti-Semitism are sparse. 
Nonetheless, her character creates the impression of widespread anti-Jewish 
sentiments across various strata of late Imperial Russian society, such as when 
Burlyaev exclaims “Хоть самого Ротшильда!” (SS 70) after Esfir fires a shot at him 
and is then recognised as a well-known banker’s daughter. Apart from raising the ugly 
spectre of the stereotypically greedy, money-hoarding Jew, Burlyaev’s follow-on 
comment expresses a further disregard for Jewish customs and traditions: “[на 
каторге] тебя жидовскими кошерами кормить не станут” (ibid.). Even more 
disturbing, perhaps, is the description of Esfir’s family’s reception in society: 
“Литвинова принимали и в самых лучших московских домах, но при этом, 
бывало, говорили шепотом другим гостям, как бы оправдываясь: ‘Жид 
крещеный что вор прощеный’” (SS 155). Regardless of her family’s contribution to 
society, Esfir will always remain the Other in terms of her ethnicity. She tries to change 
this narrative by aggressively embracing and expanding it through her outspoken 
defence of women’s rights, her liberal sexuality, and her activity in the revolutionary 
circle; yet in doing so, she inevitably also caters to the stereotype of the seductive and 
dangerous female Other that is predicted by her Russian peers. 
Grin’s development from a culture-loving, hard-working student into the novel’s 
revolutionary ‘man of steel’ is also contextualised as a Jewish experience early on in 
The State Counsellor. One of Grin’s earliest memories is the relocation of his family 
to a small town within the Pale of Settlement – an area historically situated in today’s 
Ukraine and Poland – following an Imperial crackdown on the Empire’s Jewish 
populations.464 The event reinforces the young man’s awareness of his institutionally 
enforced otherness, as it stands in clear contradiction to Grin’s previous self-perception 
 
463 Benjamin Nathans, Beyond the Pale: The Jewish Encounter with Late Imperial Russia. (Berkeley 
and London: University of California Press, 2002), 5. 
464 In a remark not wholly unfounded, Clowes also draws comparisons between the original Pale of 
Settlement for Jewish citizens of the Empire and the way the Chechen situation was handled by the 
Putin regime, cf. Clowes, Russia on the Edge, 152. 
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as a Russian citizen: “толком не понимает их чудовощного говора, потому что 
дома всегда разговаривали по-русски” (SS 44). Grin’s coldness of character is in 
part explained by the need to confront this kind of hostility from an early age; speaking 
about his school days, Grin reminisces that “его не травили, не дразнили ‘жидом’, 
потому что чувствовали в будущем стальном человеке […] тихую, несуетливую 
силу, но друзей у него не было и не могло быть” (SS 39). The small town that 
Grin’s family must relocate to is never mentioned by name, drawing attention to its 
symbolic, stand-in meaning in the wider context of the Russian Empire.  
Akunin pays close attention to the Empire’s chronological timeline in his 
depiction of the ‘Jewish Question’. The assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881 is 
described as the event that galvanized a pogrom and thus Grin’s career as a 
revolutionary. Historiographic studies confirm the link between news about the 
tsaricide and a nationwide outbreak of pogroms between 1881 and 1884;465 Grin’s 
relocation to the Pale of Settlement nearby Kiev also matches this description from a 
geopolitical point of view, as the “commonly accepted geographic and chronological 
[area] of pogroms [is] usually assumed to be in the Ukrainian lands of the tsarist 
empire”466. Moreover, Simon Sebag Montefiore summarises that “[e]ven though 
scarcely any of Alexander II’s assassins were Jews, rumours spread that Jews had 
killed God’s tsar”467. The same explanation is given in The State Counsellor: 
“Кабатчик Митрий Кузмич, отряженный обществом в Белоцерковск, приехал с 
подтверждением, что слух был верный: царя-императора убили жиды. Значит, 
абрашек можно бить, и ничего за это не будет” (SS 42).  
According to Jonathan Dekel-Chen, alternative voices to this discourse did exist, 
but these were primarily “represented in the international press [which] accused the 
reactionary tsarist government of instigating the violence”468. Incidentally, when 
Fandorin questions Pozharsky’s readiness to use illegal, or at least immoral, tactics in 
his investigation, the latter responds with the question: “А что, прикажете 
капитулировать? Чтобы взбесившиеся толпы жгли дома и поднимали на вилы 
лучших людей России? Чтобы доморощенные Робеспьеры залили города 
 
465 Cf. Jonathan L. Dekel-Chen, Anti-Jewish Violence: Rethinking the Pogrom in East European History 
(Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2011). 
466 Ibid, 13.  
467 Simon Sebag Montefiore, The Romanovs: 1613-1918 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2016), 463. 
468 Dekel-Chen, Anti-Jewish Violence, 10. 
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кровью? Чтобы наша держава стала пугалом для человечества и откатилась на 
триста лет назад?” (SS 148). Ironically, or perhaps quite tellingly, this reply reads 
more like a description of the actual pogroms than of the terrorist deeds, thus once 
again calling into question the exact relationship between revolutionary terror and state 
brutality.  
Akunin’s portrayal of the pogrom, subjective in view as it is through its retelling 
by Grin, gives sufficient room to the ambivalence of this historiographic discourse and 
manages to incorporate multiple perspectives as to the ‘true’ course of the historical 
events. Both Dekel-Chen’s assertion that the pogroms were “unrivaled episodes of 
ethnic violence and tended toward increasing levels of destruction with each new 
outburst”469 and his follow-up statement that the “early pogroms [...] caused greater 
loss of property (shops, warehouses, and homes) than deaths”470 are reflected in Grin’s 
account: 
Все вышло, как положено: пожгли синагогу, пошарили по хатам, кому ребра намяли, кого 
за пейсы оттаскали, а к вечеру, когда в шинкарском погребе отыскались припрятанные 
бочки с вином, кое-кто из парней и до жидовских девок добрался. […] Родители уцелели, 
отсиделись в каменном подвале, но дома было мерзко: погромщики разломали больше, чем 
взяли […] Утром в слободе ударил колокол, и с майдана к мосту двинулась густая толпа, 
многолюднее, чем накануне. (SS 43-4) 
 
Rather than turn his depiction of the pogrom into unreflective, pro-liberal, anti-
governmental propaganda, Akunin attempts to keep the historical complexity of the 
events intact. The mob, for instance, is not portrayed as caught up in a raging bloodlust 
from the start, but is shown to move through a slow, and because of its hesitancy all 
the more senseless, momentum that corresponds to historians’ assessments of the 
pogroms as spontaneous and unorchestrated outbreaks of anti-Semitic violence: 
“Примерялись долго – не хватало толчка, чтоб растворилась душа” (SS 43). 
Grin’s account of the pogrom also features a tsarist official who rides off to gather 
reinforcements in support of the Jewish inhabitants – although he does so only in return 
for payment. The official does not manage a return until after Grin has stopped the 
pogrom and killed one townsman in the process, but no suspicion of foul play or 
embezzlement of the money is raised: “В сумерки прибыл […] с взводом конной 
полиции и увидел, что в городке все спокойно. Удивился, поговорил с евреями 
 
469 Ibid, 1. 
470 Ibid, 4. 
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и увез аптекарева сына в тюрьму” (SS 44-5). Nor is the policeman’s cooperation 
glorified or subjugated to criticism. Instead, it is relayed in a neutral observer’s voice 
– leaving only the question as to why Grin has to suffer the consequences of his crime, 
whereas the killings that accompanied the pogrom go unpunished.  
According to Dekel-Chen, this discrepancy is historically plausible insofar as 
“many officials […] had sympathy for the perpetrators, and agreed to legal 
discrimination against the victims”471. Sebag Montefiore also states that anti-Jewish 
sentiments were widespread in Alexander III’s court, while the Tsar himself was said 
to have “encouraged an almost fetishistic anti-semitism among his entourage”472. 
Akunin refers to the existence of anti-Semitic tendencies on the highest levels of 
Empire in the character of Grand Duke Simeon Aleksandrovich Romanov, who 
appears closely modelled after Sergei Aleksandrovich Romanov – Governor General 
of Moscow from 1891 and the person generally held accountable for the Khodynka 
tragedy of 1896, which Akunin turned into a plot event in the subsequent Fandorin 
novel The Coronation (Коронация, 2000). The unusually high number of parallels 
between Akunin’s fictional Romanov and his historical prototype presage a dark future 
for the Empire’s Jewish population: one of the first official acts of the real Grand Duke, 
who was well-known for his anti-Jewish stance, was to issue a decree ordering the 
expulsion of all Jews from Moscow and Saint Petersburg. According to Sebag 
Montefiore, the Tsar – in compliance with Sergei’s wishes – signed a 
series of laws allowing Sergei to deport whole categories – ‘Jewish artisans, distillers, brewers, 
general craftsmen and workmen’ and even ‘discharged Jewish soldiers’. In Moscow, Sergei closed 
the Great Synagogue, sent Cossacks to raid Jewish homes and allowed Jewish women to remain 
only if they were registered as prostitutes. Twenty thousand Jews were expelled.473  
 
This ukaz not only caused serious damage to both cities’ economies, but was also 
accompanied by a high level of police brutality, which was once again commented 
upon in the international press of the time – and largely barred from the Imperial 
discourse.474  
On a contemporary parallel, Akunin’s confrontation of his readership with late 
Imperial anti-Semitism and the controversial aspects of the Grand Duke’s rule also 
 
471 Ibid, 7. 
472 Sebag Montefiore, The Romanovs, 463. 
473 Ibid, 472. 
474 Cf. “Enforcing the Anti-Jewish Laws,” The Washington Post (1877-1922), May 2, 1891. 
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provides an important counterweight to post-Soviet, state-sponsored views of 
Romanov glory. The topicality of this approach has not been diminished since The 
State Counsellor’s publication: in 2017, Putin attended the unveiling of a statue 
commemorating Grand Duke Sergei Aleksandrovich at the site of his assassination in 
1905. In his speech, not a single reference to the controversial aspects of the 
Romanov’s rule was made. Instead, Putin stressed the significance of the statue for 
Russia’s national identity, claiming that it “восстанавливается единство российской 
истории, в которой нам дорога каждая страница, какой бы трудной она 
ни была”475. In the light of the unilateral nationalist rhetoric and one-sided 
mythologisation of heroes that accompanies the Putin regime’s politics, this cannot be 
read as anything but a mockery of historical memory.  
At the same time, the problem of renewed anti-Semitism in post-Soviet Russia is 
not just limited to official channels – nor is it portrayed as such by Akunin. Marina 
Aptekman noted that an “odd mixture of reactionary Orthodox and reactionary 
Communist ideologies, combined with a very strong anti-liberalism and anti-Semitism 
[…] originated around 1992”476, providing several examples for anti-Semitic poetry 
that were written in the decade after perestroika. In 1995, Marsh surmised that 
“[e]xtreme Russian nationalists have deliberately fostered […] nostalgia [for pre-
revolutionary Russia], suggesting that the ‘Jewish-Masonic conspiracy’ was 
responsible for toppling the Russian monarchy and destroying the Russian state”477. 
Akunin already included a side note on this development in The Death of Achilles, 
where Fandorin voices a damning verdict on conspiracy theories of the kind: 
- Евгений Осипович, […] что же это за таинственная сила в-вертит судьбами России? По 
какому праву? И что эта сила удумает завтра? 
- На масонов намекаете? 
[…] 
- Какие там масоны, - досадливо сморщил гладкий лоб Фандорин. – Про них все знают. Тут 
же просматривается настоящий комплот, не опереточный. (SMA 201-2) 
 
Worried about the developments in the state, Fandorin refuses to shift the 
responsibility for the Empire’s instability to an artificially inflated Other. By calling 
 
475 Vladimir Putin, “Otkrytie Pamiatnika Velikomu Kniasiu Sergeiu Aleksandrovichu,” Kremlin.ru, 
May 4, 2017, <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54447> [accessed 17 December 2019] 
476 Marina Aptekman, “Kabbalah, Judeo-Masonic Myth, and Post-Soviet Literary Discourse: From 
Political Tool to Virtual Parody,” Russian Review 65, no. 4 (2006): 657-81, 664-7. 
477 Marsh, History and Literature in Contemporary Russia, 174. 
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theories about a Jewish-Masonic conspiracy the ‘operetta kind’, he not only flat-out 
rejects their applicability to Russian history, but also emphasizes their narrative 
construction in a way that hints at an underlying possibility to change them.478 
In post-Soviet Russia, the spread of a theatricalised narrative about Russian 
historical grandeur and the Jewish complicity in the downfall of Empire has developed 
along conflicting lines since the end of the 1990s. In 2001, Stella Rock stated that 
although anti-Semitic texts had not yet gained a dominant cultural currency on the 
post-Soviet Russian book market, “[w]ith racist history books, including [Oleg] 
Platonov’s, finding their way into schools and Dom Knigi selling Jewish-Masonic 
plots as authentic history, antisemitic historical ‘revisionism’ is in danger of becoming 
part of mainstream Russian historiography”479. A year later, Akunin’s own work was 
subjected to an anti-Semitic re-telling, as the 2002 TV version of the Fandorin novel 
The Winter Queen “largely omitted the interesting section of the novel set in an 
authentically re-created Victorian London, and introduced references to a ‘Jewish-
Masonic conspiracy’ – an interpretation that is specifically rejected in the novel as 
‘anti-Semitic ravings’”480.  
At the same time, state-sponsored anti-Semitism and the number of anti-Semitic 
attacks appear to be on the decline under the Putin regime.481 While this is “not for 
want of effort among certain segments of the Russian elite”482, Putin himself is 
increasingly seen as “the only leader in modern Russian history who seems to have no 
apparent problem with Jews being Jews and Russians simultaneously”483. However, 
 
478 Again, there is a historical precedent for this, as Marina Aptekman noted that “original Russian works 
on the subject of Judeo-Masonry” (Aptekman, “Kabbalah, Judeo-Masonic Myth, and Post-Soviet 
Literary Discourse,” 600) appeared as early as the 1880s. 
479 Stella Rock, “Russian Revisionism: Holocaust Denial and the New Nationalist Historiography,” 
Patterns of Prejudice 35, no. 4 (2001): 64-76, 76. Rock’s pessimistic outlook finds its confirmation in 
the works of authors and fake historians such as Prokhanov, Dugin, and Mironov, along with the 
continued literary activity of the abovementioned Platonov. The latter not only continues to publish 
works that engage in Holocaust denial, but also founded a think-tank called the ‘Institute for Russian 
Civilization’ in 1993 – self-proclaimedly aiming to strengthen the ideological narrative of Russian 
historic greatness and Orthodox heritage in its fight against the forces of ‘worldwide Russophobia’, cf.  
“Institut Russkoi Tsivilizatsii,” Institut Russkoi Tsivilizatsii, <rusinst.ru/> [accessed 20 June 2019]. 
480 Marsh, Literature, History and Identity, 526. 
481 Cf. Zvi Gitelman, Jewish Identities in Postcommunist Russia and Ukraine: An Uncertain Ethnicity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2012). 
482 James L. Gibson and Marc Morj Howard, “Russian Anti-Semitism and the Scapegoating of Jews,” 
British Journal of Political Science 37, no. 2 (2007): 193-223, 217.  
483 Konstanty Gebert, “Putin’s Jews,” Momentmag.com, November 5, 2015, 
<https://momentmag.com/putins-jews/> [accessed 12 February 2020] 
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anti-Semitic rhetoric against Ukraine increased noticeably in the context of the 
annexation of Crimea, and some scholars, such as Masha Gessen, argue that public 
faith in the seeming acceptance of Jewish culture is minimal – in part because anti-
Jewish sentiments are frequently masked as expressions of anti-intellectualism.484 
Aptekman noticed a similar phenomenon in the mid-2000s when she described how 
post-Soviet fears about a Judeo-Masonic conspiracy often carry a predominantly 
“allegorical and even metaphysical [nature] […] which actually and ultimately means 
‘a member of the liberal intelligentsia’”485. 
By engaging with the irrational fears of a ‘Jewish-Masonic conspiracy’, Akunin 
not only utilises the genre of detective fiction to add to the historical narrative about 
the Empire’s Jewish population, but also directly addresses the contemporary 
transformations of these anti-Jewish sentiments. In this sense, one emotionally laden 
and historically evocative Other is conflated with another, resulting in a telling insight 
into both Imperial and post-Soviet identitary fears. From a post-Soviet perspective, 
this process simultaneously lays bare anxieties about the prolonged impotence of the 
intelligentsia – along with its failure to make its own, meaningful contribution to the 
contemporary national identity debate. 
 
3.2.2. Writing Nation: The Disenchantment of the Positive Hero 
Fandorin’s in-between position as an intelligentsia member and state servant once 
again marks the exception to the above rule and creates a bridge that connects Akunin’s 
detective rediscovery of Empire with his attempt to offer a narrative of ‘writing 
Nation’. In The State Counsellor, this process resumes its focus on the critical 
discussion of a select number of national hero narratives and their grounding in 19th-
century literary thought. Akunin adopts three different angles in his exploration of this 
theme: Pozharsky’s role as a representative of Empire, Grin’s function as the voice of 
revolutionary counteractivity, and Fandorin’s unique position as a double to both.  
As discussed previously, Pozharsky appears as an advocate of Empire and a post-
Soviet voice of discontent with the democratic experiment. His world consists of either 
a repressive totalitarian state or the revolution, alleged order or presumed chaos – a 
 
484 Cf. Masha Gessen, The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin (London: Granta, 
2013). 
485 Aptekman, “Kabbalah, Judeo-Masonic Myth, and Post-Soviet Literary Discourse,” 667. 
152 
 
binary world of mutual aggression and exploitation in which everybody is everybody’s 
enemy, and where Russia is at war with itself.  
 
Pozharsky as Puppeteer 
In an attitude reminiscent of Kalinin’s theory about the sacrosanct status of historical 
authority, Pozharsky is convinced of being the bearer of a historical mission: “Я себя 
от России не отделяю. В конце концов, Россия создана тысячу лет назад одним 
из моих предков, а другой триста лет назад помог ей возродиться” (SS 269). 
Talking about his ancestors, Pozharsky not only lists the saints Gleb Muromsky and 
Georgii Pobedonostsev, otherwise known as Saint George, as his family’s adopted 
patrons (cf. SS 104), but also bases his delusions of historical grandeur on his kinship 
to Dmitry Pozharsky. Immortalised on the Red Square, Pozharsky is a familiar figure 
to all Russian readers and joins the list of historical prototypes whose authority Akunin 
challenges in the Fandorin project.  
In The State Counsellor, Pozharsky refers to the Red Square statue himself, albeit 
in critical tones. Condemning the seated stance his ancestor is shown to take, he reads 
this passivity as emblematic for his family’s political inactivity since 1612. In a bout 
of aristocratic existential dread, Pozharsky warns Fandorin (in whom he suspects a 
like-minded compatriot) not to follow in his family’s footsteps: 
я хочу вас с места сдвинуть, чтобы вы вон тому каменному сидню не уподоблялись. Мы с 
вами, Эраст Петрович, столбовые дворяне, на таких столбах вся Российская империя 
держится. Я веду род от варягов, вы – потомок крестоносцев. В наших жилах течет древняя 
разбойничья кровь, от веков она стала терпкой, как старое вино. (SS 192) 
 
Considering how Fandorin never told Pozharsky about his family history, it stands to 
reason that the latter did a little reconnaissance himself. However, there is little 
evidence to back up his claim about the detective’s genealogy. Pozharsky’s blood and 
birth rhetoric not only carries aspects of late 19th-century social Darwinism and the 
racism that served various Imperial powers in their colonising efforts, but it also 
mirrors the rhetoric found amid contemporary nationalist revivals such as the neo-
Eurasian movement. In 2009, then-president Medvedev used a similar phrase when he 
talked about WWII veterans during an address to the Federal Assembly: “Мы одной 
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крови с теми, кто победил, стало быть, все мы – наследники победителей”486. By 
embodying such clearly ideologized ideas, Pozharsky functions as an early mouthpiece 
for the kind of nationalist rhetoric that openly flirts with grand historical narratives and 
mythological invocations of an unbroken line of patriotic fervour. All the more ironic, 
then, that neither of the allegedly ur-Russian ancestors that Pozharsky invokes – the 
crusaders and the Varangians – were of ethnic Russian origin. 
In his discussion of the Red Square statue, Pozharsky also expresses an anti-
capitalist standpoint that propagates a conservative, aristocracy-focussed world-view: 
“[Pазбойничья кровь] погуще, чем жидкая киноварь купчишек и приказных. 
Наши зубы, кулаки и когти должны быть крепче, чем у Мининых, иначе уплывет 
империя у нас меж пальцев, такое уж подходит время” (SS 192). Being both a 
reactionary and an aristocrat intent on keeping Russia’s parallel societies apart, 
Pozharsky inscribes the nobility with the right to bend the rules to their will and whim. 
However, just as in previous instances in the novel – such as when Fandorin provided 
a counternarrative to Pozharsky’s glorification of banditry, and Esfir condemned 
Fandorin’s love of autocracy as a source of chaos – Pozharsky’s point of view about 
the role of merchants is also presented with an essential counterview. 
The character who voices this difference is the factory owner Lobastov, who 
supports the revolutionaries financially. As an embodiment of the class of socially 
responsible entrepreneurs that was beginning to develop in Russia and elsewhere at 
the turn of the 19th century, Lobastov’s work ethic and management style effectively 
belie Pozharsky’s verdict of a useless merchant class that bears no social relevance 
whatsoever. When Grin visits Lobastov’s factory, he is surprised to realise that “Если 
б все капиталисты были как Лобастов, незачем стало бы и пожар зажигать […] 
Глупая мысль, потому что на всю Россию Лобастов имелся только один [my 
emphasis]” (SS 88) – a statement that includes a potentially deliberate word-play on 
Pozharsky’s name and the proverbial sparking of a flame to bring about change in 
society.  
Despite offering the revolutionaries financial support, Lobastov refuses to be 
placed on either side of the terrorist divide. In fact, he is affronted by the idea that he 
 
486 Dmitry Medvedev, “Poslanie Federal’nomu Sobraniiu Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” Kremlin.ru, November 
12, 2009, <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/5979> [accessed 17 December 2019] 
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could be taken for a convinced revolutionary and explains his support of the Combat 
Group with the passivity of the government, which sparked his desire to scare the 
ruling elite into action:  
Вы думаете, я вам деньги из страха даю? Или индульгенцию на случай вашей победы 
покупаю? […] Не приведи Господь, если вы победите! Да и не будет у вас никакой победы. 
[…] наших дураков надутых пугать надо, чтоб не ставили палки в колеса, чтоб не мешали 
умным людям страну из болота тащить. Учить их, ослов, надобно. [...] Пусть до их 
чугунных голов дойдет, что России либо со мной, Лобастовым, идти, либо с вами, в 
тартарары катиться. Третьего нe дано. (SS 90) 
  
Lobastov correctly predicts the end of Empire in his diatribe, and although his 
reductionist view of the possible paths for Russia’s future is not reflective of the actual 
historical complexity at play, the idea that a change in business culture could have 
prevented a revolution is in itself an important addition to the historical narrative.  
A similar thought is also expressed by another supporting character, the senior 
operations officer Zubtsov. Unlike Lobastov, Zubtsov reasons that the best way to 
rectify the current situation in the Empire is to secure the cooperation of the autocracy 
itself: “Тот, кому сносно живется, на баррикады не пойдет […] Слава богу, у нас 
самодержавная монархия. Самым богатым и умным разъяснить, чтоб поняли 
свою выгоду, а потом закон провести. Сверху” (SS 178). In designing this 
character, Akunin once more took inspiration from Russian history itself: Zubtsov’s 
opinions strongly echo those of Sergei Zubatov, “brilliant secret policeman […] [and] 
chief of the Moscow Okhrana, who was sponsoring and guiding his own unions in the 
new labour movement – so-called ‘police socialism’”487. Although a convinced 
socialist, Zubatov still “advocated paternalistic governance over the working 
masses”488 and devised a successful system of turning revolutionaries into informers, 
thus infiltrating much of the Leftist movement up until and during the First World War. 
The complexity of this historical prototype thus only appears in sketches in Akunin’s 
novel, but it, too, offers an alternative to Pozharsky’s sonderweg rhetoric of 
supposedly Russian exceptionalism.  
Ultimately, both Lobastov and Zubtsov-Zubatov appear as positive business 
figures in The State Counsellor – a daring feat in the cutthroat capitalist atmosphere of 
 
487 Sebag Montefiore, The Romanovs, 509. 
488 Laurent Murawiec and Clifford Gaddy, “The Higher Police: Vladimir Putin and His Predecessors,” 
The National Interest, no. 67 (2002): 29-36, 32. As the paper title suggests, Murawiec and Gaddy draw 
parallels between his and Putin’s approach to politics. 
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the 1990s, when consumers were wavering between self-loathing and jokes about 
Russia’s nouveaux riches. Thus, although Akunin’s contextualisation of business 
involvement in revolutionary activities to ward off state backwardness evokes 
stereotypical reader reactions about the prototypical character type of the soulless, 
Westernised businessman, it also subverts this character portrayal. As a result, both 
Lobastov and Zubtsov form important contributions to the multi-layered historical 
world-building at play in the Fandorin project. This fact is also expressed in the chapter 
heading “Глава девятая, в которой много говорят о судьбах России [my 
emphasis]” (SS 173): instead of reverting to a simple black-and-white explanation for 
revolutionary intent that would support a Pozharsky-ian reading of Russian history, a 
plethora of reasons for engagement in political dissent – or support – is expressed by 
Akunin’s character ensemble instead.489  
Pozharsky’s offer of a questionable national identity narrative is further made 
manifest in the context of his political machinations. As the events of The State 
Counsellor progress, Pozharsky’s eagerness to leave his mark on the history of the 
Russian body politic is framed as a wish to play the role of puppeteer in the lives of 
his fellow citizens. Just like Achimas in The Death of Achilles, Pozharsky aspires to 
become a writer of other people’s fates; his self-insertion into the history of the Russian 
state is framed in a correspondent literary context. When Pozharsky first appears in 
The State Counsellor, he enters the room with the words “Приехавший по именному 
повелению из Петербурга чиновник требует вас сей же час к себе” (SS 104). This 
is a quotation taken directly from Gogol’s Revizor (Ревизор, 1836), a play that features 
a band of corrupt provincial officials sent into a panic by the arrival of a fake 
government inspector. The play refers to various cases of corruption, embezzlement 
and venality, yet Pozharsky’s quote itself has no bearing on actual events in The State 
 
489 The English translation renders the chapter title in the singular, saying ‘Chapter 9 in which a lot is 
said about the destiny of Russia’ (SC 184). Without laying claim to any translation expertise, I would 
want to insist on the plural for this phrase, as it appears to be a deliberate choice by Akunin. It would, 
in any case, be considerably more common to use ‘о судьбе’ in the original Russian. This view is 
corroborated by the fact that Akunin keeps introducing the topic of underrepresented historical 
perspectives into the Fandorin novels; in The Jade Rosary Beads (Нефритовые четки, 2007), for 
example, one of the short stories about the death of a business magnate (Из жизни щепок) ends with 
the plot twist that his death was just collateral damage, used to draw attention away from the murder of 
an individual of considerably lesser social standing. The aha-effect that this produces among the 
characters in the story is mirrored by the reader realisation that most historical narratives only ever focus 




Counsellor. It is also immediately rephrased into a request for coffee, signalling that 
its insertion serves no other purpose than to call Gogol’s play to mind – both for the 
characters in the novel and for Akunin’s readership. By repeating the General 
Inspector’s words verbatim, Pozharsky places a humorous claim on the role of 
defender of law and order, whilst at the same time hinting at his own masquerade and 
double-identity. It is a hint that he knows will fall flat and remain undetected, which 
allows him to simultaneously mock the gullibility of his colleagues and revel in his 
mastery over the surrounding world.  
Pozharsky continues his re-writing of reality according to literary modes during 
the recruitment of the double agent Rahmet. Rahmet’s interrogation proves futile until 
the appearance of Pozharsky, who coerces him into cooperation by threatening the 
release of incriminating pictures, taken during one of Rahmet’s regular visits to a local 
child prostitute: “Вы, Селезнев, получите не героический процесс, на котором в 
вас будут влюбляться дамочки из зала. В вас плюнут ваши же товарищи как в 
предателя и подонка, запятнавшего светлый лик революции” (SS 107). Rahmet 
relents; when it is Pozharsky’s turn to choose a codename for the new recruit, he settles 
for “Гвидон […] будете летать с вашего острова Буяна ко мне, в царство славного 
Салтана, то комаром, то мухой, то шмелем” (SS 108). It is at this point that Fandorin 
realises “что вербовка уже состоялась […] невидимый рубеж перейден” (ibid.).  
The literary reference to Pushkin’s fairy tale with the (somewhat cumbersome) 
title The Tale of Tsar Saltan, of His Son the Renowned and Mighty Bogatyr Prince 
Gvidon Saltanovich, and of the Beautiful Princess-Swan (Сказка о царе Салтане, о 
сыне его славном и могучем богатыре князе Гвидоне Салтановиче и о 
прекрасной царевне Лебеди, 1831) construes an interesting relationship between 
Pozharsky and Rahmet. In the fairy tale, Tsar Saltan is betrayed by his wife’s sisters, 
leading him to exile her while he is away at war. Unbeknownst to Saltan, the queen 
gives birth to a baby boy, who reaches adulthood within days instead of years and 
helps her flee to a foreign island. On this island, the boy Gvidon saves a swan from 
certain death, whereupon the grateful bird lends him its magical powers and enables 
him to visit the kingdom of his father in disguise – first in the shape of a mosquito, 
then that of a fly, and finally in the form of a bumblebee. Every time Gvidon visits his 
father, he asks travelling merchants to relay an invitation to Tsar Saltan from King 
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Gvidon’s tsardom, hoping he might observe his father’s reaction. The queen’s jealous 
sisters interfere each time the Tsar comes close to the decision to visit, but thanks to 
the information Gvidon gathers during his visits and the swan’s magical powers, he 
eventually manages to reunite with his father and bring about a happy family ending.  
The relation this construes between Rahmet and Pozharsky offers an essential clue 
as to their relationship in the novel. On the one hand, Rahmet clearly takes on Gvidon’s 
role as spy, gathering information while hiding in plain sight – just like the near 
invisible insects that his literary role model turns into. Likewise, Pozharsky exhibits 
early megalomaniacal traits otherwise characteristic of totalitarian rulers and openly 
covets the role of Tsar, causing him to appropriate a popular Russian proverb about 
the powers of Tsar and God: “Мол, хоть я и не в столице, но высоко сижу и далеко 
гляжу” (SS 275).490 Pozharsky also aims to achieve “почетное место в истории 
российской государственности и, что для меня еще более существенно, завидное 
место в российском государстве” (SS 191) and eventually proclaims himself 
“человек, который может спасти Россию. Потому что я умен, смел и лишен 
сантиментов” (SS 268).  
On the other hand, unlike his fairy-tale prototype, Akunin’s Gvidon does not act 
on his own behalf. Neither is the kingdom he infiltrates at peace, and the information 
gathered is not meant to be used for its defence. These differences acquire significance 
in the context of yet another discrepancy: in the fairy tale, Tsar Saltan is Gvidon’s next 
of kin, not his enemy. It is this particular relation invoked in the Saltan-Gvidon-
dynamic that suggests an alternative reading to Akunin’s relationship between Rahmet 
and Pozharsky, in which Rahmet is not a new recruit, but a long-standing informer. 
The hidden father-son dynamic is revealed through the literary reference in 
Pozharsky’s choice of codename – a link that is once again too obscure for the 
surrounding characters to decipher, although Fandorin’s impression that the 
recruitment went uncommonly smoothly steers him in the right direction.491  
Consequently, it becomes clear that Rahmet’s entire recruitment is staged – 
followed by the novel’s final revelation that Pozharsky acted as a double agent himself, 
 
490  The Russian proverb I am referring to is ‘До Бога высоко, до Царя далеко’. 
491 Rahmet’s own confession to Grin after being caught red-handed confirms the suggestion of a long-
standing collaboration between Pozharsky and him: “Давно? – Да считай, с самого начала! Меня 
давно тошнит от вас, скучнорылых” (SS 127). 
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committing “двойное предательство, то есть дергать за ниточки обе куклы, 
полицейскую и революционную” (SS 109). During the showdown, Pozharsky 
reveals that he is the anonymous source that fed state secrets to the Combat Group, 
enabling Grin’s circle of revolutionaries to carry out their recent string of successful 
assassinations. Additionally, he also acted as a puppeteer of Grand Duke Romanov, 
whose views Pozharsky manipulated and whom he cunningly implemented as a ruler 
too weak to withstand advisorial whispers.  
In thus perceiving others as puppets, Pozharsky is shown to view life as a play to 
be written or directed at will. Both this duplicity and Pozharsky’s repeated self-
stylization as a bandit and trickster figure liken him to Akunin’s writerly persona of 
the equally mischievous ‘evil man’. However, unlike Akunin, Pozharsky does not toy 
with historical what-ifs in an attempt to awaken Russian society from its self-induced 
slumber or to parody the officially sanctioned amnesia it so willingly engages in. 
Instead, he dons the costume of an unpredictable rebel for entirely reactionary reasons. 
The success he has in doing so acts as a reminder about the revolution’s flaws and the 
brittleness of political reality, but it also serves as a warning sign about the compelling 
persuasiveness of totalitarian discourses. In the end, anybody bold enough to do so can 
play with the historical narrative – for better or for worse.  
 
Grin as National Hero 
In The State Counsellor, mastery over Russia’s historic hero narrative is also fought 
over by the revolutionary circle around Grin. As Pozharsky and Grin share the same 
destructive approach to fashioning Russia’s future, they also share several other 
similarities. Thus, both refer to the battle of Borodino as a simile for their fight with 
each other – exposing their respective self-perception as noble and heroic freedom 
fighters. As one of the decisive battles in the Napoleonic War, Borodino conjures up 
the image of the Russian nation’s valiant, self-sacrificing nature. The battle occupies 
an important place in the construction and manipulation of identity narratives in Russia 
and has not only been immortalised in various works of 19th-century literature, 
Tolstoy’s War and Peace (Война и мир, 1869) and Lermontov’s poem Borodino 
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(Бородино, 1837) among them, but has also given birth to the literary trope of the 
Napoleon figure as “a sinful yet heroic rebel”492.  
Borodino also plays a recurrent part in political representations of national unity 
and heroism in Russia – which neither Grin nor Pozharsky focus on in their references 
to the battle.493 Instead, Grin singles out the grand-scale bloodshed of the Borodino 
battlefield, using it to stylise Russian officials as ruthless executioners and worse 
enemies than the French: “Вот все Бородино, Бородино. […] Там ведь стреляли, 
не думали, в хорошего или в плохого. Француз – значит, пали. […] А тут враги 
похуже, чем просто французы” (SS 169). Meanwhile, Pozharsky draws attention to 
the sheer levels of destruction that accompanied the battle, which heralded the razing 
of Moscow: “Их там семь человек, вооружены до зубов. Такое Бородино устроят, 
что после снова Москву отстраивать придется” (SS 231). Thus, both characters 
invoke the battle of Borodino as a warning sign, not as a call-to-arms – dissolving not 
only the boundary between government and revolutionaries, but also pointing towards 
an important shift in frontier: unlike in the Napoleonic War, the enemy now comes 
from within.494 
Grin’s revolutionary Combat Group is the quintessential embodiment of such a 
threat from within. While it is not the first revolutionary group to be referenced in the 
Fandorin series, it is the one most closely modelled after a historical forebear, i.e. the 
19th-century Narodnaia volia, the group responsible for Alexander II’s assassination 
in 1881.495 A revolutionary undercurrent did, however, feature in the Fandorin series 
from the very start; in The Winter Queen, set in 1876, Fandorin received a warning 
that “[н]аши российские революционеры на грани раскола. […] То, что было до 
сих пор – цветочки. Террор против правящего класса может стать массовым. […] 
 
492 Robert L. Jackson, “Napoleon in Russian Literature,” Yale French Studies, no. 26 (1960): 106-18, 
107. 
493 Putin marked the 200-year-anniversary of the battle with a visit to the original battle site, invoking 
parallels to the Great Patriotic War in his speech. Cf. Vladimir Putin, “Torzhestva po sluchaiu 200-letiia 
Borodinskogo srazheniia,” Kremlin.ru, September 2, 2012, 
<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/16346> [accessed 17 December 2019] 
494 The theme of state and revolutionaries as doubles has also been explored in works of other Russian 
writers, for example Bely’s novel Peterburg, cf. Platt, “Historical Novel,” 81. 
495 The group’s newspaper is said to be the ‘нелегальная цюрихская ‘Воля народа’’ (SS 5), which 
could also be a reference to Lenin’s time hiding out in Switzerland. 
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судьба России на карту поставлена”496, whereas in The Death of Achilles, Russia is 
described as having reached the “эпоху политического терроризма” (SMA 194).  
In The State Counsellor, Grin’s circle of revolutionary fellows-in-arms is small, 
but diverse, and represents a microcosm of a proto-democratic society based on 
equality and the rejection of a hierarchy of ranks. This is, among other things, 
expressed in the fact that “[в] группе все были на ‘ты’, вне зависимости от возраста 
и революционных заслуг” (SS 46). While Grin’s revolutionaries are ready to 
sacrifice themselves and others in the name of the greater good, they do not intend to 
create a reign of terror or fear for the greater public; instead, they are portrayed as 
striving for freedom of expression and equal comradeship. The revolutionaries’ 
standard activities are described as “[п]оругать власти, попеть недозволенные 
песни и, конечно, выпить-закусить” (SS 64) – which further strengthens the 
impression of the communal nature upon which their established social rites hinge.  
The group also includes female members, among which are the prostitute-turned-
madame Julie and the aristocrat’s daughter Needle.497 However, most of the 
revolutionary members hail from a socially disadvantaged background or the fringes 
of society, such as Grin’s closest comrades Emelya and Bullfinch. Whereas Emelya is 
described as “хороший боевик. Крепкий, несуетливый, без иинтеллигентских 
фанаберий” (SS 47), Bullfinch is introduced as “сын повешенного цареубийцы и 
народоволки, умершей в каземате от протестной голодовки […] Первый 
свободный человек будущей свободной России. Без мусора в голове, без мути в 
душе” (SS 52).  
Whereas gender and social distinctions do not matter in Grin’s choice of 
comrades, the ability for self-reflection and moderation do. Although the 
revolutionaries do not in any way qualify as role models for socially responsible 
behaviour, they do showcase moral qualms in a way not a single government official 
 
496 Boris Akunin, Azazel’ (Moscow: Zakharov, 2009), 76. All further quotations will be referring to this 
edition, abbreviated as (AZ). 
497 Although the actual plot presence of female characters in the Fandorin novels is often lamentably 
limited, most of Akunin’s women are endowed with a glittering array of proto-feminist thoughts and 
forward-thinking opinions. In The State Counsellor, women are at the centre of all crucial plot 
developments. Julie, for instance, acts as a double agent and betrays both Pozharsky and Grin; she is 
also responsible for gathering both men in Needle’s family home for the novel’s showdown. Needle 
herself is the person who not only builds and delivers bombs, but also does reconnaissance work and, 
ultimately, lights the bomb that kills both Pozharsky, Grin, and herself. 
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in The State Counsellor, with the exception of Fandorin and Smol’yaninov, does. 
During a planned operation at a railway station, for instance, Bullfinch decides not to 
give the agreed signal to throw a bomb after spotting a mother and child in the 
crowd;498 likewise, Grin condemns Rahmet’s unauthorised acid attack on a politician 
with the words: “[с] той поры на Рахмета [он] смотреть без отвращения не мог” 
(SS 49).  
Although the revolutionaries do collaborate with members of the intelligentsia – 
such as the private lecturer Aronson, who is said to be “скорее либерал, чем 
революционер, и террористических методов не одобряет” (SS 50) – the overall 
revolutionary circle’s attitude towards the intelligentsia can best be described as 
sceptical. As a self-proclaimed man of deeds, Grin has little sympathy for people like 
Aronson, who talk but do not say anything (cf. SC 54). Still, both Grin and his comrade 
Emelya are well-read and far from uneducated. In his youth, Grin “декламировал 
Некрасова и Лермонтова” (SS 39), whereas Emelya’s process of reading The Count 
of Monte Cristo accompanies the events of The State Counsellor – leading to his 
frustrated proclamation: “Гнида какая этот Вильфор! – пробормотал Емеля, 
переворачивая страницу. – Чисто наши судейские” (SS 187). The result is an 
interesting layering of fictionality: a late 19th-century fictional criminal is portrayed as 
reading an early 19th-century crime story, during which an early 21st-century crime 
fiction reader observes him. Becoming a part of this literary and historical palimpsest 
draws Akunin’s reader’s attention to crime fiction’s long-established function as a 
socio-politically engaged genre, but it also highlights its involvement in the portrayal 
of unstable realities across various cultural contexts.  
Akunin’s contextualisation of the national hero narrative within classical literature 
is made even more apparent in Grin’s own character profile. Figures from within the 
revolutionary circle twice make Grin’s hero status explicit in their greetings, saying 
“Вы знаете, что вы теперь самый главный герой?” (SS 118) and “Вы самый 
настоящий герой, - произнесла она очень серьезным и спокойным тоном, будто 
констатировала доказанный наукой факт” (SS 189). Esfir, without personally 
 
498 This scene could potentially also be read as another reference to Grand Duke Sergei Aleksandrovich, 
whose assassination in 1905 is said to have been delayed several times because of the presence of his 
wife and young niece and nephew, cf. I. C. Wakerley, “The ‘Delicate Murder’ of the Grand Duke Sergei 
of Russia (1905),” Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory, no. 47 (1976): 1-9 and Sebag 
Montefiore, The Romanovs, 522. 
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knowing Grin, also issues the more general statement of “все или почти все 
революционеры – люди благородные и героические” (SS 176).  
Akunin does not stop there. The literary intertext used in the creation of Grin 
actively plays with Russia’s heritage of ambiguous (anti-)heroes and provides a rich 
palimpsest of intertextual sources. Thus, one of the first obvious prototypes for Grin 
is Raskol’nikov, the quintessential man of ideas in Russian literature, whose influence 
on Grin as a character is indirectly referenced in the use of one of his signature phrases:  
Без тираноборства революций не бывает – это аксиома. Листовками и просветительскими 
кружками царизм не своротить. Террор был нужен как воздух […] [my emphasis] (SS 54) 
 
Гм... да... все в руках человека, и все-то он мимо носу проносит, единственно от одной 
трусости... это уж аксиома... Любопытно, чего люди больше всего боятся? Нового шага, 
нового собственного слова они всего больше боятся... [my emphasis]499 
 
Grin and Raskol’nikov share the kind of cold-blooded rationalism that allows them to 
talk about murder as if it was a mathematical equation. A lot of Grin’s habits also 
involve physical deprivation and pseudo-scientific rigour, further adding a 
Raskol’nikov-an scientific discipline to his story; when Grin is described as counting 
his heartbeats in his sleep, for instance, this activity is relayed with the words: “эта 
арифметика не была лишена смысль, потому что […] закаляла выдержку и волю” 
(SS 37). Moreover, Grin is described as a character who dreams of becoming a ‘match’ 
in the course of world history; in a similar way, Raskol’nikov hopes to take a step in 
life that no-one has dared take before him. Lastly, Grin’s aforementioned reference to 
the battle of Borodino reconnects him to Raskolnikov’s aim at becoming a ‘new 
Napoleon’. 
The chapter that features these descriptions is subtitled “Отдых стального 
человека”, which introduces several other intertexts for a reading of Grin as a 
contender for the role of national hero. The first of these is Chernyshevsky’s novel 
What is to be Done? (Что делать, 1863), occasionally labelled the ‘revolutionary’s 
bible’. In his analysis of The State Counsellor, Kevin Platt stated that What is to be 
Done? is “such an obvious source text for a novel dealing with revolutionary terrorism 
that Akunin simply delegates the citation function to one of his characters”500. Despite 
 
499 F. M. Dostoevsky, Prestuplenie i Nakazanie (Berlin: Izdatel’stvo I. P. Ladyzhnikova, 1919), 6. 
500 Platt, “Historical Novel,” 79. Alternatively, Tishchenko suggests Dostoevsky’s novel The Adolescent 
(Подросток, 1875) as the main source material for the character of Grin, cf. Tishchenko, “My Hero Is 
a Villain,” 194. 
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the similarity in name to the novel’s protagonist Rakhmetov, however, it is not Rahmet 
who resembles Chernyshevsky’s revolutionary ideal the most, but Grin. Like 
Chernyshevsky’s Rakhmetov, Grin develops the habit of lying on hard surfaces (cf. 
SC 37), practices gymnastics for physical strength, and generally lives an ascetic 
lifestyle that neither allows for luxurious foods nor sexual pleasures. Grin’s Spartan 
outlook on life is also reflected in his clipped manner of speech, which is mirrored in 
the laconic subtitles given by Akunin to the chapters that focus on his point of view.  
The link between Grin and Rakhmetov is further reinforced through Grin’s fervent 
commitment to the revolutionary ideal. He sees Russia’s only hope for a better future  
в периодическом взбалтывании, имя которому революция. Передовые нации – те, которые 
прошли через эту болезненную, но необходимую операцию, и чем раньше, тем лучше. 
Класс, слишком долго находящийся наверху, мертвеет […] от этого поры страны 
хакупориваются, и в обществе нарастает удушье, производящее бессмысленность и 
произвол. Государство ветшает, как давно не ремонтированный дом, и если процесс 
разрушения зашел слишком далеко, подпирать и латать гнилую постройку 
нецелесообразно. Нужно ее спалить, и на пепелище выстроить новый дом, крепкий и 
светлый. (SS 40) 
 
It is worthwhile quoting this passage in full, as it construes an important parallel to 
post-Soviet reality through the use of the metaphor of the ‘common European house’, 
which was one of Gorbachev’s preferred figures of speech and a cornerstone of the 
public perestroika discourse. Its invocation in this passage provides a contemporary 
level of meaning for Grin’s opinion and suggests that a ‘novostroika’, rather than a 
‘perestroika’, would have been the advisable course of action. This is particularly 
relevant for Akunin’s readership in the context of the inadequate government reforms 
that took place during the 1990s, and which allowed numerous members of the old 
Soviet nomenklatura to retain their places or move on to occupy similar ones.  
The problems that arose from this insufficient ‘perestroika’ are now being linked 
to Russia’s swift return to a authoritarian system of rule. In 1996, Olga 
Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White concluded that already under Yeltsin’s rule, the 
“Soviet tradition of ‘selection and allocation of cadres’ was in effect revived, and with 
it the ‘table of ranks’”501. While summarising their findings, they also stated that 
during “the post-communist years [...] three-quarters of the presidential administration 
and nearly three-quarters of the Russian government were former nomenklatura 
 
501 Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White, “From Soviet Nomenklatura to Russian Élite,” Europe-
Asia Studies 48, no. 5 (1996): 711-33, 722. This table of ranks is present for readers of the Fandorin 
project as well, as Fandorin rises steadily on the associated career ladder. 
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members, and among the regional leadership over 80% had similar origins”502. 
Rostislav Turovskii carried out a similar analysis in 2010, which led him to surmise 
that “rotation within the nomenklatura [has been retained], which brings to power in 
the regions new groups from the state bureaucracy [...] The elite reproduces itself”503. 
Vasily Gatov, Elisabeth Schimpfössl and Ilya Yablokov traced the persistence of 
nomenklaturnost’, as they call it, across various post-Soviet Russian media 
institutions, only to arrive at similar findings to those of the previous authors.504 Read 
in this context, Grin’s statement contains a judgment that is equally applicable to late 
Imperial as it is to post-Soviet Russia – and which contains a comment on the failure 
of the Yeltsin regime and the liberal ruling elite to seize the opportunities that the 
perestroika presented. 
A second intertext used in Grin’s character construction is hinted at in the epithet 
‘steel man’ (‘стальный человек’). Mulcahy, in his study of the film adaptation of The 
State Counsellor, recognised a connection between Chernyshevsky’s and Akunin’s 
novels, but also pointed out that Grin “[augurs] the new Soviet man of the 1920s […] 
through rigid self-discipline and vigorous exercise”505. Strangely enough, Mulcahy did 
not refer to Nikolay Ostrovsky’s novel How the Steel was Tempered (Как закалялась 
сталь, 1934) in this analysis; however, the repeated descriptions of Grin as a man of 
steel invite a comparison between Chernyshevsky’s novel and the later tenets of 
Socialist Realism just as much as they present Grin as an ambiguous, and therefore 
sufficiently Akunian, continuation of the positive hero tradition in Ostrovsky’s vein.  
Although originally a term coined in the Soviet era, the ‘positive hero’ has a long 
history in Russian literature. Marcia Morris links its rise to the literary blueprint of the 
early ascetic hero, who played a key part in a number of religious texts that predated 
the rise of the realistic novel in Russian literature by several centuries. Talking about 
both Chernyshevsky’s What is to be Done? and Ostrovsky’s How the Steel was 
Tempered, Morris argues that a degeneration process of the ascetic hero ideal took 
 
502 Ibid, 727-8. 
503 Rostislav F. Turovskii, “How Russian Governors Are Appointed,” Russian Politics & Law 48, no. 1 
(2010): 58-79, 74. 
504 Cf. Vasily Gatov, Elisabeth Schimpfössl, and Ilya Yablokov, “From Soviet to Russian Media 
Managers,” Russian Politics 2, no. 1 (2017): 7-31. 
505 Mulcahy, “A Not-so-thrilling Thriller,” 328. 
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place following its secularisation under the Soviet regime.506 Instead of fulfilling the 
role of spiritual role model, the Sovietizised hero figure became a hollow echo of 
Socialist ideals that turned the original separation of body and soul – which was meant 
to enable a search for higher truths – into a farce. Although it was sold as a positive 
role model, the figure acquired the meaning of a negative hero instead.  
In a convincing extension of this view, Rufus Mathewson reformulated the 
positive hero tradition by tracing its origins to “the earliest moments of the realist 
epoch”507 – claiming, in the process, that it inspired the Soviet search for a new literary 
ideal because of its obvious connection points to Socialist Realism. Mathewson not 
only states that Chernyshevsky was “an enormously important figure in Lenin’s 
life”508, but also that the literary creation Rakhmetov “[i]n all his character traits […] 
is a nearly perfect early model of the Bolshevik […] a member of a tiny elite which 
aspires to change the world”509. As a result, the positive heroes of Russian literature 
ought to be seen as “emblematically virtuous images of political men”510. 
It is this political capacity of Russia’s positive hero tradition that Akunin arguably 
transfers to the post-Soviet detective novel, prompting a search for potential catalysts 
of a new societal rupture. True to form, Akunin parodies the obvious disconnect 
between the positive hero’s official title and his unofficial negative reception, spurning 
Soviet detective fiction’s tendency to be “ideologically tendentious and populated by 
squeaky-clean ‘positive heroes’”511 in the process. Just as Morris calls Ostrovsky’s 
work the “Triumph of Cliché”512, Grin is an embodiment of the culminated clichés of 
both realist and Soviet literature’s search for a positive hero – made manifest in 
Rahmet’s semi-spiteful description of his character as “Франкенштейн из 
английского романа, получеловек-полумашина” (SS 109).  
 
506 Cf. Marcia A. Morris, Saints and Revolutionaries: The Ascetic Hero in Russian Literature (New 
York: State University of New York Press, 1993), 107-27. 
507 Rufus Wellington Mathewson, The Positive Hero in Russian Literature (Stanford: Stanford UP, 
1975), 14. 
508 Ibid, 63. Perhaps not coincidentally, Akunin’s Grin is said to have fled from a penal colony via 
China, Japan, and America, only to end up in Switzerland, a country Lenin also spent some time in exile 
in (cf. SS 52). 
509 Ibid, 76. 
510 Ibid, 2. 
511 Theimer Nepomnyashchy, “Markets, Mirrors, and Mayhem,” 166. 
512 Mathewson, The Positive Hero in Russian Literature, 173. 
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Although Rahmet erroneously calls the monster, not the Doctor, Frankenstein, his 
comparison correctly points out the patchwork of clichés that went into Grin’s literary 
creation. If we collect all the intertextual references previously mentioned, then Grin 
appears as a receptacle for Lermontov’s disillusioned demons, Nekrasov’s rebels, 
Chernyshevsky’s revolutionaries, and, finally, Ostrovsky’s man of steel.513 At the 
same time, Grin’s success as a positive hero is about as convincing as that of his Soviet 
prototypes – it barely exists. This parodic quality is also hinted at through another 
literary intertext, once again provided by Rahmet. During an early scene in the novel, 
he greets Grin with a couple of self-composed verses: 
Жил на свете Грин железный, 
Он имел талант полезный – 
Спал на досках славный Грин, 
Обходился без перин.  
 
- Есть и другой вариант. Рахмет остановил жестом пыснувшего Снегиря и продолжил:  
 
Жил на свете рыцарь бедный 
По прозванью Храбрый Грин. 
Он имел талант невредный – 
Обходился без перин. (SS 48) 
 
As his comrades burst into laughter, Grin realises that “это он из Пушкина 
переиначил. Наверно, смешно” (SS 48). Given Rahmet’s duplicitous role in the 
novel, the poem’s rephrasing is almost certainly meant to be mocking – not least 
because it reminds readers of Pushkin’s own literary heritage as one of Russia’s great 
masters of irony and satire. The obvious banality of Grin’s accomplishments in the 
poem – such as making do without feather duvets – is delivered in the same, highly 
stylised mode that Pushkin was known for, making Rahmet’s verses equally 
reminiscent of 19th-century intellectual satire and the conceptually empty hero rhetoric 
of Soviet times. 
The choice of a poem about knights in reference to Grin is not entirely coincidental 
either. Grin’s own mantra of life reflects his self-perception as a national hero figure, 
summarised in the trinity “стальная воля, богатырская сила, безупречная чистота” 
(SS 40). Unfortunately, the English translation loses one of the most important aspects 
 
513 Apart from this, Frankenstein has been called both “a novel of racial panic” (Adriana Craciun, 
“Frankenstein’s Politics,” in The Cambridge Companion to Frankenstein, ed. Andrew Smith 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2016): 84–98, 88) and “a kaleidoscopic political imaginary” (ibid, 84) of 
its times – labels that could just as easily be applied to The State Counsellor.  
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of this triad, i.e. the link to the Russian byliny: in these epic tales, the bogatyri appear 
as “patriotic warriors […] endowed with superhuman strength and moral goodness. 
Typically, these warriors […] serve a mythical prince Vladimir Krasnoye Solnyshko 
[…] and protect the Russian soil from evil-meaning antagonists”514. This summary is 
worthwhile discussing for two reasons: first of all, Grin’s self-stylisation as a bogatyr 
invokes a very particular set of reader expectations as to his role, all of which are 
almost immediately renounced by Grin’s actual function in the novel.515  
Although Grin did train himself to become a warrior-like figure of extreme 
physical and mental strength, he fails to pursue a path of moral goodness that would 
actually liken him to fairy-tale-esque heroism. Only at the end of The State Counsellor 
does Grin perceive the wrongness of his self-established narrative, which is when he 
realises that people cannot be reduced to fit black-and-white patterns of allegiance. 
This realisation finds expression in Grin’s meditations on the unsuitability of uniform 
colours as signposts of otherness – a topic he had previously lectured his comrades on: 
- Понять нужно. Это война. Мы воюем. Там, на той стороне, всякие люди есть. Бывает, что 
добрые, хорошие, честные. Но на них другой мундир, и значит, они враги. […] Жалеть 
нельзя. То есть можно и даже нужно, но не сейчас. Потом. Сначала победить, потом жалеть. 
(SS 169) 
 
In admitting that this stance was a misconception, Grin simultaneously realises that 
few other grounds allow for such a dehumanisation of the enemy. The inefficacy of 
the coat-comparison is satirised further in the context of the novel’s final street battle 
between revolutionaries and government forces, where the Combat Group members – 
following a hint anonymously provided by Pozharsky – appear in disguise, wearing 
official military coats to blend in with the representatives of the government.   
The second problem in Grin’s self-comparison to a bogatyr is also connected to 
this scene, as it revolves around the traditional bogatyr’s link to Prince Krasnoye 
Solnyshko. In The Death of Achilles, this name was given to Prince Dolgorukoi, who 
– in both The Death of Achilles and The State Counsellor – was presented as a stand-
in figure for paternal figures of authority. Yet unlike a classical bogatyr figure, Grin is 
not loyal to figures of state, but to the idea of the state itself. At the same time, none 
 
514 Natalija Majsova, “The Hazy Gaze of the Bogatyrs of the Russian Byliny,” Teorija in Praksa 53, no. 
4 (2016): 906-19, 912. 
515 Grin’s revolutionary comrades appear aware of his ambiguity, as they greet him with the words 
“Гриныч, как Змей Горыныч” (SS 46), referring to the recurring ‘evil’ figure Zmei Gorinych in 
Russian fairy tales and byliny.  
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of Grin’s moves are truly autonomous, as he indirectly carries out Pozharsky’s will. 
The twisted, convoluted net of obligations this produces points at Grin’s quite literal 
split into a force of good and evil in The State Counsellor, along with his failure to 
convincingly embody the face of revolutionary heroism.  
Just as the Combat Group’s fake coats place them visually on the same side as the 
state forces, so are all of Grin’s successes in the end nothing but chapters in 
Pozharsky’s masternarrative aimed at preserving the Empire. Grin is not spared the 
realisation of this failure at the end of the novel; instead, Pozharsky reveals his true 
identity to Grin shortly before his death, making the revolutionary’s world view 
crumble: 
Даже во время еврейского погрома Грин не чувствовал себя таким несчастным, как в эти 
минуты, перечеркнувшие весь смысль трудной, изобиловавшей жертвами борьбы. Как жить 
дальше – вот над чем теперь следовало думать, и он знал, что найти ответ будет непросто. 
(SS 276) 
 
Not only has the positive hero ideal as incarnated by Grin failed to fulfil its purpose, it 
has also turned the revolutionaries themselves into guileless pawns of the 
government.516 
More than just a literary sleight of hand, The State Counsellor’s problematic and 
complex doubling process between government representatives and revolutionaries 
correctly mirrors the historical situation of the 19th century. As noted by historians, the 
Great Reforms of 1864 – which, as formerly described, played a paramount role in the 
development of the Russian detective novel – created a situation in which “the 
government intervened in the judicial process at precisely those junctures where, by 
law, the court should have interacted openly with the public. Thereby, the government 
[...] eventually produced and publicized the specter of terrorism”517. Part of this search 
for a “paradigmatic way of becoming a modern political subject”518 was a shift in 
political self-awareness, which encapsulated the move from a disregard for the faces 
of autocracy towards a wish to abolish autocracy itself. 
 
516 If this simile were to be extended, then both Pozharsky and Grin would appear as pawns in the grand 
narrative of Akunin – revisiting the theme of the author as ‘evil-meaning antagonist’. 
517 Claudia Verhoeven, The Odd Man Karakozov: Imperial Russia, Modernity, and the Birth of 
Terrorism (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2009), 10. 
518 Ibid, 4. 
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Not all the characters in Akunin’s novel recognise the newly systemic nature of 
the revolutionaries’ fight for what it is – indicating, to an extent, the novelty of the 
phenomenon and its historical roots in Russian soil. Smol’yaninov provides some 
comic relief by proposing a particularly absurd theory about how to tackle the terrorist 
problem in the country: he proposes the decimation of revolutionaries through duels, 
using government officials as proverbial cannon fodder until the last of the terrorists 
are eradicated. Describing the logic behind his plan, Smol’yaninov states:  
я бы […] напечатал в газете: ‘Хватит охотиться на нас, слугу престола. Хватит стрелять в 
нас из-за угла и бросать бомбы, от которых гибнут невинные люди. Я от вас не прячусь. 
Если вы, милоствиый государь, действительно, верите в свою правду и хотите 
пожертвовать собой ради блага человечества, то давайте сойдемся в честном поединке, ибо 
я тоже свято верю в свою правоту и для России не пожалею жизни. Так перестанем же 
прoливать русскую кровь. (SS 200)  
 
The humour that this scene evokes simultaneously lays bare the fundamental change 
in jurisdiction that occurred during the 19th century, along with the political changes 
that made institutions of power, not individuals, into objects and perpetrators of 
violence alike.  
 
Fandorin as National Hero 
The topic of violence is an important connecting thread between the hero ideals 
promoted by Grin and those embodied by Fandorin. Faced with the violent behaviour 
that his colleagues display during Rahmet’s interrogation, Fandorin feels 
[мучительноe ощущениe] нечистоты […] отчего во всяком деле, связанном с политикой, 
непременно есть привкус тухлости и грязи? Вроде бы расследование как расследование, 
да еще поважнее любого другого. И цель достойная – защита общественного 
спокойствия и интересов государства. Откуда же чувство запачканности? […] Имея 
дело с жестокими убийцами, бессовестными мошенниками, кровожадными выродками, 
Эраст Петрович никогда не испытывал такой брезгливости, как сегодня. (SS 82-3)519 
 
Just as Fandorin’s impression of defilement mirrors Grin’s final disillusionment before 
his death, The State Counsellor features multiple other doubling processes between the 
two characters that Akunin is careful not to let slip past even the most inattentive of 
readers.  
 
519 The first line of the quote recalls a 1931 poem by Mandel’shtam, which begins with the words 
‘Сохрани мою речь навсегда за привкус несчастья и дыма’. This poem was written in anticipation 
of his arrest under the Stalin terror regime. 
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Thus, the novel starts, quite literally, with Grin masquerading as Fandorin in order 
to successfully carry out his assassination contract. Grin meticulously copies not just 
the detective’s grey whiskers and his aloof comportment, but also his stutter; the 
juxtaposition of the two characters is subsequently heightened to humorous-historical 
proportions when Grin is referred to as “лже-[Фандорин]” (SS 21) – a phrase easily 
identifiable to Russian readers as a reference to the throng of false Dmitrys that 
peppered Russian history between 1606 and 1612.520 Moreover, both characters have 
developed somewhat stiff, distant personalities following tragic events in their 
adolescent lives; at one point in the novel, Fandorin is also said to issue a reply “в 
голос металла” (SS 63), followed by Count Dolgorukoi’s description of him as 
“неживой какой-то, будто инеем прихваченный. Или пеплом присыпанный. Не 
отогреешь ты его, не оживишь” (SS 249). At the same time, both Grin and Fandorin 
share a certain flair for theatricality, along with an awareness of the extraordinariness 
of some of their skills. They also ultimately share a common goal: to change Russia 
for the better.  
The crucial difference between Grin and Fandorin is the latter’s condemnation of 
all forms of violence, terror, or power abuse on either divide of the political spectrum. 
Fandorin is against the idea of chaos, but remains opposed to a rule of arbitrary 
despotism at the same time. It is for this reason that I cannot agree with Tishchenko’s 
assessment that “with the course of the history of Russia, the polarity between 
Fandorin and Green would change, bringing Green into the side of ‘good’ and ‘ours’ 
and sending Fandorin to the side of ‘bad’ and ‘enemies’”521. The very end of The State 
Counsellor spells out Fandorin’s refusal to act as an accomplice to a corrupt Empire 
or any other violent political force – such as the Whites, who might be the enemy that 
Tishchenko is referring to in her quote. Grin and Fandorin are doubles in the closeness 
of their beliefs, but they are – and will remain – divided by an insuperable moral abyss.  
 
520 The name also once more conjures up the Time of Troubles as the backdrop of an uncertain, chaotic 
political climate. 
521 Tishchenko, “My Hero Is a Villain,” 198. Tishchenko follows Andrew Bromfield in her 
transliteration of Grin’s name, which I find misleading. It is explicitly stated in the novel that Grin’s 
full surname is Grinberg, and that his codename refers to the historical terrorist Ignacy Hryniewiecki. 
As Russian lacks a letter ‘h’, the latter’s name is rendered Grinevitsky. There is no association in The 
State Counsellor that would suggest a link to the colour green or the English language at all. 




Through Esfir’s character, the reader is provided with valuable additional insights 
into Fandorin’s political beliefs. When the detective, exasperated by the news of 
civilian casualties after a terrorist attack on a Saint Petersburg railway station, 
proclaims “Мерзость и злодейство, вот что такое т-твоя революция” (SS 174), 
Esfir responds with the words: “Ах, революция – мерзость? […] А твоя империя 
не мерзость?” (SS 175). In the way these questions are phrased, Fandorin and Esfir 
are framed as representatives of Empire and revolution respectively. A neutral ground 
between these two polarities is not provided, nor can the individual be absolved from 
the crimes of the movement or state he or she represents. When Fandorin accuses Esfir 
of using “д-дешевая риторика” (SS 175), she retaliates by reading out a number of 
newspaper articles, all of which are approved by official censorship and feature a 
similarly pathetic tone.  
Apart from highlighting the similarity of the two discourses, this comparison also 
sheds light on several juridical shortcomings in the way the rule of law worked in the 
Russian Empire. Fandorin is forced to admit that “Да, мерзавцев и дураков в 
государстве много […] Вечная беда России. Все в ней перепутано. Добро 
защищают дураки и мерзавцы, злу служат мученики и г-герои [my emphasis]” (SS 
176). Despite appearing like a concession at first, this statement illuminates Fandorin’s 
stalwart political views: by using the identical phrase ‘idiots and crooks’ (‘дураки и 
мерзавцы’) to denote government representatives and defenders of the Good alike, 
Fandorin outright rejects the idea of a revolution as a force of positive change. It is not 
the concept of the state itself that Fandorin excoriates, but its contemporaneous, far 
from ideal, form.  
Fandorin’s otherness within the existing national hero narratives therefore 
primarily revolves around the question of moral integrity and an aversion to chaos. Yet 
Fandorin’s adherence to order fails to perceive the profound split that exists between 
zakon i spravedlivost’ in Imperial Russia. Esfir is not wrong when she compares 
Fandorin to a jinn, enslaved by the will of Dolgorukoi – and, by extension, other 
patriarchal figures of authority: 
- А-а, тот самый Фандорин! […] Гарун аль-Рашид! Раб лампы! 
- Какой еще лампы? – удивился Эраст Петрович. 
- Ну как же. Могучий джинн, охраняющий старого султана Долгорукого. [...] Не знала, 




Through her use of this comparison, Esfir verbalises Russia’s problems of 
subservience towards “the idea of a state-dependent patriarchal society”522, once again 
linking this cultural heritage to Asia. Her criticism of Fandorin is justified in many 
ways: his return to state service in The Death of Achilles was indicative of a belief that 
a higher power of justice still exists. Moreover, when Fandorin realises that the strict 
adherence to his own moral code will likely cost him his career in The State 
Counsellor, he muses: 
Из персоны первой величины […], Эраст Петрович превратился в фигуру 
необязательную и даже несколько комичную. Собственно, кто он теперь такой? […] И 
ведь устраниться от расследования тоже было нельзя. Это означало бы, пойдя на поводу 
у гордости, предать добрейшего Владимира Андреевича, ожидавшего от своего 
помощника содействия и даже спасения. (SS 113)523 
 
Fandorin’s desire to perform the role of saviour to Dolgorukoi is not only emblematic 
of a more general submission to Tsar-like father figures, but also of his assumption 
that these paternal figures are worth saving. Pozharsky likewise stylised himself as a 
saviour to Russia, but chose to pursue his goal in a much more confrontational way. 
In his subservience to authorities, Fandorin expresses a slave-like belief in the 
existence of a just ruler – but he also embodies the late Imperial intelligentsia attitude 
of quiescence that came to be its main stumbling block on the road to survival.  
Despite this character flaw, Fandorin cannot be said to suffer from the same 
mental passivity that the late 19th-century intelligentsia was often accused of. His 
internal attempts to follow a strict moral path only remain largely invisible to the 
outside world, prompting Diana – a police informer – to question the actual possibility 
of a new type of government official altogether. When Fandorin interferes in 
Burlyaev’s botched arrest attempt, Diana reacts with the accusation: 
[…] раскололо моих революционных друзей на два лагеря. Одни усматривают в вас 
государственного чиновника нового типа, провозвестника грядущих либеральных перемен. 
А другие... 
- Что д-другие? 
- А другие говорят, что вас нужно уничтожить, потому что вы хитрее и опаснее тупых 
ищеек из Охранки. (my emphasis, SS 141) 
 
 
522 Khapaeva, “Triumphant Memory of the Perpetrators,” 69. 
523 Interestingly, in this scene Fandorin is guilty of the same naïve servility as Smol’yaninov in the scene 
quoted before; in his case, however, this servility is founded on an actual personal relationship and 
acquaintance with Dolgorukoi. 
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To split the revolutionary camp into two so as to weaken it would, of course, be just 
what a loyal government official would strive to do. Fandorin’s desire to carve out a 
new way of behaviour is less believable than a government representative’s criminal 
intents.  
As the final events of The State Counsellor show, Diana’s doubts are not 
unfounded. After Fandorin writes up a full report on Pozharsky’s involvement in the 
terrorist movement, he is granted an audience with Grand Duke Simeon 
Aleksandrovich. The latter acknowledges the truth in everything that Fandorin says, 
but refuses to act on the intelligence:  
Сделал приписку: ‘Полнейший бред и к тому же опасный’. […] Конечно, все так и было. 
[…] Только вот рапорт писать не следовало. […] я его разорвал и предал забвению. Ничего 
этого не было. Престиж власти важнее всего, в том числе и истины. (SS 281) 
 
Faced with direct evidence for the collapse of a value system in whose inviolability 
Fandorin had believed for years, he rejects the proffered promotion to the post of chief 
of police at the Grand Duke’s side and quits state service instead – walking out on the 
Tsar’s brother without even waiting to take his leave.  
As a result, Akunin’s new version of the positive hero figure in Russian literature 
comprises not only the ability for critical reflection, but also the courage to act on the 
outcomes. Paradoxically, the initiative that this demands simultaneously spells out 
Fandorin’s exit from the political stage – and thus the concomitant failure of Akunin’s 
idea for a new type of intelligentsia hero. The State Counsellor is arguably the most 
important novel in the Fandorin series because it marks a fundamental turning point in 
the design of Akunin’s overall project: a caesura at which Fandorin’s “previously 
unseen positioning of an intelligentsia character [which] marked a […] new period in 
the two-century-long ‘romance’ between the Russian intelligentsia and the 
Russian state”524 collapses in on itself.  
 
3.2.3. Conclusion 
If we see the inception of the Fandorin project as an experiment with the idea of uniting 
Empire and Nation into a new type of national idea for Russia, then The State 
Counsellor marks the moment this hope died: while Fandorin’s retreat into the private 
 
524 Dobrenko and Lipovetsky, “The Burden of Freedom,” 5. 
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realm still fulfils a novel function for the detective figure in Russian crime fiction, it 
also signals the failure of Akunin’s original project idea, which was to unite the 
divergent narratives of Empire and Nation under the umbrella of a new intelligentsia 
mission. 
Written on the eve of Putin’s rise to power, The State Counsellor provides an 
intriguing reading of revolutionary and reactionary sentiments in late Imperial and 
post-Soviet Russia alike. In contrast to The Death of Achilles, the novel renders the 
instability of Empire not through an exploration of geopolitical categories, but a 
portrayal of Moscow as a microcosm of (neo-)Imperial rule. The city’s peripherality 
finds its expression in an overarching atmosphere of panoptic paranoia, mistrust, and 
the internal fragmentation of government structures that seemingly transcends history. 
Continuing the trend that was started in The Death of Achilles, Akunin increasingly 
challenges institutionalised narratives of nostalgic remembering, turning towards a 
wider, more all-encompassing political subtext that simultaneously allows for more 
overt parallels between late Imperial and post-Soviet Russia to be drawn.  
As a result, The State Counsellor features a noticeably higher number of easily 
identifiable historical prototypes than previous Fandorin novels, which range from 
marginal roles such as Zubtsov-Zubatov and Grand Duke Simeon-Sergei 
Aleksandrovich Romanov to the largescale fictional insertion of Dmitry-Gleb 
Pozharsky. Through these characters, Akunin engages in a fictionalised interrogation 
of key points about late Imperial Russia that are being used as cornerstones in today’s 
distorted nostalgic remembering of the era. The resulting impression is one of 
disillusionment and a loss of credibility for the officially constructed narratives of 
Imperial grandeur, geopolitical strength and national unity. 
Despite being set in the late Imperial era, much of The State Counsellor reflects 
on contemporary, post-Soviet issues. Akunin contextualises the renewed obstruction 
of the formation of a Nation through the  
resurgence of Russian nationalism by the mid-1990s[, which] allowed anti-western sentiments to 
surface in some mainstream Russian films on historical topics, in which foreigners or Russians 
subject to alien western influences were presented either as capitalist exploiters, political enemies, 
or purveyors of decadent western culture.525  
 
 
525 Marsh, “The Nature of Russia’s Identity,” 561. 
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Instead of catering to this narrative, Akunin relocates all three of these categories back 
onto Russian soil, thus not only actively questioning their myths of origin, but also 
rephrasing their root causes into something homegrown and internal. Marsh’s 
addendum that post-Soviet anti-Western sentiments “have been predominantly anti-
American or anti-Semitic rather than anti-Western in general”526 also finds expression 
in The State Counsellor, as Akunin exposes historically traceable links between the 
‘Jewish Question’ and Imperial misrule. As a result, Russia’s underlying inferiority 
complex towards the West is revealed as a legacy of the Imperial process of self-
colonisation.  
Akunin also offers an important realignment of this Imperial identity narrative by 
reintroducing Asia into the discussion, providing readers with a reading of Empire that 
is rarely found in contemporary Russian literature. This is particularly true for the late 
1990s, when Russian national identity was being discussed, but with an almost 
exclusive focus on the West as Russia’s only constitutive Other. In The State 
Counsellor, stereotypes about Asia as the home of despotism, barbarity and 
backwardness are voiced by characters across the social spectrum and the 
revolutionary divide, thus construing a counternarrative to contemporary, neo-
Eurasianist distortions of Russian sonderweg thinking. Running counter to 
Noordenbos’s description of post-Soviet depictions of Empire “as a shorthand for 
fantasies about the coherence of Russian space and history, and for ideas about Russian 
culture’s fundamental deviations from the liberal traditions of ‘the West’”527, Akunin’s 
fictional Empire instead conveys an atmosphere of deep identitary confusion about 
East and West alike. 
Pozharsky also acts as a minuscule copy of the late-1990s statesman who responds 
with satire and ridicule to the failed democratic experiment. Throughout The State 
Counsellor, Pozharsky’s sonderweg rhetoric, reminiscent of its equivalent post-Soviet 
discourses, boils down to an openly criminal way of life that favours a survival of the 
fittest. The parallels between this attitude and a post-Soviet embrace of the bandit 
rhetoric are sufficiently obvious, particularly in the context of the 1999 terrorist attacks 
and the nationwide resurgence of nationalist tendencies, which marked a shift in 
 
526 Ibid, 567. 
527 Noordenbos, Post-Soviet Literature, 5. 
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Russia’s political climate that continues to affect Russian politics to this day. Akunin 
allegedly even included a comment on Putin’s infamous August 1999 press statement 
about ‘wasting [Chechen insurgents] in the outhouse’ by having Pozharsky describe 
the secret police’s dirty work in the novel as “[ч]истим отхожие места, чтобы 
дерьмо на улицу не хлынуло” (SS 111).528  
While deconstructing the appeal of Empire, Akunin once again also directs an 
equally critical eye to the legacy of Russian culture and literature. However, in contrast 
to The Death of Achilles, the lustre of the literary heroes invoked in The State 
Counsellor has noticeably dimmed. Pozharsky’s heroism, along with his narrative of 
century-old ethnic Russian exceptionalism, is discredited, if not by his deeds, then by 
his death at the end of the novel. Having assumed the role of puppet-master of late 
Imperial history, Pozharsky becomes a victim of his own narrative and is consumed 
by the revolutionary spark he helped set loose. His revolutionary counterparts do not 
fare much differently: built out of various positive hero figures from canonical Russian 
literary works, Grin fails to present a future path for Russia in a similar way Pozharsky 
does. Posited in the role of a late 20th-century update to the literary tradition of the 
bogatyr, Grin acts as a cautionary tale for zealous patriotism and the hollow political 
message it sends. Akunin skilfully creates a situation in which neither the supposed 
glamour of the revolution nor the glory of a lost Empire can be upheld; by doing so, 
he wrests control over the medieval Russian hero image from the nationalist, 
conservative camp, and starts readers on a journey of readerly detection for an 
alternative hero paradigm instead. 
This alternative paradigm is, once again, embodied in the figure of Fandorin. 
Having dissected the tradition of the positive hero in Russian literature through the 
character of Grin, Akunin begins rewriting it in the form of his protagonist. As the 
need for an intellectual figure capable of self-reflection and the moral integrity not to 
blindly follow orders grows, Fandorin is faced with the task of renouncing the Empire 
he so diligently tries to preserve. By consciously placing an intelligentsia member with 
a modern understanding of patriotism in the midst of this Imperial conundrum, Akunin 
playfully explores the notion of a ‘better past’ while laying bare the topicality of the 
neo-Imperial discourse for contemporary Russia.  
 
528 Cf. Mulcahy, “A Not-so-thrilling Thriller,” 327. 
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What if state and intelligentsia had, indeed, found a common ground to collaborate 
on? The posing of this question places Akunin firmly within the post-Soviet nostalgia 
debate and adds his voice to other literary explorations of the theme. Yet the end of 
The State Counsellor reveals Akunin’s doubts about the plausibility of his own hero 
paradigm, arguably indicating a contemporaneous disillusionment with its basic 
premise. By remaining a patriot, Fandorin is forced to adopt a position outwith the 
state. Akunin – committed as he was to the search for a niche that would allow 
protagonists of integrity and moral fibre to prevail in a Russian setting – succumbed 
to the Anglophone dictum of the amateur detective and private protagonist for lack of 
better alternatives, not as part of a prior design.  
Unlike the bourgeois home of the Western detective, which served as a thinly 
veiled symbol for the wholeness of government and state, Akunin’s Imperial Russia is 
not a place of safety or stability. Instead, it augurs Fandorin’s future role as a persona 
non grata and sets off a period of prolonged exile for him – a decision not only 
reminiscent of large swathes of the intelligentsia after 1917, but also oddly prophetic 
in relation to Akunin’s own exile after 2014. Did Akunin, just like his protagonist, 
realise the futility of attempting to work with, rather than against the state? While it 
may be argued that the novel’s message of resignation and disappointment is covert 
enough to leave room for interpretation, a reading of The State Counsellor that does 
not take into account the country’s political changes around 1999 will likely fail to 
provide a believable answer.  
It is for this reason that the 2005 film adaptation of The State Counsellor poses 
such a problem in the discussion of the novel. The most costly and most widely 
advertised cinematic adaptation of any of the Fandorin novels to date, Filip 
Yankovsky’s version of The State Counsellor garnered a considerable amount of 
critical attention and academic interest from among both the Russian literary and film 
critic scene.529 Its dubious fame was in part due to its alternative ending: in 
Yankovsky’s film, Fandorin does not resign from his post, but continues to serve under 
 
529 Previous films, produced by different directors and featuring a different cast each, were Azazel’ in 
2003 and Turetskii Gambit, also in 2005. There were rumours in 2015 that a British channel had 
acquired the film rights for the series, but those rumours seem to have died, cf. Alexandra Guzeva, 
“'Russian Sherlock Holmes’ to Come to British TV Screens,” Russia Beyond, May 05, 2015, 
<http://www.rbth.com/arts/2015/05/05/russian_sherlock_holmes_to_come_to_british_tv_screens_457
35.html> [accessed 17 December 2019] 
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the state – despite his knowledge about the Empire’s all-encompassing corruption. 
Other differences between novel and film include the elision of Grin’s backstory and 
a rebranding of Pozharsky as a fiery patriot.530 In a nod to Putin’s personality cult, 
Pozharsky’s iron fist and strong character also make him the only politician capable of 
dealing competently with the terrorist question, whereas the remaining defenders of 
law and order – Fandorin among them – appear incompetent and weak.531 
Pozharsky’s changed image was also commented upon by Nina Khrushcheva, 
who views Yankovsky’s The State Counsellor as the expression of a Russia “stuck 
[…] in the gray matter of Putinism”532. Mulcahy arrived at a similar conclusion, stating 
that “the film sanctions policies that envision an authoritarian state with the power to 
maintain internal order, silence its enemies and ruthlessly protect Russian interests”533. 
According to Mulcahy, The State Counsellor should be classified as a blockbuster that 
follows in the footsteps of other successful Russian films of the late 1990s and 2000s, 
such as The Barber of Siberia (Сибирский цирюльник, 1999), Night Watch (Ночной 
дозор, 2004) and Day Watch (Дневной дозор, 2006) – all of which aim to “[include] 
a hyperbolically positive image of the country, a manufactured past that is shaped to 
depict present issues, impassioned nationalism employed to stir patriotic sentiment and 
a heavy dose of emotionalism”534. In changing the novel’s ending, Yankovsky’s film 
propagates, in a best-case scenario, a passive, resigned attitude towards newly 
authoritarian politics and, in the worst case, outright support for Putinism.  
How are we to judge Akunin’s acceptance of these changes? Whereas Latysheva 
commented on Akunin’s unwillingness to discuss the film in public, her colleague 
Liubov Arkus successfully interviewed Akunin in 2005.535 In this interview, Akunin 
states that he tried to change Yankovsky’s mind, but that his attempts ultimately 
proved futile. By way of an explanation, Akunin adds that he is “не на сто процентов 
уверен в правильности поступка книжного Фандорина”536, despite feeling 
 
530 Marina Latysheva, “Spetsluzhb Goes to the Movies,” Russian Life 49, no. 6 (2006): 46-51, 48. 
531 Ibid, 49. 
532 Nina Khrushcheva, “Tsar of the Intelligentsia,” Newsweek International 160, no. 17 (2012), 
<http://go.galegroup.com.ezproxy.is.ed.ac.uk/ps/i.do?&id=GALE|A305331019&v=2.1&u=ed_itw&it
=r&p=ITOF&sw=w#> [accessed 17 December 2019] 
533 Mulcahy, “A Not-so-thrilling Thriller,” 311. 
534 Ibid, 318. 
535 Cf. Latysheva, “Spetsluzhb Goes to the Movies,” 49. 
536 Lyubov Arkus, “Podberite sebe Fandorina po vkusu,” Seans № 23/24, <http://seance.ru/n/23-
24/strelyayte-v-pianista-akunin/podberite-sebe-fandorina-po-vkusu/> [accessed 17 December 2019] 
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personally closer to the book ending than the film version’s. He also wondered: 
“можно ли осуждать человека, который жертвует своей integrity (прошу 
прощения, но у нас и слова-то такого нет) ради того, что ему представляется 
общественным благом?”537. Far from agreeing with Yankovsky’s view that it is the 
responsibility of the intelligentsia to sacrifice their moral integrity for the sake of 
‘rescuing’ the state (although it remains unclear whether the state is salvageable at all), 
Akunin does leave room for an open discussion, confronting his readers – and viewers 
– with a storyline that challenges his own alternative historical universe. It is a bold 
move, but it also expresses Akunin’s commitment to the counteracting of binary 
reductions of historical matters in the public cultural discourse – even if they do run 
counter to his authorial intentions. Quite fittingly, Akunin ended his interview with 
Arkus with the statement that “для того и делаю своего героя и ситуации, 
в которых он оказывается, немонохромными, чтобы у читателя была 
возможность что-то домыслить и достроить самому”538. 
Ultimately, Fandorin’s hero potential remains based on this carving out of a new 
position between Empire and Nation, where he reclaims his right to political self-
determinacy and opposes the master narrative prepared for him by the state. Inherent 
in Fandorin’s renouncement of state duty is “Akunin’s transparent hope […] for a post-
Soviet Russia defined not by the corruption of the past, but by principled behavior in 
the present”539. Yet Fandorin’s banishment from Russia and transformation into a 
persona non grata in exile do not so much make him into “‘a true original’ […] [and] 
a ‘moral citizen’ for a new and troubled age”540 as it turns him into a painful historical 
reminder of the limitations of intelligentsia agency. As subsequent instalments of the 
Fandorin series would show, Akunin’s indecisiveness about Fandorin’s – and, by 







539 Platt, “Historical Novel,” 83. 
540 Mulcahy, “A Not-so-thrilling Thriller,” 312. 
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3.3. The Black City (2012) 
[…] от книжки в голова ветер дует. Кто 
книжки много читает, начальство не 
уважает, хочет все другое сделать. 
Рэволюция хочет.541 
 
The Black City is the thirteenth instalment in the Fandorin series and was published in 
late 2012. Akunin wrote the first chapter in 2008, following a call for literary works 
by the French newspaper Le Figaro that prompted authors from around the world to 
compose a story based on the first sentence of Book Fourteen of Homer’s Odyssey. 
Akunin’s contribution was subsequently published in a volume of Russian short stories 
titled Книга, ради которой объединились писатели, объединить которых 
невозможно (2009); a few years later, Akunin used his blog to describe how the 
story’s open ending, which had been meant to tease his readers, returned to haunt him 
instead. Eventually, the short story’s antagonist sparked the idea for another Fandorin 
novel: “Однако чертов Одиссей засел у меня в голове, начал плести хитроумную 
интригу, да еще и Фандорин не на шутку разозлился […] И стал вырисовываться 
роман”542.  
The Black City’s events begin in Yalta in 1914 and unfold in Baku, the capital of 
modern-day Azerbaijan. Fandorin follows the trace of an elusive terrorist by the name 
of Odysseus, who succeeds in assassinating Spiridonov, the head of the Tsar’s security, 
in the latter’s private garden. Fandorin himself becomes the target of several 
assassination attempts from the moment he sets foot in Baku, and ends up embroiling 
himself in the budding oil capital’s parallel societies in order to uncover Odysseus’s 
plan to spark a nationwide revolution. His investigation leads him to accept the help 
of Hasim, a local Azerbaijani crime lord, and brings Fandorin into closer contact with 
the multi-faceted ethnic and religious patchwork society of the Caucasus. It also sets 
him the challenge to face his estranged wife, a theatre actress whom Fandorin married 
at the end of the previous Fandorin novel, All the World is a Stage (Весь мир театр, 
2009).  
 
541 Boris Akunin, Chernyi Gorod (Moscow: Zakharov, 2012), 142. All further quotations will be 
referring to this edition, abbreviated as (CHG). 
542 Boris Akunin, “Baikhua iundun!,” LiveJournal (blog), November 21, 2012, 
<http://borisakunin.livejournal.com/83054.html> [accessed 20 December 2019] 
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Set against the backdrop of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of 
Austria and the looming shadow of the First World War, The Black City is not only a 
political thriller, but also an exploration of questions concerning the survival and 
longevity of Empires at the beginning of the 20th century. The novel ends with 
Fandorin’s success in arresting Odysseus, followed by the order to travel to Vienna 
and act as a mediator between the European Empires – a daring, if characteristic, play 
at alternative history. However, Fandorin never gets to fulfil this task, as he is shot in 
the head by Hasim, who acted as Odysseus’s accomplice and henchman from the start 
and releases the criminal back into the world. 
Akunin’s process of writing The Black City coincided with a period of intense 
political turmoil in Russia. In autumn 2011, Putin announced his intention to run for a 
third presidential candidacy, which sparked a nationwide protest movement that 
culminated in mass demonstrations against the fraudulent elections carried out in 
March 2012. As part of the protest movement, so-called ‘strolls with writers’ 
(‘прогулки с писателями’) were organised in Moscow. Akunin became one of the 
leading faces of this movement, participating on several occasions alongside other 
well-known writers such as Lyudmila Ulitskaya, Dmitri Bykov, and Sergei 
Gandlevski. Once Akunin decided to participate in the protests, he stopped working 
on his book projects, The Black City among them, and relocated from France to Russia 
in December 2011. In response to a user question on his blog in March 2012, Akunin 
stated that his work on the novel had temporarily stalled and that its further plot design 
would likely change in response to the political events of 2012: 
Весь декабрь и почти весь январь я был в творческом оцепенении. […] Фандоринский 
роман я отложил, потому что радикально сменилось настроение. […] скоро буду готов 
продолжить фандоринскую книгу. Только она, видимо, станет несколько иной по цветовой 
гамме.543  
 
Akunin actively used his blog as a platform for political agitation as well as a tool for 
gauging and discussing the political views of his readership during those months. He 
was forced to concede that his previously unseen involvement in political events had 
adverse effects on his public perception as a writer:  
Впервые за свою писательскую карьеру я обзавелся внушительным антирейтингом. 
Если раньше люди относились ко мне либо безразлично, либо одобрительно, 
 
543 Boris Akunin, “Prosnulas’ sovest’,” LiveJournal (blog), March 29, 2012, 
<http://snob.ru/profile/5232/print/47514> [accessed 20 December 2019] The original LJ entry is no 
longer publically accessible.  
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а пропорция недоброжелателей была минимальной, то своей общественной 
активностью я снискал неприязнь, с одной стороны, пламенных путинистов (за 
‘раскачивание лодки’), с другой – пламенных революционеров (за робость 
и соглашательство).544 
 
In October 2011, a lawsuit was filed against Akunin’s publisher Zakharov for 
publishing All the World’s a Stage, in which the author was accused of including 
extremist statements in his novel. True to the unruly nature of his literary persona, 
Akunin quipped “[н]у все, моей преступной деятельности, кажется, наступает 
конец”545. He also did not fail to point out subsequent, rather blatant official attempts 
at covering up the incident.546 
Not surprisingly perhaps, The Black City was met with strongly contrasting 
reactions amid both Western and Russian critics. Whereas Western reviewers 
considered the novel “prime Akunin — ingenious, twisty, at times digressive, 
exotic”547 and “a novel to sharpen the wits [...] the journey is amazing”548, Russian 
voices alternated between sceptical and outright negative, if not to say scathing. 
Historian and literary critic Lev Lur’e called the novel “[o]дин из худших романов 
Акунинa”549, whereas Konstantin Matrosov initially criticised the feeling of déjà vu 
and lack of novelty in the plot construction, only to go on to say that “стиль 
изложения и та виртуозная ловкость, с которой Акунин обращается с сюжетом 
и персонажами, с лихвой искупает тяжеловесность”550.   
Other Russian critics were not quite so easily appeased and voiced their 
displeasure about Akunin’s political involvement through hostile reactions to his 
literary work in toto. Whereas Matrosov did not comment on Akunin’s newly acquired 
status as an opposition figure other than to note that “[y]же не герой, а автор вступил 
 
544 Boris Akunin, “Kto s vami, mastera kul’tury?,” Echo Moskvy (blog), March 22, 2012, 
<http://echo.msk.ru/blog/b_akunin/871074-echo/> [accessed 20 December 2019] 
545 Boris Akunin, “Ekstremizm ne proidet!,” Echo Moskvy (blog), October 27, 2011, 
<http://echo.msk.ru/blog/b_akunin/824595-echo/> [accessed 20 December 2019] 
546 Cf. Boris Akunin, “Eto byl samozvanets! Lovite ego!,” Echo Moskvy (blog), December 23, 2011, 
<http://echo.msk.ru/blog/b_akunin/842084-echo/> [accessed 20 December 2019] 
547 Elizabeth Buchan, “Historical: Black City by Boris Akunin,” Mail Online, November 8, 2018, 
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/home/books/article-6368811/historical.html> [accessed 20 December 
2019] 
548 Marina Vaizey, “Boris Akunin: Black City Review – A Novel to Sharpen the Wits,” 
TheArtsDesk.com, December 16, 2018, <http://theartsdesk.com/books/boris-akunin-black-city-review-
novel-sharpen-wits> [accessed 20 December 2019] 
549 Lev Lur’e, “Novyi roman Borisa Akunina ‘Chernyi gorod’,” DP.ru, February 10, 2013, 
<http://www.dp.ru/a/2013/02/08/Fandorin_v_zhanre_komiksa> [accessed 20 December 2019] 
550 Konstantin Matrosov, “S bol’iu v Baku,” Gazeta.ru, November 22, 2012, 
<http://www.gazeta.ru/culture/2012/11/22/a_4863041.shtml> [accessed 20 December 2019] 
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в период стремительных изменений, добровольно и вполне осознанно стал 
частью нового сюжета”551, Geidar Dzhemal’ surmised: “[т]о ли Григорий 
Шалвович устал от Эраста Петровича, то ли оппозиция вредно влияет”552. 
Pointing out several alleged incongruences in the plot construction, Dzhemal’ takes 
particular issue with Akunin’s representation of Muslim characters in The Black City, 
questioning the author’s integrity because of Akunin’s Georgian roots and finishing 
with the suggestion that “Видимо, […] он […] воспринимает себя в разных амплуа 
[…] -- хомяки и белоленточники!”553. As will be recognisable for Russian readers, 
the term ‘white ribbon-ists’ (‘белоленточники’) is a denigrating neologism aimed at 
the bearers of white ribbons, which were the protest symbol of the 2010/11 public 
strolls. 
The comment section for Dzhemal’s article featured several further denigrating 
comments aimed at Akunin’s person, including a wordplay based on Akunin’s 
Georgian surname and the Russian word for the devil, “чертишвили”554, and a 
description of Akunin’s “омерзительная личина врага России”555. A similar 
statement of questionable political libel was made in 2012 by Putin, in which the 
President linked Akunin’s ethnicity to his anti-Russian sentiments.556 Akunin was well 
aware of these allegations and included a response to them in The Black City, using 
Fandorin’s new habit of keeping a Japanese-style diary to reminisce about the 
weaknesses of the Russian national character: “Где еще такое напишешь? Только в 
собственном Никки, где […] никто не прочтет. Не то прослывешь русофобом, и 
все истинно русские люди оскорбятся, отвернутся, да еще скажут, что такую 
гадость мог написать лишь человек с нерусской фамилией ‘Фандорин’” (CHG 
296). By making the recommendably private explicitly public, Akunin subverted the 
 
551 Ibid. 
552 Geidar Dzhemal’, “BAKUnin.az. Reaktsiia na ‘Chernyi gorod’ B. Akunina,” Odnako.org, December 
24, 2012, <http://www.odnako.org/blogs/bakuninaz-reakciya-na-chyorniy-gorod-b-akunina/> 
[accessed 20 December 2019] 
553 Ibid. 
554 Z.H.L.O.B., comment on “BAKUnin.az. Reaktsiia na ‘Chernyi gorod’ B. Akunina,” Odnako.org, 
December 24, 2012, 2:44 p.m., <http://www.odnako.org/blogs/bakuninaz-reakciya-na-chyorniy-gorod-
b-akunina/comments/> [accessed 20 December 2019] 
555 uliss, comment on “BAKUnin.az. Reaktsiia na ‘Chernyi gorod’ B. Akunina,” Odnako.org, December 
24, 2012, 11:50 p.m., <http://www.odnako.org/blogs/bakuninaz-reakciya-na-chyorniy-gorod-b-
akunina/comments/> [accessed 20 December 2019] 
556 Cf. “Putin na vstreche so SMI govorit o natsional'nosti Akunina, upotrebliaet slova ‘ponos’, ‘bydlo’,” 
Gazeta.ru, January 18, 2012, <http://www.gazeta.ru/news/lenta/2012/01/18/n_2170829.shtml> 
[accessed 20 December 2019] 
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notion of self-censorship and lent a deliberate overtness to his literary contribution to 
Russia’s soul-searching mission. 
Baku is a telling choice of setting for The Black City from precisely this point of 
view of artistic license and censorship. Unlike other cities in the Empire, Baku and its 
newspapers “reported on political assassinations and revolution in neighboring Iran 
and Turkey, pogroms in Russia, and strikes and riots in Baku”557 – in short, all the 
undesirable proof of Imperial instability that was usually carefully kept out of public 
sight. Akunin capitalised on this in The Black City by peppering various of the novel’s 
chapters with authentic newspaper clippings from pre-revolutionary Baku, including: 
- К забастовке присоединились Балаханы! 
- На двести двадцать пятой забил фонтан! 
- В Мардакянах кровник застрелил Гаджи-Раджаба-Зарбали-оглы! 
- В Сараеве убит наследник австрийского престола! (CHG 48) 
 
Photographs of the original newspaper articles can be accessed in the interactive eBook 
edition of The Black City, encouraging an active comparison of these historical source 
texts and their representation in Akunin’s work.558 They also invite a reflection on the 
historical power of the written word in disempowering state censorship and 
normalising citizens’ access to free media coverage. Akunin’s inclusion of Baku’s 
liberal media landscape in his novel not only points out the media’s role as a separate 
form of political protest, but also highlights the Fandorin project’s subversive return 
of historical fact to mainstream culture through the anti-nostalgic use of popular 
fiction. 
 
Figure 4 Original Newspaper Captions 
(Boris Akunin, “Baikhua iundun!”) 
 
557 Audrey Altstadt-Mirhadi, “Baku: Transformation of a Muslim Town,” in The City in Late Imperial 
Russia, ed. Michael F. Hamm (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1986), 283-319, 303. 
558 Cf. Boris Akunin, “Baikhua iundun!”. For the first time in the series, Akunin also used the help of a 
historical consultant, who is mentioned on the page containing general editorial information. 
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As in previous discussions, my following analysis will begin with a focus on Akunin’s 
response to precisely this nostalgic portrayal of Empire in post-Soviet discourse. As 
The Black City is the only novel in the series that is set in the Russian Empire, but does 
not feature any scenes in either Saint Petersburg or Moscow, Akunin’s discussion of 
the actual borderlands of Empire invites a closer analysis. How did the changed locale 
of the Caucasus impact Akunin’s portrayal of Russia’s process of self-colonisation, 
and what are the differences between the ‘internal Orient’ previously portrayed in The 
Death of Achilles and The State Counsellor and the ‘lived Orient’ of The Black City’s 
protagonists? Fandorin’s journey to the Imperial borderlands acquires an important 
psychological function within this contrast, as it allows him and the other Russian 
characters in the novel to posit themselves against the more visibly Other of the 
periphery. I will correspondingly analyse how Akunin incorporates the Empire’s 
failure to integrate its peripheries into his portrayal of Imperial identity and governance 
– asking, along the way, which role Baku’s oil boom played in the portrayal of political 
parallels between Imperial and post-Soviet Russia. 
The second part of this chapter will offer a continuation of my previous discussion 
points for the narrative thread of writing Nation, i.e. the national hero theme and the 
rediscovery of Russia’s cultural heritage through literary source texts. Linking back to 
Fandorin’s own conflicted position as an Imperial subject and intelligentsia detective, 
Akunin explores two literary leitmotifs in the development of his national hero 
paradigm in The Black City: Chekhoviana and Dostoevskiana. Both intertextual 
strands will be discussed in corresponding detail in my analysis. How does Fandorin’s 
turn away from his original intelligentsia hero position move him closer to a 
Chekhovian ideal, and in which ways does Odysseus fulfil the traditional role of 
Fandorin’s double by becoming a Dostoevskian mouthpiece? The discussion will be 
rounded off by a look at the national characteristics that Akunin links to these two 
pillars of Russian cultural heritage, along with the respective successes and failures he 
sees within their corresponding national hero narratives. Lastly, I will interpret these 
findings with a view to Akunin’s final message for the post-Soviet intelligentsia and 




3.3.1. Re-Writing Empire: Elephant on Edge 
In The Black City, Akunin’s process of re-writing Empire is heavily influenced by the 
locale he chose for the novel. Just like Simon – an old acquaintance of Fandorin’s, 
who now acts as a director on the film set that lured Fandorin’s wife to Baku – Akunin 
capitalises on the mythical image of the ‘real East’ in his search for a gripping sujet 
and authentic setting: “Я собрал деньги, чтобы снимать ориэнтальную фильму в 
натуральном милье – не в павильоне и не в Крыму, а на самом настоящем 
Востоке” (CHG 59-60). Simon is joined in this endeavour by Fandorin, whose desire 
to perceive Baku as an exotic Other guides his detective work from the very opening 
pages of the novel – turning his view of the city and the Caucasus into an overt source 
of both reader entertainment and self-scrutiny. 
Throughout The Black City, Fandorin’s engagement with cliched notions about 
the East is paired with a much less romanticizable reality.559 Thus, when the detective 
travels from the train station to his hotel, the ‘New Europe’, he finds little to set the 
local boulevard apart from its European and Russian counterparts:560  
Фаэтон подпрыгивал по булыжнику идеально прямого, совершенно европейского 
проспекта.  [...] Будто на Петровке или Неглинной. Публика тоже малоинтересная – как в 
центральном части Тифлиса. То есть попадались прохожие в восточном наряде, но они 
составляли незначительное меньшинство. (CHG 50) 
 
Even the name of Fandorin’s chosen hotel contradicts his paradoxical quest to 
experience the Other. Yet he goes on to compare his disappointment in the insufficient 
exoticism of his surroundings with his memories of Japan, where he encountered a 
similar feeling of disenchantment – creating an analogy that places Baku in a distinctly 
Asian framework of reception: 
 
559 This is not the first time Fandorin uses an Orientalist gaze in the series. In The Death of Achilles, he 
describes Wanda, a German national, with the words: “В этом ракурсе она выглядела 
соблазнительно беззащитной, словно восточная рабыня у ног падишаха” (SMA 52). Instead of 
viewing her as the German national citizen that he knows she is, Fandorin feels the need to apply an 
orientalist attribute to the demimondaine in order to be able to mentally place her in a victim’s role, as 
if her Westernness automatically precluded her from being disadvantaged or helpless in his books. The 
male gaze overriding her individuality in this scene is placed in an Asian context, but the only thing it 
purveys is the Western construction of this alleged Asianness – a circumstance all the more disturbing 
as Fandorin is generally described as enjoying the company of strong-willed, independent women, of 
which there is no shortage in the Fandorin series. 
560 Just like in The Death of Achilles, Akunin references a real hotel here. The ‘Yeni Avropa’ or ‘New 
Europe’ hotel in Baku was built in 1913 and housed, among others, the poet Sergei Esenin and future 
Azerbaijani President Geidar Aliev. At the time of writing, it is the seat of the Baku branch of Russian 
oil company Lukoil. 
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Фандорин почувствовал некоторое разочарование, как в свое время от знакомства с 
Иокогамой, в облике которой оказалось так мало экзотики. Бесцеремонный паук-Запад все 
больше оплетает своей серой паутиной планету. (CHG 51) 
 
Fandorin explains his mounting disappointment by criticising the uniformity that 
follows European influences across the world, referencing architecture, clothing and 
language as examples. This is an interesting statement to make, both from a historical 
and a contemporary point of view: whereas Fandorin perceives Europe as the synonym 
for an equalising, threadbare influence that extinguishes local specifics – not realising 
or not stopping to realise that the colonial influence of the Russian Empire has the 
same eradicating effect on the Caucasus – the contemporary Russian reader is 
accustomed to portrayals of Europe as the seat of diversity, multi-ethnicity and a quasi-
threatening tolerance for otherness. Yet although the image of Europe has changed, 
what remains is the same existential angst expressed in Fandorin’s thoughts: “ведь 
восточный город, принадлежащий русскому престолу, а улица будто в Ницце, 
половина вывесок – на французском и немецком” (CHG 52).  
Fandorin’s fears mirror not only those of a post-perestroika audience, but they are 
equally emblematic of the insecurities of his Imperial compatriots,  who – unlike in 
The State Counsellor, where the characters struggled to identify with the East for its 
links with despotism and barbarity – are discomfited because Baku does not provide 
the desired level of otherness that they hoped to see. Europe itself is not the actual 
culprit in either scenario. Instead, it is Russia’s distorted and shaky self-image that 
causes its gaze to wander ever outward in search for reliable markers of self-definition. 
Fandorin starts to perceive the clash between his search for authenticity and the 
colonial filter he imposes onto Baku during his discovery of the city:  
Ведь это Российская империя, это двадцатый век, а словно дургой мир и другая эпоха. 
Возможно ли, чтобы Кузнецкий Мост и эта сказка Шахерезады существовали в пределах 
одного государства? И сам усмехнулся: что брать Кузнецкий Мост? Европа находилась 
гораздо ближе, в двухстах метрах отсюда – и ничего, как-то все это уживается вместе. (CHG 
72) 
 
Fandorin’s identification of the Kusnetsky Bridge with Europe reveals Russia’s 
underlying irresolution about its place between East and West, but it also highlights 
the general futility of trying to define a Russian identity along arbitrary benchmarks of 
geopolitical boundaries. As the conceptually blurry borders between a European and a 
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Russian identity begin to overlap, they also cease to pose an existential threat (‘как-то 
все это уживается вместе’).  
As Baku’s otherness is not sufficiently fixated in its appearance, it is verbally 
inscribed onto the city by its inhabitants instead. Fandorin uses the phrase “Дикой 
Запад […] Wild East” (CHG 40) in his diary, expressing his need to render the 
epistemological mystery of the Russian Imperial identity intelligible in a transfer of 
alphabets. By doing so, Fandorin also plays on a succinct historical parallel – one in 
which “Westernized Baku […] held for contemporaries the same romance as did the 
American frontier for the eastern tenderfoot – and the same dangers”561. The use of 
Cyrillic indicates a closer kinship of Russia with the ‘Wild’ West than with its equally 
‘wild’ Eastern counterpart; however, the phrase is also used by Saadat, a Muslim 
woman and oil entrepreneur, who argues: “East is East. Тут из любой ерунды 
устраивают тайны. Может, в этом и заключается главное очарование Востока” 
(CHG 180).  
Saadat’s own use of the Latinised phrase reveals a simultaneous othering process 
that occurs from within the local population – an impression heightened by the fact 
that only a few moments earlier, she had initially stated that it is “[с]мешно, как 
действует на европейцев ориентальный колорит в сочетании с ароматом тайны. 
Они прямо цепенеют” (CHG 178). As a result, the use of opposite alphabets 
ultimately only serves to collapse the border between East and West. As the one side 
creates and the other side manipulates the imported narrative of the ‘mysterious East’, 
its supposed mysteriousness becomes nothing but a tool in the fight over control and 
power on both sides of the colonial divide.562 
A more apparent marker of Baku’s externally inscribed otherness is the phrase 
‘это Баку’, which is intoned with almost religious predictability by all of the novel’s 
Russian characters. The inflationary use of this expression in The Black City is imbued 
with a clear othering function that reveals its own constructedness: 
 
561 Altstadt-Mirhadi, “Baku,” 284. 
562 Saadat and Fandorin are juxtaposed in a similar way in their perception of each other. Whereas 
Fandorin thinks that “госпожа Валидбекова превратилась в Царевну-Лебедь с известного полотна 
Врубеля” (CHG 219), Saadat considers the Russian detective as “похож на принца Гоштаспа из 
‘Шахнаме’” (CHG 284) – a comparison that serves to show that each character views the other through 
the cultural paradigms of their source culture, while ultimately expressing the same thought. Moreover, 
the connection wrought through the two comparable narratives proves art’s capacity to transgress 
cultural borders and to highlight the interchangeable charm inherent to other cultures. 
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Все-таки поразительная наглoсть! Шайка бандитов живет, можно сказать, на виду у всего 
города и ничего не боится! Значит, абсолютно уверены в безнаказанности. Как тут говорят: 
‘Это Баку...’ (CHG 156) 
 
‘This is Baku’ serves as an obvious shorthand for the many illegalities committed in 
the city’s day-to-day life, which are being exoticized in order to make them appear un-
Russian and usable. Yet the more frequently the phrase is invoked as an explanation 
for Baku’s love affair with illegality, the more impatient Fandorin grows with it – 
mirroring the reader’s simultaneous exasperation with the notion: 
[…] у меня нет ни одного сотрудника, в ком я был бы стопроцентно уверен. У каждого 
бакинского полицейского имеется какой-нибудь маленький гешефт. Боюсь, не вышло 
бы утечки. Один черт разберет, кто где прикармливается. – Он развел руками. – Чего вы 
хотите? Это Баку. 
- Да-да, - кивнул Фандорин ... – Я знаю. (CHG 205) 
 
Incidentally, almost all of the utterances of ‘this is Baku’ are made by Shubin, a corrupt 
government official who wields considerable power in the city and who is described 
as a cunning strategist. Shubin expresses a laissez-faire attitude about tackling the local 
corruption problem by jokingly telling his aptly named subordinate Altynov to defer 
plans for eradicating bribery for yet another month (indicating that this will likely grow 
into an interminable process of procrastination – a case of Chekhovian irresolution 
turned on its head).563 Thereafter, Shubin is twice portrayed to engage in manipulated 
roulette games at the local casino and freely admits to taking bribes both times he is 
confronted about it by Fandorin: “я знаю, что в казино мне везет только по средам. 
Только у этого стола. И в пределах определенной суммы. Это Баку” (CHG 265, 
cf. 106).  
Shubin is also one of the characters in The Black City who fails to acknowledge 
his own otherness within the specific context of the Caucasus. Propagating a view of 
Baku as a place of softness, warmth and welcome that starkly opposes the supposedly 
law-abiding, rigid and soulless West, he instead carries a distinct similarity to 
Goncharov’s literary hero Oblomov – all that is lacking is that Shubin should put on a 
khalat and lounge on his divan, contemplating whether or not to put on his slippers: 
На Востоке все расслабленное, благодушное, жирное – даже противузаконная 
деятельность. Потому что законы здесь – категория условная. У нас на Руси закон все-таки 
вроде дышла: хоть и поворачивается, куда вышло, но как-никак прямой и твердый. На 
Востоке закон вроде вьюнка – обвивает всякую крепкую палку и ластиться к ней. […] С тех 
пор как я научился правильно пользоваться Востоком, моя жизнь сделалась сытна, приятна, 
 
563 The altyn is a historical Russian currency formerly used by Tatars. 
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нехлопотна. […] Но наш начальник жандармского управления – человек европейский, 
квадратно-треугольный. (CHG 104)564 
 
In this quote, Shubin frames Europe as a harsh and unforgiving frontier whose natural 
opposite is the East and whose emblem is Baku, with its pliancy of the local law and 
its sedate attitude towards vigilante justice. Shubin’s use of the historical and 
emotionally charged term Rus’ creates the impression of a temporal and spatial split 
of Imperial core and periphery: the historical Rus’ appears as the geographical 
heartland of Empire, but fails to fulfil the function of ideological homeland because of 
its progressing Europeanisation. In its place, Baku emerges as the peripheral Eastern 
locale for Mother Russia’s mythological future.565 
Shubin is not the only Russian official in the novel to utilise the methods of 
orientalist myth-making. Pestrukhin, the head of a gendarmerie division, offers an 
outright colonial narrative of life in Baku – succumbing to stereotypes of the opposite 
kind to Shubin’s:  
[…] в этих изобильных и темных джунглях водится множество зубастых хищников, рвущих 
друг у друга добычу. Нефтяные бароны грызутся между собой из-за барышей; тюрки и 
армяне враждуют; очень развит обычай кровной мести; повсюду шныряют иностранные 
агенты; революционеры всех оттенков занимаются экспроприациями и вымогательством, а 
кроме того, город кишит обыкновенными уголовниками. (CHG 40)566 
 
Pestrukhin not only transfers the ‘Imperial jungle’ back onto its traditional locale in 
the Empire’s borderlands, but also dehumanises Baku’s entire population in the 
process, highlighting the manifold divisions that exist within its society. For a post-
 
564 Saadat’s plans for her son Tural’s future provide a counter-argument to Shubin’s view of the East as 
soft, relaxed and malleable: having employed an Austrian tutor for Tural, she envisions that he will be 
taught gymnastics, German, good manners and “самой важной науке: быть мучжиной” (CHG 175). 
In this case, neither the image of the barbaric nor of the exotic East uphold. Overall, Saadat is the 
character who pays the least attention to national stereotypes and alleged national characteristics; this 
is not only mirrored in her desire to emigrate to Nice, but also in her parting appeal to Fandorin to ignore 
all of these pointless differences and focus on their emotional bond instead.  
565 As noted by Clowes, a similar impression arises in the work of Lyudmila Ulitskaya, who tends to 
locate “authenticity […] with the older cultures of the peripheral area, and much less so with the center” 
(cf. Clowes, Russia on the Edge, 137). 
566 Incidentally, Fandorin is described as having missed the Governor General of the Caucasus 
Viceroyalty, Count Vorontsov-Dashkov, for this particular audience; his name is only mentioned in 
passing, but Fandorin would likely have received a highly contrasting narrative from this individual, 
whose liberal tendencies are well recorded (cf. Altstadt-Mirhadi, “Baku,” 300f.) and who “showed a 
proclivity for tolerant nationalities policies” (Stephen Badalyan Riegg, “Neotraditionalist Rule to the 
Rescue of the Empire? Viceroy I. Vorontsov-Dashkov amid Crises in the Caucasus, 1905–1915,” Ab 
Imperio 2018, no. 3 (2018): 115-39, 123). It seems only fitting that Akunin felt the need to relegate the 
Count – an example for a workable version of Imperial rule in the Caucasus, whose attempts failed to 
create a lasting legacy – to the sidelines of the official historical narrative. 
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Soviet reader, the mention of ‘foreign agents’ (‘иностранные агенты’) is particularly 
evocative, as it recalls the Foreign Agent Law that was signed by Putin in the summer 
of 2012. Requiring non-profit organisations to register as ‘foreign agents’ should they 
engage in political activities whilst receiving funding from abroad, the law has affected 
a number of NGOs working to create a civil society in Russia, Memorial and Golos 
among them, and has been criticised as a human rights violation both from within 
Russia and from abroad. The law officially commenced on the same date as The Black 
City was published. 
Ultimately, all of the moral and legal transgressions committed under the auspice 
of ‘this is Baku’ in The Black City have one thing in common: their perpetrators are 
ethnic Russian characters. As a result, the phrase becomes less of a descriptor of 
otherness and more of an expression of Russia’s process of self-colonisation. Having 
exoticized criminality in an attempt to justify it, the Russian ruling elite reclaims it for 
itself – thus turning its members into a separate periphery and failing to escape the 
original othering process that was at work in the Imperial heartland. As Akunin renders 
this process visible in the specific locale of Baku, he also establishes a connection to 
Russia’s literary legacy of the early 19th century, when writers such as Lermontov and 
Pushkin “converted the Caucasian tribes into gratifying meanings about their own 
undeniable cultural and intellectual retardation vis-a-vis the West”567. Akunin reveals 
Russia’s authorship of this particular narrative whilst drawing attention to the desires 
and insecurities that informed it – exposing, along the way, the historical longevity of 
the problems surrounding Russia’s national identity formation. 
 
Megalomania and misrule 
Akunin continues his discussion of Russia’s problematic self-positioning between East 
and West through a focus on the imperfect Imperial system of rule in the Caucasus. 
The beneficial impact of Russia’s reign on both heartland and periphery is routinely 
questioned in The Black City, made symptomatically obvious in the status of Russian 
as a language of crime and corruption, rather than that of a linguistic bridge of stable 
 
567 Susan Layton, Russian Literature and Empire: Conquest of the Caucasus from Pushkin to Tolstoy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1995), 288. 
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governance and peace: “[и] армяне, и мусульмане, и кто угодно […] часто берут в 
посредники русских – чтоб не наводить на след” (CHG 183).  
Shubin takes a central role in this portrayal, as it soon becomes clear that despite 
his claims to the contrary, he has by no means learnt how to control the Empire’s 
periphery. What Shubin frames as positive lawlessness for the higher-ups conversely 
translates into an abject lack of rights for the local people, which Akunin highlights by 
repeatedly referring to the complete and utter distrust that the locals harbour towards 
the Russian police. Reminiscent of the breakdown of the social contract in The State 
Counsellor, Baku’s citizens perceive Russian rule as an arbitrary and foreign system 
of oppression that they cannot rely on. Hasim strictly refuses to collaborate with the 
police while helping Fandorin, advising the detective not to even try to seek official 
help in the persecution of his would-be assassins because “[п]олиция не дурак 
бесплатно Хачатур ловит” (CHG 149). For Saadat, “[ж]аловаться в русскую 
полицию еще худший срам, чем решать тяжбу в русском суде […] эта полиция 
только и умеет, чтоб брать бакшиш” (CHG 185). Leon, a Bakinian actor who starts 
an affair with Fandorin’s wife, responds with confusion – rather than outrage – to the 
detective’s suggestion of involving the police following her abduction: “Помилуйте, 
я бакинец! Какая полиция? И что она может?” (CHG 290).  
Fandorin’s own investigations are hindered by the inefficacy and incompetence 
of the police from the start of The Black City. The detective’s physical distance to his 
superiors impedes a successful communication even more than usual, leading Fandorin 
to distrust everyone around him: “в наличии одни подозрения” (CHG 256). Just as 
the Empire appears to be following a ‘divide-and-conquer’-strategy in the Caucasus, 
its own institutions of power are once again warring between one another, continuing 
to secure the absolute power of the Tsar as a result of their internal quibbles: “первые, 
самые драгоценные часы ушли на унизительные и бесполезные объяснения с 
дворцовой полицией, Охранным отделением, жандармами, придворным 
ведомством и прочими инстанциями” (CHG 17). As the events of The Black City 
draw to a close, Fandorin adopts the locals’ attitude, conceding the uselessness of 
Russian law enforcement as a system of structure and order: “Звать на помощь 
полицейских Фандорину и в голову не пришло” (CHG 336).  
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The Russian failure to successfully police Baku is indicative of a wider failure to 
govern the Caucasus as a whole. Akunin skilfully weaves hints as to the longevity of 
this problem into his narrative, the most evocative of which is Hasim’s answer to 
Fandorin’s question about the source of hatred between Armenians and Azerbaijanis. 
Hasim’s outspoken dislike of Armenians is a source of constant consternation for 
Fandorin, who nonetheless does not intervene when Hasim rewards a young boy for 
his help in guiding Fandorin to a secret meeting place by promising: “можно слушать, 
как мы будем армяне убивать. Смотреть нельзя, слушать можно. Такой награда” 
(CHG 156). Hasim describes the ethnic tensions in Baku as an age-old problem, yet 
links the latest outbreak of violence to the failures of Governor Nakashidze, the 
Imperial Governor of Baku. In Hasim’s report, Nakashidze instigated violence 
between Armenians and Azerbaijanis by letting his anti-Armenian resentments dictate 
his style of governance:  
Накашидзе-губернатор вместе с Охранка захотел армяне напугать. Чтобы забыли 
рэволюция. Охранка сказала глупые и жадные люди (у нас такие тоже есть): можно армяне 
немножко грабить и резать. Когда начальство разрешает резать, это легко. Стали резать, 
грабить. ‘Немножко’ не получилось, потому что немножко резать никогда не получается. 
Начальство говорит: хватит, а люди еще хотят. Тогда солдаты стрелять стали. А на Кавказ 
стрелять начнешь – стрельба нескоро кончится. […] Все, теперь сто лет стрелять будем. Это 
Кавказ. Мы не любим армяне, армяне не любят нас, все вместе не любим русские. Раньше 
в Баку все рядом жили. (CHG 142)  
 
Nakashidze is portrayed as having engaged in a misguided attempt at securing and 
bolstering his own role as a would-be mediator between the ethnic factions – an 
underestimation of the tense situation in the city that eventually cost him his life.  
From a historical point of view, the situation was – needless to say – slightly more 
complex than just an “[o]бычная история на тему ‘разделяй и властвуй’” (CHG 
142). Akunin’s Nakashidze is closely modelled after the historical prototype of 
Mikhail Nakashidze, whose surname Akunin did not even attempt to alter. The 
catastrophic effects of Nakashidze’s rule in Baku are moderately well documented: 
Stefan Wiese’s analysis of the events of February 1905, for instance, portrays 
Nakashidze as a newcomer to the region who was paralysed by events and pushed into 
passivity by his own incompetence. Wiese’s article attributes the failure to nip the 
interethnic violence in the bud not just to the (lack of) interference on the part of the 
Imperial government, but also to the unreliability of the local police apparatus and its 
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loyalty to different criminal gangs in the city.568 Nevertheless, Wiese also confirms 
that anti-Armenian moods were widespread among the local administration, 
corroborating the fact that Imperial rule consolidated a Russian enemy image among 
the Armenian community.569 Wiese also backs up the idea that there were ethnically 
mixed districts in Baku prior to 1904/5.570 The fact that Hasim purports a less forgiving 
view of this chain of events is a result of his ethnic affiliation, yet the end result is the 
same: the central cause for the Caucasus’s prolonged instability is attributed to the 
incompetence of Russian Imperial governance in the region.  
In the character of Shubin, Akunin places a successor to Nakashidze’s system of 
rule in the midst of his own novel. Much like Nakashidze, Shubin believes that he can 
control the spark of violence he is in the process of igniting; rather than quench the 
flames of ethnic strife in the city, Shubin fans it: “[с]амый влиятельный из местных 
начальников, фактически хозяин города, которому полагалось бы охранять 
порядок, делает нечто противоположное: разжигает пламя” (CHG 253). In 
behaving this way, Shubin lives up to Etkind’s verdict that the “re-enchantment of the 
world by the enlightened colonizers for the sake of ‘the idea’ ignites violence and is 
impossible without it”571. However, just like Nakashidze, Shubin is destined to fail in 
his endeavours, and does indeed get killed at the end of the novel. Shubin’s 
megalomaniacal designs for his professional future are reminiscent of Pozharsky’s in 
The State Counsellor, as he, too, pursues a political path that ultimately only serves to 
bolster his personal station, not stabilise the Empire he serves: “Я давно уже доклад 
заготовил на высочайшее имя: как делать бурное Закавказье тихим и спокойным. 
[…] когда я родину спасу, верну империи нефть […] Истинным хозяином 
Кавказа стану я!” (CHG 268).  
In a complementary view to the issue of Imperial misgovernance, Akunin also 
focusses on the consolidation of the late Imperial opposition movement as an 
embodiment of the breakdown of the regnant social contract. As Fandorin records his 
impressions of Baku in his diary, he notes that his knowledge about the city “день ото 
 
568 Cf. Stefan Wiese, “Lalaevs Haus Brennt. Das Februarpogrom Von 1905 in Baku – Paralysierter Staat 
Und Massengewalt Im Russischen Reich,” Journal of Modern European History 10, no. 1 (2012): 117-
38, 133-5. 
569 Ibid, 119-35. 
570 Ibid, 136. 
571 Etkind, Internal Colonization, 216. 
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дня обогащался сведениями о бакинских революционных организациях: 
большевиках, меньшевиках, анархистах, эсерах, мусаватистах, дашнаках, 
панисламистах” (CHG 189-90). Odysseus’s success in creating a united 
revolutionary front that crosses both ethno-religious and class lines – securing the 
cooperation of Georgian railway workers, social democrats, Mensheviks, social 
revolutionaries and the Caspian flotilla – is contextualised in the Empire’s concomitant 
failure to provide the people with an integrative identity narrative of its own. Baku’s 
particular potential as a hotbed for political activity is rendered as the result of this 
heightened conflict potential between a colonised people, a corrupt police force, and 
an ineffectual leadership:  
Идеальный плацдарм – не Тифлис, а Баку […] тут неисчерпаемый источник 
революционных кадров: горячие тюрки, пламенные армяне, боевитый пролетариат. Плюс 
немаловажный фактор – раскормленная, покладистая полиция. (CHG 85) 
 
Odysseus also refers to the sluggish, inept Imperial machine of the Russian Empire as 
an ‘Elephant’, i.e. a colossus of cumbersome heaviness – representative of a system of 
rule that can be hunted and brought down. 
Throughout The Black City, the disintegration of this Imperial ‘Elephant’ is shown 
to be far more advanced than its official representatives suppose. General Lombadze, 
a high-ranking Tsarist official, professes an astounding amount of naïveté when it 
comes to the allegiances of the people, made apparent in his refusal to refer to the agent 
provocateur Afina as such; instead, he calls her “[д]остойнейшая дама, которая 
сотрудничает с нами из патриотизма” (CHG 7). In freely combining the terms 
Bolshevist, patriot and collaborator, Lombadze proves his inability to realistically 
assess the current situation, which is a discrepancy made even more surprising given 
his high rank within the Imperial surveillance state. On the very opening pages of The 
Black City, Lombadze proudly proclaims: “Ага! Мне докладывают обо всех 
приезжих!” (CHG 6). However, the Empire’s failure to inspire loyalty and integrity 
among its servants also means that the unshackled liberty to (mis)use information in 
the pursuit of individual gain spawns an endless cycle of corruption, turning the tools 
of surveillance into yet another source of instability instead.  
In contrast, Odysseus commands an effective and loyal informer network that 
spans from the periphery all the way to the capital of the Empire: “Между Питером 
и Баку летали шифрограммы. А я их читал. Есть у меня на спецтелеграфе 
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человечек...” (CHG 340). Odysseus also leaves a note at the site of Spiridonov’s 
murder that is signed with his official codename; as Fandorin correctly deduces, this 
suggests a contact “внутри какого-то из розыскных ведомств” (CHG 18), i.e. the 
higher government circles. Although the identity of Odysseus’s informer is never 
revealed in The Black City, other members of the state machinery are shown to harbour 
similar views to those of the revolutionaries – Pestrukhin, for instance. A captain by 
rank, he says: “Законность, откровенно говоря, и повсюуду-то у нас в России 
плохо соблюдаемая, в Баку отсутствует вовсе […] бравируя либерализмом, что 
у жандармских офицеров почиталось особенным шиком” (CHG 40). The apparent 
spread of liberalism as an en-vogue attitude among higher-ups on the table of ranks is 
a notable change from previous Fandorin novels and indicates the shaky legs upon 
which the Imperial Elephant totters.  
Another feature of the Imperial surveillance state that Akunin addresses is the 
existence of a far-reaching prison network. As a microcosm of panoptic despotism, the 
Empire’s complex penitentiary system wields unifying powers that are praised by 
Odysseus, who states: “ваш коронованный остолоп нам даром не нужен. Он наш 
главный союзник в борьбе с царизмом” (CHG 14). Incidentally, the panoptic 
surveillance structure of prisons also lies at the heart of Odysseus’s and Hasim’s 
partnership: as Hasim’s radicalisation occurred under Odysseus’s tutelage in prison, it 
not only points towards the self-made problems of Empire, but also towards the overall 
revolutionary success in recruiting a wide diversity of followers: “в тюрьма меня 
посадили не армяне – русские. В тюрьма армяне тоже были, много, но драка не 
было, и ругань не было. В тюрьма один враг – начальство” (CHG 143). Hasim’s 
memory of his time in prison reads like a thinly veiled metaphor for life in the Russian 
Empire as a whole.  
Lastly, there is a third reason for the instability of Imperial rule in the Caucasus. 
Not only have dissatisfaction with the system eroded the last traces of loyalty and a 
lack of moral guidance made collaboration with the criminal fringes of society more 
attractive than the pursuit of a non-violent change of power, but Russia’s presence in 
Baku for the economic exploitation of its oil resources likewise led to a destabilisation 
of Imperial rule in The Black City. As summarised by Etkind, most of Russia’s 
colonisation expeditions were driven by economic enterprises such as the fur trade and 
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the oil industry. As the upkeep and security of these new markets grew in importance 
for the Empire, the provision of liberty to the people proportionally decreased. Etkind 
characterises the resulting situation as “a double monopoly that could be best 
compared to a Mobius [sic] strip”572 – imbuing this latter symbol with an additional 
meaning to those previously provided in the Fandorin project. Since the Empire’s 
wealth had to be protected at all cost, the colonial attitudes that accompanied the 
conquest of various peripheries helped to implement more restrictive policies based on 
artificial othering narratives. 
 
Fuelling the Revolution 
In The Black City, Akunin provides a multi-focal portrayal of Baku’s oil industry, aptly 
capturing its complexity within Russia’s narrative of Empire. On the one hand, the 
Empire’s fears of foreign interference in Russian dominance over Baku’s oil reserves 
are given centre stage – coming to a tragic climax when Fandorin overreacts and kills 
an Austrian secret agent, thinking he has uncovered an international conspiracy to cut 
off Russia from its oil supplies to spark a regime change (cf. CHG 303f.). The fact that 
Baku’s oil fields were a highly contested locale on the international stage at the 
beginning of the 20th century is a well-researched piece of historical information, 
bolstered by the presence of a number of key historical players such as “молодой 
Роберт Нобель, брат владельца петербургского оружейного завода” (CHG 33), 
Rudolph Diesel (CHG 199) and Baron Rothschild (CHG 177). Shubin’s words 
summarise the martial character of Baku’s oil industry, as he links the entire oil world 
to the sphere of warfare and conflict: “в мире нефти война не прекращается 
никогда. Самая настоящая – с диверсиями, саботажем, убийствами” (CHG 198).  
On the other hand, Akunin’s portrayal of the budding oil business in early 20th-
century Baku not only reveals fears about foreign interference in the trade, but also 
focusses on anxieties related to Empire’s inability to control its self-created internal 
Others – along with the way they may impede Russia’s survival as an Empire. 
Akunin’s description of Baku’s oil industry renders a fairly accurate picture of its 
complex ethno-religious composition of workforce; as Jonathan Sicotte’s analysis of 
survey results from 1909 indicates, “Baku, just before the First World War, had 
 
572 Etkind, Internal Colonization, 73.  
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absorbed […] a reliable and diverse source of low-cost labour from across both the 
region and the Russian Empire”573. At the same time, Emil Souleimanov states that “it 
was primarily Russian, Armenian, and foreign capital that profited from the oil wealth 
of Baku”574. Audrey Altstadt-Mirhadi refers to Baku’s enormous and unprecedented 
increase in population following the city’s oil boom by stating that Baku’s number of 
inhabitants grew by over 700% between the 1870s and 1897, at which point “over one-
third of Baku’s population was Russian”575.  
Thus, faced with the problem of mass urbanisation and industrialisation – which, 
by nature, bring their very own social problems with them – Baku was also shouldered 
with the process of colonisation by the Russians. As Souleimanov points out, the 
Empire’s Russification campaign in the Caucasus in the 1870-1880s led to a 
deterioration of Russian relations with both the Armenian and the Azerbaijani 
populace and the rise of an attitude of “condescending accommodation”576 among the 
colonisers – a statement easily applicable to Fandorin’s own behaviour towards Baku’s 
inhabitants.  
The fact that there was rivalry between the Russian administration of the area and 
its local oil barons is also explored by Akunin in the character of Mesrop Artashesov 
– an Akunin-ian copy of Zeynalabdin Tagiev (unknown birth year-1924), to whom 
Altstadt-Mirhadi ascribes considerable socio-political significance. She mentions 
rumours that “council decisions were actually made in Tagiev’s parlor”577 and calls 
him “a patron in Baku Muslim society”578, which suggests an appropriately intricate 
network of relations between Baku’s oil business, the city’s ethno-religious tensions, 
and Russian Imperial politics in the early 20th century. This is also reflected in 
Fandorin’s visit to Artashesov-Tagiev’s summer residence in Mardakan, which he 
compares in its splendour to Buckingham Palace (cf. CHG 92). At Mardakan’s dinner 
parties, Fandorin witnesses the planning of several oil deals and criminal undertakings.  
 
573 Jonathan Sicotte, “Baku and Its Oil Industry through War and Revolution: 1914–1920,” The 
Extractive Industries and Society 5, no. 3 (2018): 384-92, 386. 
574 Emil Souleimanov, “Between Turkey, Persia and Russia: Perception of National Identity in 
Azerbaijan and Armenia at the Turn of the 19th and 20th Century,” Middle East Review of International 
Affairs 16, no. 1 (2012): 74-85, 77. 
575 Altstadt-Mirhadi, “Baku,” 288. 
576 Souleimanov, “Between Turkey, Persia and Russia,” 81. 
577 Altstadt-Mirhadi, “Baku,” 300. 
578 Ibid, 300. 
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Fandorin’s own perception of the oil industry is a predominantly negative one. He 
perceives the substance as threatening and repellent, exclaiming, at one point: “Какая 
все-таки гадость эта нефть!” (CHG 342). From Fandorin’s point of view, the wooden 
oil rigs in Baku’s actual Black City create a spectacle which “напоминало не лес, а 
кладбище” (CHG 29); he also links it to a “паука, раскинувшего густую паутину” 
(CHG 90). His negative surprise at mistaking a drill zone for a forest mirrors the 
distressed gaze of the pre-industrial subject, but more than being confronted with 
existential fears brought about by modernity – an out-of-character reaction for 
Fandorin, who otherwise harbours a strong interest in technological progress and feats 
of engineering – Fandorin’s shock at realising that the passenger train he is on is moved 
to a holding track to allow the oncoming “ротшильдовские, нобелевские и 
манташевские составы” (CHG 29) to pass reads as a literal manifestation of 
Hosking’s theorem about Empire taking precedence over Nation.579 In switching the 
established poles of meaning and connecting the train image to one of disruption, 
Akunin endows the associated image of the railway station with “a new sense of 
personal and social insecurity”580. The paramount significance of the train as the only 
means of establishing and securing communication, trade, and travel across the vast 
swathes of the Russian Empire is turned from a symbol for national cohesion into an 
emblem of Empire’s impending downfall instead.  
Fandorin’s interrupted rail journey to Baku thus becomes indicative of a wider 
rupture in the Empire’s stability, which is a metaphor that plays a central role 
throughout the Fandorin series. The majority of the novels’ plotlines open at train 
stations, featuring events that disrupt the imagined cohesion and symbolic function of 
Russia’s train network as the country’s main artery: thus, in The Death of Achilles, 
Fandorin’s arrival by train marks his return to Russia as an internal Other; in The State 
Counsellor, the opening train scene replaces Fandorin with a murderous double that 
assassinates a representative of Empire. In The Black City, Fandorin’s arrival at Baku’s 
central station culminates in the first attempt on his life, conveying yet another instance 
of threatening instability.  
 
579 This occurrence is historically accurate, cf. Sicotte, “Baku and Its Oil Industry,” 385.  
580 Frithjof Schenk, “Attacking the Empire’s Achilles Heels: Railroads and Terrorism in Tsarist Russia,” 
Jahrbücher Für Geschichte Osteuropas 58, no. 2 (2010): 232-53, 234. 
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As a result, railway stations in the Fandorin series are turned into prime locales to 
“[challenge] the Tsarist regime […] [turning] out to be a cage-like site of modern 
public space, sheltering an assassin and imprisoning his victim at the same time”581. 
This vulnerability also extends to the country’s oil network, placing Baku and its 
reliance on a functioning railway back in the role of the Empire’s weak spot. Historian 
Frithjof Schenk realised this when he called the railway Russia’s Achilles Heel, but so 
does Akunin’s antagonist Odysseus, who states: “самое главное было – найти 
ахиллесову пяту: точку, удар по которой сразит насмерть, казалось бы, 
непобедимого врага. Точка эта – Баку. Современные великие державы, сами того 
не заметив, стали топливыми наркоманами” (CHG 322).582   
At this point in the novel, loyal readers of the Fandorin series will have identified 
Odysseus as the same anti-hero who was active during the events of the novel The 
Diamond Chariot (Алмазная колесница, 2002). In this novel, Odysseus’s attempts to 
sabotage the railway system were aimed at preventing the outbreak of the 1905 Russo-
Japanese War. Odysseus’s revolutionary activity in The Black City bears a similar 
stamp, as he chides Fandorin for delaying the inevitable revolution and risking the 
outbreak of a world war instead: 
Слон так или иначе сдохнет, - сказал он. – А вы, фокусник японский, только сделали хуже. 
Революция все равно грянет. Только сначала придется пройти через мировую войну. 
Вместо нефти на растопку пойдут миллионы жизней. И будет Тьма, а за нею – Свет. (CHG 
343) 
 
The logic behind fueling a revolution to prevent a war is further explained by Odysseus 
in a similar dichotomy of light vs. darkness: 
Военно-промышленной клике придется забыть об империалистической войне – кинутся 
спасать собственную шкуру. Но не спасут. Слон самодержавия, трехсотлетний 
одряхлевший исполин, не устоит на своих тумбообразных ножищах. […] Свет воссияет 
вновь, озаряя бескрайнюю страну, наконец освободившуюся от рабства. (CHG 323) 
 
The rhetoric that Odysseus employs in these quotations is important to note. For the 
revolutionaries, Baku’s oil and kerosene supplies function as a visual symbol of 
progress and enlightenment, as they dictate an acceptance of competition and the laws 
of the market as integral parts of a new social contract. This new societal make-up, in 
turn, enables the evolution of a society where the “объем добываемой нефти был 
 
581 Ibid, 245-6. 
582 Cf. ibid. 
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чем-то вроде аристократического титула” (CHG 98) – thus making Baku into a 
modern and progressive counterpart to the Empire’s obdurate and soon-to-be-obsolete 
heartland. In the wake of this process, Baku is transformed from a peripheral 
backwater into a path for the future, albeit in a very different sense from the one 
previously envisioned by Shubin. The socio-economic power of oil in Baku effects 
societal changes from within, resulting in the fact that the Empire’s hunger for 
resources feeds its own demise. Consequently, the source of Imperial darkness is not 
oil itself, but the Empire that mismanages both its resources and its people. 
Oil as a resource of Empire is also a central category of analysis for a discussion 
of post-Soviet nostalgia for Empire. As pointed out by Kalinin, the post-2000 years 
saw a rapid rise in literary productions concerned with the topic of ‘petropoetics’, 
which mirrored oil’s simultaneous elevation into a symbol of national cohesion and 
even national identity in a Russian context.583 Kalinin notes a number of identical 
functioning modes in the way the political elite treat the extraction of cultural capital 
from the past and the drilling for oil, summarising that  
oil acts as one of the central symbolic figures through which the post-Soviet unconscious finds a 
language – the unconscious that seeks in the bowels of the earth, the depths of memory, and the 
beginnings of history a resource for the articulation of utopian perspectives, the restoration of 
historical totality, and the revelation of a metaphysical source.584 
 
Fandorin’s distaste for oil can thus also be read as a veiled comment at the neo-Imperial 
exploitation of the resource of history – along with the corruption it engenders.  
The significance of the oil theme in The Black City for a post-Soviet readership is 
not limited to matters of nostalgia. The link between oil, Empire, and geopolitical 
instability likewise carries relevance within the greater context of post-Soviet foreign 
policy. Just as securing Baku’s Black City played a paramount role in prolonging the 
lifespan of the Romanov dynasty, so did Russia’s post-1999 oil boom help to 
consolidate Putin’s rule. John Lawton links the Russian interference in Georgia in 
2008 to a question of dominance on the oil market, viewing oil and gas as “the 
Kremlin’s key tool for ensuring the success of its foreign policy initiatives as well as 
 
583 Cf. Kalinin, “Petropoetics,” 122. 
584 Ibid, 143. 
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its national economic prosperity”585. Similarly, Stephen Blank labels Russia’s 
contemporary policy in the Caucasus as neo-Imperial, stating that  
the conflicts that currently roil the Caucasus are either the result of Russia’s new neo-colonialism 
or […] can […] be characterized […] as the wrecks of empire […] the legacy, if not the current 
example of Russian governance, has contributed greatly to the overarching authoritarianism that 
characterizes the Caucasus, north and south.586 
 
As Russia’s influence in the region has once again led to an increase in ethno-religious 
conflicts, it has also brought about a state of political instability that directly benefits 
Russian neo-Imperial designs and places Russia back in the role of the pseudo-
mediator.  
What remains is the question of how much better equipped contemporary 
politicians are in dealing with the unrest they set loose. Unlike historians’ accounts of 
the genuine incompetence of early 20th-century Imperial governors of Baku and 
surroundings, Blank views Russia’s contemporary Caucasus policy as premeditated 
and deliberate – calling to mind Shubin’s callous willingness to plunge the region into 
chaos. Blank hypothesizes that Putin used the Chechen War to reintroduce the kind of 
power vertical that furthers “the return of a traditional internal colonialist pattern of 
rule that incited unrest when applied to a twenty-first-century problem”587, before 
summarily pointing out “Moscow’s unrelenting desire to recover some of its lost 
imperial heritage in the Caucasus”588 – a desire effectively subverted by The Black 
City’s events, which undermine nostalgia for Imperial rule in the area by focussing on 
the concomitant wrecks of Empire and oil’s considerable conflict potential instead. 
 
3.3.2. Writing Nation: More of Chekhov, Less of Dostoevsky 
At the end of The Black City, Akunin’s inversion of the symbolic meaning of darkness 
and the colour black is carried over into the scene of Fandorin’s death. During his final 
moments, Fandorin muses:  
Вдруг голос, очень знакомый, но уже не вспомнить чей, зашептал Фандорину на ухо 
сказку, под которую когда-то было так страшно засыпать: ‘В черном-черном городе, на 
черной-черной улице, в черном-черном доме...’ (CHG 362) 
 
585 John Lawton, “The Great Game: Power Struggles in Asia,” History Today 59, no. 2 (2009): 39-41, 
41. 
586 Stephen Blank, “Russia’s Caucasus Wars: The Wrecks of Empire and the Wars of Decolonization,” 
American Foreign Policy Interests 34, no. 4 (2012): 182-93, 182. 
587 Ibid, 184. 




The repeated incantation of the word black creates an impression of claustrophobic 
terror and establishes a link to the novel’s title. However, the format Akunin chose for 
Fandorin’s final thoughts refers to a popular oral tradition of short horror stories for 
Russian children, so-called strashilki, which generally end on a sudden anti-climax by 
revealing a thoroughly banal source for the horror. Such a playful turnaround is not 
only hinted at throughout The Black City – following the first attempt on his life, 
Fandorin is forced to go undercover; as case proceedings make it necessary for him to 
announce his survival to the authorities, he plans: “Действовать будем так. Во-
первых, я воскресну” (CHG 195) – but it is also continued in Fandorin’s resurrection 
in the novel Not Saying Goodbye (Не прощаюсь, 2018).589 Nevertheless, the fact that 
Akunin’s hero is brought to the brink of death raises questions about the survival of 
his proposed hero paradigm – and, by extension, the post-Soviet intelligentsia in toto. 
In The Black City, Akunin’s traditional juxtaposition of literary national hero 
narratives largely rests on Fandorin and Odysseus, his antagonist and routinely explicit 
double. Fuelled by their desire to discover a stable homeland within the folds of the 
Russian Empire, Fandorin and Odysseus are condemned to an identical journey of 
nostos – a Greek term describing the homecoming of an epic hero in tales such as The 
Odyssey and the original source term for the word ‘nostalgia’.590 Both Fandorin and 
Odysseus fulfil the function of wanderers in the physical and philosophical sense that 
nostos requires, but their search for a state of identitary arrival is perpetually thwarted 
and deferred by the Empire it is linked to:  
[…] А как только прищучу господина подполковника, жизнь сразу сделается менее 
таинственной. (CHG 257) 
 
[...] когда свершится великое общее Дело, можно будет заняться личным счастьем. […] 
После того как издохнет Слон, все это станет возможно. (CHG 325) 
 
As both characters entertain visions of a better future that will not only reintroduce 
safety and stability to Russia, but which will also enable them to move beyond their 
established hero roles, they likewise dream of a return to the status of private citizen. 
 
589 Apart from the obvious parallel to Sherlock Holmes’s resurrection by Conan Doyle, Golovacheva 
also sees a foreshadowing of Fandorin’s status of ‘undeadness’ in a reference to Tolstoy’s posthumously 
published play The Living Corpse (Живой труп, 1911). Cf. Golovacheva, “Dilogiia B. Akunina,” 130. 
590 Cf. Marigo Alexopoulou, The Theme of Returning Home in Ancient Greek Literature: The Nostos of 
the Epic Heroes (Lewiston and Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press, 2009). 
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However, the comfort of a contemplative refuge in the cosy tradition is neither 
envisaged nor achievable for either hero, who, despite being placed in the midst of 
both the Greek and the classical detective literature tradition, function as emblems of 
the rootless modern man and identitarily uprooted Imperial subject instead.591  
By choosing Odysseus as the namesake for his antagonist, Akunin cunningly 
explores the parallel between Greek literary heroes and their detective counterparts – 
summed up by Brigid Brophy in their underlying purpose to “perform miracles […] 
They rely on nothing but commonsense, which, however, the detective uses to an 
uncommon, heroic degree”592. However, Akunin also reconnects to the classical 
reception of the Odysseus character in ancient Greek literature as a trickster and rebel 
figure. Whereas the majority of readers are likely to associate the figure of Odysseus 
with positive images of a cunning and intricately developed hero, this very 
cunningness also allows for inverse interpretations of his character: Homer’s 
contemporaries and direct successors, for instance, treated Odysseus “[...] in all his 
significant appearances in extant tragedy except in Ajax [...] [as] a rogue [...] the main 
villain [...] the instigator of the mob [...] merciless opportunist and pragmatist, 
indifferent to human suffering [...] a thievish trickster [original emphasis]”593. 
According to Silvia Montiglio, Odysseus also embodied “a propensity coldly to defend 
the rule ‘the end justifies the means’ […] [and] the figure of the demagogue”594.  
It is difficult to ascertain whether Akunin was aware of and playing with this 
classical reputation of the Odysseus figure or not; however, his own criminal’s 
uncanny deviousness is expressed not just in his official codename – in General 
Lombadze’s words, “Четырнадцать лет в розыске! Невероятной изворотливости! 
Отсюда и кличка!” (CHG 7) – but also in the fact that he himself acknowledges his 
status as a bandit figure, contextualising his behaviour within the functioning modes 
of Empire: “Всей этой разбойничьей (какой же еще?) деятельности придавала 
 
591 Whereas Fandorin changes his domicile in almost every novel, more often than not taking up 
residence in a hotel – the quintessential resting place of the traveller and home of several well-known 
flâneurs of world literature – Odysseus, as mentioned previously, is a recurring figure in the series 
whose revolutionary activities take him all across the country.  
592 Brigid Brophy, “Detective Fiction: A Modern Myth of Violence?,” The Hudson Review 18, no. 1 
(1965): 11-30, 19.  
593 Silvia Montiglio, From Villain to Hero: Odysseus in Ancient Thought (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 2011), 3-4. 
594 Ibid, 8-10. 
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смысл и оправдание только великая цель: завалить Слона. Без нее Дятел был бы 
просто вымогатель и шантажист” (CHG 84).  
Odysseus and Fandorin also mirror one another in one additional shared character 
trait, which is their preparedness to engage in self-criticism. Throughout The Black 
City, both the detective and his counterpart repeatedly question their preconceived 
notions of truth and reality: 
- Правильно я говорю?  
- Не знаю. – Фандорин улыбнулся, поневоле залюбовавшись рассказчиком. – То есть я того 
же мнения, но не уверен, что п-прав. (CHG 130) 
 
Всегда полезно подвергнуть свои взгляды и планы испытанию скепсисом. (CHG 83) 
 
A similar desire to get to the bottom of things is also reflected in Odysseus’s choice of 
moniker for himself. As stated in his official secret police file, Odysseus has appeared 
under a range of nicknames in the past, all of which relate to bird species (cf. CHG 
18). His nickname in The Black City is Diatel (Woodpecker), a bird which he links to 
“прекрасной, хоть малоизвестной поговорки ‘Дятел и дуб продалбливает’” 
(CHG 83) – the proverbial oak, in this case, being the Russian Empire.  
Apart from his role in the non-Fandorin novel Bruderschaft with Death (Смерть 
на брудершафт, 2007), Diatel also appeared in the Fandorin novel The Diamond 
Chariot under the name Drozd (thrush). In a Q&A hosted by BBC Russian on their 
Facebook page in 2015, Akunin seemingly confirmed this chronology of the 
character’s previous appearances:  
Azamat Ulbashev [...] 2) Встретимся ли мы еще с Дроздом-Грачем-Гвоздем-Дятлом-
Одиссеем? 
3) Были ли у вашего Дятла прообразы: Виктор Павлович Ногин, например?  
BBC News Russian: [...] 2) Обязательно. 3) Нет, это собирательный образ Сильного 
Большевика, как я представляю себе эту фигуру.595 
 
The ‘collective’ nature of Diatel’s role as a Bolshevik is subsequently also expressed 
in the character’s supposed real name, which is given on file as “непримечательное 
 
595 Boris Akunin and BBC News Russian, “Pisatel’ Boris Akunin, Gost’ Prokhodiashchego…,” 
Facebook, April 10, 2015, 
<www.facebook.com/bbcrussian/photos/a.410032698324.185727.190992343324/1015282715817332
5/?type=1&comment_id=10152830311198325&reply_comment_id=10152835798048325&offset=0
&total_comments=109&notif_t=photo_reply> [accessed 20 December 2019] 
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[…] Иван Иванович Иванцов” (CHG 9) – i.e. a literal everyman’s name, devoid of 
any distinguishing aspects.596 
 
Odysseus, Diatel and Dostoevskiana 
However, there is also an alternative way of interpreting Odysseus-Diatel’s supposedly 
‘real name’. As all three chapters written from Diatel’s point of view in The Black City 
are captioned as ‘conversations with the devil’, an explicit literary reference to 
Dostoevsky’s Ivan Karamazov in The Brothers Karamazov (Братья Карамазовы, 
1880) is created: “В дьявола, как и в боженьку, человек, разумеется, не верил [...] 
Психически человек был абсолютно здоров, шизофренией не страдал, […] к 
образу Ивана Карамазова и творчеству Федора Достоевского относился 
юмористически” (CHG 83). Akunin’s established trickster role in regard to literature 
and stylistic conventions makes this open renunciation of Dostoevsky’s novel into an 
equally overt postmodernist subterfuge, aimed at bringing the intertextual relationship 
between the two novels to the fore.  
As Diatel’s ‘conversations with the devil’ take the shape of critical moments of 
self-reflection and soliloquies, Akunin places his own devil in a similar role to that of 
Ivan Karamazov’s critical interlocutor. By creating this link, Akunin resumes 
Dostoevsky’s search for the true nature of the devil: “И вот выдалась минутка 
поболтать с умным че... – чуть было не подумалось ‘человеком’” (CHG 83). The 
conflation of the Russian words for ‘man’ (‘человек’) and ‘devil’ (‘черт’) in this scene 
mirrors Ivan Karamazov’s own argument with the figure, in which he steadfastly 
proclaims that the devil is nothing but “воплощение меня самого, только одной, 
впрочем, моей стороны... моих мыслей и чувств, только самых гадких и 
глупых”597. The corresponding view of evil as man’s critical spirit lends The Brothers 
Karamazov the appearance of an anti-intelligentsia manifesto, written in support of a 
subservient national spirit.  
Indeed, according to Vladimir Kantor, The Brothers Karamazov was generally 
read as “an explication of ‘the people’s truth’ and ‘the Russian path’ and as a 
 
596 In The Diamond Chariot, the name ‘Lagin’ is mentioned once, but this, too, might be a pseudonym. 
597 F. M. Dostoevsky, Brat’ia Karamazovy. Tom vtoroi (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo 
khudozhestvennoi literatury, 1963), 347. 
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condemnation of the Russian intelligentsia”598. Katia Dianina, who argues that culture 
“lost currency at the end of the imperial period, when it was assailed on all fronts”599, 
also talked about Dostoevsky’s satirical views on the term and noted how he used 
‘culture’ as a curse word.600 Akunin offers his own view on the topic by using Fandorin 
as a mouthpiece: during one of his ruminations on Russia’s future, the detective 
demands “[п]оменьше бы нам достоевско-розановского, побольшье бы 
чеховского” (CHG 296).  
The literary-cultural maxim created by Fandorin establishes an additional link 
between Dostoevsky and Rozanov, a 19th-century religious thinker and conservative 
writer who published a book on Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor in 1891. The Grand 
Inquisitor is a theological digression and story told by Ivan Karamazov to his brother 
Alyosha, and is often considered one of the most important parts of Dostoevsky’s 
novel overall. In this story, Christ returns to Earth during the time of the Inquisition, 
but is imprisoned and sentenced to death by the Church. A conversation between the 
Grand Inquisitor and Christ unfolds, in which the former criticises Christ for having 
encumbered humankind with the burden of freedom. Christ never responds to these 
allegations with words, but eventually kisses the Inquisitor on the lips and is released. 
According to Simona Forti and Zakiya Hanafi, both Dostoevsky and Rozanov saw 
the essence of the tale about the Grand Inquisitor in the belief that “humanity should 
be saved from its own freedom – a freedom that is a crushing, tormenting burden”601. 
It is important to note that this belief is presented by Ivan, a member of the radical 
intelligentsia, who juxtaposes his own intellectual worldview with that of his spiritual 
brother’s. Ivan’s highly analytical worldview makes him doubt the existence of truly 
objective moral categories – an intellectual struggle that finally leads him to insanity, 
as it would also allow innocents to suffer. In despairing over the notion of morality, 
Ivan’s character simultaneously loses faith in the rightness of personal freedom, 
ultimately railing against God and life in one. 
 
598 Vladimir Kantor, “Whom Did the Devil Tempt, and Why? Ivan Karamazov: The Enticements of the 
‘Russian Path’,” Russian Studies in Literature 40, no. 4 (2004): 69-92, 70. 
599 Dianina, When Art Makes News, 37. 
600 Cf. ibid, 32-3. 
601 Simona Forti and Zakiya Hanafi, The New Demons: Rethinking Power and Evil Today (Redwood 
City: Stanford UP, 2014), 187. 
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There is a clearly identifiable socio-political dimension to this conundrum, as 
Ivan’s troubled rejection of freedom links to what Daniel Rancour-Laferriere called 
the Russian ‘cult of suffering’602. According to Rancour-Laferriere, who analysed the 
work of Dostoevsky as part of his study on masochism in the Russian national 
character, Dostoevsky is “the master [of] depicting masochism in literature – Russian 
or otherwise”603. Authoritarianism clearly benefits from such a submissive mind-set, 
which is why it also tends to nourish the three pillars of “чудо, тайна и авторитет”604 
as supported by the Grand Inquisitor – all of which are threatened by the development 
of sceptical individualism and a desire to look beyond manipulative narratives of 
mystery and wonder. Both Ivan’s teachings and his descent into sickness mark out the 
perils of the associated intellectual mind-set in The Brothers Karamazov. 
In The Black City, Akunin not only reclaims the vector of ‘тайна’ for renewed 
interpretation through his use of detective fiction – once again drawing attention to his 
self-stylisation as an ‘evil’ trickster figure – but also responds to the way that “neo-
religious thinkers perceived [The Brothers Karamazov] as a warning about the 
intelligentsia’s negative role”605. Through the doubling of Odysseus-Diatel and 
Fandorin, Akunin investigates both the role and the conscience of the late Imperial 
intelligentsia from his own point of view – returning both characters to an overarching 
discussion of morality.  
Diatel’s critical intellect challenges him to reflect on his outsider status in society 
and future path of development: “Ты всю жизнь в подполье, в темноте. Сможешь 
ли ты жить на свету? Не ослепнешь?” (CHG 325). Although there is an obvious 
reference to Dostoevsky’s Notes from the Underground (Записки из полполья, 1864) 
here – whose protagonist embodies an enthusiastically masochistic mind-set – 
Akunin’s antagonist presents a different kind of underground man from Dostoevsky’s 
original figure. Instead of finding happiness in kowtowing to a higher power, Diatel 
 
602 Cf. Daniel Rancour-Laferriere, The Slave Soul of Russia: Moral Masochism and the Cult of Suffering 
(New York: New York UP, 1995). 
603 Ibid, 80. The propagation of this attitude is by no means an accepted fact among all Dostoevsky 
scholars, but I believe its use is intended in Akunin’s references to his work. 
604 F. M. Dostoevsky, Brat’ia Karamazovy. Tom pervyi (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo 
khudozhestvennoi literatury, 1963), 320. 
605 Kantor, “Whom Did the Devil Tempt, and Why?,” 74. Kantor draws special attention to Ivan’s 
description of Europe as a cemetery and the way it presages, in some ways, post-Soviet Russia’s 
subsequent disenchantment with the West.  
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receives pleasure from opposing it. This is because his own underground status is not 
a choice, but a sentence, reminiscent of the othered status of the liberal intelligentsia 
in 19th-century Russia – which, slowly but surely, branched out into an ever-greater 
opposition movement in response to the ‘авторитет’ imposed from above. 
Problematically, Diatel considers his own peripherality of thought exceptional to the 
point where he fails to identify as part of the society around him: 
Один слюнявый поэт сказал: ‘Никто из людей не остров’. А Дятел думал про себя, что он 
именно остров. Причем большой. Такой большой, что может считаться материком. […] Что 
такое остров? Это твердь, со всех сторон окруженная бессмысленной, жидкой, 
волнующейся массой. (CHG 83) 
 
Contextualised here in a reference to John Donne’s No Man is an Island (1624), 
Diatel’s self-exultation is also reminiscent of Ivan Karamazov’s embittered 
dissociation from humankind. It is subsequently mocked by his own ‘devilish’ voice 
of reason: “Скажи мне, человек-остров, а не превратиться ли тебе в полуостров, 
когда закончится борьба?” (CHG 324).  
Reminded about the underlying selfishness of his revolutionary endeavours, 
Diatel is forced to confront his lack of a workable offer of narrative for Russia’s future. 
However, he refuses to do so, envisioning, instead, a retreat into the private realm 
(‘можно будет заняться личным счастьем’, CHG 324). The inherent paradox in this 
stance marks Diatel as an unsuitable hero for imitation: expressing, on the one hand, a 
distaste for the masses (‘бессмысленной, жидкой, волнующейся массой’), he is still 
willing to leave the fate of Russia to their hands and act as a catalyst alone. The critical 
intelligentsia voice embodied in the devil reminds Diatel of his societal responsibility, 
but is silenced by his revolutionary gusto. 
Consequently, although Diatel does mark an evolution from The State 
Counsellor’s Grin to a more Bolshevist version of the positive hero – reflected in 
Diatel’s description as possessing a “твердая рука, единая воля и железная 
организованность” (CHG 317) – he simultaneously showcases a notable lack of 
responsible leadership, which would later become emblematic of the functioning 
modes of Bolshevik rule. The fact that Russia’s path is set on a Bolshevik future is 
foreshadowed in various ways throughout The Black City, most notably through 
mentions of the Tiflis bank robbery in 1907, one of the biggest Bolshevik coups used 
to finance the movement (cf. CHG 84), and the repeated name-dropping in references 
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to Lenin (CHG 9), Kerenskii (CHG 8) and Koba, the later Stalin (CHG 9).606 At some 
point in the novel, the Communist Manifesto also puts in a passing appearance (CHG 
193), whereas the admonition that “болванов никто не любит” (CHG 15) sounds 
suspiciously like a well-known Soviet propaganda poster phrase.  
Instead of listening to the devil’s reprimands, Diatel continues to pursue his more 
or less selfish course of actions. Fandorin’s retreat from the field of Russian politics 
following the events of The State Counsellor could be read in a similar vein, and 
indeed, the fact that Fandorin could have developed into the same kind of revolutionary 
activist as Diatel is stressed in the novel: 
Лицо это Фандорину сильно не понравилось: умное, волевое, притом с чертовщинкой. Из 
таких юношей при определенном стечении жизненных обстоятельств получаются 
чрезвычайно опасные индивидуумы. Эраст Петрович знал это по собственному примеру. 
(CHG 9) 
 
Hasim voices a similar sentiment, explaining his continued loyalty to Odysseus-Diatel 
as a result of mere bad timing, not a lack of leadership potential on Fandorin’s side: 
“Ты тоже мог бы быть мне как отец, если б я встретил тебя раньше. Но двух 
отцов не бывает” (CHG 359). However, in contrast to Diatel – who relegates his inner 
voice of critical reason and morality to the extraneous sidelines of his official identity, 
thus rejecting the freedom of critical thought in a Dostoevsky-Rozanovskian vein – 
Fandorin listens to his inner ‘akunin’ and follows a firm set of moral guidelines 
instead.  
As part of this catalogue of moral virtues, Fandorin not only recalls Kant’s 
teachings – asking “Что скажет moralische Gesetz in mir?” (CHG 111) – but also 
criticises two widespread attitudes in the Russian national character, embodied in the 
sayings “Сойдет и так” (CHG 295) and “Полюбите меня черненьким, а беленьким 
меня кто угодно полюбит” (ibid).607 Whereas the first functions as an expression of 
a careless indifference to life, as if “мы обитаем в своей стране временно и не 
 
606 In a tragicomic aside, Akunin includes a little apostille in his novel, saying that Stalin was caught by 
Chechens who decided not to kill, but only beat him, “Чтобы показать: такую букашку даже убивать 
не стоит” (CHG 234). 
607 Instead of using a Russian translation, Akunin marks the idea of a superior moral ideal as foreign to 
Russian thought by inserting the original German. The parallel to Kant is overall a curious one, as the 
philosopher not only unexpectedly found himself a Russian subject after the occupation of Königsberg 
in 1756, but also experienced a profound writer’s block and mental paralysis until the city’s liberation 
from Russia, cf. Etkind, Internal Colonization, 181. A. G. Golovacheva uses Fandorin’s invocation of 
Kant as the last in a long line of instances that posit him in a mirror role to Pierre Bezukhov in Tolstoy’s 
War and Peace, cf. Golovacheva, “Dilogiia B. Akunina”. 
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обязаны думать о тех, кто будет после нас [my emphasis]” (CHG 296), the latter 
– taken from Gogol’s unpublished second part to the novel Dead Souls (Мертвые 
души) – stresses a willingness to excuse, if not to embrace, criminal modes of 
behaviour, and to use them as “оправдание и расхлябанности, и этической 
нечистоплотности, и хамству, и воровству” (ibid). It is this “idea of nonresistance 
to evil [original emphasis]”608, traced by Rancour-Laferriere from religious writings 
of the early Rus’ to Dostoevsky and beyond, that Fandorin wishes to quell. In doing 
so, Fandorin embodies a literary heritage opposite to that of Dostoevsky and Rozanov 
– the literary heritage of Chekhov. 
 
Fandorin, the Noble Man, and Chekhoviana 
To an extent, Akunin is a professional in the creative re-imagining of Chekhov’s 
literary heritage in his own work. In 2000, the author published a homonymous sequel 
to Chekhov’s play The Seagull (Чайка, 1896), which starts with Treplev’s ‘suicide’ 
and turns it into a murder mystery instead. Each one of the eight attending characters 
is given a motive for the crime, providing viewers with eight possible, but not a single 
conclusive solution to the case. The play also establishes a family relationship between 
the physician Dorn and Fandorin: “Мои предки, фон Дорны, переехали в Россию 
еще при Алексее Михайловиче, очень быстро обрусели и ужасно расплодились. 
Одни превратились в Фондорновых, другие в Фандориных, наша же ветвь 
усеклась просто  до  Дорнов”609.  
Akunin’s The Seagull received mixed reactions from the Russian public, but has 
since been read as a successful parody on the detective genre by Lyudmila Parts. 
Focusing on the heightened postmodern metatextuality of the play, Parts argued that 
Akunin’s version works as both a “defense mechanism of cultural memory”610 and “an 
ironic take on the postmodern rejection of the concept of truth”611. Through this playful 
transfer of The Seagull into the popular detective fiction genre, Akunin dethroned 
Chekhov from the pedestal of canonical grandeur, whilst at the same time returning 
 
608 Rancour-Laferriere, The Slave Soul of Russia, 19. 
609 A. Chekhov and B. Akunin, Chaika. Komediia i ee prodolzhenie (Moscow: Mosty Kul’tury, 2000), 
113. 
610 Parts, “Boris Akunin’s Postmodern Čajka,” 39. 
611 Ibid, 40. 
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the playwright’s text to the attention of a contemporary readership – creating, in the 
process, a disrespectful homage to their literary (dis)interests. 
Michael Katz goes one step further by describing Akunin’s play as “an act of 
homage [...] perverse and subversive, and carnivalesque in its overturning of venerated 
authority”612. Katz’s invocation of the carnivalesque lifts it out of its original, 
Bakhtinian sense and merges the idea of a subversion of political authority with the 
equally rebellious task of dethroning literary idols. Akunin indirectly refers to 
Bakhtin’s work when Fandorin makes a fleeting, yet consequential remark about the 
way it feels to walk next to Hasim: “похожий на Панурга рядом с Пантагрюэлем” 
(CHG 153). On a surface level, this comparison reads like a mere comedic reference 
to Hasim’s enormous body height; yet Panurge and Pantagruel are also the lead 
characters in Rabelais’ work – which, in turn, was studied by Bakhtin. The resulting 
book Rabelais and His World (1965) explored “the interface between a stasis imposed 
from above and a desire for change from below, between old and new, official and 
unofficial”613. 
In my reading, Akunin uses the carnivalesque in this precise sense of suspension 
between the political and the cultural. Just as Renate Lachmann analysed Bakhtin’s 
concept of the carnivalesque as a phenomenon of counter-culture, leading her to extend 
its applicability to Stalinism and the statement that Bakhtin “sees the anticipation of 
another, utopian world in which anti-hierarchism, relativity of values, questioning of 
authority, openness, joyous anarchy, and the ridiculing of all dogmas hold sway”614, a 
similar mood shift in society can also be registered in Putin’s Russia. In 2004, so-
called ‘monstrations’ – demonstrations that feature pointedly absurdist, nonsensical 
slogans – became an annual feature in various cities across Russia. Geir Flikke 
describes these ‘monstrations’ as popular expressions of an apolitical mind-set; at the 
same time, however, he also discusses the inevitable political reactions that these 
events entail, confirming that participants consciously anticipate police retaliation.615 
 
612 Michael R. Katz, “Boris Akunin’s Khuliganstvo: Literary Parodies of Chekhov and Shakespeare,” 
in American Contributions to the 14th International Congress of Slavists, ed. by David M. Bethea 
(Bloomington: Slavica, 2008): 85-90, 88. 
613 Katarina Clark and Michael Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1984), 5. 
614 Renate Lachmann, Raoul Eshelman and Marc Davis, “Bakhtin and Carnival: Culture as Counter-
Culture,” Cultural Critique 11 (1988): 115-52, 118. 
615 Cf. Geir Flikke, “‘Monstrations for Mocracy’: Framing Absurdity and Irony in Russia’s Youth 
Mobilization,” Demokratizatsiya 25, no. 3 (2017): 305-34. 
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In concluding that “Monstrators use irony and evasiveness strategically [...] [to] 
demonstrate that the specific context offered by the authoritarian regime of Putin 
cannot successfully control perceptions and what people think and feel”616, Geir also 
describes the inadvertently political nature of much of contemporary Russia’s cultural 
sphere.617 
The Chekhovian story arcs present in the novels All the World is a Stage and The 
Black City continue this theme and address the conflicted border between culture and 
politics in contemporary Russia, highlighting the increased theatricality of the post-
Soviet political space in the process.618 It is noteworthy that the subplot about 
Fandorin’s marriage to the actress Clara runs parallel to the appearance of the 
Chekhovian subtext in the Fandorin project: in All the World is a Stage, Fandorin is 
recruited into helping his future wife by Chekhov’s widow, Olga Knipper.619 The Black 
City begins with Fandorin’s journey to Yalta following a request by the “к-комиссии 
по наследию Чехова” (CHG 6). In the novel’s opening scene, the arrival of General 
Lombadze interrupts Fandorin’s perusal of The Cherry Orchard (Вишневый сад, 
1904) – a disruption of the cultural by the political that merges the two spheres into a 
symbiotic spectacle of the absurd through Lombadze’s melodramatic excitability, 
which reminds Fandorin of “персонаж из ранней чеховской пьесы […] [л]евые 
газеты прозвали генерала ‘придворным мопсом’ и шутят, что по утрам он в зубах 
приносит его величеству тапочки” (CHG 5-6). As a readily apparent copy of Ivan 
Antonovich Dumbadze, Yalta’s ultraconservative and semi-dictatorial Governor in 
1914, the character of Lombadze-Dumbadze is not only turned into a caricature of 
 
616 Ibid, 334. 
617 On the opposite end of the spectrum, the resurfacing of show trials likewise gives cause for concern, 
cf. Catherine Schuler, “Reinventing the Show Trial: Putin and Pussy Riot,” The Drama Review 57, no. 
1 (2013): 7-17; “Russian Justice and Theatre of Absurd; Show Trial Strengthens the Case for an EU 
Magnitsky Act,” The Financial Times, February 19, 2013. 
618 As noted by Olga Sobolev, Akunin also toyed with the topic of carnivalesque subversion in the novel 
The Coronation, cf. Sobolev, “Boris Akunin and the Rise of the Russian Detective Genre,” 79. 
619 Fandorin’s acquaintance with Olga Knipper dates back to a case involving Chekhov himself: “Как 
гениально отыскали вы пропавшую рукопись Антона Павловича!” (Boris Akunin, Ves’ Mir Teatr 
(Moscow: Zakharov, 2010), 20; all further quotations will be referring to this edition, abbreviated as 
(VMT)). This same, ‘lost’ manuscript is mentioned again in the opening pages of The Black City, 
although it is never identified by name – making it a likely contender for Chekhov’s play Platonov, one 
of the writer’s earliest works that was kept in a safe deposit box by his sister Maria and was later 
confiscated by Soviet officials. It is occasionally labelled Chekhov’s ‘lost play’, making this entire 
interlude one of Akunin’s characteristic plays with literary history – which, at the same time, posits 
Fandorin as both a contemporary and a kindred spirit to Chekhov. 
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mindless subservience, but also becomes an indictment of the disruptive influence of 
authoritarian regimes on the cultural sphere in general.  
True to the tenets of his established writerly persona, Akunin’s parodic barb at a 
figure of Imperial authority carries not only an external referent, but also targets his 
own work. In The Black City, Fandorin is already estranged from his wife, but her 
presence is still inflicted upon the reader (and Fandorin) at periodical intervals – 
suggesting a function other than the mere provision of comic relief. As Fandorin’s 
exasperated reactions to Clara’s theatrics grow in acerbity, they also begin to open up 
a parallel discussion about the mockery made out of reality by post-Soviet politics: “В 
Баку ждали важные дела, государственного значения, а здесь буффонада с 
туземным колоритом” (CHG 301).620 Yet just like Clara’s film-set, Akunin also 
exploits the ‘local flavour’ of Baku to attract a wider readership. Similarly, the assassin 
and love triangle plot that can be found in the sujet of ‘The Caliph’s Love’, the film 
Clara is starring in, is equally present in The Black City, calling to mind the success of 
the romance genre on the Russian book market of the 1990s.621 As a result, Akunin 
parodies both the continued success of action and romance productions in Russia and 
the societal conditions of the 1990s that led to the proliferation of this escapist fare in 
the first place – a time when “literature considered escapist distracted readers from 
more serious ideological concerns […] the detective novel in particular”622.  
Yet it is not escapist fiction itself that Akunin criticises, but escapist fiction that 
leads to a complete dissociation from truth and reality – particularly in regard to the 
genre of historical fiction. As Fandorin visits his wife’s film-set in Baku, Simon 
 
620 This impression is heightened by the realisation that the majority of Clara’s replies are quotations 
from theatre plays that she has acted in – works by Chekhov, Ostrovsky and Shakespeare among them. 
Fandorin usually identifies these quotes straightaway, thus providing an insight for the readership on 
their fake allure; however, as pointed out by Golovacheva, not all of his attributions are correct. One of 
his mistakes includes a reference to Chekhov’s The Seagull – a play that Akunin, as previously 
mentioned, rewrote and therefore knows exceptionally well. Fandorin mistakenly attributes one of 
Clara’s replies to Trigorin, not Treplev – the very same character who was shot in Akunin’s re-writing 
of The Seagull. Thus, Fandorin’s mistake can be seen as foreshadowing his own death and fate at the 
end of The Black City, cf. Golovacheva, “Dilogiia B. Akunina,” 125-6. 
621 Fandorin’s embroilment in the ‘love’ triangle between himself, Clara – playing the heroine in 
Simon’s film – and her actor colleague Leon creates an additional layer of reality between film, history, 
and Akunin’s novel. Just like the historical Harun al-Rashid, Fandorin is the ‘older’ of the two male 
characters, and just like in Simon’s film, he is repeatedly followed and attacked by assassins in Baku. 
Just like Fandorin, Harun al-Rashid plays the role of hero in both his fictional source text, the Arabian 
Nights, and in Simon’s film. 
622 Theimer Nepomnyashchy, “Markets, Mirrors, and Mayhem,” 163-4. 
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describes the film’s plot and mentions the characters of Harun al-Rashid and Hassan-
i Sabbah. Fandorin is prompted to ask: 
- Погоди, - удивился Фандорин, - если ты имеешь в виду Хасана ибн-Саббаха, он жил на 
три века позднее Гаруна. Во времена аль-Рашида ассасины еще не существовали.  
- В самом деле? – Продюктер не опечалился. – Ну, а у нас так. Неважно. (CHG 61) 
 
Simon’s flippant dismissal of historical fact is rendered as an expression of capricious 
artistic license – but it does not find Fandorin’s approval, who subsequently goes on 
to question Simon’s decision to include blunderbusses in his film. Simon replies that 
these guns were available for cheap from the set of ‘The Siege of Izmail’ and that he 
intends to use them for the creation of sound effects (cf. CHG 75).623 Fandorin’s 
censure echoes Lipovetsky’s words, who, when talking about the rise of 
postmodernism in Russian politics post-2014, criticised the “painless and almost 
artistic shifting from [reality to performance] which never stops and is never reflected 
upon as a problem”624. Lipovetsky also expressed criticism about the post-Soviet, 
postmodern replacing of categories such as truth, reality and fact “with the notions of 
‘hyperreality,’ ‘simulacrum’ and performance, with concerns for the real subordinated 
to esthetic considerations [my emphasis]”625 – thus also recalling Epstein’s earlier 
work. 
The late Imperial interest in action and historical sujets in Akunin’s fictional world 
mirrors the post-Soviet obsession with the same topic, but it also showcases the same 
inherent flaws. Fandorin’s challenge to observe historical accuracy makes the various 
layers of reality within the fictional text interact with the reality of the reader: as the 
use of the mocking chapter title ‘Настоящий экшн’ (CHG 70) indicates, there is 
nothing ‘real’ about the action described. The same phrase is repeated at the end of the 
chapter, thus constructing a literary frame reminiscent of a theatre curtain, drawn open 
and closed at the beginning and end of a performance. The curtain metaphor is also 
applied to the whole of Baku at an earlier point in the novel when Fandorin attempts 
to find a suitable Japanese translation for the city’s name: although he initially renders 
 
623 The Siege of Izmail was a battle fought between the Russian and Ottoman Empires in 1789, which 
ended in a decisive victory for the Russian army; the day of the battle, December 22, is now annually 
celebrated as the Day of Military Honour. An attentive reader will also have caught a potential reference 
to The State Counsellor in the character of Harun al-Rashid, which was the nickname given to Fandorin 
by Esfir to mock the detective’s slave-like allegiance to Governor General Dolgorukoi. 
624 Lipovetsky, “Intelligentsia and Cynicism,” 242. 
625 Ibid, 244. 
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it as “[г]ород-нувориш […] Сразу пускает пыль в глаза” (CHG 42), he eventually 
settles on “Город-Занавес” (CHG 41). 
Although Fandorin’s reason for calling Baku a ‘curtain city’ links to his plans to 
draw the curtains on Odysseus’s career as a revolutionary, the name also appears as a 
suitable sobriquet for The Black City’s preoccupation with the topic of duplicity and 
deceit.626 The dangerous effects of a politicised theatricalisation of reality are further 
highlighted in the novel when another attempt on Fandorin’s life is made during the 
abovementioned action shoot, during which the killer conveniently exploits the use of 
Simon’s historically inaccurate weapons to obscure his own location. As artifice’s play 
with history helps cover up the intrusion, it simultaneously reveals that the ‘real action’ 
craved by the characters in the novel already exists within their lives.  
Read against the backdrop of Russia’s political protest movement in 2012, this 
‘play within the play’ can be read as a warning against the deliberate transfer of the 
political world into the realm of staged nonsense. It reflects a transformation of 
Akunin’s attitudes towards the limits of his own playfulness, along with a 
condemnation of distorted representations of history for the sake of cheap 
showmanship. Writing from within the very genre that lives by these transgressions, 
Akunin claims a voice of authority on the matter that demands a more responsible 
stance of irreverence towards contemporary treatments of history and its concomitant 
forms of nostalgia. Thus, the ‘play within the play’ no longer serves to catch the 
conscience of the ‘king’, but to hold up a mirror to the readership’s tastes instead. 
Throughout The Black City, Akunin discusses the contrast between a calamitous 
world and its cultural recoding into laughter by resurrecting and interrogating the spirit 
of Chekhov’s work. Having already questioned Chekhov’s sharp-witted understanding 
of parody and humour in The Seagull by asking why the play was considered a comedy 
in the first place, Akunin raises a similar thought in Fandorin’s meditations on The 
Cherry Orchard:627  
[…] он вдруг понял, почему ‘Вишневый сад’ комедия. Это пьеса, написанная чахоточным 
больным, который предчувствует, что его грустная жизнь закончится фарсом. Скоро он 
 
626 It also provides an equally metaphorical hint at Fandorin’s looming ‘death’ and the end of the novel 
– a curtain drawn on his own career, so to speak. 
627 Parts quotes a blog article written by Akunin and in which he discusses this question in her footnotes; 
unfortunately, the corresponding website is no longer available online. Cf. Parts, “Boris Akunin’s 
Postmodern Čajka,” 47 (footnote 21). 
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умрет на чужбине, и его привезут назад в вагоне-холодильнике с надписью ‘устрицы’. 
Типично чеховский прием комедийного снижения трагической ситуации. (CHG 6)628 
 
The ‘overturning of authority’ through the use of tragicomic laughter is a desire shared 
by Chekhov and Akunin. As pointed out by Parts, Akunin’s use of the detective genre 
emphasises Chekhov’s own proclivity for “providing questions rather than answering 
them”629, a feat which also characterised Chekhov’s fictional works – some of which 
pertained to the detective genre. Thus, Alfred Sproede provided a relevant update to 
the interpretation of Chekhov’s novel The Shooting Party (Драма на охоте, 1884) 
when he argued that the novel functions not just as a parody of the Russian readership’s 
outspoken taste for crime fiction at the time, but also as a critique of the Russian legal 
system and its internalised state of corruption. In placing the criminal in the role of 
both narrator and sudebnyi sledovatel’, Chekhov created an early version of the 
unreliable crime fiction narrator that would later become an internationally successful 
format under Agatha Christie. Yet Chekhov also delivered a shrewd, if harsh, 
commentary on the theatrical aspects of the Empire’s legal system, which provided a 
smokescreen for widespread corruption and illegality: 
The diagnosis of the local nobility and regime of dignitaries is scathing. Chekhov presents the 
criminal proceedings as a ‘cultural’ event, which becomes memorable not through its precise 
investigations and questioning of witnesses, but through the exchange of educated hints and 
clues related to world literature.630 
 
This verdict, censuring the use of fake culture(dness) as a veneer for a corrupt political 
system and revealing this disconnect through the use of literary intertexts, 
simultaneously echoes Akunin’s design of The Black City. 
Chekhov’s willingness to provide a counternarrative to the official representation 
of Empire was also documented by Jeffrey Brooks. Brooks traces a distinct change in 
the representation of the Russian Empire as a multi-ethnic state in the illustrated press 
 
628 The historically correct description of Chekhov’s last journey in a train wagon marked for oysters 
not only parallels this and prompts real tragicomic laughter, but also foreshadows Fandorin’s own 
‘death’ at the end of The Black City – which catapults him into a prolonged coma and reduces him to 
comical insignificance as he is eventually carried onto a train by his assistant Masa in the form of a 
“длинный сверток из овчины” (Boris Akunin, Ne proshchaius’ (Moscow: Zakharov, 2018), 2).  
629 Parts, “Boris Akunin's Postmodern Čajka,” 41. 
630 ‘Die Diagnose der lokalen Adelsgesellschaft und des Honoratiorenregimes ist vernichtend. Den 
Strafprozess präsentiert Čechov als „Kultur“-Veranstaltung, die statt durch präzise Ermittlung und 
Zeugenbefragung vor allem durch den Austausch weltliterarischer Bildungsreferenzen in Erinnerung 
bleibt,’ Alfred Sproede, “Rechts- und Justizkritik im frühen osteuropäischen Kriminalroman,” in 
Investigation - Rekonstruktion - Narration: Geschichten und Geschichte im Krimi der Slavia, eds. Nina 
Frieß and Angela Huber (Potsdam: Universitätsverlag Potsdam, 2019), 13-49, 27. 
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of the 1890s, which he links to the publication of Chekhov’s Sakhalin Island (Остров 
Сахалин, 1893) and Tolstoy’s Redemption (Воскресенье, 1899). Brooks portrays the 
1890s as a decade that was characterised by “an ongoing discourse on nation and 
identity and the moral self that unfolded […] in the new popular media”631 – a verdict 
that could be applied verbatim to the post-Soviet period. He also states that Chekhov 
temporarily succeeded in working a “glint of imperial pride”632 into his narrative. 
Singling out Sakhalin Island for his analysis, Brooks points out how Chekhov 
integrated previously marginalised groups into his portrayal of the Russian nation, 
focussing on people’s characteristics and values instead of pre-defined ethnic or social 
backgrounds. According to Brooks, this approach helped Chekhov in his portrayal of 
an “inclusive body politic, embracing Russians of disparate origin together with 
criminals and obscure native peoples, and showing the ability of inherent personal and 
cultural strength to triumph over adversity”633. In thus using literary subversion to 
challenge “the state’s role in defining the nation”634, Chekhov advocated a “solicitude 
for outcasts and for all nationalities as well as […] sympathy for people who had 
overcome sins and failings”635 – reminiscent of the neschastnyi mind-set of earlier 
decades.  
Lastly, Brooks mentions The Steppe (Степь, 1888) in his discussion of 
Chekhov’s re-writing of multi-nationalism in the Russian Empire – a work that Akunin 
also referenced in 2015, when he used it to criticise the Russian patriotic movement.636 
Condemning the hate-fuelled, ostentatious forms of nationalism characteristic of the 
Russian patriotic movement at the time, Akunin postulated that “всякий настоящий 
патриот – человек достойный”637, followed by a direct quote from Chekhov’s short 
story: 
Дурной, крикливый, кичливый ‘патриотизм’ отвратителен. Чехов, повесть ‘Степь’: ‘Наша 
матушка Расия всему свету га-ла-ва!’ - запел вдруг диким голосом Кирюха, поперхнулся и 
умолк. Степное эхо подхватило его голос, понесло, и, казалось, по степи на тяжелых 
колесах покатила сама глупость’. [original emphasis]638 
 
631 Jeffrey Brooks, “Chekhov, Tolstoy and the Illustrated Press in the 1890s,” Cultural and Social 
History 7, no. 2 (2010): 213-32, 216. 
632 Ibid, 216. 
633 Ibid, 224. 
634 Ibid, 229. 
635 Ibid, 229. 
636 Ibid, 215. 
637 Boris Akunin, “Patriotizm i ‘patriotizm’,” LiveJournal (blog), April 11, 2015, 





The concept of the ‘благородный муж’, or ‘noble man’ is the underlying idea for the 
development of Fandorin as a Chekhovian man and intelligentsia prototype. Although 
first mentioned in The Winter Queen in the description of Fandorin as “[ю]ноша 
чистый, смелый, благородных устремлений и патриот отечества” (AZ 134), the 
concept of the ‘noble man’ became a mainstay of Fandorin’s character construction 
only after the character’s prolonged period of service in Japan and his concomitant 
internalisation of certain dominant tenets of Eastern philosophical thought. Fandorin’s 
ruminations on the topic are typically linked to behavioural maxims of honour and 
dignity, such as in The Death of Achilles, where the idea that “поддаваться 
неразумным эмоциям недостойно благородного мужа” (SMA 145) is 
accompanied by the dictum that “благородный муж не может быть ничьим 
орудием” (SMA 362). In the novel Special Assignments (Особые поручения, 1999) 
Fandorin refers to Confucianism and states that “Благородный муж насыщается, 
воздерживаясь”639, whereas in The State Counsellor, Fandorin finds consolation “в 
изречении Мудрейшего: ‘Благородный муж знает, в чем его долг, и не пытается 
от него уклониться’” (SS 253).  
References to both Confucianism and Buddhism continue to influence the 
discussion surrounding the ‘noble man’ in the Fandorin project. In the novel The 
Diamond Chariot, which covers Fandorin’s time in Japan, the detective mentally 
argues that “[с]уществует Справедливость, Правда, защищать которую — 
обязанность всякого благородного человека. Нельзя позволять, чтобы рядом 
безнаказанно совершалась подлость”640. Another of these maxims states that 
“[б]лагородный муж знает, что мир несовершенен, но не опускает рук” (ALM 
55). Finally, in the novel All the World is a Stage, Fandorin links his concept of the 
‘noble man’ to the intelligentsia itself, criticising the latter’s tendency to talk, but not 
act, and calling it the central shortcoming of the intelligentsia as a social group:  
‘Классический интеллигент’ - существо для России вредное,  даже г-губительное! Сословие 
вроде бы симпатичное, но обладает роковым недостатком, который так верно подметил и 
высмеял Чехов. Интеллигент умеет достойно переносить невзгоды, умеет сохранять 
благородство при поражении. Но он совершенно не умеет побеждать в борьбе с хамом и 
мерзавцем, которые у нас так многочисленны и сильны. До тех пор, пока интеллигентское 
 
639 Boris Akunin, Osobye porucheniia (Moscow: Zakharov, 2010), 252. 
640 Boris Akunin, Almaznaia kolesnitsa (Moscow: Zakharov, 2019), 469. All further quotations will be 
referring to this edition, abbreviated as (ALM). 
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сословие не научится д-драться за свои идеалы, ничего путного в России не будет! […] Это 
должна быть драка по своим правилам, правилам б-благородного человека! (VMT 134-35) 
 
Akunin’s understanding of the Chekhovian ideal thus not only focusses on a 
willingness to challenge authoritarian narratives about Empire and Nation, but also 
formulates a different perception of the intelligentsia’s main function – viewing it as 
the agent, not just the philosophical mastermind, of change.  
Fandorin, designed as a representative of this new type of intelligentsia hero, is 
the ‘noble man’ made manifest, inserted into Russian history in an attempt to see where 
the journey would lead him. Aron noted the detective’s similarity to a Chekhovian 
character as early as 2004, long before the publication of All the World is a Stage and 
The Black City:  
Fandorin’s temperament [..] is unmistakably that of an Anton Chekhov: neither optimist nor 
pessimist, but a pragmatic skeptic wary of grandiose social projects and believing in a few self-
made and self-policed rules of honorable living. Chkhartishvili’s hero daily practices the four 
virtues that Chekhov seemed to consider Russia's only hope: decency, dignity, competence and 
hard work.641 
 
As outlined previously, Aron interprets this character profile as proof for Akunin’s 
desire to sever Fandorin from Russia’s traditional intelligentsia heritage altogether. 
However, I would argue that Fandorin’s criticism of the classical intelligentsia is not 
so much aimed at its basic existence than at the continued imperfection of its ideals. 
Fandorin’s fundamental belief in the possibility of change for the better is what sets 
him apart from the general chorus of intelligentsia-critical voices of his time – and that 
of Akunin’s post-Soviet readers. 
That being said, it is also crucial to keep in mind that Chekhov’s efforts to change 
the Imperial narrative, temporarily successful as they were, in the end failed to create 
a lasting impact. Following the resurgence of right-wing political parties after the 1905 
revolution, the attractiveness of Chekhov’s identity narrative for the public faltered, 
which prompted Brooks to call the 1890s a “lost moment of increasing toleration and 
acceptance of different peoples within the empire”642. Similarly, the once hopeful anti-
nostalgic discourse purported by Akunin in the 1990s, along with his attempt to fashion 
a new narrative of nation based on a dignified version of enlightened patriotism, was 
 
641 Aron, “A Champion for the Bourgeoisie,” 155. 
642 Brooks, “Chekhov, Tolstoy and the Illustrated Press in the 1890s,” 221. 
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exposed to a comparable climate of restorative nostalgia – forcing him to reevaluate 
his innovative intelligentsia stance.  
As The Black City shows, Akunin became increasingly aware of the parallel 
between Chekhov’s and his own fate. In the novel, Fandorin’s embodiment of the 
‘noble man’ principles is put under constant scrutiny. In part, this is done through the 
novel’s colonial setting: despite concerted efforts to adapt to his new surroundings – 
for instance by radically changing his appearance following the escape from his would-
be assassins, shaving his head, switching his clothes, adopting the new name 
‘Iumrubazh’ (meaning ‘round head’) and taking instructions in ‘good manners’, such 
as loudly slurping his tea and not taking off his hat indoors (cf. CHG 140) – Fandorin 
still showcases several traits that unmistakably mark him as an Imperial citizen. Thus, 
he frequently employs the same exoticising gaze as his compatriots, perceiving his 
surroundings through an explicit colonial filter that retains an aloof manner and betrays 
a certain condescending attitude towards the local populace. Hasim comments on this 
at the end of the novel, saying: “Ты думал, я тупой дикарь. Ты относился ко мне 
свысока. […] Я долго водил тебя, как собаку на поводке” (CHG 360). This is no 
longer just Hasim speaking to Fandorin – it is the colonised subject speaking to its 
coloniser.  
Hasim’s role in the novel is overall a complex one, regardless of the overt 
simplicity of his character. On the one hand, he appears as a mouthpiece of the 
Caucasian mind-set in The Black City and as a character who provides comic relief 
through his good-natured sense of self-complacency and his happy-go-lucky attitude. 
Fandorin receives several local philosophical gems from Hasim, such as “богатые все 
плохие” (CHG 125) and “[в]раг моя враг – мой друг, ясно?” (CHG 127). Hasim 
also proposes a thoroughly misogynistic, yet creative interpretation of the gendered 
Russian language, which Fandorin promptly applies to a more abstract political 
context:  
Хорошее слово всегда 'он’, плохое слово – 'она’. Я женщины не уважаю. Вся зло от них.  
‘Интересная идея. Не про женщин – про отношение к словам. Сразу видно, что человеку 
нравится, а что нет. Например, говоришь: ‘Милостивая государь, могу ли я доверять 
ваша честная слово?’ (CHG 126) 
 
Last but not least, Hasim also feigns a dislike for literacy. Linking the power of the 
written word to manipulation and secrecy, he censures: “Я буква не знаю, читать-
222 
 
писать не умею. Вся зло от грамота. Чиновник пишет, полиция пишет, буржуй 
пишет – все плохие люди пишут” (CHG 151). From a historical point of view, 
Hasim is not wrong: not only had literacy levels in the Russian Empire reached an all-
time low towards the end of the 19th century, but they also carried overt ethno-religious 
connotations in a city like Baku, where “literacy among Azerbaijani workers was as 
low as 18% and among other Muslim workers as low as 5%; in contrast, literacy rates 
among Russians were 76% and 51% respectively”643. As most of the administrative 
power in the region was controlled by Russians, Hasim’s association of literacy with 
evil likewise identifies it with the Russian ruling elite in Baku.  
At the same time, Hasim’s attitude highlights authoritarian attempts to impose a 
narrative of dominance onto its population – along with Akunin’s own role as a literary 
‘evil man’. The self-referentiality in this statement, which elevates literature into 
contested and incendiary material, is further strengthened through the role that the 
written word plays at central plot points in The Black City. Thus, the note that 
Odysseus leaves at the assassination site in Yalta starts Fandorin on his journey to 
Baku; conversely, Fandorin uses his diary as a trap for Odysseus once he realises that 
it is being monitored, and starts to insert fake schemes that allow him to control his 
adversary’s movements and bring about the confrontation that leads to Odysseus’s 
temporary arrest (cf. CHG 340).  
Language and literature as a means to distort reality also gain prominence when 
Hasim uses a note to lure Fandorin into Odysseus’s final ambush. Hasim’s role reversal 
from friend to foe at the end of the novel reveals that both his wrong grammar and his 
anti-intellectual attitude were only play-acts, meant to lead Fandorin astray and to 
expose the folly of Fandorin’s colonial gaze – along with his contemporary 
readership’s willingness to buy into these stereotypes. As Fandorin’s 
inappropriateness becomes the reader’s, it creates interrogation points about everyday 





643 Sicotte, “Baku and Its Oil Industry,” 386. Cf. Boris N. Mironov, “The Development of Literacy in 
Russia and the USSR from the Tenth to the Twentieth Centuries,” History of Education Quarterly 31, 
no. 2 (1991): 229-52, 246. 
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Intelligentsia vs Banditry 
The most important lapse in judgment that Fandorin commits in regard to Hasim is his 
infatuation with the image of the oriental bandit figure, which sets off their 
acquaintance and simultaneously jumpstarts the novel’s main chain of events. 
Following the second assassination attempt on Fandorin’s life, during which he is 
dumped inside an oil rig and rescued by Hasim, the bandit gains the detective’s 
confidence by means of a rather simple conversation: “Погоди-ка. Это ты за нами 
ехал? - Я. - З-зачем? Ты кто? - Как зачем? Грабить хотел, - с достоинством 
ответил силач” (CHG 124). The extent to which the detective falls prey to the allure 
of Hasim’s bandit image is obvious in his choice of monikers for the Azerbaijani, 
whom both Fandorin and Masa call “настоящий человек. Искренний человек, хоть 
и акунин” (CHG 167), “Портос, толлько в папахе и черкеске” (CHG 130) and 
“богатырь” (CHG 124). At the same time, Hasim’s actions and approach to life often 
confuse Fandorin, whose value system fundamentally differs from Hasim’s. Indeed, 
the latter seems to know only a single fixed benchmark in life: “Уважаемый человек 
всегда прав, даже когда неправ” (CHG 130).  
Transferred onto a post-Soviet context, Hasim becomes the late Imperial 
equivalent to a loyal, but lawless mafia bandit: respectability, in Hasim’s view, is 
commanded exclusively through power and despotism. Truth and untruth lose all 
meaning in this context, making the seeming incongruence between the terms ‘traitor’ 
and ‘hero’ disappear at the same time. Hasim’s firm belief in the validity of his value 
system is corroborated by his opinions on the ubiquity of crime and lawlessness in the 
society he is a part of. While explaining the difference between the terms ‘разбойник’ 
and ‘гочи’ to Fandorin, Hasim states: “Плохие люди на свете много. Всегда есть у 
кого штраф взять […] Будут не давать – убью. Порядок такой. Кто не хочет 
отдавать – можно убить” (CHG 125).  
Ultimately, it is unclear whether Hasim is a product of his times or a contributor 
to its various forms of lawlessness – most likely, he is both. However, his character 
clearly resembles the susceptibility of the infantile muzhik to a stronger father figure. 
Hasim’s loyalty towards Odysseus marks his quick adoption of whatever value system 




Он открыл мне глаза на жизнь, когда мы сидели в одной камере. Научил меня хорошо 
говорить, хорошо думать. Всему научил. Он мне как отец.[…] Отец мудрый, - сказал Гасым. 
[…] отец сказал, что, пока ты стоишь на его пути, дел сделано не будет. Ты поедешь в Вену 
и помешаешь войне. А без войны не будет революции. Тебя обязательно нужно убить. 
(CHG 359-60) 
 
As a result, Fandorin’s desire to see the Russian periphery as a dangerous, oriental 
frontier not only produces the spectre he wishes to perceive, but also leaves him blind 
to the real Hasim hiding behind a masquerade of buffoonery.  
In a characteristic exploration of parallel timelines, Akunin’s treatment of the late 
19th-century taste for stories about the Caucasus’s mysterious bandit-like rogues also 
draws a direct link to the concomitant post-Soviet enamourment with the same theme. 
According to Frederick White, “the Russian bandit was a romantic hero [and] a cultural 
hero [...] evolving in response to the changes in post-Soviet society”644 throughout the 
1990s. The national identity implications of this process were complex: White 
documents both a growing Western interest in cultural productions of the kind and a 
reciprocal Russian desire to satisfy their neighbours’ demand in search for a positive 
self-image. Marsh observed this interplay in Pelevin’s work, describing Generation P 
as a novel that depicts “a mafia bandit who instructs an advertising copy-writer to 
compose a Russian idea so that Russians can impress the Americans”645.  
It thus appears that in post-Soviet culture, Russia’s lasting infatuation with the 
bandit theme is not only characterised by a continued desire for external affirmation, 
but also by a move away from the Imperial ‘periphery’ that it traditionally inhabited. 
Instead, it has settled comfortably in the midst of the neo-Imperial ‘heartland’ – 
lending further support to Akunin’s distinctive collapsing of the border between those 
two contested terms. In acknowledging both Fandorin’s fascination with the bandit 
image and his contemporaries’ admiration for contumelious corruption, Akunin 
explores a well-known 19th-century literary trope against a post-Soviet frame for 
reading.  
This exploration was all the more timely against the backdrop of 1990s Russian 
cinematography, in which the bandit theme occupied an even more prominent place 
than it did in literature. White comprehensively commented upon the fact that the 
 
644 Frederick H. White, “Balabanov’s Bandits: The Bandit Film Cycle in Post-Soviet Cinema,” 
Canadian Journal of Film Studies 25, no. 2 (2016): 82-103, 89. 
645 Marsh, “The Nature of Russia’s Identity,” 563. 
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“unfamiliar freedom that brought out the worst in human nature also provided 
filmmakers with ready stories from their daily lives”646 – which led to a surprising 
spike in the popularity of the bandit motif in post-Soviet film productions. As the 
bandit theme was increasingly used to invent a conceptual smoke screen that glorified 
transgressions of the law as an expression of anti-Western, Russian exceptionalism, it 
also bolstered the advancing institutionalisation and normalisation of crime in the post-
Soviet world.  
White chose the highly popular filmic work of Aleksei Balabanov as a case study 
for this observation, which lays bare the intense reciprocity between Russian and 
Western culture that shaped and informed much of the Russian national identity debate 
in the 1990s. Writing about the development between the immensely successful 
productions Brother (Брат, 1997) and Brother 2 (Брат-2, 2000), White flags up the 
growing desire to not just passively, but actively contradict or even punish the West – 
and, by doing so, “[alleviate] national anxieties and post-Soviet humiliations [...] 
striking a positive chord with post-Soviet audiences”647. However, post-2000, White’s 
appraisal of Balabanov’s cinematic work took a dramatic turn. Talking about the film 
Dead Man’s Bluff (Жмурки, 2005), White not only concluded that Balabanov 
decisively declared an end to the bandit cycle, but that he did so in response to the 
restructuring of Russian society under the Putin regime. Describing how Balabanov 
turned towards parodic pastiches of his own work, White details how the portrayal of 
former petty bandits was first transformed into oil and gas magnates and then into 
corrupt government officials – “the new bandits of the Putin years”648.  
Akunin traces this exact development in The Black City through the parallel world 
of Simon’s film production. During Fandorin’s set visit, Simon talks admiringly of the 
government official and industrialist Putilov and a certain Sal’kovskii, who is 
described as the local director of the Imperial Mining Department. Praising the latter’s 
steely resolve and unimpressionability, Simon says:  
Ему предлагают взятку, говорят: ‘Мы вам заплатим двадцать тысяч и гарантируем полную 
конфиденциальность.’ А он в ответ: ‘Давайте лучше сорок и болтайте кому угодно’. Не 
человек – крупповская броня! 
– У нас в империи таких бронированных сколько угодно, - заметил Фандорин [...] (CHG 89) 
 
646 White, “Balabanov’s Bandits,” 85. 
647 Ibid, 88. 




Not only are both of Simon’s idols Russians by ethnicity, they are also employed in 
the very trades which White pointed out as the career branches for Putin’s ‘new 
bandits’. Sal’kovskii’s open embrace of bribery and defiance of the moral code that 
dictates shame for criminal behaviour mirrors the post-Soviet image of the proud 
bandit figure who revels in his own lawlessness. The association of this kind of 
behaviour with Krupp steel, the early 20th-century synonym for hardiness and 
defensibility, lends additional bellicosity to the image, framing aggressiveness and an 
open disregard for the law as desirable manifestations of strength. 
As Putin’s rise to power cemented a law and order mentality in post-Soviet Russia 
that produced a shift of criminality from street to government levels, the lawlessness 
of the 1990s grew into a criminal code of law in which banditry is portrayed as 
necessary for survival. Fandorin’s enamourment with Hasim results from the latter’s 
identical embrace of his own criminality, highlighting the appeal that this lack of 
duplicity carries for a post-Soviet readership: “У нас считается, что прикидываться 
приличным человеком хуже и стыднее, чем откровенно демонстрировать свое 
природное скотство” (CHG 296). However, Fandorin’s ultimate fate also functions 
as a warning about this kind of mind-set: as the detective succumbs to the lure of the 
oriental bandit image, considering criminality permissible and even charming within 
the context of Baku, he is ultimately made to pay the price of his life for this faulty 
double standard. Fandorin’s failure also carries catastrophic results for the 
international stage: on the one hand, Odysseus-Diatel is freed from prison and released 
back into the revolutionary void; on the other hand, Fandorin fails to fulfil his task as 
negotiator between the warring Empires in Europe, meaning that World War I will 
inevitably break out.  
Audacious as this play with history may seem at first glance, it is, essentially, just 
a continuation of Akunin’s exploration of his alternative national hero paradigm. As 
Akunin re-writes Russian history by inserting a ‘noble man’ and intelligent into the 
crucial political events of the late Imperial era, he challenges readers to reconsider the 
teleological fallacies often attached to historical events of global magnitude. Akunin’s 
previous commitment to preserving the historical timeline more or less dictates that he 
will not take the extreme liberty of saving the world from World War I; nevertheless, 
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Fandorin’s mission showcases the kind of leadership and moral integrity his character 
was meant to represent, and which simultaneously symbolises the alternative role 
Russia could have played on the international stage of the 20th century – had there been 
a different hero narrative and a real civic nation in place.  
Fandorin’s failure to carry out his task returns readers to a discussion about the 
survival chances of Akunin’s hero narrative. Ultimately, Fandorin is kept from his 
mission by a combination of two factors: his false assessment of Hasim and his 
subsequent attempt to remedy this failure by upholding the strictest of moral codes. 
Fandorin is lured into Odysseus’s trap by a fake letter from his ex-wife, in which she 
asks for his urgent help. Deciding that it is the moral thing not to ignore the missive, 
he sets out to rescue her – despite having no desire to actually help her. Odysseus 
comments on Fandorin’s predictability by mocking the success of his scheme: “Я не 
сомневался, что ты решишь напоследок поиграть в рыцаря. Люди твоей породы 
слишком предсказуемы” (CHG 359). As Odysseus leaves Hasim to finish the job, 
Fandorin is given the opportunity to avert his death sentence by telling a rather simple 
lie. However, Fandorin decides to remain true to his moral integrity – even at the cost 
of sacrificing security in Europe: 
Свернуть в сторону от зла, преградившего тебе путь, означает признать свою жизнь 
никчемной. Можно было бы сейчас наврать – казалось бы, чего проще? Но и этого 
Фандорин позволить себе не мог. (CHG 361) 
 
The decision to die rather than betray the ‘moralisches Gesetz in ihm’ makes Fandorin, 
on the one hand, a novelty among his contemporary literary fellows; on the other hand, 
it also turns him into an embodiment of the powerlessness of the individual noble mind 
within a sea of corruption.  
As a result, Akunin’s exploration of the ‘noble man’ theme simultaneously poses 
an exploration of the aspects of ideal leadership – Fandorin’s among it: 
[…] когда благородный муж становится правителем (что случалось в истории редко), все 
общество, следуя его примеру, тоже начинает тянуться вверх: улучшаются нравы, в моду 
входят благородство, бескорыстие, отвага. Когда же воцаряется сяожэнь, всеобщим 
законом становится унижение подданных […]  в эпоху правления сяожэней в обществе 
распространяются льстивость, вороватость и вероломство […] (CHG 153) 
 
Written in the context of the events of 2011/12, there is reason to assume that this 
quotation refers not just to the issue of late Imperial leadership, but also to the explicit 
case of Putin’s presidency. This suggestion is corroborated by a reply written by 
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Akunin to a LiveJournal user asking about the role distribution between Fandorin and 
Putin in 2012: 
Есть ли в Фандорине старшем, черты нацлидера?  
Нашего-то? Обижаете. Фандорин – 'благородный муж’, а Владимир Владимирович – 
архетипический сяожэнь.649 
 
As this juxtaposition creates a clear frontier between the two hero narratives provided 
from above and below, it also reactivates a discussion about the intelligentsia’s actual 
leadership potential. In the same year as The Black City was published, Akunin 
expounded on this question in one of his blog posts:  
Цзюнцзы должен оставаться ‘благородным мужем’ в любой ситуации, и ничего плохого 
с ним тогда не случится. Максимум - убьют. Но благородная гибель ‘благородного 
мужа’ - всегда тяжкое поражение Зла. […] Броня и арсенал благородного человека – 
этическое превосходство. Точка.650 
 
Yet Fandorin’s death nonetheless spells out the end of Akunin’s experimentation with 
the idea of the ‘noble intelligent’ – a verdict in part reversed by the subsequent 
resurrection of the detective, but overshadowed, nonetheless, by Fandorin’s complicity 
in his own ‘death’. Finishing a diary entry on the differences between ‘good’ and ‘evil’ 
men, Fandorin ends up chiding himself: 
Хотелось написать что-нибудь утешительное, чтобы выйти из самоедского 
расположения духа, а вместо этого получилось морализаторство с нарциссическим 
уклоном: все плохие, один я хороший, только очень уж к себе, бедняжке, строг. (CHG 
241)651  
 
This struggle between the ideal and the real is one of the defining moments of 
Fandorin’s character development in The Black City. It is also indicative of the post-
Soviet intelligentsia’s struggle for recognition, along with their supposed lack of 
initiative in carving out a new function for themselves in society. As Fandorin’s failure 
to take more decisive action earlier on precipitates his demise, he also becomes a living 
reminder of the fateful passivity of the intelligentsia he represents. Situated between a 
 
649 Boris Akunin, “Otvety na voprosy i Obrashchenie za pomoshch’iu,” Echo Moskvy (blog), January 
16, 2012, <http://echo.msk.ru/blog/b_akunin/849226-echo/> [accessed 20 December 2019] 
650 Boris Akunin, “Otvety na voprosy,” LiveJournal (blog), December 3, 2012, 
<http://borisakunin.livejournal.com/2012/12/03/> [accessed 20 December 2019] 
651 This quote, I believe, could also easily be read as a meta-textual commentary inserted by Akunin 
about what he was trying to achieve with the Fandorin series – along with the question of what he does 
not want the project to become. 
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useless (neo-)Empire and a ruthless Soviet elite in the making, the hope for a new kind 
of national hero is not altogether buried, but silenced – and, quite literally, put to sleep.  
 
3.3.3. Conclusion 
In 2012, Akunin stated in his LiveJournal blog that “[н]ачиная с ‘Театра’, я 
использую своего главного героя в качестве фронтовой разведки: как оно там, 
по ту сторону Времени? [my emphasis]”652. The turbulent political events of 2011 
and 2012 not only prompted Akunin to take on the role of scout on the frontlines of 
historical memory, but also to frame Russia’s nostalgia for Empire in the explicit 
semantic field of warfare. The result of this confrontation between politics and culture 
was The Black City – one of the darkest Fandorin novels in the overall series and a 
work in which the two competing narratives of Empire and Nation have drifted further 
apart than ever. 
In The Black City, the visible fiction of late Imperial rule as a period of 
international might and internal stability is thoroughly subverted. The city of Baku 
appears as a concentration of all of the Empire’s problems: ethno-religious, political, 
economic. Just as in previous instalments, the novel traces the source of these problems 
back to the Empire itself, focussing in particular on the issues of incompetent 
leadership, resource greed, and the synchronous escalation of violence and ethnic 
tensions in the Caucasus. The Russian Empire’s double vulnerability in the form of its 
railway network and its dependency on a steady flow of oil feature centrally in The 
Black City; yet despite the name of the novel, the fight for control over the oil market 
is only one piece of the overall puzzle – comparable to a symptom in an overall sick 
body politic.  
Throughout The Black City, Imperial rule in the Caucasus appears both criminal 
and inept, as epitomised in the character of Shubin. The Empire’s self-proclaimed role 
as a mediator in the region crumbles against the rich historiographical backdrop of 
Akunin’s novel, which features a record number of historical prototypes used in the 
creation of world-building background characters – among them General Lombadze-
Dumbadze, Governor Nakashidze, the head of the Tsar’s security Spiridonov 
(modelled after Aleksandr Spiridovich) and the minister Sal’kovskii, whose prototype 
 
652  Akunin, “Otvety na voprosy.” 
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was most likely Konstantin Skal’kovskii. All these representatives of Empire in the 
novel perform, first and foremost, the role of instigators of social and ethnic strife, 
posing as the main source of instability in the region.653  
By fuelling the ethnic tensions in the Caucasus, the representatives of Empire are 
also shown to speed up the breakdown of the existing social contract – which is 
inherently shaky to begin with. One of the foremost broken links between state and 
society in the novel is the local police, whose failure to inspire trust among the citizens 
eventually also contributes to Fandorin’s downfall: because the detective cannot send 
the police after his kidnapped wife, he begrudgingly sets out to the meeting place 
himself. The inadequacies of the Imperial system of colonial rule figuratively become 
a source of danger for its own citizens, and by extension the Empire as a whole.  
The ultimate embodiment of incompetent leadership in the novel is the Romanov 
family itself, which is notably absent: unlike in previous Fandorin novels, neither the 
figure of the Tsar nor any of his relatives appear in acting roles in The Black City. 
Instead, the process that was foreshadowed in The State Counsellor has come to full 
fruition: as the fight against authoritarianism has grown into a fight for ideas, it has 
also turned into a fight against the system in toto. The Tsar’s inconsequence is not just 
voiced by Odysseus-Diatel, but also by Fandorin himself, who – in stark contrast to 
his previous, youthfully passionate defender’s stance – utters the harsh criticism: 
“Лучше бы Господь обвенчал Россию с каким-нибудь другим ж-женихом, 
подаровитей” (CHG 10).  
Whereas the Empire fails to modernise itself in a way that would vouchsafe its 
survival, its opposition has evolved into a force that foreshadows the rise of the 
Bolsheviks. Having created a surveillance state to curb citizens’ liberties, the Empire’s 
ruling elite has also provided its opponents with the very mechanisms of surveillance 
that enable civic disobedience. Akunin successfully construes a portrayal of cross-
party unification under Bolshevik leadership that stresses the movement’s appeal as a 
force of change in the face of unrelenting authoritarianism, not failing to point out the 
concomitant lack of loyalty among various members of the government apparatus. 
 
653 Akunin deviated from the course of documented history in an uncharacteristically strong manner by 
killing off Spiridonov. The real Spiridovich survived the First World War and succeeded in emigrating 
in 1920, whereafter he became a historian. 
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The issue of successful leadership connects the narrative exploration of Empire 
and Nation in The Black City. Looking for authoritative voices to lead in the 
construction of a viable national identity narrative, Akunin returns to a discussion of 
Russia’s historic process of self-colonisation. Fandorin’s inability to overcome his 
Imperial mind-set plays a central part in this, as does his desire to perceive the Imperial 
periphery as an exotic Other. Indicative of an overall Imperial need to find self-
definition against a visibly distinct and clearly recognisable Other, the attempts of both 
Fandorin and his compatriots to fixate the ‘real East’ are, in essence, nothing but the 
desire to discover the nature of the ‘real Russia’. As Akunin relocates the estrangement 
of the ruling and educated classes and their concomitant feeling of being strangers unto 
themselves – to borrow Julia Kristeva’s words – to the literal periphery of Empire, he 
explores both Russia’s role as a colonising power and Fandorin’s internalisation of the 
Imperial gaze. Tellingly, all of Fandorin’s attempts to delineate Russia from the 
outside world lead to a collapse of the borders between self and Other, ending in 
Fandorin’s summary that “на Диком Востоке, как и на Диком Западе, человеческая 
жизнь, вероятно, стоит дешево” (CHG 47). Thus, the people of Empire are not so 
much divided by social class or ethnic origin as they are united in the shared experience 
of a denigrating disenfranchisement. 
Invoking a post-Soviet parallel, Akunin links the open disregard for lawfulness 
and morality in Imperial Russia to the growing post-2000 desire to refute and even 
punish the West. Throughout The Black City, Akunin constructs a cinematographic 
subplot surrounding Fandorin’s actress-turned-wife that runs parallel to the main 
events of the novel and serves as a nod to the wildly popular 1990s bandit motif in 
Russian cinema and culture. Problematising the internalisation of this bandit mind-set 
under the Putin regime, Akunin criticises the fact that Russian society – unlike the 
heroes in Balabanov’s famous bandit films – has not yet completed the journey from 
self-stylization to self-parody, but instead condones the institutionalisation of 
criminality within politics and society. In choosing this mode of portrayal, Akunin 
simultaneously turns the seemingly harmless world of Simon’s film-set into a 
surprisingly caustic perspective on post-Soviet escapism. Fandorin’s reactions to 
Simon’s irresponsible treatment of history are similarly scathing as his responses to 
his estranged wife: “Актриса, до кончиков ногтей. А значит, своего рода 
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инвалидка, не умеющая отличать игру от жизни […]” (CHG 246). In reacting 
negatively to transgressions of the border between playfulness and lawlessness, 
Akunin also speaks out for a more responsible use of cultural voices in the re-
imagining of history.  
As a result, Akunin not only makes a dismantling of nostalgia into a central 
concern of The Black City, but also stresses the role of art in shaping perceptions of 
reality. This discussion seems largely informed by the increased politicised distortion 
of culture in the post-Soviet space – yet Akunin’s criticism is also aimed at his 
perceived lack of public reaction to it: “можно жить в современном городе, где на 
каждом углу кричат газетчики, и не иметь ни малейшего представления о том, 
что происходит в мире” (CHG 355). Such an attitude was also expressed in Akunin’s 
social media posts from early 2012, where he pleaded with his readers: “Те из вас, 
кто не верит в референдумы; кто твердо уверен, что ‘в этой стране все 
бесполезно’; кто просто не интересуется политикой, пожалуйста, потерпите”654.  
Akunin’s desire to counteract the post-Soviet tendency towards nostalgic 
escapism finally also finds its expression in his elevation of the Chekhovian character 
type into a cornerstone of his new national hero narrative. As in the previous Fandorin 
novels discussed in this thesis, Akunin’s portrayal of the Imperial nation is construed 
along a careful interweaving of classical literary intertexts in The Black City. The two 
main cultural tendencies for affiliation are identified as the Chekhovian vs. the 
Dostoevskian world view: in Akunin’s reading, the first comprises an embrace of 
quasi-carnivalesque critique of authoritarianism and the cultivation of an 
individualised sense of responsibility, whereas the latter stands for a kowtowing to 
authority, a proliferation of moral masochism and a concomitant indulgence of 
nationalist isolationism, along with the devaluation of the individual freedom to choose 
to act morally – which is presented as an inherently faulty concept. While neither of 
these standpoints is treated as outright desirable or condemnable by Akunin, they are 
used as reference points on a gradient upon which Akunin’s protagonist clearly favours 
the Chekhovian end.  
 
654 Boris Akunin, “Kandidaty v voprosy na referendume,” LiveJournal (blog), May 31, 2012, 
<http://borisakunin.livejournal.com/2012/05/31/> [accessed 20 December 2019] 
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The routine doubling between protagonist and anti-hero, i.e. Fandorin and the 
character Odysseus-Diatel, is carried out within this same framework of juxtaposition 
and transplants The Black City’s discussion of the national hero motif onto the 
opposition between Chekhovian and Dostoevskian values. The comparison of the two 
characters as alternative national hero blueprints eventually zeroes in on the question 
of morality. Whereas Fandorin appears as the Chekhovian ‘noble man’ by upholding 
a non-violent stance of moral integrity, Diatel is willing and intent on bringing down 
the system with a bang – without taking responsibility for the consequences. By 
pursuing this course, both Diatel and his loyal henchman Hasim will eventually end 
up on the side of Russia’s national heroes, but they will be supporting a regime that is 
going to replace one system of oppression with another. Thus, Akunin provides an 
implicit warning about the mindless elevation of historical victories into benchmarks 
of national glory, and once again reveals the volatility of hero concepts in general.655  
Subsuming the principles of proactive intelligentsia leadership and inviolable 
moral integrity under his Chekhovian-inspired hero theme, Akunin lastly also 
questions the suitability of his protagonist for the role of ‘noble man’ and national 
leader. Fandorin attains a moral victory, but he loses the overall battle for change. 
Although he is resurrected in a subsequent and final novel, Fandorin’s fate provides a 
symptomatic interrogation point for the intelligentsia in both its Imperial and its post-
Soviet form: just like Fandorin, the temporarily vanquished intelligentsia of the 19th 
century reappeared as the voice of cultural reason at a later point in the 20th century. 
Just like him, it also let itself be vanquished amid a neo-Imperial consolidation of 
power, following another turn-of-the-century period of instability. The victory of 
reason is therefore neither pre-written nor a matter of course – and its authority is 
increasingly made into a subject of debate. 
  
 
655 Vishevsky noted this trend in the Fandorin series as early as 2001, when he commented on Akunin’s 
anti-heroes with the words: “Negative in the tenets of their genre, these literary characters turn out to 
be positive in the realm of history,” cf. Vishevsky, “Answers to Eternal Questions in Soft Covers,” 738. 
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4. Conclusion: The Empire That We (Never) Lost 
Болезнь всякой гнилой власти в том, что 
она вытесняет талантливых людей на 
обочину. (CHG 86) 
 
The past, in contemporary Russia, has turned 
into a kind of future perfect, or future 
imperfect (both are clear deviations from 
Russian grammar).656 
 
In 2017, Akunin gave an interview to Anastasia Edel, a Russian-born American writer 
and social historian. When asked about his relationship with Russia, he stated:  
I write my ‘letters’ to Russia—books. And I receive answers, via Facebook or comments on 
my blog. It’s hate mail, mostly. Like, Stop reviling our great Motherland, you bloody 
Russophobe. So, I guess, the separation is likely to continue for a while longer. [original 
emphasis]657 
 
From Russia’s most popular representative of crime fiction to the country’s literary 
enfant terrible: Akunin’s changed perception in the Russian public is indicative of a 
wider shift in the social and political make-up of the country, which hinges on 
questions of historical truth, cultural memory and the increasingly unstable border 
between fact and fiction. Delivering an insight that is both timely and thought-
provoking, the Fandorin project helped chronicle these changes from 1998 until 2018. 
Having started as a predominantly stylistic, playful experiment on the genre 
boundaries of detective fiction, the Fandorin series evolved into a multi-faceted 
investigation of post-Soviet Russia’s nostalgic re-orientation towards its past. By 
actively generating impulses to critically address the regnant simplification of the late 
Imperial era, along with the underlying crisis of national identity it represents, Akunin 
assumed a key role in tackling the repressive perversions of historical memory that 
currently define the post-Soviet Russian sphere of both politics and culture.  
The main objective of this thesis was to move beyond the existing, genre-based 
studies of Akunin’s work and embark on a detective quest of my own, analysing the 
Fandorin project as an anti-nostalgic pièce de résistance of alternative remembering 
for Empire within the wider post-Soviet nostalgia debate. This investigation was 
 
656 Boym, “From the Russian Soul to Post-Communist Nostalgia,” 152. 
657 Anastasia Edel, “A Top Russian Dissident on Why Putin’s Honeymoon with Trump Won’t Last,” 
Quartz, February 15, 2017, <http://qz.com/910971/boris-akunin-russian-dissident-explains-how-
democracy-died-under-putin-and-what-the-us-can-still-do-to-resist/> [accessed 17 December 2019] 
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guided by three underlying research questions: (1) Which elements of the Fandorin 
project make it a ‘new detective novel’ in the post-Soviet context, capable of critically 
addressing post-Soviet distortions of the past? (2) Which widespread nostalgic 
tendencies accompanied the creation of the Fandorin novels, and how did these shape 
the design of the project overall? (3) To what effect did Akunin use his ‘new detective 
novel’ to deconstruct the existing romanticised narrative for identification with 
Empire, whilst resuming the intelligentsia’s original nation-building mission through 
the provision of a future-oriented counter-narrative? 
 
(1) Akunin’s ‘new detective novel’ 
Akunin’s choice of historical detective fiction – a genre that is both popular and 
interactive at the same time – involved a broad readership in a critical problematisation 
of Russian history and updated crime fiction for a specific post-Soviet usability. 
Akunin’s intimate knowledge of the history and development of detective fiction in 
Russia and abroad enabled him to create a middle-brow format that utilises the genre’s 
long-standing function as a vehicle for socio-political critique, but which 
simultaneously honours its Russian literary roots. Unlike Western crime fiction, the 
Russian crime novel was a deeply subversive genre from the start, often eschewing 
legal solutions to crimes in favour of empathy for the criminal. Jumpstarted by the 
Great Reforms of 1864 and brought to life in Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment, 
Russian crime fiction produced a series of literary works and police memoirs over the 
course of the 19th century that frequently focussed on an incompetent police force, the 
Russian neschastnyi figure in society, and a deeply ambivalent attitude towards the 
terms zakon i spravedlivost’.  
As a result, the Russian crime novel consistently brought the instability of the 
Imperial system and its legal code to the fore – only losing its strongly subversive 
character towards the end of the 19th century, when Russian writers started looking 
westward in the search for individual detective heroes to emulate. Both the British 
Sherlock Holmes and the American detective prototypes Nick Carter and Nat 
Pinkerton were incorporated into Russian crime fiction, producing a plethora of action-
filled and entertaining detective stories. At the same time, the substitution of socio-
political critique for cheap effects and garish cover pages created a lack in originality 
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that Akunin, with the confidence of the postmodernist writer, belatedly aimed to fill. 
Akunin’s self-stylization as a literary anarchist and ‘evil man’ played an important part 
in the realisation of this project, as he posited himself as a writer who actively seeks 
to break established cultural paradigms and discover new answers to old problems –
providing historical insights that disturb, engage, and provoke all at the same time. 
In the Fandorin project, Akunin combined the socio-political critique of early 
Russian crime fiction and the literary style of the late Imperial period with the Russian 
reader’s 20th-century taste for action plots and foreign dandyism. The result is a 
commercially viable project that rids post-Soviet popular fiction of its negative 
connotations with pulp fiction, and which freely mixes Russian and international 
detective traditions into a new form altogether. The format of the postmodern detective 
novel was crucial to this journey of discovery, as it allowed Akunin to move away 
from easy answers and ready-made solutions and face the dilemma of Russia’s 
incomplete historical memory from multiple, contrasting perspectives. 
Consequently, three main aspects spell out the originality of Akunin’s ‘new 
detective novel’. First of all, Akunin applies the international crime fiction tendency 
of connecting a “a wider interrogation of society or of what constitutes criminality”658 
with the explicitly Russian problem of a post-Soviet identity crisis – thus positioning 
himself as a readily recognisable detective fiction writer of the 21st century who deals 
with more than just a simple whodunit-problem. As the first Russian writer to imbue 
the highly formulaic genre of crime fiction with this new function, Akunin 
acknowledges detective fiction’s reality-shaping power and its ability “to affirm and 
also to undermine all concepts of identity, be these at the level of nation, ethnicity, 
culture, or at the level of gender and genre”659. At the same time, the entirety of the 
Fandorin project also draws attention to the imperative role that narratives play in 
present-day perceptions of reality – both in a Russian context and on a global stage. 
This avenue for interpretation potentially opens up room for further studies on the role 
of crime fiction in a 21st-century post-truth world. 
 
658 Marieke Krajenbrink and Kate M. Quinn, “Introduction: Investigating Identities,” in Investigating 
Identities: Questions of Identity in Contemporary International Crime Fiction, eds. ibid. (Amsterdam, 
New York: Rodopi, 2009): 1-11, 1. 
659 Ibid, 1. 
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Second of all, the middle-brow format that Akunin created for his detective fiction 
project successfully bridged the gap between a post-Soviet taste for escapist fare and 
a need to tackle identitary concerns via a discussion of history. Akunin embraced the 
post-Soviet shift towards popular culture, but without losing sight of the tenets of 
critical postmodernism. By unapologetically espousing commercial reasoning and 
willingly engaging with various new types of media, Akunin actively linked his 
literary craft to the political events of his day and postmodernised several traditional 
aspects of the detective novel – the treatment of history among them. As Akunin chose 
to view history as a Moebius strip of mutual interaction between past and present, he 
tackled not just the issue of nostalgia in a way that set him apart from other writers of 
his time, but which also provided an appropriate visualisation of the instability of post-
Soviet reality. In Akunin’s reading, “the world is ruled by principles entirely different 
from those apparent at the surface level, leading ultimately to rejection of ideological 
master narratives and skepticism towards the logic of history per se”660. By revealing 
the parallels between the pre-Soviet past and the post-Soviet present, Akunin refused 
to provide a stable endpoint for his detective’s quest for truth – whilst also paying 
homage to the resilience and complexity of 19th-century intellectual thought and 
pointing out their gradient loss in the contemporary cultural sphere. 
Lastly, in taking a stance for a more courageous and demanding attitude towards 
nostalgia in post-Soviet Russia, Akunin also deviated from the widespread entrenching 
of oversimplified attitudes about the Russian past among the Russian intelligentsia. By 
positioning an intelligentsia member in the role of his main detective figure, Akunin 
reactivated the intelligentsia hero type in literature at a time when the intelligentsia 
was being proclaimed as dead. Thus, he expressed hope in the group’s ability to resume 
their historical nation-building mission, whilst also reviving the reading traditions of 
the late Imperial era – a time when “there was no simple opposition between literary 
intelligentsia and lower-class readers. By the 1880s, and even more so by the 1900s, 
[…] Russia was […] acquiring a ‘middlebrow’ fiction of its own”661. In reminding his 
readership of this heritage, Akunin attempted to reverse the emerging anti-intellectual 
tendencies in Russian culture and to fashion a ‘popular’ literature capable of uniting a 
 
660 Platt, “Historical Novel,” 80. 
661 Lovell, “Literature and Entertainment in Russia,” 20. 
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diverse Russian audience. By doing so, he also counterbalanced the widespread 
cynicism that had become a characteristic trait of the post-Soviet intellectual elite at 
this time, and which continues to pose a particular problem on the way to solving post-
Soviet Russia’s identity and nostalgia crisis. As a result, Akunin devised a hero not 
only capable of a critical engagement with the intelligentsia’s past, but also of a 
meaningful search for a usable identity narrative in the depths of Russian history. 
 
(2) Post-Soviet Russian Identity Crisis and Nostalgia 
As perestroika pushed Russia into a deep-seated identity crisis, the country developed 
multiple parallel processes for the mediation and commodification of nostalgia, which 
became one of the main operational acts of identification for the construction of a new 
national identity narrative in the post-Soviet era. In the early and mid-1990s, these 
processes were largely focussed on memories of childhood carefreeness and an earnest 
desire to mend the broken timeline of Russia’s past. Towards the end of the decade, 
the decline of the democratic experiment and Yeltsin’s failure to create 
“commemorative traditions to preserve positive memories of Russia’s founding 
moment or its adoption of a new constitution”662 began to erode the public willingness 
to critically reflect on the uncomfortable realities of the past. The regime change that 
occurred at the beginning of the 2000s further broke down the multipolarity of the 
existing discourse, harnessing its simplified remnants to a singularized narrative of 
past glorification instead.  
As images of stability, strength, and paternalistic authoritarianism gained in 
prescriptive prominence about both the Imperial and the Soviet past, they also started 
to impose the oppressive comfort of a sanitised national identity narrative of eternal 
value onto the Russian public. The Putin regime crafted a historical timeline that 
recovered Russia’s ‘lost’ periods from their protracted acts of silencing, whilst 
simultaneously mediating the idea of a prolonged crisis of the Russian state – thus 
effectively conquering the interpretative agency over four centuries of Russian history. 
Putin’s labelling of the disintegration of the Soviet Union as ‘the biggest geopolitical 
catastrophe of the century’ in 2005 officially elevated Empire back to a conceptual 
category for the public perception of the Russian past, framing the 1990s as a historical 
 
662 Smith, Mythmaking in the New Russia, 181. 
239 
 
aberration in need of reversal. As a result, official memory politics after 2000 
increasingly funnelled the disorganised 1990s trauma and nostalgia discourse into an 
official rhetoric that neatly fit under the umbrella of nostalgia for the super-status of 
Empire.  
The national scope and nationalist overtones of this historical narrative offered a 
welcome – and, in many ways, desirable – reprieve from the prevalent 1990s rhetoric 
of self-flagellation. However, it also forcibly boosted the development of a nostalgia 
culture that interpreted the term Empire to mean “not only that a country was powerful 
but also […] that it was in the forefront of progress”663. Subsequently, the Imperial 
past became an increasingly attractive resource for the extraction of ideological capital. 
In my reading, this also meant the re-emergence of Geoffrey Hosking’s historical 
theorem about Empire impeding the formation of a Nation: by giving official sanction 
to the reactionary sentiments that were already existent in Russian society in the late 
1990s, the Putin regime effectively suppressed its alternative voices, streamlined the 
public discourse on Russia’s past into a fairy tale about Russian exceptionalism and 
Imperial might, and undermined Yeltsin’s focus on openness, tolerance, and 
democracy – shambolic as it was. By doing so, it also weakened the development of a 
civil society and elevated the concerns of power over those of policy. 
In today’s Russia, cultural memory about the 19th century is predominantly limited 
to notions of geopolitical power and Imperial martyrdom, whereas the rich intellectual 
culture of thinkers, writers, and artists who carried a very different vision for the 
country is being silenced. Similarly, the Soviet era is commemorated, but largely in 
martial terms of warfare, an elevation of national suffering, and various forms of 
Stalinist adulation, not through official references to the dissident heritage or the 
countless victims of terror, war and the gulag years.664 As Noordenbos correctly 
pointed out, “Putin has never made equally decisive statements about the ‘catastrophe’ 
of Soviet executions and deportations, or its other crimes of repression and 
corruption”665 as he has about the loss of Empire.  
 
663 Dominic Lieven, “The Russian Empire and the Soviet Union as Imperial Polities,” Journal of 
Contemporary History 30 (1995) 4: 607-36, 607. 
664 One exception to this might have been Russia’s continued enamourment with the concept of the 
Russian people being the best read in the world, but I believe it is fair to presume that this ‘fact’ (if it 
ever was one) no longer applies to the post-Soviet book market and reading culture. 
665 Noordenbos, Post-Soviet Literature, 13. 
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The Fandorin project forms an important counterweight to this overall tendency, 
as it neither dismissively invalidates nor uncritically embraces the nostalgic impulses 
that came to dominate the post-Soviet Russian search for a national identity. Instead, 
it presents the ambivalent cultural world of the Imperial era as harbouring the key to a 
solution for the contemporary Russian identity crisis. Akunin corroborates his 
readership’s desire to uncover identity pillars worth emulating in the past, but rejects 
the simplified depictions of symbolically charged images of Empire in favour of an 
often uncomfortable investigation into the Russian past and its intelligentsia heritage. 
Empire, in the Fandorin project, is therefore not just a romanticised backdrop, but one 
of the main subjects of discovery and interrogation.  
I will now outline the main ways in which Akunin deconstructed the prevalent 
image of Empire in the Fandorin series. 
 
(3.1) The Deconstruction of Empire 
Throughout the Fandorin project, Empire appears as a character in its own right. The 
basic idea that “the criminal writes the secret story of his crime into everyday ‘reality’ 
in such a form that its text is partly hidden, partly distorted and misleading”666 is 
investigated on both a textual and an extratextual level in the Fandorin series: on the 
one hand, Akunin’s fictional, historical Empire acts as the main culprit behind the 
crimes committed in the Fandorin series. This means that the glorifying distortion of 
historical memory committed by the present state likewise constitutes a criminal act – 
a crime that may differ from previous instances of the silencing of history, but which 
nonetheless proves highly problematic. On the other hand, Akunin’s role as ‘villain’ 
makes it possible for him to expose these crimes in the traditional role of the subversive 
intelligentsia writer, and to break his analysis of Empire’s weaknesses down into 
subject blocks that carry a distinct recognisability for the post-Soviet reader.  
My analysis of Akunin’s process of writing Empire has revealed three such 
subjects blocks along which the author deconstructs the official nostalgic narrative 
about Imperial Russia as a stable, lawful, and imitable state. The three subject blocks, 
as explored in the three novels I discussed, are: (1) periphery vs centre, (2), East vs 
West and (3) leadership vs society. Over the course of the Fandorin project, Akunin’s 
 
666 Hühn, “The Detective as Reader,” 454. 
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treatment of these issues substantially lost in playfulness, substituting his characteristic 
tongue-in-cheek irony with an increasingly more acerbic and explicit commentary on 
present-day nostalgic politics.  
 
3.1.1 Periphery vs Centre 
Across the Fandorin project, Akunin’s exploration of the Imperial heartland and its 
border regions draws attention to the sheer scope of the Empire under discussion. 
Instead of equating size with strength, Akunin rephrases Russia’s Imperial borders into 
a source for its present-day identitary confusion – thus elevating the categories of 
heartland and periphery into subjects for a geopolitical as well as a psychological 
reflection.  
In all of the Fandorin novels discussed, the idea of a clearly fixable, distinctly 
Russian heartland of Empire is upended through repeated portrayals of the supposedly 
Other that is at the same time also the own. The Death of Achilles discusses 
architectural landmarks from the Imperial era, but simultaneously reveals the neo-
Imperial inauthenticity and historical hollowness that characterise the resurrection of 
this pseudo-Imperial glory. The choice of a Chechen antagonist, hired by the Kremlin 
to assassinate a national hero, turns the classical topos of the infiltrated heartland 
upside down, portraying Moscow as an uncontrollable, peripheral force instead.  
This process continues in The State Counsellor, where the revolutionary deeds of 
Grin, the peripheral Jewish Other, pale in comparison to the treason committed by 
Pozharsky – the heir to Russia’s historical ‘Saviour of the Motherland’, whose statue 
adorns the Kremlin and acts as a literal embodiment of Empire within the Imperial 
heartland. The discussion of the periphery is further lifted out of its geopolitical context 
as the Kremlin and its subordinate government structures are portrayed as the main 
seats of liminality and transgression – subverting Moscow’s representative function of 
Imperial wholeness and strength in the process.  
In The Black City, the actual geographical periphery is explored on location in the 
Caucasus – yet Baku, too, reveals Russia’s unresolved issues of the internal Orient as 
posing a much greater danger for the Empire’s survival than the revolutionary activity 
along its physical borders. As representatives of the heartland infiltrate the Empire’s 
border regions for economic and political gain, the traditional image of “the Caucasus 
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and its peoples as that alien setting against which Russian characters discover and 
define themselves”667 is turned upon its head. Akunin rejects established portrayals of 
the Caucasus as “something of a representation of hell and of the transgressive nature 
of life on this edge of the empire”668 and relocates the periphery’s supposedly hellish 
aspects to the centre of Imperial rule instead. In doing so, he creates expressions of 
Russian self-definition that skilfully reveal Russia’s long-standing inferiority complex 
as the main source behind these transgressions. 
Akunin consistently collapses the distinction between self and Other in situations 
that carry relevance for both Imperial and post-Soviet Russia, thus applying the tenets 
of a postmodern historical understanding to present Russia’s contemporary instability 
as an heirloom of Empire, not a post-1991 import from the West. The Death of Achilles 
features references to Luzhkov’s neo-Imperial building projects and the Chechen Wars 
of the 1990s, which is a topic that also resurfaces in the terrorist setting of The State 
Counsellor. The latter novel additionally deals with the problem of Anti-Semitism in 
Russia, whereas The Black City explores the significance of oil for Russia’s long-
standing and troubling presence in the Caucasus.  
In all these explorations, Akunin highlights the continued topicality of what 
Alexander Etkind termed Russia’s process of internal colonisation for a contemporary 
Russian readership. As the exploration of this topic primarily occurs through Fandorin 
and his character doubles, Akunin reverts to one of self-colonisation’s main literary 
expressions: “The circular character of [doubles] matches the reflective character of 
self-colonization, which is striving to define its Other and ends up with doubles of the 
Self”669. However, this doubling process also extends to a more abstract level: as 
Russia’s internal colonisation process is relayed as a late Imperial problem, it is also 
shown to have found its double in the Russian present.  
In summary, I suggest that Akunin’s consistent linkage of periphery and heartland 
to the topic of Russia’s internal colonisation process conveys one of the central 
messages of the Fandorin project. By expanding his portrayal of the periphery into a 
cultural construct that spans all of Empire, Akunin likewise turns periphery and 
heartland into interchangeable categories that lose their status as geopolitical givens. 
 
667 Clowes, Russia on the Edge, 141. 
668 Ibid, 129.  
669 Etkind, Internal Colonization, 247. 
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The Imperial heartland is characterised by a peripheral self-understanding of its 
inhabitants, who in turn carry this internal peripherality to the Empire’s borders in a 
futile search for lines of cultural demarcation.  
In thus highlighting the hollowness of a neo-Imperial re-imagining of Russia as a 
to-be-born-again Empire, Akunin flags up the necessity of recanting Russia’s 
sonderweg fantasies and invented narratives about a ‘geopolitical catastrophe’. 
Instead, he highlights the need to focus on the challenges posed by Russia’s lingering 
problem of the internal periphery. The failure to comprehend this problem is ultimately 
elevated into an existential threat when Fandorin’s own struggles to overcome his 
colonial gaze lead to his ‘death’ at the end of The Black City – marking him as a 
Russian, vanquished by the very periphery he fails to understand. 
 
3.1.2 East vs West 
Akunin’s deconstruction of the centre/periphery-binary also aligns with his discussion 
of the Russian Empire’s cultural vacillation between East and West. In the Fandorin 
novels, both the European West and the Asian East appear as equal stimuli for the 
development of Russia, neither of which is portrayed as inherently detrimental or 
uniformly beneficial. Just as the Russian periphery is shown to be an invisible and 
fluid conceptual border, so is Russia’s alignment across cultural spaces shown to be 
malleable and, in a sense, unstable. 
The ambivalent treatment of Asia throughout the Fandorin series is a particularly 
important feature in the overall project, as it provides an innovative counterweight to 
the 1990s infatuation with the West and the post-2000 rise of neo-Eurasian doctrines. 
Akunin portrays Russian views about Asia as encapsulating parallel ideas about 
despotic backwardness and enchanted exoticism; likewise, the West appears as both a 
seat of enlightened civilisation and a source of unsettling liberalism. Instead of 
disproving either narrative, Akunin corroborates both sides of each – exposing, in the 
process, the multi-faceted othering processes that went into the construction of the 
Russian sense of self over the course of the centuries.  
As a result, I concur with Baraban’s view that “Akunin’s heroes see the 
advantages and drawbacks of both the West and Russia, de-idealizing, though not 
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denigrating, and offering a more appreciative view of both”670. In this adaptable 
attitude, Akunin in many ways resembles the approach of Vladimir Sorokin, whose 
literary work also dealt with the topics of Empire, Asia, and the intelligentsia over the 
course of the 1990s and 2000s. According to Tatiana Filimonova, Sorokin not only 
moved from a predominantly postmodernist play with conventions towards an 
increasingly more noticeable socio-political agenda in his work, but also “[exposed] a 
paradoxical view of China […] as a metaphorical extension of self and an increasingly 
powerful ‘Other’”671. In line with such alternative postmodern representations of the 
East, the Fandorin project propagates the peaceful co-existence, not the mutual 
exclusivity, of Western and Asian influences on both the Russian past and its present.  
Throughout the Fandorin project, Akunin’s overt criticism of stereotypical 
national pigeon-holing supports this reading. The casting of ethnic minorities in the 
role of villains, such as the Jewish Grin in The State Counsellor and the Caucasian 
Muslim Achimas in The Death of Achilles, elicits historical and contemporary 
stereotypes about groups facing discrimination in post-Soviet Russia, only to 
subsequently re-contextualise the associated narratives of threat as outgrowths of 
Empire. In The Black City, Akunin notably omits the creation of an ethnic Other as the 
main antagonist altogether, focussing instead on the destabilising role that Russians 
have historically played for others and themselves. By portraying the Imperial ruling 
elite as providing a breeding ground for corruption and an all-encompassing homo 
homini lupus est mentality, Akunin also reveals how the late Imperial mind-set has 
created its own anti-heroes – embodiments and scourges of ‘Mother Russia’ alike.  
Lastly, Akunin increasingly problematises the Russian exploitation of stereotypes 
about East and West in the context of lawlessness. As he condemns the pervasive 
bandit mentality that has captured post-Soviet Russian culture, Akunin compares 
instances of power abuse in the Russian Empire to the selective democratisation 
processes that have shaped the post-Soviet reality – drawing an equally damning 
picture about both eras as a result. Consequently, the detective journey that Akunin 
invites his readership on ultimately reveals the crime story of their own, present-day 
lives. As Akunin’s use of national stereotypes keeps circling back to the Russian 
 
670 Baraban, “A Country Resembling Russia,” 409. 
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complicity in the central criminal cases of the novels, he also produces a counter-
narrative to the contemporary infatuation with the image of the lawless criminal as the 
embodiment of Russia’s ‘special path’. The overall impression this produces is doubt 
about the benefits of an open embrace of criminality, which ultimately only preserves 
the power of Empire at the cost of internal stability for the nation. As Empire becomes 
the main source of criminal activity in the Fandorin project, the Imperial discourse is 
likewise shown to offer a highly undesirable and unstable identity narrative to fall back 
on in the present day. 
 
3.1.3 Leadership vs Society 
The fragmentation of late Imperial society and the associated instability of Empire are 
lastly also revealed through Akunin’s discussion of the issue of ideal leadership. In all 
the novels analysed in this thesis, problems born of internal strife in the late Imperial 
state apparatus are linked to a breakdown of the existing social contract. Again, the 
ultimate cause of this internal strife is the Empire itself, which artificially inflates the 
rivalry among its various police and law enforcement institutions in order to secure the 
lasting power of the Tsar.  
The weakness of official zakon is reflected in the fragility of spravedlivost’ in 
Imperial society. Readers encounter this problem throughout the Fandorin series in the 
form of a panoptical surveillance society that enacts a similar degree of repressive 
violence on members of the public as it does on representatives of the state. In The 
Death of Achilles and The State Counsellor, this problem is largely rendered obvious 
through the surveillance of Fandorin by his higher-ups and the descriptions of a 
growing public distrust in the police; in The Black City, this latter process reaches a 
climax, as the Russian Empire’s colonial mismanagement creates a situation where 
considerations of power completely overrule those of policy. As a result, Hosking’s 
theory comes back to life and acerbates Baku’s potential as a political hotbed, 
hastening the fall of the ‘Imperial elephant’.  
The relevance of the topic of Imperial misrule and incompetent leadership for a 
post-Soviet readership was also addressed by Akunin. Throughout the Fandorin series, 
readers encounter a number of characters who are modelled after contemporary 
prototypes – a process that extends to figures from politics, economy and society. 
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Thus, in The Death of Achilles, the first face of government and Empire that Fandorin 
encounters is Governor General Dolgorukoi, whose megalomaniacal attempts at 
resurrecting past glory mirror Mayor Luzhkov’s 1990s grand designs for Moscow. In 
The State Counsellor and subsequent novels, Akunin’s representatives of Empire 
become increasingly more evocative of general paternal father figures; Fandorin’s own 
susceptibility and child-like trust in figures of Russian authority is turned into an 
emblematic symbol of the wider issue of Russia’s ‘Tsar-father’ mind-set, which 
continues to inform post-Soviet attitudes towards political leadership. The fact that the 
Romanovs are first presented as untrustworthy, then rendered altogether superfluous 
shows the development of Akunin’s critique of authoritarian leadership, along with his 
gradual doubts about the principle of successful Russian leadership in toto. 
 
 (3.2) The Reconstruction of Nation 
Within the context of cultural responses to Russia’s post-Soviet identity crisis, it is 
important to point out that Akunin did not only dismantle the dominant narrative about 
Empire. While the majority of literary works from the 1990s followed such a singularly 
destructive, chernukha-inspired approach to exploring Russia’s issues with itself – 
followed by the post-2000 trend to explore increasingly simplified narratives of self-
glorification that eschewed self-critique altogether – the Fandorin project 
simultaneously dissected established truths and provided a counternarrative of future-
oriented self-critique, which was not just aimed at the state, but also at the post-Soviet 
intelligentsia and Akunin’s entire middle-brow readership. As Akunin engaged the 
public in an open discussion of Russian national history, he attempted to promote 
society-wide ideals suited to the task of creating a functioning model of civic 
citizenship. He also pursued the formation of a more variegated and – by virtue of 
being so – more inclusive sense of national identity. 
Akunin’s portrayal of 19th-century literary and cultural conventions followed two 
main trajectories: (1) a prolific use of intertextual sources as a means to test the 
applicability of Russia’s existing national hero paradigms to the post-Soviet national 
identity crisis, accompanied by the evolution of Akunin’s own hero ideal in the 
character of Fandorin, and (2) a problematisation of the fragile border between art and 
artificiality, which carries topical applicability for the post-Soviet cultural and political 
247 
 
space and which created the Fandorin project’s meta-textual detective quest to uncover 
the complicity of Russia’s cultural elite in facilitating a restorative nostalgic turn in 
politics.  
 
3.2.1 Intertextuality and National Hero Narratives  
Akunin’s use of intertextuality is guided by his desire to critically illuminate Russia’s 
19th-century intelligentsia heritage and to question the ways this legacy continues to 
influence post-Soviet Russian cultural thought. Instead of invoking literary history to 
instil a sense of restorative nostalgia among his readers, Akunin looks to Russia’s 
literary past in an attempt to dispel the halo that has been constructed around its cultural 
ancestry.  
Although the original impetus for this reappraisal of cultural authority came from 
Akunin’s self-proclaimed role as a ‘literary anarchist’ – mixing the popular with the 
intellectual as a way of creating a ‘new detective novel’ – the later Fandorin novels 
suggest a much more purposeful counteraction of the nostalgic misappropriation of 
literary voices from the past. Thus, a large number of Akunin’s intertextual references 
in The State Counsellor and The Black City are not aimed at the corresponding source 
texts per se (although Akunin would doubtlessly be in favour of a careful re-reading 
of them), but at the culture of critical thought they symbolise, and which he considers 
the crucial – possibly the only, apart from the elegance of style – reference point for a 
nostalgic remembering of the 19th century. 
As an advocate of a civic citizenship approach to building a Russian nation, 
Akunin unites quintessentially moral intelligentsia ideals with the notions of political 
activism and patriotism. His protagonist Fandorin fulfils the role of detective not just 
in order to detect the fractured lines of late Imperial political life, but to simultaneously 
uncover elements in Russian history and culture that would help guide the Russian 
public on the way to a stable future. As part of this detective quest, Akunin returns a 
range of 19th-century classical texts to his readership’s attention, presenting and 
dissecting various literary hero narratives amidst his search for a new hero ideal.  
As the Fandorin series progresses, this discussion becomes both more streamlined 
and more self-referential. Whereas The Death of Achilles saw a somewhat haphazard 
de-throning of Pushkin from his (quite literal) throne, the resurrection of Lermontov 
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and the deromanticisation of the actual military hero Sobolev, the novel’s antagonist 
Achimas did not recall any particularly overt literary prototypes. In contrast, The State 
Counsellor’s Pozharsky and Grin followed clear literary blueprints, fulfilling the roles 
of literary scribe of fate and positive hero, respectively. Grin’s attempt to fashion 
himself into a new kind of bogatyr in the positive hero tradition of the late Imperial 
and early Soviet era –  mixing influences from Lermontov, Nekrasov, Chernyshevsky 
and Ostrovsky into an intertextual Frankenstein’s monster –  ultimately revealed the 
unsuitability of this national hero narrative for the post-Soviet present, as it failed to 
provide a forward-looking, constructive reimagining of Russia’s future and propagated 
a destructive patriotism reminiscent of post-Soviet patriotic spectacles instead. In The 
Black City, Akunin limited his intertextual forays to a concise confrontation of the 
Dostoevskian and Chekhovian literary heritage, which eventually zeroed in on the 
question of individual morality. By choosing to elevate Chekhov into his protagonist’s 
literary ideal, Akunin also lifted Fandorin from the contextual sidelines of earlier 
instalments and moved him into the explicit focus of his alternative national hero 
paradigm.  
Over the course of the Fandorin project, this national hero narrative underwent 
several transformations – all of which occurred in response to changes in the post-
Soviet political landscape and the intelligentsia’s concomitant failure to address them. 
The pronounced optimism Akunin first embraced in the design of his detective hero in 
the late 1990s speaks to the generally open cultural sphere at the time, but the lustre of 
Akunin’s idea of imbuing an enlightened patriot with the active willingness to 
cooperate with the state waned soon after its inception. Mere months before Putin’s 
official rise to power and only about one and a half years after the start of the Fandorin 
series, Akunin’s hero construction underwent a major re-alignment, resulting in 
Fandorin’s exit from state service in The State Counsellor and the burying of Akunin’s 
first version for an alternative national hero paradigm. 
Because of this timeline, Aron’s enthusiastic 2004 proclamation that Fandorin is 
“nothing short of an existential breakthrough – an alternative to the silent opposition 
to the regime and alienation from state-produced resignation, dour cynicism, sullen 
submission and shoddy work characteristic of the intelligentsia’s way of life”672 lacks 
 
672 Aron, “A Champion for the Bourgeoisie,” 154. 
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the textual clout to be fully convincing. While Aron correctly identified a change in 
Akunin’s national hero design, which thenceforth placed moral self-responsibility over 
a duty to the state, he failed to address the fact that this was not only a compromise 
and deviation from the original project idea, but that it highlighted the apparent 
impossibility of a softening of the confrontational frontier between state and nation in 
contemporary Russia. Although Fandorin acted as a stalwart defender of moral 
integrity and self-improvement, his split from the state apparatus simultaneously 
incapacitated him from contributing to any timely changes within the country he was 
trying to (pre)serve.  
At the same time as Akunin’s doubts about the validity of his national hero 
narrative grew, Fandorin was also increasingly turned into an object of discovery 
himself. It is true that “[a]s if heeding Vekhi’s call, Fandorin’s first priority [was] not 
to change Russia, but to change himself - or rather to change Russia by changing 
himself and helping others around him to change as well”673 – at least from The State 
Counsellor onward. As the official ruling elite of Empire and its revolutionary enemies 
were grouped on one side of a moral abyss, Fandorin occupied its opposite side. The 
problem I see with Aron’s verdict, however, is that over the course of the Fandorin 
project, Fandorin remains alone on his side of the chasm: although his notion of 
bettering Russia by bettering himself reads like a textbook embodiment of civic 
citizenship, Akunin’s faith in the success of this approach ultimately faltered, 
culminating in an overall sense of resignation and the death of his protagonist. 
In many ways, this makes Akunin similar to Chekhov, the author he invokes in 
the development of Fandorin’s stance of moral self-dependence and the principle of 
the ‘noble man’. In Akunin’s reading, Chekhov is elevated to the role of intellectual 
godfather to the flatlining post-Soviet intelligentsia: convinced of the basic value of 
morality as an individual choice, he offered a workable and authentic embodiment of 
the multifaceted national identity of the historical Russian Empire. Fandorin’s stance 
of inviolable moral integrity not only transported these Chekhovian values to the post-
Soviet time, but also made him an innovative protagonist for a contemporary 
readership: as the identitary lostness that produced detrimental forms of self-
attribution and othering during Imperial times returned to do so in post-Soviet Russian 
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society, Fandorin’s stalwart views mirrored the attitude of the Russian intelligentsia 
just before the 1917 revolution and offered a workable model for its internal 
revivification. 
Yet as the development of the Fandorin project coincided with the consolidation 
of the Putin regime, Akunin’s search for a sustainable intelligentsia mind-set of 
proactive morality faced the identical problem of a consolidation of reactionary powers 
in politics and society. This process reached its zenith during the 2011/12 protest 
movement when Akunin participated in the call for greater democratic freedoms and 
an end to Putinism. While doing so, he mirrored Chekhov’s focus on non-violent, 
socially responsible forms of change. Chekhov’s categorical rejection of violence 
“made it impossible for him to accept the revolution which he felt was about to break 
out”674 – and similarly, in December 2014, Akunin chose the anniversary of his 
involvement in the protest movement to reflect on its outcomes, outlining once again 
his initial hopes for a peaceful opposition movement that could have brought about a 
democratic turn and toppled the government without the use of bloodshed or violence.  
However, while looking back at these previously held convictions, Akunin also 
arrived at the disheartening conclusion that his optimism was misfounded from the 
start. Making use of the train imagery that is synonymous with discussions of Russia’s 
fate as a state, Akunin outlined three possible future stops in 2014: the Lubianka, i.e. 
a complete devolution into a totalitarian police state, Biriulevo – synonymous with a 
descent into criminality and lawlessness – and the self-explanatory Revolution Square: 
Я верил в то, во что верить не следовало. Я принимал желаемое за действительное. А белые 
ленточки хороши только на свадьбе… […] Двери, собственно, уже закрылись. 
Остается лишь гадать, какой будет следующая остановка. Там развилка из трех станций, 
и  поезд может повернуть на любую. Станции называются ‘Лубянка’, ‘Бирюлево’ и 
‘Площадь революции’. С моей точки зрения, это как выбирать между четвертованием, 
сожжением на костре и расстрелом. При таком выборе я, разумеется, за расстрел.675 
 
Akunin’s sense of resignation in response to the failed protest movement and the 
overall development over the course of the 2000s recalls the failure of Chekhov’s own 
attempts at changing the Imperial narrative from within. Akunin’s increased 
preoccupation with the Chekhovian mind-set towards the latter half of the Fandorin 
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project adequately demonstrates his attempts to fortify his national hero paradigm 
against the growing conviction of an inescapable historic parallel between his own era 
and Chekhov’s. Once again, Filimonova issued a similar summary of Sorokin’s oeuvre 
when she noted a complete absence of “hope for Russia’s spiritual salvation”676 in his 
work following the millennial turn.  
Having first highlighted the underlying ambivalence of previous Russian national 
hero narratives and the inherent volatility of hero concepts in general, Akunin was 
ultimately forced to concede the ephemerality of his own narrative. As exile becomes 
the only refuge for Akunin’s hero, Fandorin embodies the intelligentsia’s repeated 
failure to oppose the regime in a constructive, proactive way. This problem not only 
pertains to the pre-revolutionary intelligentsia, but also to the late Soviet period, during 
which the intelligentsia “repositioned itself as the moral elite. Articulating a promise 
of morality in an immoral society became its main function”677. Writing from the 
vantage point of 2020, it appears that another period of potential self-renewal within 
the intelligentsia has passed – once again without producing any of the desired 
changes.  
To all appearances, Akunin has joined the chorus of disillusioned voices about the 
intelligentsia’s future. In 2016, he published a collection of short stories titled 
Unchekhovian Intelligentsia (Нечеховская интеллигенция), based on historical sujets 
that Akunin had previously explored in his LiveJournal posts. In 2018, the Fandorin 
project came to a close. In a commemorative article, the literary critic Galina 
Iuzefovich summarised Fandorin’s unique role in post-Soviet literature and called him 
“единственным настоящим героем, которого за 25 лет своего существования 
сумела породить постсоветская литература”678. However, Iuzefovich also noted the 
dwindling potential for imitation that this new hero model possesses in the changed 
circumstances of post-Soviet Russian politics:  
Из героя, чье сердце билось в унисон с сердцами читателей, он, по сути дела, превратился 
в реликт прежней эпохи — ностальгический, воплотивший в себе наши собственные 
идеалы и мечты, и потому сегодня вызывающий не столько любовь, сколько жалость 
и неловкость — о господи, какими же глупыми, смешными и наивными мы были каких-то 
 
676 Filimonova, “Chinese Russia,” 239. 
677 Serguei Oushakine, “Introduction. Whither the Intelligentsia: The End of the Moral Elite in Eastern 
Europe,” Studies in East European Thought 61, no. 4 (2009): 243-48, 245. 
678 Galina Iuzefovich, “Akunin zakonchil posledniuiu knigu o Fandorine,” Meduza.io, October 10, 
2017, <http://meduza.io/feature/2017/10/10/akunin-zakonchil-poslednyuyu-knigu-o-fandorine> 
[accessed 21 December 2019] 
252 
 
20 лет назад. […] мы все, выросшие с этим героем, некогда очарованные им, разделявшие 
с ним его иллюзии и несбыточные надежды, должны присутствовать при этом прощании.679 
Invented in order to combat nostalgia, Akunin’s hero has become an object of nostalgia 
himself – nostalgia for the optimistic, courageous and critically elegant self-reflectivity 
of Russia’s cultural climate in the 1990s. 
 
3.2.2 Art vs. Theatricality 
Finally, Akunin’s loss of playfulness in treating the national hero theme in the 
Fandorin series also went hand in hand with an increased focus on the theatricality of 
post-Soviet politics and a problematisation of the question about recommendable 
limits for artistic escapism. More than any other discussion point in the series, this 
question helps to illuminate the post-Soviet context for Akunin’s decision to proclaim 
his self-invented national hero paradigm (almost) dead – whilst also highlighting his 
condemnation of the post-Soviet intelligentsia’s complicity in this process. 
Akunin began discussing the problematic relationship between authorial activity 
and a re-writing of reality within two years of starting the Fandorin project. His early 
treatment of the theme was characterised by a generous degree of playfulness, leading 
the characters in The Death of Achilles to rail against their pre-written fates in much 
the same vein as Lermontov’s Pechorin did – by asking general questions about human 
self-determinacy, instead of launching a concrete attack on the blurry boundaries 
between lived reality and political spectacle. In contrast, The State Counsellor featured 
Pozharsky’s explicit wish to impose his narrative of Russian exceptionalism onto the 
Russian body politic – producing the impression that life in the Russian Empire is a 
controlled spectacle, orchestrated according to the laws of deceit and deception that 
are instituted from above. In The Black City, Akunin made the link between post-
Soviet politics and the production of criminal simulacra even more explicit by 
introducing the cinematographic world of Simon’s film-set – creating a constant clash 
between political investigations and theatrical asides of seemingly superfluous 
randomness. 
As the Fandorin novels increasingly questioned the permissible limits of escapist 





fiction in the post-Soviet Russian space – practising self-critique as much as a critique 
of the intelligentsia and Russian society as a whole. In doing so, Akunin practised a 
characteristic feat of foresight and anticipated Lipovetsky’s 2018 warning about 
performance becoming “the Achilles heel of contemporary Russian politics”680 by 
more than a decade. At the same time, Akunin went one step further in the Fandorin 
project and problematised the conflict of performance superseding reality as the 
Achilles heel of contemporary Russian culture in general.  
Ultimately, the Fandorin project made it clear that artificiality can only become 
an Achilles heel if left unchallenged by the public. In many ways, Yurchak’s definition 
of Soviet stiob as a mixed stance of irony, cynicism, and passivity that affected all 
spheres of daily life still seems to affect large swathes of Russian culture: 
By refusing the boundary between reality and performance, seriousness and humor, support and 
opposition, sense and nonsense, bare life and political life, life and death, this humor imitated the 
performative shift of authoritative discourse and all the concomitant paradoxes and discontinuities 
that resulted from it in the everyday.681 
 
As Fandorin’s growing adherence to late Imperial thought patterns in the later 
Fandorin novels shows, Akunin is aware of the post-Soviet intelligentsia’s problematic 
passivity. He framed this not only as a legacy of Soviet times, but traced its roots back 
to late Imperial thinking – highlighting the need to question and reform the entire 
intelligentsia tradition in order to secure its survival.  
In the end, Akunin’s Fandorin project – aimed at providing a solution to Russia’s 
post-Soviet identity crisis, counteracting the nostalgic romanticisation of Russia’s past, 
and creating a new national hero paradigm situated at the border between intelligentsia 
and civic-minded intellectualism – failed and succeeded at the same time. Just as the 
late 19th-century intelligentsia effort to create a nationwide national identity offer had 
its internal flaws and suffered from an overly ambitious scope, so did Akunin’s project. 
The Fandorin series aimed high and was disenchanted by reality; yet Akunin’s 
initiative nonetheless symbolizes literature’s importance in the formulation and 
formation of national identity narratives – the resulting plurality of which is a boon, 
not a bane. Akunin’s significance as a writer of post-Soviet historical detective fiction 
lies precisely in the provision of such historical mind-games as presented in the 
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Fandorin project, which contribute to the safekeeping of pages of Russian cultural 
history that otherwise risk being consigned to oblivion. In confronting his readers with 
answers to unasked questions, Akunin challenged them to continue the detective play 
at would-have-been history that he initiated and to mend the broken story thread that 
a resurrection of Empire at the cost of integrity produces. 
Going forward, Akunin’s innovative use of the detective genre to defuse the 
increasingly explosive border between fact and fiction can hopefully act as a case study 
for popular literature’s unique potential to verbalise and tackle problems of a 
transcultural relevance across the global stage. Akunin’s pioneering role in the 
discussion of convoluted identity issues through popular culture has not lost in 
topicality since his emergence on the post-Soviet book market, and is beginning to 
create echoes in the work of younger writers from Eastern Europe, too – such as 
Ziemowit Szczerek, whose semi-journalistic gonzo deconstruction of Ukrainian and 
Polish identities Mordor Will Come and Eat Us (Przyjdzie Mordor i nas zje, czyli tajna 
historia Słowian, 2013) features a nod at Akunin’s hero, describing Russian police 
cadets in a telenovela as “innocent and filled with noble ideals like Erast Petrovich 
Fandorin”682. 
An equally timely takeaway from this analysis of the Fandorin project is the need 
for further literary investigations into the incomplete task of de-Sovietising Russia’s 
cultural sphere, which will ideally feature an analysis of the post-Soviet cultural 
cynicism trap amid a larger pool of intelligentsia voices. A comparison of Akunin’s 
oeuvre to that of other critically postmodern writers such as Sorokin or Pelevin would 
be just as compelling as a look at the further development of historical fiction in 
Russia, for instance in the work of Sergei Lebedev. Lastly, given Akunin’s prolific 
activity in genres other than detective fiction over recent years, a book-length analysis 
of his overall role in Russian contemporary literature that would take into account his 
move towards historiography and high-brow fiction, and which would contextualise 
this evolution against the backdrop of the Fandorin project, would be a highly 
rewarding endeavour. 
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